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ABSTRACT 
The following pages are devoted to Members of Parliament 
- 
Labourites, Liberals, Nationals, Independents 
- 
who expressed dissent 
at the National Government's handling of foreign and defence affairs. 
Each of these groups was studied separately, but care was taken to 
view the Opposition in toto, so that similarities of view or approach 
were ascertained. Any efforts made to effect a united opposition 
were traced, as were the inter-party movements that originated in 
these years. Finally, research was undertaken to discover what 
factors 
- 
sociological, economic, electoral - differentiated dissidents 
from loyalists in the governing coalition or rival factions within 
the Opposition Parties. 
It appeared that the Government's opponents, despite divergencies, 
began to move towards a common goal of limited collective security. 
Nevertheless, so divided were they by rival creeds and calculations 
that little co-operation was affected until the outbreak of war. 
Separately, howeverl the dissidents achieved little, primarily because 
each group was crippled by a lack of cohesiveness within its own 
ranks. The end result was that the Government had a freer hand than 
it would otherwise have had. 
The counsel offered by the Opposition looked to the fortification 
of peace to deter the dictatorsq or to overawe them it aggression 
occurred. Although insufficient thought had been given to how the 
allies would have fared in the event of war, the grand alliance 
policy was 
- 
and was recognised by the public to be 
- 
an alternative 
to appeasement. As to the flimsy dividing line between both 
Coalition loyalists and dissidents and groupings within the opposition 
Parties it would seem that the only significant difference was that 
of aggregate experience. In effect, dissent or specialism in 
foreign or defence matters was found to be primarily connected 
with members being placed in close relations with overseas interests 
or serving either in the Forces or in a related department. 
1. 
INTRODUCTION 
November 1935 to May 1940 were especially five momentous years in 
Britain's political life. Crisis followed crisis in rapid succession, so 
that in a brief span of time not only was the hope of the twenties 
- 
the 
maintenance of peace through disarmament and the establishment of the 
effective authority of the League of Nations 
- 
finally shattered, but 
Britain was committed to a total war that she could not win, and would not 
have done so, Churchill or no Churchill, save for the unforeseen interven- 
tion of Russia and the United States. In retrospect observers have 
-found 
it hard to account for the short-sightedness of Britain's statesmanship, 
which might have used the country's strength in the struggle to maintain 
the rule of law without paying the terrible price ultimately exacted 
of her. 
The main burden of responsibility for Britain's inability to put up 
effective resistance to successive aggressions must undoubtedly lie upon 
the National Governments, which held sway during these years. The original 
National administration had been formed by Ramsay MacDonald in 1931, and 
drew support from Conservatives, Liberals and but a few Labour Members. 
MacDonald handed over to Stanley Baldwin, the Conservative leader, in June 
1935, who in turn was succeeded by Neville Chamberlain, in May 1937. 
Formed to take the country out of crisis, albeit financialq it was to 
plunge the British Empire into the most formidable struggle it ever had 
to meet. 
The foreign policy of the National Government has been chronicled by 
many writers from many different points of view. Indeed the students of 
the National Government's policy have been legion. The origins of that 
policy have been much debated; the attempts of British statesmen to 
implement the policy have been recorded in minute detail. The validity 
2. 
of the total policy, particularly Chamberlain's share in it, is still 
passionately discussed. In all that has been written, however, there has 
been little attempt to trace the activities of the group of members who 
expressed dissent over the Government's foreign policy. In fact it is 
misleading to speak of them as a group at all, but rather heterogeneous 
elements. They included the Labour Party, Liberal Party and men independent 
of all political affiliations. Furthermore, as Duff Cooper commented, 
foreign policy t1cut clean across existing party lines", and there were a 
number of dissident Conservatives and National Government supporters that 
can be added to the list of opposition elements. 
1 
These opposition elements have been relatively ignored until of late, 
when a number of historians, particularly American ones, have made contribu- 
tions in this field. John F. Naylor's book Labour's International Policy 
has given us an admirable account of that party's outlook and activities 
on foreign affairs in the thirties. The Liberal Party has not been so 
fortunate, for the only recent works on the partys those of Trevor Wilson 
and Roy Douglas, largely skate over the period. 
2 Excepting Winston Churchill, 
Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillang the supporters of the National 
Government who protested at the country's foreign policy were virtually 
ignored until the publication of Neville Thompson's The Anti-Appeasers, a 
sharply critical account 
- 
perhaps too critical 
- 
of their endeavours. 
Moreover, there has been no real attempt to examine the opposition in totog 
viewing the respective criticisms of Government policies, alternative 
Duff Cooper continued: "It (division of opinion over foreign affairs) 
produces strange phenomena, such as the majority of the Tory Party 
vociferously cheering the ultra-pacifism of Lansbury while regarding the 
Duchess of Atholl as a dangerous revolutionary. " The Second World 
War, p-67. 
2 Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914-35; Douglas, The History 
of the Liberal Party, 1895-1970- 
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policies and activities as a whole. The nearest to this is WR Rock's 
Appeasement on Trial, which is merely concerned with February 1938 - 
September 1939, and is much in need of revision. The only other major 
works touching the opposition as a whole are KW Watkins' Britain 
Divided, the Effect of the Spanish Civil War on British Political 
Parties, which concentrates on Churchill and the Labour Partycompletely 
ignoring the Liberals and other National dissidents, and M Cowling's 
Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British History, 1933-40 which 
is similarly concerned with leading political figures, concentrating 
heavily on Chamberlain's peace-time premiership. Another serious 
omission in work on this period is the lack of a general study of the 
inter-party movements that originated in the later '30s and the various 
efforts to effect a united opposition from the dissident groupings. 
This thesis is a further step in filling that void, without following, 
I trust, too much, in recently made footsteps. To prevent this I have 
tended to concentrate on dramatic highlights 
- 
such as the Munich Debate 
rather than, as in the other works, a detailed examination of events as 
they occurred. Furthermore, in the examination of Labour, I shall 
restrict myself to the parliamentary party, ignoring almost wholly, 
unlike Naylor's work, the movement outside Westminster. The evolution 
of Labour's foreign policy will be traced, its makers, in as far as 
possible, ascertained, and the effects of the international scene on 
the notorious divisions within the party will be studied in some detail 
as will other factors relevant to Labour's approach to foreign or 
defence matters. In the process I hope to resurrect the opinions and 
activities of as many Labour MPs as possible, including hitherto obscure 
backbenchers, too often neglected by historians in favour of the more 
celebrated few. 
A similar approach has been adopted for the National dissidents, 
concentrating on areas, for example the lesser-known critics, glossed 
over by Neville Thompson. His work appeared at a somewhat late stage in 
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the writing of this thesis and consequently some revision was necessary 
in order to avoid it being too much an approximation of his study of the 
dissenters. Despite similarities, I beg to differ, on occasions, with 
some of his conclusions. 
Naturally enough I shall give considerable attention to the neglected 
Liberal Party, but the difficulty here is the comparative shortage of 
material. With an acute lack of funds the party headquarters have moved 
more than once in recent years, discarding valuable, at least to the 
historian, material in the process. Nevertheless it is possible 
- 
by 
gleaning here and there 
- 
to piece together an account that does some 
justice to the Liberal Party's endeavours and difficulties during this 
period. 
A further aim of this thesis is to examine the Opposition elements 
in toto, viewing as a whole their criticisms of Government, suggested 
alternative policies and general activities to ascertain whether any 
similarities of view, approach or action existed. There is good reason 
to do this. In dealing with the history of any one Government one has 
constantly to bear in mind the political forces on the other side. A 
government's fortunes for good or ill can depend to a considerable extent 
on the activities of its opponents as upon its own exertions. For 
example, Stanley Baldwin maintained in his famous reply to Churchill's 
statement that "the responsibility of Ministers for the public safety is 
absolute and requires no mandate", that part of the responsibility for 
Britain's slow start in rearmament rested on the Opposition. In evidence 
he brought forward certain facts to the attention of the House. He 
blamed the Labour Party for exploiting the pacifist feeling that had 
existed in the country, in 1933-4, in order to defeat the National 
GoverAment candidates at by-elections, and went on to declare that he had 
not seen any prospect, after the East Fulham by-election, of getting a 
50 
rearmament mandate but rather, if an election were held, of the 
likelihood of a large majority opposed to rearmament. And so, the Prime 
Minister claimed, it had been necessary to hold on until the mood of the 
country had changed in favour of rearming and then seek his mandate. 
This he did but not without losing much valuable time. 
1 Seen in this 
light, the question within a democracy such as Britain is to what extent 
the responsibility for the pursuit of particular defence and foreign 
policies or, as is largely the case here, the failure to follow others, 
rests on the opposition, official or otherwise, and not merely on the 
existing Government. 
Another avenue that will be explored is the inter-party movements, 
groupings and contacts that existed in the later 30s and the various 
efforts made to link those of all parties and of none, that dissented 
at the Government's course, into a united opposition. Inspiration for 
this phenomenon 
- 
the like of which we have not seen before or since 
- 
came largely from the foreign situation, and such a study of movements 
like the Hundred Thousand Group or Arms and the Covenant can teach valuable 
lessons for those who today argue for a fundamental realignment of 
political forces outside the established party structure. 
In a further respect this work breaks with previous tradition in that 
it has a socio-economic flavour, reflecting the fact that, as originally 
envisaged, it was a joint venture of the History and Political Departments 
of Nottingham University. After consultation the idea was conceived of 
systematically analysing those members who protested against the National 
Government's course in international affairs. This has been done in a 
variety of ways. Included is an analysis of the Labour, Liberal and 
1 House of Commons Debates, November 12th, 1936. Col-589. 
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Conservative Parties as they stood following the General Election of 1935. 
To this continual reference and comparison is made when the opposition 
elements are again analysed during the various dramatic highlights of 
these years. A similar process has been applied to other occasions worthy 
of note, including the creation of inter-party movements, such as the All 
Party Parliamentary Action Groupt or the emergence of a body of members 
expressing dissent at the course their parties were taking on the vital 
issues of the day, as in the cases of Labour's rearmers or pacifists. 
To this end biographical data on the M. Ps concerned numbering 
approximately 300 was compiled. The information assembled was reduced 
to meaningful and comprehensible lines by using filing cards on which 
were recorded antecedents, age, education, religiong occupation and other 
relevant details. The pictures that finally took shape were incomplete 
in some details. Unfortunately this could not be rectified by securing 
permission to use the autobiographical material which Josiah Wedgwood, one 
of the M. Ps; we shall be studying, persuaded several hundred of his 
contemporary M. Ps to prepare and entrust to him, and which now is in the 
possession of the History of Parliament Trust. Consequently when the 
officially sponsored History of Parliament appears, analysis and 
synthesis on a far grander scale will become possible. Yet this 
exhaustive treatment of the M. Ps involved will not reach fruition until 
the distant future. There was need, therefore, to cover this ground, 
albeit on an interim basis only, and with sufficient material to make 
the research worthwhile some interesting conclusions took shape. 
It is not necessary for me to testify to the efficacy of the 
biographical approach to history. Recent research has shown that 
biographical studies can be a very effective means for examining the 
House of Commons. Through the work of scholars like Sir John Neale 
and Sir Lewis Namier our knowledge of Parliament has been greatly 
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enlarged. 
1 There is sufficient reason. therefore to embark on the 
laborious task of compiling biographical data on M. Ps, many of whom were 
not very important or interesting as individuals, for only in this way can 
one meaningfully evaluate such statements as the appeasers were middle 
class businessmen while the anti-appeasers were descended from the 
pre-nineteenth century aristocracy. Moreover, as the thesis will 
illustrate, an examination of a member's or group of members' background 
can reveal why he or they arrived at a particular view or took a certain 
course of action. 
One last introductory note is necessary. This study ends on the 
10th May, 1940, rather than 3rd September, 1939, because it was the 
formation of Churchill's Government, not the outbreak of war, that ended 
a political era which had opened with the formation of the National 
Government in 1931. Although Churchill and Eden joined the Cabinet when 
the war began, political control remained largely in the hands of those 
who had managed the country's, affairs for the best part of a decade. Nor 
did criticism of the administration cease with the beginning of the war. 
After a short truce following the initial shock of hostilities, opposition 
was renewed on both sides of the House of Commons. Many of those who had 
previously challenged the Government's handling of foreign affairs now 
took issue with its conduct of the war. Neville Chamberlain's resignation 
finally ended the political fueds and criticism which had originated in 
the domestic, imperial, and foreign events of the early 1930s. 
Neale, The Elizabethan House of Commons; Namier, The Structure of 
Politics at the Accession of George III. 
8. 
CHAPTERI 
THE 1935 GENERAL ELECTION 
The Campai-n 
The House of Commons which was elected in 1931 was dissolved on 
October 25,1935, and polling in the general election was fixed for 
November 14. Nominations took place on November 4, when 38 members 
were returned unopposed to the new Parliament, a group that included 
22 Conservatives and 3 Liberal National men on the one side, and 
12 Labour and an Independent on the other. For the remaining seats a 
total of 1,310 prospective MPs entered the field: 493 Conservatives, 
20 National Labourites, 41 Liberal Nationals, 6 National Candidates as 
Government supporters; 157 Liberals (of the Samuelite variety), 
4 Independent Liberals (Lloyd George family party), 540 Labourites and 
49 Independent Candidates who opposed the Baldwin Ministry. 
1 
The question of the League of Nations was to figure in the 
contest. 
2 All the parties 
- 
Conservative, Liberal and Labour alike - 
were for the League; each of their manifestoes expressed support for 
a system of collective security administered from Geneva. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the electors felt that there was little to 
choose between the parties on this issue, and were somewhat bewildered 
by the hostility between rival candidates who used the same League of 
1 Figures recorded in Dod's Parliamentary Companion, 1936. 
The election is dealt with somewhat briefly here but further 
comment can be found elsewhere, when subject matter requires 
reference to aspects of the campaign. 
9. 
Nations slogans. 
1 Baldwin's tactics, in effect, had left the Liberal 
and Labour Parties at a distinct disadvantage. Both went to the 
hustings with roughly the same apparent position on the League of 
Nations as that held by the Government. CL Mowat aptly commented 
that the Conservatives had stolen their clothes and the Opposition 
parties could only protest that Baldwin would never wear them. 
2 
Participants in these years, particularly Labour ones, and some 
historians, have considered that the League was the "main issue" at 
the election. 
3 Neville Thompson wrote that the National Government won 
"the 1935 election on a platform of supporting the League and collective 
security", while Michael Foot has put that "Labour's pleadings to the 
Government to stand by their obligations (to the League), merely played 
into the hands of Stanley Baldwin who won an election on the promise 
4 
that he would do just that" These views rest on the assumption that 
It 5 much of the election campaign was devoted to international affairs" 
. 
It was not. With roughly the same apparent position on the League as 
that held by the Goverment, the Liberal and Labour Parties were forced 
to turn their electoral attention elsewhere to unemployment, depression, 
the misery still overshadowing parts of the land, and these became as 
The League of Nations Union asked candidates to indicate publicly 
their attitude to the League and the use of sanctions. From informa- 
tion relating to 567 constituencies reaching the Union's Head Office 
it was apparent either from the speeches or election addresses that 
550 MPs of the new Parliament were in favour of maintaining the 
League's collective pressure upon Italy until her war of aggression 
in Africa was stopped. Only 52 of these declared their desire to 
avoid or their opposition to the use of armed force by the League. 
League of Nations Union Handbook, 1936. 
2 Britain'Betwedn The Wars, p. 554. 
3 Ibid, p. 553. 
4 Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers 
' 
p. 38; Foot, Aneurin'Bevan, p. 211. 
See also Attlee's As It Happened, p. 80. 
5 Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism, p. 229. 
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important in the campaign as the Italian aggression. This was noted 
by the Daily Herald on 15 October: 
"The General Election will be fought on domestic issues 
and not exclusively on foreign policy. Six months ago it 
looked as if foreign policy would dominate the election. 
Between Labour and the Tories there was a gulf that seemed 
unbridgeable on foreign policy. Now, incredible as it 
would have seemed six months ago, the Government is 
supporting the League. " 
Consequently Labour devoted fourteen of the sixteen pages of its 
pamphlet, The Case Against the National Govdrnm6nt, to domestic matters, 
Similarly the weight of the GovernmentIs manifesto was directed to the 
home front, making much of the improvement in conditions since 1931 - 
economic recovery, the boom in housing - and promised more efforts to 
assist the distressed areas, extension of old age pensions, and the 
raising of the school leaving age to fifteen. In surveying the campaign, 
therefore, The Times bandbook, The*General Election of*1935, argued 
that it was "generally agreed that the international situation played 
a very small part in the campaign! '. 
' Thus it is quite possible that 
the League was not such a key issue in the election as has been assumed, 
and that the combination of Labour apologists, eager for an explanation- 
that distracted attention from their party's shortcomings, and 
historians too mindful of subsequent events, have given the role of 
the League a greater retrospective importance in the campaign than it 
in fact warrants. 
Another of the issues at the campaign was that of rearmament, 
which the Government tended to keep out of the lime-light except as 
1 Page 19. 
ii. 
far as it could be treated as part of Britain's contribution to the 
League system: 
"The fact is that the actual condition of our defence 
forces is not satisfactory. We have made it clear that 
we must in the course of the next few years do what is 
necessary to repair the gaps in our defences, which have 
accumulated over the last decade 
.. 9* The defence 
programme will be strictly confined to what is required 
to make the country and the Empire safe and to fulfil 
our obligations towards the League. "' 
In fact had they chosen to, the Government by campaigning more 
vigorously for rearmament could well have drawn a sharp distinction 
between the policies of the two major parties. This was indicated by 
the statements of the Labour leaders: Clement Attlee ridiculed the 
need for a "tremendous and costly programe"; Arthur Greenwood denounced 
Neville Chamberlain as "the merest scaremonger"; Herbert Morrison called 
Chamberlain, Churchill and Amery "fire-eaters and militarists 
.. 0 
(Chamberlain) would spend on the means of death, but not on the means 
2 
of life" 
. 
Baldwin, however, apparently on the advice of party agents 
and officials, decided not to stress the rearmament issue, and although 
mentioned in many Conservative speeches, was rather played down as the 
campaign progressed. 
3 Tom Jones confided to a friend: 
"He (Baldwin) has only very slowly, and with obvious 
reluctance proclaimed the need for more armaments; he has 
avoided all trace of the. Daily Mail's lust to arm the Nation 
From the National Goverrment's Election Manifesto found in 
Thg General Elect'on of 1935, p, 22* 
2 Quoted in Iain Macleod's Neville'Chamberlain, p. 186. 
3 See FeilingýS'The Life of Neville Chamberlaing pp. 266-69. 
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to the teeth and has also kept clear of Winston's enthusiasm for 
ships and guns. " 
1 
When the election dust cleared it became'apparent that 431 supporters 
of the Government were returned to the new Parliament. Of the 
Ministerialists elected, 387 were Conservatives, 33 Liberal National, 
8 National Labour, and 3 Nationals, The Opposition consisted of 154 
Socialists, 21 Independent Liberals, 24 members of the Independent 
Labour Party and 1 Communist. There were also 4 Independent members: 
2 Irish Nationalists, Patrick Cunningham and Anthony Mulvey, members for 
Fermanagh and Tyrone, who did not take their seats; Eleanor Rathbone, 
member for English Universities; Alan Patrick Herbert, member for 
Oxford University. 
The Governing Coalition 
Once again the national parties had an impregnable majority, for 
less than one hundred seats of the unique total of 1931 were lost. 
Over 70% voted and the Covernment achieved a higher percentage (53.6%) 
of the popular vote than any other of the twentieth century with, 
again, the exception of 1931.3 The decisive support given the 
administration could not be gainsaid. It was back in office for a 
further five years, while the Liberal and Labour Parties - the latter 
recovering somewhat from its 1931 knockdown but significantly failing 
to wholly erase the stigma of its last performance in government - were 
1 Jones, letter dated November 17, A Diary With Letters, p. 155. 
Jones was Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (1916-30) and an intimate friend of Baldwin. His diaries are a valuable source of information 
on the politics of the inter-war years. 
The 21 includes 17 Samuelites and 4 Lloyd George MPs. Several books 
give the figure as 20, eg Butler and Freemants 
' 
British Political 
Facts 1900-1960. This is probably because RH Bernays, MP for 
=ristol North, left the Independent Liberals for the Liberal 
Nationals a few months after the election. 
3 Figures obtained from Baldwin by Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, 
p. 869. 
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condemned to the continued frustration of opposition. 
It is doubtful if the label 'National' contributed much to the 
Government's success in the election, Baldwin, for one, dismissing 
it as a "facade". 
' The National character of the Government was 
dependent on the National Labour and Liberal National Members returned. 
The former group had been originally formed of those Labour Ministers 
and their supporters who helped in 1931 to establish the National 
Goverment. Its avowed policy was to strengthen the Goverment and 
to ensure that it received the support of Labour views and traditions, 
and to make certain that Labour ideals played their part in the 
councils of Goverment and of Parliament. No one took the group 
seriously, especially after Ramsay MacDonald gave way to Baldwin in 
June 1935 and when the election of that year resulted in only eight 
National Labourites in the new House. 
2 
The other party to the coalition, the Liberal Nationals, 
originated from a group of HPs led by Sir John Simon and Sir Walter 
Runciman, who in June 1931 rejected the Liberal Whip over Free Trade 
policy. In the election of October 41 candidates stood as Liberal 
Nationals, 35 successfully. The following year when the Samuelite 
Liberals left the Government over the Ottowa agreements, the Simonite 
Liberal Nationals remained, arguing that the National Government 
should have complete freedom in approaching national problems without 
restraint of party views. Three years later they fought the 1935 
election in alliance with the Conservatives and 33 of the 44 
candidates were returned, 
1 Letter dated May 12, A Diary with Letters, p. 145. 
2 Harold Nicolson's record reveals how far the group had strayed. 
Having offered himself as a Conservative candidate for Sevenoaks 
he stood as a National Labourite for West Leicester, His inclina- 
tions, however, tended towards the Liberal Party. Diaries and 
Letters, 1930-39, p. 215. 
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These two small groups, which together had put up 64 candidates, 
polled 1,200,000 votes, although it must be remembered that a tidy 
proportion of these votes were Conservative. It is unlikely that many 
Liberal National or National Labour candidates would have been returned 
but for the help and support of local Conservative associations. Few 
of their seats could be categorized as 'safe' if Conservative support 
was withdrawn, something which doubtless affected their independent 
standing as 11Ps and made them less liable to criticise the National 
Government than their once cherished views warranted. It is interesting 
to note that only one of this group consistently opposed the Government's 
foreign policy, and it is to Harold Nicolson's lasting credit that he 
was willing to go against Government and party on a majority of 87. 
The overwhelming Conservative nature of the victory can be seen 
by the fact that the National Liberals and Labourites were outnumbered 
by ten to one on the Government benches. As in previous Parliaments, 
the contrast between this fact and the distribution of offices in the 
ministry - where non-Conservatives had a wholly disproportionate number 
of places - was surprising. There were four Liberal National Cabinet 
Ministers, Simon, Runciman, Sir Godfrey Collins and Ernest Brown, as 
well as 5 junior Ministers outside the Cabinet. From the National 
Labourites, both MacDonalds and JH Thomas sat in the Cabinet, while 
a further two held ministerial posts. 
1 This surprisingly high number 
of Liberal Nationals and National Labourites is quite simple to explain: 
it was essentially the cost of the national label which was attached 
I 
This effectively explains Nicolson's greeting on first entering the 
House: Winston rose tubbily and stretched out great arms. "Welcome! 
Welcome! " he yelled. You know how overwhelming his charm can be, 
but I would rather it had occurred in greater privacy. "Well", he 
shouted, "when I saw your result on the tape, I said to myself, 
"that means he goes straight into the Cabinet", and then I remembered 
that all of your Party were already in the Cabinet and that they 
must have at least one follower on the back benches. So I 
realised that you would be chosen as the single follower. " 
Letter dated December 4,1935, Diaries and Lettersl p. 229. 
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to the Government. According to Duff Cooper there was much ill- 
feeling, if not envy, on the Tory benches over this number of 'allies' 
on the Government pay roll. 
1 
The Liberal Party 
While the forces of the Right were in the ascendant those of the 
Left were in disarray. This was particularly true of the Liberal 
Party, whose recent history was complicated by the bitter disunity 
which existed within its ranks. During the Parliament of 1929-31 the 
party had split assunder; one section had grudgingly assisted the 
Labour Government while the other, which included Simon, aided the 
Conservative Opposition. The financial crisis of 1931 and the formation 
of the National Goverrment saw the party temporarily united. Within 
a few months, however, controversy broke out afresh. David Lloyd 
George had endorsed the new Gover=ent as long as it abstained from 
an election, and he expected Sir Herbert Samuel and his colleagues to 
resign should the Conservative elements insist on going to the hustings 
in order to make party capital of a national emergency. Samuel's 
failure to do so was regarded by Lloyd George as a gross betrayal and 
led him and his 'family party' to sever all connection with the Liberal 
machine. 
Consequently the 1931 General Election witnessed the Liberal Party 
offering three distinct positions: the semi-Conservative position of 
Simon; the semi-Labour position of Lloyd George; the non-Conservative, 
anti-Labour position of the official party under Samuel. Seventy-two 
Liberals were elected, which was a better result than 1929, but this 
was deceptive. Whereas in 1929 the Party had won seats on its own 
1 Cooper, The Second World War, p. 111. 
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strength, in 1931 it secured many of them through the help of the 
traditional enemy, the Conservative Party. In fact, of its 72 seats 
only 10 were contested by Conservative candidates. 
The Liberal rift was to move one stage further when it became 
evident that the prevailing tendency of the National administration 
was to favour protection. The issue came to a head in September 1932, 
when Samuel, Isaac Foot, Archibald Sinclair and Sir Robert Hamilton 
resigned, while others, like Simon, and Runciman, constituting them7 
selves as 'Nationalt Liberals, remained in the Government. It was not 
until a year later, however, that Samuel and his followers, who at 
first had seen their role as criticism and support of the Government 
from an independent and friendly position, finally moved into full 
opposition. 
1 The Samuelite remnants then attempted to recover their 
bearings and their traditional position, but the events of recent years 
had destroyed the Liberal Party's sense of direction. 
In 1935, with the prospect of a general election, the Liberal 
leaders took stock of the situation. Their major concern was that 
although they still viewed themselves as a national party concerned 
with national issues, it seemed increasingly unlikely that there was 
any valid future for the Liberals as an independent force. 
2 After all 
they had not been in office effectively since 1916, which meant that 
a new electorate was growing up not accustomed to thinking of the 
party in terms of political power, For the new voter the essential 
dividing line and electoral choice was between the two major parties, 
and in such a contest a vote for a Liberal increasingly seemed a vote 
thrown away. HL Nathan, the Liberal Member for Ne E. Bethnal Green, 
1 The Samuelites had remained seated on the Government benches. 
2 Lloyd George for one did not think so. He announced: "I see no 
future except a dishonourable grave for Liberalism as it is. 
Liberalism is in an advanced state of creeping paralysis. " 
NeV8 Chronicle January 16,1933, 
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echoed this diagnosis: 
1 
"The Liberal Party is split beyond repair on important 
issues, its voice is weak and ineffective in the House of 
Commons and even if it succeeded in overcoming these 
obstacles it has fallen so low in numbers and prestige 
that it cannot again present itself to the country as a 
party capable of forming a Government e.. The drive 
that was the life of the Liberal Party has gone. It has no 
effective message for our times 
... 
The mantle of the 
,, 
2 
standard bearers of Liberty has fallen on the Labour Party 
. 
Sinclair wrote to Samuel informing him that the "time has come 
for a big effort to arrest public attention and to arouse the fighting 
support of Liberals in the country by dramatic announcements and skilful 
3 
publicity" 
. 
Unfortunately the public up and down the country was 
only impressed by the dissensions between Samuelites, Simonites, and 
Lloyd Georgites, so much so that they had become the subject of jokes 
and sneers. 
4 
The rift with the Simonites was now complete; the Liberal 
Nationals 
- 
however Liberal the opinions which some of them still held - 
had become Conservatives for all practical purposes, Nor could the 
Samuelite Liberals count on collaboration with Lloyd George. As late 
as May 1935 Sinclair was to admit that he had just shaken hands and 
spoken to Lloyd George for the first time since the 1931 General 
Election. Following this chance encounter Sinclair was enraged to hear 
HP N. E. Bethnal Green, 1929-35; Central Wandsworth (Labour) 
1937-40. 
2 Letter to Lloyd George July 19349 Lloyd George Papers. 
3 Letter to Samuel, Samuel Papers, May 4,1935. 
4 This was particularly so in the House of Commons. In the course of 
an attack upon the Liberals, a Conservative MP, Marjoribanks had 
said: "In the Liberal Party are many mansions! ". His equilibrium 
was somewhat shaken by Lloyd George's quick retort: "And in the 
Conservative Party there are many flats. " Frances Lloyd George, 
The Years That Are Past, p. 233. 
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that Lloyd George had, the same day, declared that there was no future 
for the Liberals as an independent force and that they must co-operate 
with one or other of the major parties! 
1 
Whatever animosity felt for 
Lloyd George was equalled if not surpassed on his side, adding weight 
to the claim that the Liberals were "suffering today from a similar 
conflict which started 18 years ago. That the schism has never been 
healed, and that the bitterness is, if anything, worse than ever 
."2 
Although several attempts were made to bring Samuel and Lloyd George 
together, the Liberals still went to the hustings presenting an 
appearance of hopeless disunity. Indeed Lloyd George, instead of 
devoting himself to a party campaign, spent most of his still consider- 
able energy establishing the non-party Council of Action for Peace 
and Reconstruction, which pressed candidates to support the dual policy 
of a new deal at home and peace through the League of Nations abroad. 
When the nominations closed on November 4 only 157 Independent 
Liberals were in the fight. Obviously the party stood no chance of 
forming an alternative government and the most they could ask was that 
Liberalism should be strengthened "to safeguard the country against 
3 
the complacent Toryism and reckless Socialism! ' 
. 
It was hoped that 
the election would return the two main parties to the equilibrium of 
1929 so that the new Goverrment would be at the mercy of the Liberals. 
The election far from justifying such hopes, proved to be a catastrophe. 
1 Letter to Samuel, May 4,1935, Samuel Papers. 
Notes for Mr Waterhouse February 15,1934. Lloyd George Papers. 
In a letter to Baron Mottistone, Lloyd George described Samuel as 
"always has been, and ever will be, until he gets to the bosom of 
Abraham, a swine of the swiniest". October 9,1939. Lloyd George 
Papers, 
3 Wilson, Thd Downfall of 'the Liberal Party, 1914-35, p, 377, 
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Years later Sir Percy Harris, the Liberal Chief Whip after 1935, 
wrote that "the election played havoc with the Liberal Party". 
I Their 
voting strength fell, and not only was their representation virtually 
halved but their leader, Samuel, and such prominent figures as Sir Walter 
Rea, Sir Robert Hamilton and Isaac Foot, were defeated. Fourteen only 
of the thirty-one seats secured by Samuel's followers in 1931 were 
retained, while three were captured from Conservatives, by narrow 
majorities, in remote rural constituencies, with a strong radical 
tradition, and which Labour did not contest. Of the fourteen retained 
only six candidates had successfully withstood the combined challenge 
from Labour and National Government candidates, and three of the six 
came from rural parts of Wales. What representation the Liberals had 
achieved, therefore, was confined to certain Welsh and Celtic fringes, 
and in a few isolated spots scattered over the country, seemingly 
without rhyme or reason, but probably due to local circumstances. 
2 
On one matter the General Election marked an improvement in Liberal 
relationships. Whereas in the previous Parliament the Lloyd George 
family group had been aloof from the ordinary activities of the party 
they now took the party whip, bringing the total number of Liberals to 
21.3 Lloyd George was persuaded by Harris to preside over the first 
meeting of the Members, although he was unwilling to stand for the 
chairmanship of the parliamentary party. On his proposal, Sinclair 
was elected. Although Sinclair had been Chief Whip in 1930-1, and 
had held office in the National Government, he was not well known in 
the Country as a whole. Four years later, at the outbreak of war, he 
1 Harris, Forty Years In and Out of Parliament, p. 124. 
2 
'Ariell, in the Congregationalist Christian'World commented: "It 
used to be said of Charles James s party that it could drive 
to the House in a Cab; the leaderless remnant of the Samuelites 
might go in a small charabanc, and still have room to spare. " 
November 20p 1935. 
3 David, Gwilym, Megan and Goronwy Owen. 
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was held in wide respect far outside the range of his own party. 
The results of the General Election gave the Liberals cause for 
serious reflection on their future prospects. The small number of 
candidates; the number of deposits lost (42); the failure, outside the 
West Country, to come even second in the poll in the vast majority of 
cases; the probability that where there was no Liberal candidate their 
usual supportem voted for the Government, all boded ill for the future. 
Geoffrey Mander, the Member for Wolverhampton East, concluded that the 
"Left goodwill has definitely gone Labour 
... 
it is very difficult to 
see how the Liberal Patty can again secure its dominating position in 
national affairs". 
' AH Henderson Livesey, Lloyd George's political 
agent, was more gloomy: "At the next election, except for a few 
individuals scattered about the country, there will be no Independent 
Liberal candidates"* 
2 
Even though it seemed increasingly unlikely that there was any 
valid future for the Liberals as an independent force, the immediate 
reaction of party to the election setback was to reject any further 
party entanglementso In recent years they had constituted one of the 
great parties of the state; and they continued to view themselves as 
a national party concerned with national issues rather than a minor 
party representing some regional interest, dependent for office on 
the goodwill of the Labour or Conservative parties. When, therefore, 
on December 4, a joint meeting took place in London between the 
Executive Council of the National Liberal Federation, the Women's 
National Liberal Federation, and the National League of Young Liberals, 
a resolution was carried to the effect that it would be a gross betrayal 
of everything for which Liberalism stood for to entrust the maintenance 
of the Liberal faith to the keeping of either the Conservative or Labour 
Parties. 
1 
'The General Election and Afterlp Contemporary Review, 1936. 
2 Memorandum dated 1938. Lloyd George Papers. 
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Power or the possibility of gaining it, is the lifeblood of any 
political party. And yet the Liberal defeat had been so complete that 
a policy of total independence, as outlined in the resolution, excluded 
the party from any immediate chance of attaining office and in 
exercising any important influence on public policy. Herein lay the 
crux of the Liberal dilernma of the next five years. Virtually relegated 
to the role of onlookers, Liberal NPs wondered whether their cause 
might be better promoted by co-operating with one or other of the major 
parties rather than by keeping their faith inviolate and aspiring to 
be a second and weaker opposition. 
The Labour Party 
It was not the Liberal Party's but Labourvs disunity which had 
provided the Government with a good opportunity for appealing to the 
country. Under the lead of Arthur Henderson the party had adopted a 
policy of strong support for the League, but there was in Labour's 
ranks a strong pacifist section led by George Lansbury. The crisis 
came over the question of the application of sanctions against Italy, 
should she invade Abyssinia. After a full if somewhat acrimonious 
debate at the Annual Party Conference at Brighton in October, the 
pacifists were overwhelmingly defeated. A few days later Lansbury 
resigned the leadership and Clement Attlee was elected leader in his 
place. 
In addition to the break with the pacifists, the Brighton Conference 
also witnessed the disaffection of the Left, which viewed the Abyssinian 
issue in the most abstract terms as a clash of rival imperialisms. 
Mussolini was intent on imperial conquestq as everyone knew, but by 
supporting sanctions against him, so their argument went, the Labour 
Party was committing itself to a Conservative policy which might lead 
to war in which they would be fighting not for the true principles 
of the League of Nations but for the defence of purely imperialis. t 
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interests. So long as the Government was in power, they argued, Labour 
must withhold its support, devoting its resources instead, in the words 
Cripps used in opposing the Executive's resolution, "to the defeat of 
that very capitalism and imperialism which is represented in this 
country by our class enemies masquerading under the title of a 
'National' Government". Only when a Labour Government was in power 
could there be, he concluded, any hope of a true policy of collective 
security. In protest against Labour's adopted course Cripps, the 
Left's leading spokesman, had already resigned from the National 
Executive Committee and from the Executive Committee of the parliamentary 
party in order that he could challenge the resolution which the 
Executive had drafted for submission to the Conference on the Abyssinian 
affair. 
The loss of two such outstanding personalities as Cripps and 
Lansbury was serious, but far more serious was the disunity Labour 
displayed on the eve of the dissolution of Parliament. There seems 
little doubt that Baldwin had been carefully noting the divergencies 
of opinion at the conference and the subsequent resignations and 
changes, and had decided it was a favourable time for an election. 
So it proved to be, as AL Rowse, himself a Labour Candidate at the 
election, admitted: "The docritinarism of the Left Wing and the 
pacifists played straight into the hands of the Goverment", costing 
Labour, on his account, over 40 seats. 
1 
And even Cripps's official 
biographer concurred with this judgement. "There is no doubt". he 
wrote, "that the Party was weakened in its 1935 campaign by the 
112 affair at its last Conference 
. 
Rowse, 'The Present and Immediate Future of the Labour Partyý 
Political Quarterly, 1938. 
2 Cooke, The Life of Sir'Richard Stafford'Cripps p. 177. 
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Nevertheless, the abnormal ebb-tide of 1931 turned. In all the 
Party made 94 net gains, compared with 213 losses in 1931. Labour now 
held the Coalfields, the East End of London, the Potteries, and a 
minority of seats of some of the great industrial towns. She did not, 
however, make the inroads into industrial areas which had been hoped 
for, particularly in places classed as distressed. Broadly speaking 
it may be said that Labour regained seats which had been classified 
by the Government as certain losses, but they did not secure the 
seats which had been ranked as doubtful. Herbert Morrison did not 
attempt to hide his disappointment, at the results of the General 
Election, in the November issue of Forward. 
"We ought to have done better., Look at the "certainties" 
we have failed to win. There are too many of them for my 
liking. " 
Yet the parliamentary party was now a good deal better off for 
leaders and debaters. In addition to Clement Attleet Sir Stafford 
Cripps and Arthur Greenwood, the return of AV Alexander, JR Clynes, 
Hugh Dalton, HB Lees-Smith, Herbert Morrison and FW Pethick-Lawrence 
strengthened the Labour front bench. GDH Cole commented that there 
was once more "a team that could reasonably cover the field, though 
the Party was weak on foreign affairs and none too strong in incisive 
debating power. "' Tom Jones endorsed this verdict: 
"The front Opposition bench should bq a much better 
debating team than was the last, which was pitiable 
.**9 
Dalton, Lee-Smith and Pethick-Lawrence will make some amends 
,, 
2 for these defects in the new Parliament 
. 
In fact the 1935 election marked a significant change in the 
leadership of the Parliamentary Labour Party. The Executive Committee 
1A History of the Labour Party from 191j, p. 311. 
2 
Letter dated November 17,1935. A'Diary With Letters, p*156. 
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consisting of 12 Commons members, and six ex-officio members: the 
leader and deputy leader of the Party, the Chief Whip of the House 
of Commons, the Leader of the Labour Peers, the Chief Whip of the 
Labour Peers, and their elected representative, is elected at the 
beginning of each session of Parliament. Prior to 1935 the 
Executive Committee had been composed largely of men of working class 
origins who, denied an opportunity of higher education, had climbed 
to the leadership through years of trade union and party work. By 
contrast, the leadership from 1935 was to contain a higher percentage 
of members with a university and professional background, who had had 
little, if any, contact with the unions. In all 18 MPs were to be 
elected onto the Committee during the next four years and three 
positions were to remain permanent: Attlee, Greenwood and Sir Charles 
Edwards. Ter. of the twenty-one serving had professional and university 
backgrounds 
-a proportion quite unwarranted, by their numbers in the 
party. 
1 The fact that few trade unionists were finding their way 
into the inner counsels of the party caused a certain amount of disquiet 
in union circles. Following the executive elections, in 1936, when 
only three trade unionists were successful, John Marchbank, General 
Secretary of the Railwaymen, complained that the remainder of the 
Committee, though men of high ability, had little industrial experience 
or direct contact with the unions. He therefore welcomed the decision, 
recently taken, to reconstitute the trade union group of members, 
which had existed in previous Parliaments, looking to it to restore 
the influence of the union members in the counsels of the party, 
2 
It never did. 
These were; Attleet Greenwood, Benn, Dalton, Johnston, Morgan Jones, 
Lees-Smith, Noel-Baker, Pethick-Lawrence and Pritt. 
2. The Times, November 27,1936. 
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A further feature of the parliamentary leadership must be considered; 
that of age, The oldest of the members, Sir Charles Edwards, had 
first been elected Chief Whip at the age of 64 and continued to hold 
the office until 1942, when he was 75. In November, 1938, Aneurin Bevan 
was to get into hot water for stating the obvious: ". 
.. 
he should 
resign. He is no match for the Government Chief Whip. 
... 
There 
are plenty of able younger men who are aching to win their spurs in 
this pivotal position, and it is intolerable that the effectiveness of 
the party should be impaired by the continuence in office of men who 
are not equal to the demands of the present day. " Bevan's attack did 
not end at Sir Charles Edwards, "The same could be said of others who 
sit on the front bench. It is true they are elected by their 
colleagues, but the natural reluctance of their comrades to remove 
them ought not to be allowed to impair the efficiency of our efforts. " 
It is difficult, however, to ascertain just who these members were 
that Bevan referred to. The average age at the 1935 General Election 
of the 21 elected to the committee in the 1935-39 period was 54 years 
six months, slightly lower than that of the party, and in 1938, when 
Bevan made his attack, the average age of the 15 then on the committee 
was 53 years 2 months. Other than Edwards, the oldest were 
Pethick-Lawrence (64), Wedgwood Benn (58), and Lees-Smith (57)p while 
the others compared very favourably with the parliamentary party. 
One of the most serious weaknesses in Labour's strategic position 
at the General Election was its failure to advance a leader who then 
measured up to the electorate's standard for a Prime Minister. "The 
Labour Party", wrote GDH Cole, after the election was over, "lacks 
an effective leader more than anything else; and until it finds one, 
and is prepared to trust him to speak to the people in its name, it 
will fail to win back the ground that has been lost. 1,2 Attlee, NP for 
1 Manchester Guardian, November 26,1938. 
2- 
New States p and Nation, November 23,1935. 
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Limehouse, Stepney, had carried the unexpected burden of leadership 
creditably enough through the election campaign, but he was no national 
figure, and Tom Jones went so far as to describe him as "unknown! ' at 
the time of the election. 
I The great objection to Attlee retaining 
the leadership was that he was not a strong men, who could emerge as 
a national figure, but somewhat retiring, "too nervous and too modest 
ever to become dominating at the box in the House of Commons* ,2 
Indeed it would seem that Attlee recognised his limitations: 
"I have been a very happy and fortunate man 
.a. 
in 
having been given the opportunity of serving in a state of 
,, 
3 life to which I had never expected to be called 
. 
Consequently he was widely regarded as just filling the post until after 
the election, when a more dynamic leader would be found. 
Now that the election was over and the parliamentary party 
possessed a wider array of talent, the question of leadership had to 
be determined anew. There were three contestants: Attlee, the 
incumbent; Morrison, a strong contender who had already won distinction 
as Minister of Transport and more recently as leader of the London 
County Council; Greenwood, who had strong links with the party 
headquarters and was largely supported, by northern trade unionists. 
As Tuesday, November 26 was the first party meeting after the General 
Election, it was then that the leadership question was settled. There 
was a close contestq with this preliminary result: Attlee, 58 votes; 
1 
Diaries and Letters, p. 156* 
2J Wedgwood, Memoirs of a Fighting Life, p*236. 
As It Happened, p. 156. 
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Morrison, 44; Greenwood, 32.1 The latter then withdrew, as it had 
been agreed that the bottom candidate would drop out after the first 
ballot. Attlee, on the second ballot, was then elected by 88 votes to 
Morrison's almost unaltered total of 48. 
Clearly Greenwood's supporters had swung almost solidly to 
Attlee and against Morrison. Dalton put this down to a "prejudice, 
surprisingly strong and widespread" against Morrison getting the leader- 
ship as he would be too dominant. 
2 
"Powerful leaders", wrote the 
latterts biographers, "could take the party in the wrong direction, as 
it was thought MacDonald had. What was wanted was a leader who would 
follow the party. Attlee fitted that bill, but Morrison was divisive; 
he enjoyed controversy. Attlee, however, shunned dissension. He 
sought to conciliate and unite. With Morrison the party would be 
rent by disagreement over policies, tactics and personnel 
."3 
After the second vote the two losing contestants moved and 
seconded the decision so as to make it unanimous. Attlee, returning 
thanks said that his election was for one session only and that if 
the party wanted a change later he wouldn't complain. In effect the 
question of leadership, far from being conclusively settled, was 
left open for subsequent debate, or perhaps more accurately, the 
seeds were sown for future discord. Dalton summed up his feelings: 
"I felt that we had lost by far the strongest personality 
and by far the most efficient politician of the three. I 
I The figures in the first ballot "strongly support the view that 
Attlee's principal support came from his colleagues of the previous 
four years". R Jenkins, Mr Attlee, p. 167. Attlee's vote coincided 
almost exactly with the number of Labour members in the previous 
House. 
2 The Fateful Years, p. 82. Shinwell concurs, Vve Lived Through It 
All, p. 125. 
3B Donoughue and GW Jones, Herbert Morrison, p. 241. Other factors 
were that the Left felt that Morrison was little more than a Liberal, 
while the Trade Union leaders, particularly Bevin, were incensed by 
his opposition to the principles of workers representation on 
governing boards of socialized industries. 
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wrote in my diary: 'a wretched, disheartening result. And 
a little mouse shall lead them. "" 
The memoirs of several of Attlee's leading colleagues reveal 
similar sentiments, and just how uneasy they continued to be at his 
leadership. They were to frequently criticise his work and on 
various occasions over the next 20 years intrigue to unseat him. 
2 
Several instances are baldly recorded in Dalton's autobiography 
and private papers, of which the following are a sample. In 
September, 1939 Dalton told Greenwood that "CRA at no time, and much 
less now 
... 
is big enough or strong enough to carry the burden! ', 
and went on to suggest that he (AG) should be leader in place of the 
sick Attlee. 
3 
Nothing came of this. Almost a year earlier, during 
the Munich crisis, Sir Stafford Cripps had proposed that Attlee should 
be tshuntedt from the leadership and replaced by Morrison. "Attlee", 
he said, "even after making a good speech, sat down like a frightened 
rabbit". Dalton agreed that Attlee inspired little enthusiasm but, 
as he had recently told Morrison, a change was not on the cards. 
4 
On anot her occasion Ellen Wilkinson attempted to get a movement under- 
foot to replace Attlee by Morrison. As part of the campaign she wrote 
1 Dalton, The Fateful Years, p, 82, Dalton thereafter referred to 
Attlee as "rabbit". though privately of course, eg Diary, 
September 19,1939, "Rabbit is bacV, By contrast Attlee's 
colleagues on the General Coundil spoke of his as 'Clam' Attlee, 
"and worthily he sustained the reputation! '. Citrine, 'M6n and Work, 
p. 357. 
2 As recorded by Morrison who claimed "in none of which I ever took 
part". An Autobiography, p. 164. 
3 
Diary entry, 18 September, 1939. 
4 Diary entry, 6 October, 1938. 
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an article for the. SundaZ Referee outlining the need for decisive, 
courageous and inspiring leadership of the Labour Party. If Chamberlain 
were confronted by Morrison, "a superb organiser and first-class 
political leader", the political situation would be transformed and 
a Labour victory would soon follow. The substance of the article 
was subsequently debated at a party meeting where feeling was strongly 
against her, partly on the grounds that Attlee was sick. 
I 
The question of Labour's leadership, therefore, remained a 
constant source of contention throughout the 1935 Parliament, with 
leading front benchers and a section of the rank and file resenting 
Attlee's being over them. In consequence Attlee was never 'comfortable' 
in his position, and perhaps this, coupled with a natural diffidence, 
so obvious to those who desired an alternative, was why he appeared 
as a chairman or spokesman rather than a dominant national figure 
with the confidence of the movement behind him. In retrospect Attlee's 
great weakness 
- strength to some of those voting for him 
- was that 
he all too often simply personified the ambivalent attitudes that 
were held within Labourts ranks, and at a time when the party badly 
needed a man who could perform the extremely difficult task of making 
it face up to unpleasant realities. 
Analysis Of The New House 
In the following pages the Members returned in 1935 have been 
successively examined for age, education, occupation and religion. 
The supporters of the National Government will also be analysed, 
although this thesis is concerned only with a small number of them; 
but this is merely to obtain a comparison with the Tory dissidents 
and see how representative or otherwise they were of their party. 
1 The'Fateful Years, pp. 222-25. 
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Age 
Of the 615 11Ps elected in 1935 the average age was fifty-one 
years, which was the highest between the wars except for Lloyd George's 
'Coupon' Parliament* In fact Ronald Cartlandp the newly-elected MP 
for Kings Norton and a mere stripling of twenty-eight, wrote to his 
mother concerning his first impressions of Parliament: "Most of the 
House seem old. No one looks as young as I Two factors caused 
the rise from the 1931 figure, 48 years 6 months. 
2 There was, first, 
a considerable transfer of seats, approximately a hundred, from 
Conservative to Labour HPs. The latter, as we shall see, tended to be 
older than their contemporaries in the House. Secondly, in 1935, the 
number of new members was quite abnormally small. The fact that a 
large proportion had sat in the previous House is alone sufficient 
to account for a considerable rise in the average age. 
National Members 
The following table breaks the 428 Government supporters into 
their respective age groups: 
'Tdbld A 
Range , Conservative Liberal National National Labour 
21-9 12 
30-9 87 5 2 
40-9 91 4 1 
50-9 102 10 1 
60-9 64 12 2 
70 upwards 15 2 1 
Unknown 16 1 
. 
387 3 
. 
33 
.8 
I R6nald'CartlAnd, by his sister B Cartland, p. 67. 
2 Both the 1931 and 1935 figures have been taken from Parliamentary 
Representation by JFS Ross, p. 32. 
3 
See over. 
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It is interesting to note that more than one quarter of the Tory 
party, 99 Mrs, were under 40 while less than half (181) were over 50. 
Consequently, the average age of Conservative Members was somewhat 
lower than for the whole of Parliament, 49 years 4 months. By contrast, 
the Liberal Nationals were an 'older' party: over two-thirds, 73%, were 
on the wrong side of 50 while 14,42.4%, were over 60. Their average 
age was 54 years 1 month, over four years nine months older than their 
Conservative counterparts. Similarly, the National Labour MPs, the 
third component of the National Government, had a high average age, 
54 years 9 months. 
Table B 
Opposition Members 
Range Labour Liberal 
20-9 21 
30-9 9 
40-9 32 
50-9 53 7 
60-9 40 1 
70 upwards 82 
Unknown 10 
154 21 
The figures for Labour illustrate Hugh Dalton's remark, that 
nearly everyone he "cared for in the younger generation had been 
beaten. John Parker was a solitary young victor. "' In fact Parker, 
the newly-elected Member for Romford, was not the sole representative 
3 Information on the Conservative Members (ager education, occupation) 
has been derived from JH McEwen's thesisq Conservative And 
Unionist MPs'1914-39., 
_ 
pp. 358-84. 
1 The Fatdftil'Ydars, p. 76. 
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of the younger generation. MK MacMillan, MP for Western Isles, at 
22 years of age was not only the youngest member of the parliamentary 
party but was also the 'babel of the House. Parker and MacMillan 
apart, however, the party contained little of youth and good new blood. 
Of the 154 Labour Members only 11, about one-fifteenth, were less than 
40. Apparently the younger generation of Gaitskells and Gordon Walkers 
had been left to contest the more difficult seats. Harold Laski, a 
member of Labour's National Executive, complained bitterly of this 
practice: 
"It must give-its younger members seats that can be won. 
It has many permanent (and old) backbenchers in the party who 
are simply not available as members of a future goverment, 
They weaken the party's debating strength in the House; they 
lessen its impact on the country. "' 
As things stood Hugh Dalton, at 48, could be considered a member 
of Labour's 'younger generation'. Three-quarters of his colleagues 
were over 50 and a third over 60, which produced a high average age, 
54 years 7 months. This state of affairs in a party dedicated to 
change compared very unfavourably with the Conservative Party, which 
on these figures certainly appeared more a party of 'youth' than 
Labour. It is well to remember the effects of advancing age, 
particularly on a radical party. "With the accumulation of years", 
wrote WP Maddox, "the fires of the agitator and of the youthful 
enthusiast burn with less intensity - and gradually subside into 
1,2 smouldering embers 
. 
As it was, the defective lack of vigour on the 
part of many Labour Members in the 1935 Parliament must have made the 
Party less intransigent than a normal opposition and may in part account 
1 
'The General Electionp"P61itical Quarterly, 1936. 
2 Foreign Relati6ns In British Labour Politics p. 76. 
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for its clinging to old shibboleths, like disarmament, long after 
they ceased to be practical politics. On both counts, therefore, 
Labour paid the penalty for treating Parliament like a mausoleum. 
Of the three major parties the Independent Liberals were the 
youngest in content. One-third of the party were under 40 and less 
than a half over 50, producing an average age of 47 years 9 months. 
This was perhaps fortunate from their point of view. Albeit a small 
party, the members still intended to function on a national scale, 
examining and questioning the whole range of Government activities 
as well as making detailed proposals of their own. In consequence a 
considerable strain must have been placed on the individual Liberal HP, 
in both fulfilling everyday duties and acquainting himself with the 
necessary background information in order to intervene, regularly, 
on a variety of subjects in the House. As on average they were a 
younger Party, the Liberals presumably had more stamina and vigour 
to carry out the irksome tasks of an HP. 
One fact that arises from the figures, requiring some attention, 
is the age gap between the two wings of the historic Liberal Party. 
Whereas the average age of the Independent was 47 years 9 months, that 
of his National counterpart was 54 years 1 month, a difference of 6 years 
4 months. Since the party had been united until 1932, this is somewhat 
surprising. The age difference cannot be satisfactorily explained by 
reference to an influx of Independent Liberals, due to the country 
moving against the Tories, as it did to some extent in 1935.1 Both 
Liberal camps, in fact, had their share of newly-elected members. 
2 
As suggested by Sir Richard Aclands, Letter to the Author, 
4 February, 1972. 
2 Liberal Nationals; JS Dodd (Oldham) and SV Furness (Sunderland), 
aged 31 and 33 respectively; Independent Liberals: R Acland. (Barnstaple), 
29, Wilfred Roberts (N. Cumberland), 30, Sir Hugh Seely (Berwick- 
on-Tweed), 37. 
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Was age, therefore, a factor in deciding which Liberal camp to join? 
It is possible to generalise that the older Member tended, with age, to 
be more conservative, ready to play safe and hold on to what might 
prove the last chance of office. 
1 By contrast, the younger Liberal 
was more independent-minded, and with youth on his side, not so easily 
moved by the prospects of immediate power as to abandon principle and 
throw in his lot with a traditional rival. 
Education 
The study of the 615 Members elected in 1935, reveals the division 
between the two main parties according to class interest. The education 
system of the late 19th Century produced wide social divisions. The 
children of the masses went to elementary schools to learn the "three 
R's", leaving before adolescence with only a rudimentary knowledge of 
how to read and write. Such was the educational background of most 
Labour MPs. By contrast the children of the privileged went to 
expensive boarding schools, then proceeded to expensive public schools, 
and from thence to university. For the most part they went to Oxford 
or Cambridge, as the more modern universities were regarded as inferior 
institutions. From such circumstances the majority of Conservative, 
and for that matter Liberal, Members came. Here were two different 
educational worlds catering for different classes and providing 
education for what had hitherto been the rulers and the ruled. 
Government Sup2orters 
- 
Public Schools 
In no other country do a few great public schools have such an 
influential role in educating the nation's leaders as in Britain. The 
following table shows how the more famous public schools were represented 
1 That it is a generalisation should be stressed, as there were 
exceptions to the rule, eg 5 Liberal Nationals in their 30s and 
2 Independents over 70. 
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in Government ranks: 
Table C 
School Conservative Liberal National National Labour 
Charterhouse 9 1 
Eton 98 1 
Harrow 26 
Marlborough 6 
Rugby 14 
Uppingham 6 1 
Winchester 10 
Others 45 94 
214 12 4 
The election resulted in 214 1APs sitting on the Conservative benches 
who had a public school background. This was 56.2% of the total number 
of male Conservatives (381), The most striking figure of all perhaps 
is the 98 MPs that had attended Eton. It is interesting to note that 
Old Etonians formed more than a quarter of the Tory Party in the 
Commons, This fact was commented on by certain contemporary observers. 
One 'such occasion was 28 October, 1938, when an article in the 
Evening News read: 
"Mr Chamberlain's changes in the Ministry add two more 
Old Etonians to the Cabinet. Earl Stanhope and Earl De La Warr 
join their school colleagues Viscount Hailsham, Lord President 
of the Council, who was Capt of the Oppidans in his time; 
Lord Halifax, Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Mr Oliver Stanley 
of the Board of Trade, and Earl Wintertont Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster, Eton thus has a majority in the Cabinet. " 
Contemporaries were surprised by such a high proportion of Old 
Etonians in Cabinet rank. They need not have been. The Conservative 
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Party had been dominated by Old Etonians and public school men 
for generations. In fact a somewhat scurillous work, published in 
1939 by the Left Book Club, drew attention to this long-standing 
Tory tradition, pointing out that public schools were a most 
important training ground for prospective Conservative politicians. 
The writer went on to brand them as part of "a series of institutions 
which develop the outlook of Tory legislators". 
' 
Of the 214 Conservative MPs that attended public school, 79% 
hailed from the more famous ones. By contrast, only 3 of their 
electoral allies can be included in this category, although 31.7% 
of the National Liberals and Labourites had attended public school. 
The education of those remaining was somewhat varied, as was the 
case of Conservative Members. A large number went to Cra-ar or 
High Schools of some local importance, while others were educated 
privately. Some, quite young, entered a branch of the Armed Forces 
or undertook a course at a naval or military college, in order to 
commence service careers. 
2 
opposition 
- 
Public Schools or Early Edudation 
The most striking fact in the following figures is the very poor 
showing of the Labour Party: 
1 Simon Haxey, Tory NP, p. 96. 
Eg Sir Godfrey Collins, Secretary of State for Scotland, who 
wrote of himself as educated on 'EMS Britannia'. 
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School Labour Liberal 
Charterhouse 
E ton 2 2 
Harrow 1 2 
Marlborough 1 1 
Rugby 1 2 
Uppingham 
Winchester 2 
Others 7 8 
14 15 
Only 9.1% of the Labour Party could be classed as public school, 
much the lowest of all the parties or groupings in the House of 
Commons. By contrast the 15 Liberals represent 71.4% of their 
party, the highest percentage of all for public school attendance. 
Excluding the 14 Labour MPs that attended public school, 
140 have still to be accounted for. One of the obstacles to 
assessing the educational background of Labourites is the failure 
on the part of many Labour members to record the schools which 
they attended. Where this has occurred it has been assumed that 
the member concerned received only a rudimentary level of education, 
the very absence of information lending weight to such a view. 
In addition such members took manual jobs and tended to rise to 
Parliament via the trade union movement, factors which fit the 
picture admirably. The following table analyses the education, 
up to secondary standard, of the 140 Labour NPs that failed to 
attend a public school: 
Of the missing Liberals, 4 attended Gra-ar School, David Lloyd 
George was educated at Church Schools and his daughter abroad. 
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Elementary only (recorded) 50 
Elementary only (assumed) 37 
Elementary (recorded) but who received 
some further education later in 
their careers 24 
Elementary (unrecorded) but who 
received further education 2 
Self-educated 2 
Grammar or Secondary 18 
Royal Naval College 
Privately 
Unknown 5 
140 
Overall the tables reinforce the impression that the major public 
schools were the preserves of Conservative politicians. Whereas 79% 
of the 214 Conservatives went to schools of repute, 62.5% of the 45 
Labourites, Liberals, National Liberals and Labourites attended the 
less famous, more modern public schools. Another interesting feature 
is the discrepancy between the two wings of the historic Liberal 
Partyo Over twice as many Independent Liberals attended a public 
school despite their more limited numbers, than did the Liberal 
Nationals. Perhaps the most telling fact of all, however, is the poor 
showing of the Labour Party, where a majority, 56.5% had not progressed 
beyond the elementary stage. Labour Members too, it seems, had 
their pTeserves, the elementary schools. 
University and Further Education 
The National Government 
Here we get a similar picture but Oxford and Cambridge are the 
Eton and Harrow, as is indicated by these tables: 
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Liberal National Oxford Conservative National Labour 
Balliol 15 2 
Christ Church 31 
Magdalen 17 
New College 17 1 
University 8 
Others 21 3 3 
109 4 5 
Cambridge Conservative Liberal National National Labour 
Clare 4 
King's 8 
Trinity 40 1 1 
Trinity Hall 6 1 
Others 16 4 
74 6 1 
A smaller number were educated at the modern universities in large 
towns, regarded as inferior to Oxford and Cambridge: 
Liberal National University Conservative National Labour 
Aberdeen 1 
Belfast 3 
Bristol 1 
Dublin 2 
Dundee 1 
Durham 2 
Edinburgh 9 2 
Glasgow 6 
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University Conservative Liberal National National Labour 
Leeds 3 
Liverpool 2 1 
London 7 2 
Manchester 4 
Reading 1 
S Wales 1 
Dominions 3 
Foreign 5 1 
49 8 
Graduates on the National Government benches were very numerous. The 
number of Conservatives attending a university was 232,60.9% of the 
party; that of the Liberal Nationals was 18, or 54.5%; the National 
Labourites 6, or 75%. Oxbridgets importance can be gauged from the 
fact that 78.9% of those Conservatives attending universities went 
to Oxford or Cambridge. The corresponding figures were 55.5% 
Liberal National and 100% National Labour. It would appear that 
social status from an education embracing university, usually Oxford 
or Cambridge, and public school for that matter, was an important 
qualification for a prospective National, more particularly 
Conservative, candidate. 
The Opposition 
The following table indicates the number of university men on 
the Opposition benches: 
Independent Labour Liberal 
Cambridge 
Clare 
King's 1 
Trinity 32 
41. 
Trinity Hall 
Others 
Oxford 
Balliol 
Christ Church 
Magdalen 
New College 
University 
Others 
Edinburgh 
Exeter 
Glasgow 
Leeds 
Liverpool 
London 
Manchester 
Reading 
Royal College Science 
South Wales 
Foreign 
Independent Labour Liberal 
2 
13 
5 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
2 
15 28 
Twelve, or 57.1% of the Liberal Parliamentary Party were 
Oxbridge men and if one includes the three provincials, the total 
is 71.4% university educated on the Liberal benches. This was the 
highest percentage for the three major parties, As with public 
schools, there was a discrepancy between the two wings of the old 
Liberal Party. Only one half of the Liberal Nationals were 
university educated compared with four-fifths of their counterparts, 
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the Independent Liberals. Of the six non-university Liberal HPs 
remaining, they either finished their education privately, or went 
into the forces. 
Again the Labour Party made a very poor showing; its percentage 
of university trained members was a mere 18.2%, the lowest of the 
major parties. Nevertheless, there were others that had undertaken 
some form of further education. Most of those in this category had 
received an elementary education, going on to work in mine, shop or 
factory and later on in life gaining admittance to a Labour College. 
In this way 17 Labourites attended courses at Labour and Co-operative 
Colleges including 9 at Ruskin College, Oxford. Another 4, of whom 
2 were graduates, studied at theological college, and 5 pursued 
courses at art school, polytechnic and training college. A further 
3 underwent evening, tutorial or university classes. Thus the total 
number of Labour members that had engaged in some form of what may 
be described loosely as further education was 54,35.1% of the party. 
With 56.5% not progressing beyond the elementary level, 18.2% 
attending university and 35.1%, including graduates, tfurther 
educated', it is not surprising that there were charges that Labour 
squandered its resources. "It remains an outstanding feature of the 
party", wrote Harold Laski, "that few 
... 
intellectuals were 
returned". 
' Instead of making use of able university men, and there 
were many of such that turned to the party in the inter-war period, 
it simply had the wrong personnel in Parliament. "This may to some 
extent account", felt AL Rowse, "for the impression that undoubtedly 
exists, an objection which one constantly encounters in many circles, 
often well-inclined, that the Labour Party has not the men, for one 
1 
'The General Election', Political Quattdrly 1936, 
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thing, with whom to govern. "' 
Occupation 
The third aspect of the 1935 House of Commons considered in 
these pages is that of occupation, This analysis is somewhat 
different. Age and education are constant factors for they do not 
change, whereas occupation is in a state of flux. Thus a Tory IIP 
might have started his career in the armed forces and then moved into 
commerce or industry. Alternatively, a Labour man might start his 
career in a baker's shop at the age of 11, later moving into another 
trade, such as the print. The difficulty lies in trying to classify 
these MPs into a certain group. Would the Tory be classed as a 
soldier or director, the Labourite printer or shop assistant? 
Consequently a certain amount of overlapping occurs and one has to 
be careful lest the overall picture is distorted. 
In order to analyse occupation it has been found necessary to 
assume the existence of four major divisions: armed forces and 
official services; land; professions; commerce, finance and industry. 
This is a very satisfactory method of considering the Conservative 
and Liberal NPs, but it is not very rewarding for the Labour Party, 
so that a modification of the four-fold division is essential. 
National Supporters 
(1) Land 
One of the main components of the Conservative Party has always 
been the landed aristocracy. Robert Lowe had said as much over 100 
years ago: 
l-Political'Qxiatteily, 1938,, ýThe Present and Immediate Future of 
the Labour Partyk, On one occasion Churchill described "the Labour 
people' as "so ineffectual, weak and uneducated. And that an 
uneducated Opposition was always powerless". Diary entry for 
4 May, 1937, Chips, The Diaries 6f'Sir'Henry'Chdnnon, p. 122. 
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"You, the gentlemen of England - you with your 
ancestors behind you and your posterity before you - with 
your great estates, with your titles, with your honours, 
with your heavy stake in the well-being of this land, with 
an amount of materialprosperity, happiness, dignity, and 
honour which you have enjoyed in the last 200 years, 
such as never before fell to the lot of any class in the 
world. "' 
By 1935, however, the proportion of Conservative NPs who could be 
classed under land had declined, Twenty-three could be referred to 
as land-owners; 7 possessing large areas of land, while the other 
16 had more modest estates. There were also 14 heirs to estates, 
-thus bringing the total number of country gentlemen up to 37. This 
was a mere 9.7% of the Party. 
(2) Amed Forces and the Official Services 
An appreciable number of men, after following a career in the 
Armed Forces or Official Services, reached the age of retirement or 
became bored with their occupation and turned to Parliament as an 
outlet for their energies or a vent for the opinions they have 
acquired elsewhere. For the most part the retired Colonels, Generals, 
Judges etc turned to the Conservative Party. 
3 The following table 
1 House'of Conuftoris Debates May 20,1867, Col. 606* 
A percentage of 381 - the total number of Tory MPs excluding 
6 women IlPs. 
3 The influx of retired Colonels and Generals, Admirals and Commanders, 
Colonial Administrators and Judges is sufficient to raise the 
average age of the Conservative Party appreciably. The influx 
of Trade Unionists into the Parliamentary Labour Party is their 
political counterpart. 
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analyses this grouping on the Tory benches: 
Army 49 
Royal Navy 8 
RAF 1 
Diplomatic 9 
Civil and Colonial 7 
Total 74 
The Army was well represented in the Parliament of 1935, and yet 
prior to World War II the Service which was neglected in favour of 
its rivals, was, in fact, the Army. Somewhat surprisingly the Navy 
had only 8 representatives in a country where there was such a 
strong Naval tradition. The third Service, the Royal Air Force, due 
to its comparative youth, could hardly be expected to have many 
former officers in Parliament before 1939. Taken as a whole, the 
Official Services constituted 19.4% of the Tory Parliamentary Party. 
The Professions 
Advocatesq Barristers and Solicitors 79 
Printers and Publishers 11 
Lecturers and Teachers 8 
Medics 9 
Theatrical 2 
Authors and Journalists 14 
Total 123 
The figure of 79 for those connected with the legal profession before 
their entry into Parliament is not high nor surprising. Parliament, 
after all, is the highest court in the land. The 123 MPs represented 
32.3% of the Party. 
Commerce, Finance and IndU8try 
In the following table those MPs who could loosely be called 
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businessmen have been lumped together: 
Accountants 5 
Stockbrokers 11 
Merchants 25 
Insurance 6 
Company Directors 20 
Bankers 4 
Shipowners 8 
Manufacturers 15 
Textiles 11 
Engineering 21 
Coal and Iron 4 
Builders 4 
Brewers 6 
Others 16 
Total 156 
The businessmen, an increasing group in the Conservative Party in the 
inter-war period, constituted 40.9% of members elected in 19351 This 
was by far the largest of the four groupings. 
In noting the business interests of Conservative politicians, 
Simon Haxey wrote that the facts proved that "Conservative MPS are 
part of a particularly small section of society concerned with the 
pursuit of profit and the employment of labour. It is also interesting 
to note that very few important industries are without Directors in 
the House of Commons, showing the extent to which the Conservative 
Party is dominated by this section of society. " 
2 Haxey's bookf 
Tory MP, was typical of a new sort of political literature which 
flourished in the late 19301s. It was engendered by distrust of the 
Government's handling of the unemployment question and by the 
The discrepancy in the percentage (Total 102.3%) is due to the 
certain amount of overlapping in occupations and professions. 
2 Tory MP, P-52- 
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bitterness and controversy aroused by its foreign policy. His 
book set the fashion which was soon followed by other writers. 
Haxey anatomised the character of the Tories in a manner 
reminiscent of Sir Lewis Namier's investigation of the structure of 
politics in George III's time: the strength of the aristocratic 
influence in the House of Commons; their wealth, their company 
directorships and business connections. The reader learned how 
many Conservative Mps hailed from Eton or Harrow, Cambridge or 
Oxford, from the Army, or Navy. What Haxey was really implying 
was that such associations influenced points of view, votes and 
policy. "The foreign policy which the Conservative Party has 
pursued", he argued, "is the natural policy of a wealthy and 
privileged class. The Conservatives have supported General Franco, 
Mussolini, Hitler, and even the Mikado, because these men are the 
champions of the wealthy and privileged class of other countries. 
There are many British Conservatives who believe that a defeat for 
the dictators or a victory for democracy anywhere in the world would 
weaken British Conservatism at home or in some part of the Empire". 
Haxey's book certainly reflected the pent-up bitterness of the Left 
over the foreign policy of the National Government in its latter 
years, but as CL Mowat aptly commented, it contained "more malice 
than truth". 3 
The late thirties and early forties saw a spate of Left books 
in a similar vein to Haxey's by pseudonymous authors, whose 
names evoked the glory of Rome. The most famous of course, 
were Cato's Guilty Men (1940) and Your MP (1944) by Gracchus. 
2 Tory 
, 
PP-239-40. 
3 Britain Between the Wars,, p. 634. 
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What Haxey did effectively show, however, was that, in so far 
as their occupations were a guide, the Conservative Members were 
clearly not a true cross section of the nation. Ratherothat only 
successful businessmen who could afford time for Parliamentary 
duties, or successful professional men, or persons of independent 
means, or the wives of any of them, could become Conservative Mps. 
This was never in dispute. At that time the majority of Conservative 
candidates had to pay for their electoral organisation and the 
expenses incurred during a campaign, and this necessitated the 
Conservative Party having a class bias far more emphatic than was 
warrented by its support in the country. 
Dividing the 41 Liberal National and National Labour MPs into 
their four component parts the results are as follows: 
Occupation Liberal National National Labour 
Armed Forces and Official Services 11 
Land 2 
Professions 15 5 
Businessmen 10 
Unknown 51 
-2 
33 7 
Perhaps the most notable feature of the Conservatives' electoral 
allies was their professional slant. Twenty or almost 50% can be 
categorised in this way, as opposed to 32-3% of the Tory Party. 
The Opposition 
The following table divides the Opposition Parties into the 
Liberal Nationals: Barrie, Fildes, Harbord, Leckie, Magnay. 
National Labour: ST Rosbotham. 
2JH Thomas had been General Secretary of the National Union of 
Railwaymen prior to his entry to Parliament. 
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four groupings utilised in the analysis of the National Supporters: 
Occupation Liberal Labour 
Armed Forces and Official Services 22 
Professions 9 34 
Land 41 
Businessmen 37 
181 44 
It is interesting to note that 8 Independent Liberals were attached 
to the legal profession. The corresponding figure for the Liberal 
Nationals was ten, 8 barristers and 2 solicitors. Taken together a 
total of 18 MPs out of the 54 from the two wings of the party had 
legal training. This was a third or 33.3%. For the Conservative 
and Labour Parties the comparable figure was much lower, 20.4% and 
5.2% respectively. 
Only 44 Labourites have been classified in the four categories 
utilised so far. As the party contained 154 Members only a fraction 
have been dealt with, approximately 28.6%, and of this 21.4% was made 
up from the professions. In fact the bulk of Labour MPs, originating 
from the poorer sections of the community, cannot be dealt with in 
this way. For the most part this large group was composed of trade 
unionists, the backbone of the party, whether in Parliament or in the 
country, since the establishment of the Labour Representation Committee 
in 1900. 
Most of the delegates to that foundation conference had been 
trade unionists, wanting independent Labour representation in the 
House of Commons to maintain and enhance their painfully-won rights. 
Thus it is true to say that the birth of the Labour Party was mothered 
I have been unable to trace the occupations of Sir HH Jones and 
HG White. 
50- 
by a need of the trade unions to have a voice in Parliament. 
Ernest Bevin had said as much to the 1935 Party Conference: 
"I want to say to our friends who have joined us 
in this political movement, that our predecessors formed 
this Party. It was not Keir Hardie who formed it, it 
grew out of the bowels of the Trades Union Congress. " 
Originally constituted as the political party of the unions it was 
inevitable that many of its Parliamentary representatives were 
trade unionists, and they continue to be today. 
The following table breaks down those MPs who had been actively 
involved in trade union affairs prior to their election to Parliament 
in 1935. Their occupations can normally be derived from the unions 
they belonged to, as in the case of George Hicks, MP for Woolwich 
East, the General Secretary of the Building Trade Workers, who had 
started life as a bricklayer. 
Number of Representatives 
Trade Union in the 1935 
Parliament 
Miners' Federation of Great 
Britain 36 
Transport and General Workers' 
Union 8 
National Union of Railwaymen 4 
Railway Clerks' Association 6 
National Union of General and 
Municipal Workers 6 
National Union of Allied and 
Distributive Workers 6 
Amalgamater Engineering Union 3 
London Society of Compositors 2 
United Society of Boilermakers 2 
1 Labour Party Conference Report, 1935, p. 180. 
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Number of Representatives 
Trade Union in the 1935 
Parliament 
Amalgamated Society of 
Woodworkers 2 
Others (unions with a single 
representative in Parliament) 16 
91 
The 91 represented 59-1% of the parliamentary party. 
The large number of trade unionist MPs was not only due to the 
political importance the trade unions played in the life of the 
party. The growth of the movement from its inception in 1900 had 
brought with it, as the years progressed, a determination to fight 
every possible seat. In a large number of constituencies, however, 
Labour election campaigns were badly hampered by a lack of funds. 
This was the opportunity of the trade unions. They assumed 
financial responsibility for many constituencies, paying for 
elections, the services of a regular agent and for the maintenance 
of the organisation in a good state between the elections. In return 
the constituency adopted a candidate who was in most cases an official 
of the union concerned. Consequently, the proportion of trade union 
MPs was high. In 1935, of the 552 Labour Candidates, 118 were 
financed by trade unions; and of these 118 candidates, 78 were 
elected. 
1 In other words, less than a quarter of the candidates 
were financed by trade unions, but half the Labour members were. 
This shows that sponsored trade unionists occupied many of Labour's 
safest seats and represented 50.6% of the total number of Labour MPs. 
That the trade unions occupied many of the safest Labour seats 
would not have mattered if they had exercised their choice wisely; 
The 91 trade unionists were not all aided by their unions. In 
a minority of cases the Divisional Labour Party was responsible for sponsorship. 
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but in fact they did nothing of the kind. They tended to appoint 
trade union officials who were no longer wanted in their organisations. 
According to Josiah Wedgwood, Labour Member for Newcastle-under- 
Lyme, it had been for years the practice of the Miners' Union to find 
seats in Parliament for their superannuated agents, and thus augment 
their old friends' inadequate pensions. 
1A distinct phenomenon, 
therefore, on the Labour side, was the elderly trade unionist who had, 
in his youth, worked vigorously for his union and the Labour Party. 
As a result he was retired by his union to Parliament, where he spent 
his declining years in comfort. This is admirably illustrated by 
a close study of the age groups of trade union sponsored members: 
Age Trade Unionists 
20 
- 
29 0 
30 
- 
39 3 
4o 
- 
49 12 
50 
- 
59 2'? 
6o 
- 
69 27 
70 upwards 4 
Unknown 6 
79 2 
A mere 3 of the group were less than 40 while approximately four- 
fifths were above 50.42.5% of this group were above 60. The 
average age was 58 years 1 month and yet the partyls average was 
54 years 7 months. Consequently the trade unionist member was, on 
average, over 7 years olders than his counterpart, sponsored by the 
Divisional Labour Party. The existence of such a large number of 
elderly trade unionists meant that Labour did not secure the most 
energetic representation within Parliament. 
Testament to Democracy, p. 22. In fact the average age of the 
Mineworkers Federation of MPs, 57 years 7 months, was lower 
than that for the other unions. 
2 The figure 79 is drawn from the list of Labour Members contained 
in the Labour Party Conference Report, published after the 
November election. 
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Another defect on the part of certain of the trade unionists, 
that of their environment hitherto, also did much to impair the 
effectiveness of the Parliamentary Opposition. Pat Strauss, wife 
of George, the Labour Member for North Lambeth, wrote that while the 
trade unionists were usually first class people they had been "worn 
out by a life of hard work and struggle. They find the atmosphere 
of Parliament utterly unlike their previous battlefields, and they 
are too old and exhausted to reorientate themselves to a new outlook 
and a new career. They are intimidated by the lush atmosphere of 
social correctness imparted to the House by generations of Tories, 
and are afraid to speak in the House because their accents are 'common' 
and their vocabulary is homely and direct. Rather than risk making 
fools of themselves, in their own eyes, they spend most of their time 
in the smoking rooms 
-.. 
They alternate between a nagging feeling 
of inferiority in the House, and the compensation of being the Big 
Man in their di8trict every time they return home. " 
I Naturally, the 
existence of such unobtrusive members weakened the Parliamentary 
Labour Party, as they occupied seats that could have been held by 
young, vigorous and unafraid Labourites, who would have been far more 
useful in the House. 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to give the impression that trade 
union members were essentially a liability to the party. In fact 
certain trade unionists were of a spectacular fighting breed. It should 
not be forgotten that some of Labour's greatest leaders, like 
Arthur Henderson, Jimmy Thomas, JR Clynes and Ernest Bevin, have been 
drawn from trade union ranks. 
As well as the 91 MPs engaged in trade union work prior to their 
elevation to Parliament and the 44 analysed earlier, 10 Members were 
1 Bevin and Co., p. 83- 
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sponsored by and involved in the work of the Co-operative Party. 
1 
This had been formed in 1917, originally being called the Central 
Go-operative Parliamentary Representation Committee. As this title 
proved too cumbersome it was changed to Co-operative Party in 1920. 
Its raison dletre was political protection for the Co-operative 
Movement. A national agreement existed between the Co-operative 
Movement and Labour Party so that any candidate sponsored by the 
Co-operative Party was designated 'Labour and Co-operativel. Not all 
of the 10 sponsored MPs were solely occupied by Co-operative affairs 
prior to their election, a handful were engaged in trade union work 
and one, the Rev. GS Woods, in pastoral work. 
In addition three members had been actively engaged in the life 
of the Labour Party Organisation before the 1935 election. The most 
notable of this group was Herbert Morrison, Secretary to the London 
Labour Party and Leader of the London County Council. Of those 
remaining, a few followed individual trades such as bookbinding, 
stereotyping and engineering, making their way into Parliament via 
a Divisional Labour Party. While the occupations of five it has not 
proved possible to trace, as none of these progressed further than 
an elementary education, it is probable that they were engaged in 
some form of manual work. 
2 
Whereas the occupation figures for Labour indicate that the party 
represented a wide variety of social backgrounds, from miners to 
middle class professional men, it is still true to say that the bulk 
of the party was made up of men from humble origins. James Griffiths, 
who entered Parliament following a by-election in 1936, in recording 
his first impressions, wrote that he was "surrounded by the old 
Eg WH Green was Political Secretary to the RACS while Neil Maclean 
had been organiser for the Scottish CWS. 
2D 
Frankel, B Gardner, T Kennedy, E Marklew and George Muff. 
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'cloth-cap, MPs 
... 
Nowadays (1969) the 'cloth-cap' is giving way 
on the labour benches to the 'cap and gown'. " 
1 
Working class origins, in practice, meant a lack of financial 
independence on the part of many Labour Members, and this scarcity 
of money made a Labour Opposition less intransigent than a comparable 
Tory or Liberal one. Effective Opposition, in which obstruction must 
play its part, implies long sittings into the night. Most Labour 
members, being comparatively poor men who had to live in the cheaper 
and therefore more remote sectors of London, could not afford taxi 
fares, and if debates were kept going beyond midnight they missed 
the last trains or buses home. Thus there was every incentive for 
making long sittings infrequent. 
2 
Tom Jones, too, noted that "these Labour leaders are often 
poor and unable to command the secretarial service available to the 
Conservatives. 
... 
In the last Parliament a small handful of them 
had to be prepared at short or no notice to range over topics from 
China to Peru and confront Ministers equipped with all the ability, 
knowledge and experience of the Civil Service.,, 
3 In June 1937, 
Dnmanuel Shinwell, Member for Seaham, attempted to rectify a situation 
that was hardly conducive to the party's effectiveness. 
4 
He prepared 
a memorandum in which he called for a more energetic and uncompromising 
opposition to the National Government, suggesting that Labour's 
machinery should be so adjusted to increase the effectiveness of the 
work of the party in the House of Commons. One of his proposals was 
1 Pages from Memory, P-54. 
2 See Jennings, Parliament, p. 179. 
3 Letter dated November 17,1935, A Diary With Letters, P. 156. 
4 
Shinwell: national organiser Marine Workers' Union; MP Linlithglow 
1922-24,1928-31; Seaham 1935-70; Parliamentary Secretary, Department 
of Mines, 1924,1930-31; Financial Secretary to the War Office, 
1929-30- 
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the creation of a central information bureau, for the setting up of 
which each MP should contribute L8 per year. It is probable that 
lack of income was the major factor in the rejection of this and 
the other suggestions, The Times commenting that there was "little 
enthusiasm" for the memorandum. 
1 
One further aspect of the members returned in 1935 that requires 
study is that of religious affiliation. Unlike other aspects of an 
MPIs background this is not something that will constantly be referred 
to throughout the thesis, and it is easy to view this section as an 
irrelevancy. But it is well to remember that the influence of 
religious sentiment on the attitude of members, from all sides of 
the House, was apparent during the Spanish conflict, and it is, 
therefore, worthwhile categorising MPs as far as is possible. 
The difficulty here, however, proved to be an absence of 
information. There is a simple reason for this 
- 
in a nation where 
the majority of men in public life belong to the established church 
it hardly seems necessary to comment upon their religion. Consequently 
the lack of a stated religious persuasion leads one to assume that 
the member was either Church of England or, if of Scottish parentage, 
Church of Scotland. A rider is added to the effect that some of 
this number may have been of another persuasion or not genuine 
adherents of the Christian faith. 
By contrast, the names of Noncomformist MPs elected for English 
constituencies appeared in the Congregational Christian World, the 
Methodist Recorder, and the Baptist Times and Freeman, following the 
General Election. The breakdown was as follows: 
The Times, June 24,1937- 
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Labour Liberal Liberal Conservative National 
Congregationalist 9 2 5 
- 
Friends 3 
- - 
1 
Unitarian 4 1 
Baptist 5 2 2 1 
Methodist 22 5 10 7 
43 9 17 10 
These statistics show that the Conservative Party was still "the 
Church at prayer" for a mere 2.6% of Tory MPs dissented (Protestant) 
from the established church. Belonging to the Liberal Party, on the 
other hand, was still related to Nonconformity, and indeed the same 
connection could be made to a lesser extent for Labour. 42.9% of 
Liberal MPs and 51.5% of Liberal Nationals fitted into this category, 
while the Labour figure was 27.9%. These figures throw some doubt on 
Stephen Koss's conclusion that the process of 'estrangement between 
Nonconformity and Liberalism' and the 'steady drift of Free Churchmen 
into the Labour and Conservative camps' was virtually complete by the 
outbreak of the Second World War. 1 With percentages of 42.9% and 
51.5% a mere four years before, a later date would be more appropriate 
for 'virtual completion' of this process. 
Nevertheless Koss's contention that Nonconformity had, by 1935, 
ceased to be a "viable and fairly homogeneous tactical unit" is valid. 
2 
With Free Churchmen in the new House sitting on the Opposition and 
Government sides in the ratio of 2 to 1 it could not have been other- 
wise. And from reactions to events abroad and the policies of the 
1 Nonconformity in Modern British Politics, p. 10. 
Ibid, P-13. 
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National Government at home it is evident that Nonconformity remained 
split asunder. Whatever the strictures of leading Nonconformists 
such as Lloyd George, Albert Alexander and Chuter Ede, Walter Runciman 
was despatched to Prague in July 1938 as the accredited agent of 
appeasement. Sir John Simon was tarred by the same brush. Among 
the other MPs prominently identified with Nonconformity, Sir Kingsley 
Wood was one of Chamberlain's most intimate friends and advisers, and 
Ernest Brown and Geoffrey Shakespeare were otherwise attached to the 
Government. 
Turning to Catholicism and Judaism, the Universe and Catholic 
Weekly recorded the name of the former's MPs, and its figures for 
1935 were: 
Labour Conservative 
6 10 
Consequently a very small proportion of MPs, 3.2% of Labour and 
2.6% of Conservatives, were Roman Catholic. Jewish Mps could be 
easily recognised by their names, for example, Sidney Silverman or 
Emmanuel Shinwell. But it was impossible to tell whether such 
Members still practised Judaism or were converts to the established 
branch of the Protestant Church. 
This brief look at the age, education, occupation and religion 
of Members elected in 1935 leads one to the conclusion that, of 
the three major parties, the Conservatives appear comparatively best- 
equipped to watch over the Government's handling of defence and 
foreign affairs. They were younger than Parliament as a whole, 
and possessed a sound educational background, which for some included 
the study of foreign cultures and languages. Others had attended 
either naval or military college and had behind them a long and 
distinguished service career. Money, the essential prerequisite 
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of foreign travel, was not lacking to the average Conservative Mp. 
In addition several had business interests which encompassed foreign 
lands, while others could look back on residence in foreign countries 
or involvement in Britain's overseas possessions. Of the Parliamentary 
Liberal Party much the same could be said but on a vastly limited 
scale. By contrast the average Labour MP had none of these advantages. 
Rather he was older than the House as a whole, and had a narrow 
education, his formative years spent in shop, office, mine or factory. 
Rarely did his feet touch foreign soil, except perhaps during military 
service. By the time Parliament had been reached, he might be too 
worn out by a life of hard work and struggle to take his new duties 
seriously. 
6o. 
CHAPTERII 
REARMAMENT 
By November 1935 the centre of interest was shifting from home 
to international affairs, to the political repercussions of the 
Great Depression. Three events were instrumental in this change: 
Japan's conquest and annexation of Manchuria; Hitler's accession to 
power and the commencement of German rearmament; Mussolini's invasion 
of Ethiopia. These, however, were to be a mere prelude to the crises 
which came thick and fast as the 1930s progressed. The result of 
this fluid international situation was that the British Government 
began to stir itself, recognising the need for rearmament, albeit on 
a modest scale. An f. 130,000 increase in expenditure in the 1934 air 
estimates was budgeted for, and then, in July of the same year, Baldwin 
gave a pledge that the Royal Air Force would at least retain parity 
with all possible competitors, coupling with this an announcement 
that the number of squadrons would be raised over the next five years 
to 41. 
The following year a Government White Paper, Statement Relating 
to Defence, was issued. Much of the document was devoted to a 
defence of past policy and a pledge of its continuance: support of 
the League and collective security, efforts to bring about a reduction 
of armaments. But, it continued, the Government "can no longer close 
its eyes to the fact that adequate defences are still required". The 
Disarmament Conference was at a standstill, Germany and Japan and 
other countries were rearming, and in Germany the "spirit in which 
the population 
... 
are being organised lends colour to 
... 
the 
general feeling of insecurity". The condition of each branch of 
the services was then discussed, and the paper concluded with the 
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words: "An additional expenditure on the armaments of the three 
Defence Services can, therefore, no longer be safely postponed. " 
1 
It might have been thought that the Service Estimates which 
accompanied the White Paper would betoken an opening of a real 
programme of rearmament. However, the Estimates put forward showed 
only an increase of L10 million over the 1934-35 figures, and of 
these only the Air Estimates carried any provision for an actual 
increase in size. 
It was not until 1936 that Britain began to rearm more vigorously 
though still without full conviction. The new programme, foreshadowed 
during the election campaign, was announced in another White Paper 
2 
published on 3 March, 1936 
. 
After the customary reference that 
rearming would not deter the Government from taking every possible 
opportunity for reducing the general standard of armaments, the 
provisions for increases were set out. The army, which was below 
the strength of 1914, was to be modernised and four new battalions 
added, and the Territorial Army was to be reconditioned. In the 
navy two new battleships and one aircraft carrier were to be laid 
down, existing battleships modernised, and the number of cruisers 
brought up to seventy. The first-line strength of the air force 
for home defence, which under existing programmes was to rise to 
1500 planes, would be increased to 1750 planes, and twelve more 
squadrons would be distributed along the empire's defences. The 
country1g; capacity for the production of war goods would be increased 
by orders and financial aid to companies not normally engaged in 
1 Statement Relating to Defence (Cmd. 4827,1935)- 
2 Statement Relating to Defence (Cmd- 5107,1936). 
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the manufacture of munitions; in this way companies would be helped 
to expand their plants and to equip themselves for a quick change- 
over to war production when necessary. 
Critics on the National Benches 
The reluctant progress of the Government towards rearmament 
and the removal of deficiencies within the Armed Forces did not pass 
unnoticed amongst the Ministerial supporters. Indeed from the 
Government rank and file there arose no small amount of criticism 
at what appeared to be the Government's refusal to face the facts 
squarely; it was a mood summed up in Leo Amery's words, "The more 
dangerous and confused the international situation the more urgent 
the case for putting our defences in order. ". 
1 
These critics, 
several of whom were distinguished servicemen or ex-ministers, with 
authoritative knowledge in their individual fields, were not slow 
in making their views known. 
Winston Churchill, Unionist MP for Epping since 1924, was the 
foremost Cassandra. Hitherto Churchill had had a somewhat chequered 
career. 
2 
Entering the Commons in 1900 as a Tory he soon transferred 
his allegiance to the radical wing of the Liberal Party, and thus 
served in the ensuing Liberal administrations. Removed from the 
Admiralty in 1915, because of his supposed responsibility for the 
Dardanelles fiasco, he returned to high office in 1917 when 
Lloyd George made him Minister of Munitions. After the fall of 
1 Amery, My Political Life, Volume III, The Unforgiving Years, p-195. 
2 
Under Secretary for the Colonies, 1905-08; President of the Board 
of Trade, 1908-10; Home Secretary, 1910-11; First Lord of the 
Admiralty, 1911-15; Secretary for War and Air, 1919-21; Colonial 
Secretary, 1921-22. 
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the Coalition, Churchill lost his seat, but within two years was 
back in the House as a 'Constitutionalist', unopposed by the 
Epping Conservatives. The same year Baldwin rescued him from 
possible oblivion by appointing him Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
a post he held until 1929. 
During the Labour Government that followed Churchill figured 
prominently in the Conservative Shadow Cabinet. However in 1931 
he withdr*w because he bitterly opposed the Labour Government's 
policy towards India, which Baldwin supported. Churchill 
denounced the Government's policy as premature and dangerous: 
concessions to Indian nationalism would only increase disorder, 
and the struggle would go on for the complete severance of every 
tie between Britain and India, "a frightful prospect to have 
opened up so wantonly, so recklessly, so incontinently and in so 
short a time". He believed that India, "a jewel of Empire" should 
never cease to be a part of the Empire. In a typical phrase, he 
spoke of Gandhi as a "seditious saint striding half-naked up the 
steps to the vice-regal Palace". 
1 
When the National Government was formed, Churchill redoubled 
his efforts to get the Government to abandon the policy of its 
predecessor. Not only was his opposition ineffective but, in the 
words of AJP Taylor, it established his reputation "as a romantic 
sabre-rattler and discredited him in advance against the time when 
he took up worthier causes". 
2 All in all he estranged many 
Conservatives and also deepened the profound hostility which 
1 House of Commons Debates, January 26,1931, Col-702. 
2 
English History 1914-45, p. 278. 
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practically all Labour men felt towards him. Thus began the years 
of isolation which ended only with the Second World War. 
Undaunted by his isolation Churchill devoted himself to his 
personal pursuits: his home, family, painting and the biography 
of his ancestor, Marlborough. In the midst of his solitude, 
Churchill thought constantly of the European situation and the 
rearming of Germany. Soon he became associated with another group 
of rebels in the Commons, those warning of the "German menace" 
and the need for British rearmament. While some dismissed him as 
a warmonger, others saw his warnings as another drive for power. 
His one-time close friend, the press magnate, Lord Beaverbrook, 
was among the latter and felt that "If he continued on his present 
course I would not be surprised if Baldwin put a veto on him in 
his constituency". 
1 
The Times, too, suspected his motives, 
remarking that it is "generally felt that he ir. now determined to 
carry on a continuously hostile campaign against the Government". 
2 
In effect, suspicion as to his intentions was handicapping the 
warnings he now gave to Parliament. David Maxwell Fyfe, then MP 
for West Derby, recalled: 
"Winston Churchill's mighty philippics on defence 
matters, perhaps the greatest and bravest speeches he 
ever delivered, were listened to in grim silence in the 
House of Commons, but his reputation had suffered so 
severely over the India Bill and his hapless intervention 
in the Abdication dispute that he made little impact. 
1K Young, Churchill and Beaverbrook, p. 121. 
2 
may 8,1936. 
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In the lobbies and the Smoking Room he was almost 
universally regarded as a finished man, and it certainly 
seemed to be the case. 't 
1 
Although Churchill later saw fit to condemn British statesmen, 
unmindful of his warnings, as blind, it should not be forgotten 
that what he was then saying carried less weight simply because 
he put it forward. 
At the beginning of the decade, when the virtues of disarmament 
had been extolled by all parties Churchill had struck a different 
chord. He deplored the fact that the Disarmament Conference was 
mainly attempting to secure some sort of approximation in military 
strength between Germany and France. The danger of urging France 
to disarm was that Britain would be involved more closely on the 
Continent. His hope was that Britain would be able to steer clear 
of European commitments, and that a strong France and her allies 
would be able to cope with any European dangers that might arise: 
"If we wish to keep our freedom, we should forthwith 
recognise our role in Europe is more limited than it has 
hitherto been considered to be. Isolation is, I believe, 
utterly impossible, but we should nevertheless practice 
a certain degree of sober detachment from the European 
scene. We should not try to weaken those powers which 
are in danger, or feel themselves in danger, and there- 
by expose ourselves to a demand that we should come 
to their aid. " 
2 
Political Adventure, The Memoirs of the Earl of Kilmuir, P-51. 
From an article dated November 7,1933, Arms and the Covenant, 
P. 101. 
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But even at this time Churchill was constantly pointing out that, 
if Britain wished to secure a real measure of detachment from the 
Continent and to preserve her liberty of action, early rearmament 
was essential. 
1933 witnessed the European situation being further complicated. 
Germany, under its new Chancellor, commenced rearming and this was 
to become, for Churchill, the central issue in any Continental 
appraisal. Faced with such circumstances Churchill continued to 
expose what he felt was the unwisdom of the successive attempts to 
weaken France, and intensified his demand for a strengthening of. 
Britain's defences. Thus he told a London audience at a meeting 
in November, 19331 that it was "our business, our wisdom to detach 
our country as much as possible from the vehement conflicts which 
are gathering on the continent of Europe". 
1 Britain could not do 
this if she encouraged Germany's neighbours to disarm and failed 
to put her own defences in order. Growing relatively weaker must 
inevitably involve Britain more closely on the Continent and 
therefore, he argued, a measure of detachment could only be 
regained by a vigorous and timely rearmament. Deficiencies in 
the national defences should be made good, and in particular the 
Government should accept the "principle of having an Air Force 
at least as strong as that of any other Power that can get at us". 
2 
Although Churchill's warnings of German rearmament and of 
Britain's inferiority in the air had begun as early as 1933, it 
The Times, 15 November, 1933- 
Article dated 7 February, 1934, Arms and the Covenant, p. 111. 
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war, the following year that they became more frequent. He 
complained in March that Germany, now "arming fast", would within 
a year or eighteen months be strong enough in the air to threaten 
"the heart of the British Empire", while Britain was "the fifth 
Air Power only 
- 
if that". 1 Small wonder he thought the increased 
expenditure budgeted for in the 1934 estimates - U30,000 - was 
derisory. Replying for the Government, Baldwin dismissed Churchill's 
charges but pledged the administration to maintain parity in the air, 
that is, an air force as large as Germany's. 
Six months later Churchill told the House that not only did 
Germany have a military air force but that within a year it would 
be as strong as Britain's and by 1937 twice as large. That same 
day, November 28, in company with other Government backbenchers, 
including Sir Robert Horne, Leo Amery, Captain FE Guest, Lord 
Winterton and Bob Boothby, he moved an amendment to the Address 
which declared that "the strength of our national forces is no 
longer adequate to secure the peace, safety and freedom of 
Your Majesty's faithful subjects". Baldwin denied this flatly, 
describing their calculations as "considerably exaggerated", but, 
on May 22 of the following year, was forced to eat his words, 
admitting that the German Air Force had already achieved parity. 
The absurd part of the story is that Baldwin was nearer to 
the truth than Churchill. The German air force had to start from 
a very rudimentary basis early in 1934 and was not able to achieve 
much operational strength before 1936. The total German production 
of combat aircraft from the beginning of the new air force up until 
the end of 1935 was only about 2663 machines, while the Royal Air 
1 House of Commons Debates, 8 March, 1934, Col. 2031. 
68. 
Force had more than that number in service in March 1935- 
1 Evidently 
the Germans had not achieved parity and the Royal Air Force still had 
a considerable lead, as the unrepentant Air Ministry had then main- 
tained. The only evidence to the contrary came from Hitler himself. 
On 2 May, 1935, he told Sir John Simon that his air force was as 
strong as, if not stronger than, the British. Hitler's assertion was 
at once accepted as true by Baldwin on behalf of the Government, and 
has generally been accepted to the present day. As AJP Taylor has 
commented "It was unprecedented for a statesman to confess to more 
arms than he had. But this was Hitler's way: he hoped to win by 
bluf f. 11.2 
Although Churchill's figures were incorrect, in a further sense 
he was right. This was in his conviction that German rearmament would 
gain momentum and thus leave Britain behind. Seen in this light the 
Government's new programme, which was immediately planned, providing 
for an expansion of front-line strength equivalent to double the 
existing target, was inadequate to "restore" or, more accurately, 
maintain parity. 
Fortified by the Prime Minister's admission, Churchill again and 
again in the period 1935-37 returned to the same theme, trying to 
shake the Ministry out of what he considered its cautious approach. 
His endeavour was to bring the relative strength of British and 
German armaments to a clear-cut issue. In Germany rearmament was 
"proceeding upon a colossal scale, and at a desperate break-neck 
speed 
... 
they have organised the whole industry of the Nation 
1 U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Overall Report 1945, P-11. 
2 English History, 1914-45, P-385. 
69. 
to war, and a very large part of it is actually working on a war 
basis". 1 In Britain, however, Baldwin's Government 
- 
unwilling to 
interfere in the normal course of trade and alarm the public with 
a prodigious programme of rearmement 
- 
was, in Churchill's opinion, 
unable to decide on measures equal to the emergency. What did trade 
and public disquiet matter when Britain's life was at stake and she 
could be caught defenceless? To this end he witheringly attacked 
the Government for its seeming lack of leadership: 
"Is there no grip, no driving force, no mental energy, 
no power of decision or design? " 
By now Churchill was convinced that the best time to commence 
rearming, and the scale of armaments required, had gone un-noticed, 
and a long interval must now elapse before Britain could once again 
be strong to maintain an independent position. Ever flexible, 
Churchill began to feel his way towards the establishment of a 
collective system to meet the arming German menace. By 1936 he 
was pressing with increasing resolution for a firm League policy 
to ensure that a united stand might be made so that the peaceful 
nations should not be struck down one by one. 
It is necessary to add that as 1937 progressed, and with the 
succession of the more determined Chamberlain, Churchill's 
criticisms of British rearmament plans lessened in their intensity 
I 
as he became conscious of the new Government's efforts to improve 
national defences: 
1 House of Commons Debates, 21 April, 1936, C01.15o6. 
2 Ibid, Col-15o8. 
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"At present the Government is making a great effort 
for rearmament 
... 
It is our duty to support His 
Majesty's Government in its policies of defence and 
world peace by every means in our power. Party unity 
is indispensable. " 1 
Perhaps Churchill also hoped that by muting his attacks Chamberlain 
would find it possible to bring him back into office. Apparently 
Churchill told Leslie Hore-Belisha of his desire to get into the 
Cabinet and the Secretary for War discussed the matter with the 
Prime Minister. But Chamberlain was firm in his refusal: 
"If I take him into the Cabinet 
... 
he will 
dominate it. He won't give others a chance of even 
talkingti. 
When Hore-Belisha brought up the subject again the Prime Minister 
replied: "I won't have anyone who will rock the boat". 
2 Nevertheless, 
soon after Eden's resignation, by when it was apparent to Churchill 
that he had no more chance of obtaining office than he had had in 
Baldwin's day, conflict over rearmament was to reach a new pitch. 
It has since come to light 
- 
as in the case of air parity in 
May 1935 
- 
that Churchill's estimates of German strength were 
exaggerated. In 1936, according to Churchill, Germany was rearming 
at an annual rate of 12,000 million marks. The actual rate was 
5,000 million. Hitler himself boasted that he had spent 90,000 
million marks on rearmament. His actual expenditure in the six 
years up to March, 1939, was 40,000 million. In a sense then, 
1 Burton Klein, Germany's Economic Preparations For War, PP-17-20. 
2RJ Minney, The Private Papers of Hore-Belisha, P-130- 
71. 
Churchill, whose estimates of German spending on armaments before 
the war were consistently almost twice what was actually being spent, 
had an exaggerated fear of Hitler. In retrospect, it could well be 
argued that if exaggerated precautions, on the lines advocated by 
Churchill, had been taken against Germany it might well have proved 
beneficial for this country and Europe. As it was the Government, 
somewhat in advance of an unpeturbed public - at least till 1938 - 
rearmed, albeit slowly, and on a scale insufficient to meet the 
coming catastrophe. 
However much the impression is conveyed in The Gathering Storm, 
Churchill was no lone Cassandra. There were other MPs who realised 
more acutely than most the transformation in the relative war power 
of victors and vanquished that was taking place in Europe. Sir Austen 
Chamberlain, the Member for West Birmingham, was perhaps the most 
distinguished of this group. Austen came from the celebrated 
Midlands family, the eldest son of Joseph and half-brother of Neville, 
who was soon to be premier. Entering politics in his late twenties, 
he held various minor offices until his appointment, in 1903, as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. In 1911, when Balfour resigned the 
leadership of the Unionist Party, Austen was a contender for the 
vacant throne. He stood down, however, as did Walter Long, his rival, 
in favour of Bonar Law, who was to rely heavily upon him. In 1915 
he was made Secretary of State for India, and he entered the War 
Cabinet in 1918.1919 saw him back at the Treasury, and two years 
later he became leader of the Conservative Party on the resignation 
of Bonar Law. His hold on the leadership did not last long. In 
October, 1922, at the Carlton Club meeting dissatisfaction with 
Chamberlain's support of Lloyd George came to a head. The Coalition 
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and Chamberlain's leadership drew abruptly to an end. He 
returned to office in 1924 when Baldwin made him Foreign Secretary, 
a post which he held until the Government's defeat in 1929. His 
foreign policy, highlighted by the Locarno Pact, revealed a deep 
love of France, which was unpopular in many quarters. 1931 saw 
Chamberlain First Lord of the Admiralty in the National Government. 
His tenure of office only lasted a few months, for in October, 1931, 
he declined further office to make room for younger men. It was 
a decision he later regretted. 
Until his death in 1937, Austen Chamberlain is held to have 
exercised his greatest influence as elder statesman. Keith Feiling, 
in his biography of Neville, referred to Austen winning as "a 
private member an influence he had never held as a Minister". 
Doubtless he was a much respected figure on the backbenches but 
the fact remains he was a declining political figure. His 
speeches on the German menace and the need for rearmament were 
listened to with the respect appropriate to an elder statesman, 
but there is little evidence that they made much impact. This is 
well illustrated by the diaries of Henry Channon, MP for Southend, 
who went so far as to describe Austen as "the doyen of the House 
of Commons donkeys" after he made "a really stupid speech in which 
he attacked Germany with unreasoning violence". 
2 
Nevertheless, for those restive about the Government's conduct 
of affairs the respectable Chamberlain, and not the tainted Churchill, 
appeared as a natural leader and mentor. It was to him that critics 
tended to turn, as Ronald Cartland implied in a letter to his sister. 
1 Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain, P-277. 
2 Diary entry, July 27,1936, The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, P-73- 
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"He is the Elder Statesman", he wrote, "the backbenches have given 
him what the Front Bench never did 
- 
disciples". 1 In February, 1935, 
even Churchill's son-in-law, Duncan Sandys, felt pressed to write 
that he "in common with many other younger members", was heartened 
by a great speech Chamberlain had made on defence. "It will make 
all the difference", he went on, "if we can continue to look forward 
to a strong and independent lead from you in the very difficult and 
decisive times that lie ahead". 
2 
They were to be disappointed. 
There were family reasons why Austen could not take his dissent too 
far, as he outlined in letters to his sister Hilda: "I have to be 
double careful lest I should injure Neville"; "I believe I should 
attack him (Baldwin) but for the fact that by so doing I should 
damage Neville's chances". 
3 Furthermore Chamberlain, like another 
occupant of the Foreign Office, Anthony Eden, was not a rebel by 
nature, and although he was frequently dissatisfied with aspects 
of the Government's defence and foreign policies, he was effectively 
loyal to the end. 
Sir Robert Horne, Conservative Member for Hillhead, Glasgow, was 
another malcontent. Entering politics in 1918 he immediately obtained 
a minor post in Lloyd George's Government. His promotion was 
equally rapid: Minister of Labour, 1919-20; President of the Board 
of Trade, 1920-21; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1921-22. Like 
Austen Chamberlain, Horne lost office when the great Coalition was 
IB Cartland, Ronald Cartland, P-70. 
2 Duncan Sandys to Austen Chamberlain, February 15,1935, 
Austen Chamberlain Papers. 
Letters dated respectively 10 October, 1936, and 4 july, 1936. 
Austen Chamberlain Papers. 
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overturned. Unlike Austen he was never again to sit on a government 
front bench, although this can be traced to Baldwin's hostility towards 
him. Apparently the latter regarded his habit of haunting night 
clubs with distaste, and was moved to describe Horne as "that rare 
thing 
-a Scots cad". 
1 
The dissident grouping included Sir Edward Grigg, Sir Henry 
Page Croft, Viscount Wolmer and Earl Winterton. After a service 
career from which he retired in 1921, Grigg served as Lloyd George's 
private secretary, a post which brought him a seat in the House of 
Commons. From 1922-25 he sat as National Liberal Member for Oldham 
but was then appointed Governor General of Kenya, only returning to 
England in 1931. Within two years he re-entered the Commons as a 
Conservative sitting for the Altrincham Division of Cheshire. His 
views at this time were set out in a letter written by Tom Jones, 
following a meeting between the two men in February, 1936: 
"Grigg talked most of the time with a vigorous, 
monotonous dogmatism. Baldwin must go. The Cabinet is 
useless. Defences have been shockingly neglected. We 
are impotent in the air. By July we shall be in the 
soup. Musso will be on top and we shall have to choose 
between War and Humiliation. " 
2 
Grigg's colleague, Page Croft, had a "purer" Tory background, and 
first sat in the House as Member for Christ Church, 1910-18, during 
which time he served in the Great War. He severed his connections 
with the Army in 1924, when he was made an Honorary Brigadier General. 
Blake, The Conservative Party from Peel to Churchill, p. 226. 
Evidently Baldwin offered Horne the Ministry of Labour in 1924, 
knowing he was bound to decline. 
2 Letter dated February 25,1936, A Diary With Letters, P-176. 
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From 1918 until 1940 he represented Bournemouth, when Churchill 
elevated him to the Peerage and appointed him Under Secretary of 
State for War. He was very much to the Right of his party, as his 
stand over India and, to a lesser extent, Abyssinia was to reveal. 
Viscount Wolmer also entered the House in 1910, sitting for 
South West Lancashire and subsequently Aldershot, which he continued 
to represent to 1940. 
l He was Assistant Director of War Trade, 
1916-18; Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade, 1922-24; 
Assistant Postmaster General, 1924-29. In 1942 he was appointed 
Minister of Economic Warfare. Wolmer's constituency of Aldershot 
contained a service training ground, and it is therefore likely 
that he would have had strong local support in his views on the 
inadequacy of Britain's defences. 
Earl Winterton, an Irish Peer, entered the House at the tender 
age of 21, in 1904. He was to represent Horsham, Sussex for 47 
years. His political career encompassed several offices of State: 
Under Secretary of State for India, 1922-24 and 1924-29; Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1937-39; Deputy to the Secretary of 
State for Air and Vice President of the Air Council, March-May, 1938; 
Assistant to the Home Secretary, June 1938 to January 1939; 
Postmaster General, January 1939, relinquishing the post in November. 
Thompson has it that Winterton, in accepting the Chancellorship of 
the Duchy of Lancaster in 1937, was "bought off" by Chamberlain, 
and this is quite possible for, as we shall see, he had proved 
himself to be an effective opponent of Baldwin's administration. 2 
Wolmer was heir to the Farl of Selborne, a title to which he 
succeeded in 1940. 
The Anti-Appeasers, p. 14. 
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Loss of office in 1939, however, marked the return of Winterton to 
the dissidents, for in May, 1940, he voted against the Chamberlain 
Government. 
Bob Boothby, Brenden Bracken and Duncan Sandys were the youngest 
of this group of MPs. Boothby had entered the House as Member for 
East Aberdeenshire in 1924 at the age of 23- 
1 Although he had 
strongly criticised the return to the Gold Standard in 1925, 
Boothby had served as Churchill's Parliamentary Private Secretary 
at the Treasury 1926-29. He had not taken part in Churchill's 
India campaign but consistently supported him on defence and foreign 
affairs. He was one of the first Members of Parliament, during 
the 19301s, to advocate compulsory military service. 
Bracken, in contrast to the open Boothby, was something of a 
mysterious character, as he still remains. 
2 Born in Ireland, he 
left for Australia at an early age, returning to Britain in his 
twenties. He entered the world of journalism and banking, becoming 
Chairman and Managing Director of the Financial News and the 
Investor's Chronicle, while continuing 
- 
still in his twenties - 
to edit The Banker. He won Paddington North in the 1929 election 
for the Conservatives, against the national swing, and from then on 
was Churchill's man totally, being friend, informant, critic and 
counsellor. His contacts in the City and other high places provided 
Churchill with much valuable information which he might otherwise 
have missed. Unlike Boothby, he was very definitely right of centre. 
1 Boothby was briefly Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of 
Food, in 1940, but was then forced to resign over an enquiry into 
his finances, over which he felt bitter at Churchill for not 
supporting him. 
2 MP North Paddington, 1929-45- "He was a man of mystery to the end", 
wrote Robert Rhodes James. "He died of cancer in August, 1958, 
after years of ill-health, and left explicit instructions that his 
papers were to be destroyed". Churchill, A Study in Failure, 
1900-39, p. 294. And he remains a mystery. Andrew Boyle's Poor, 
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Duncan Sandys was elected to the House in 1935, after resigning 
from the Foreign Office to go into politics. 
1 His association with 
Churchill can be linked with his marriage to Diana Churchill in 1935 
after meeting her during the Norwood by-election. It was his father- 
in-law that set him on what was to be a long and distinguished 
ministerial career, which began in 1941 with his appointment as 
Financial Secretary to the War Office. 
By any standard, both at the time and in retrospect, this was 
a notable group of distinguished Parliamentarians. Churchill wrote 
of them: 
"The Ministers eyed this significant but not unfriendly 
body of their own supporters and former colleagues or seniors 
with respect. We could at any time command the attention 
of Parliament and stage a full dress debate. " 
2 
This was not arrogance on Churchill's part. Tom Jones commented 
that the "hostile critics in the House are a formidable group: 
Austen, Winston, Horne and Winterton". 
3 
It is important to note that the handful of Conservative and 
Unionist Members so far mentioned were not the sum total of those 
alarmed over the state of the country's defences. The call for 
increased rearmament 
- 
over and above that which the Government 
intended 
- 
attracted, as it always has done, considerable support 
2 contd. 
Dear Brendan 
- 
because of the chronic lack of information on his 
activities, opinions etc 
- 
goes nowhere near unravelling the true 
Bracken. 
1 For more information on Sandys see P. 212-13- 
2 The Gathering Storm, P-70- 
3 Letter dated May 23,1936, A Diary With Letters, p. 209. 
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on the Conservative benches. Yet the others, some of whom will be 
mentioned later, were not part of the Churchill-Chamberlain circle, 
which met regularly, pooled information, and acted as a pressure group 
in the House. 
According to Sir Henry Page Croft the group met very frequently 
at dinner and each of them in turn invited the other, either to a 
room at some well-known restaurant or to their private houses. 
1 In 
Sir Austen Chamberlain's appointment diary for 1936 twelve such dinners 
are recorded, and these were mostly held at the Savoy or Claridges. 
2 
It is not clear whether the whole group was present on each occasion, 
as the diary for the most part merely alludes to single dinner 
companions. However it is possible that they were all gathered 
together and that Chamberlain's reference to dining with a certain 
member of the group indicates which one was to act as host on that 
occasion. 
As to meetings at private houses, Chamberlain's diary and 
letters reveal that he attended at least two in 1936, the notorious 
May gathering at Shillinglee Park, and the other held at Churchill's 
home at Chartwell in February. In a letter to Ida, dated February 23, 
Austen confessed that he was staying with Churchill for the we; kend. 
"It is a man's party", he wrote, and Robert Horne, Edward Grigg, 
Page Croft, Bob Boothby and the Professor, otherwise Professor 
Lindeman of Oxford, were the guests. "We were a merry party", 
he continued, "and the talk was good. There were almost as many 
opinions as men, but on one thing we were all agreed 
- 
that 
1 My Life of Strife, 
'p. 
285. 
2 Appointment Diaries, Austen Chamberlain Papers. 
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Germany was a danger, the one danger that might be fatal to us, and 
that that danger had been too long neglected. 111 Such sentiments were 
reiterated by Sir Henry Page Croft: 
"All of us were obsessed with the German peril and the 
nakedness of our country to meet it, and Winston was 
galvanic in collecting the latest information to place 
before us 
... 
We had convincing evidence that he was 
right or very nearly right in every particular. " 
2 
The May weekend was held at Earl Winterton's home, Shillinglee 
Park, on the 22-23 of that month. Members of the party included 
the Austen Chamberlains, the Winston Churchills, the Edward Griggs, 
Page Croft, Robert Horne, and of course the host. It was designed 
as another informal occasion when those present might get down to 
jointly considering matters that troubled them, and this is what 
appeared to have happened. A week later Austen Chamberlain wrote 
to Ida saying that "we discussed some serious questions of defence 
3 
and foreign policy and laughed and amused ourselves a good deal" 
. 
What made the occasion notable was that an enterprising reporter 
managed to enter the grounds and published a correct list of those 
present. With such a group of malcontents it was not surprising 
that sensational articles were written in the popular press that 
they had constituted themselves a cabal and a "shadow cabinet" and 
were plotting to bring down the Government. Such was the substance 
of The Daily Express and Daily Herald stories, while the News 
Chronicle gave the feature three columns on the front page. 
Letter from Austen to his sister Ida, February 23,1936. 
Austen Chamberlain Papers. 
My Life of Strife, p. 285. 
3 Austen Chamberlain to Ida, 29 May, 1936. Austen Chamberlain 
Papers. 
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Inevitably this gave the group bad publicity and for a while 
threw them in a somewhat sinister light. 
1 Yet had they hoped to 
bring the Government down? One faithful Government supporter 
certainly thought they were concocting "dark schemes to torpedo the 
government". 
2 
This seems unlikely, although it is only fair to add 
that some, if not most, of the membership would have liked to see a 
change of leadership. Chamberlain, writing to his sister in February, 
had asked the question was the group a "cave". Answering his own 
query he commented that "some would like to make it so, but I am not 
3 
a cave-man". In any case dislodging Baldwin or other national 
leaders was not part of the group's avowed purpose. As Page Croft 
related "We were engaged in no form of intrigue against the Baldwin 
Government, our whole purpose being to force the administration to 
face the facts by stating the truth in Parliament'le 
4 
It is probable that members of the group circulated information 
to each other, but the evidence for this is scanty. In the Chamberlain 
Papers there is a memorandum from Sir Edward Grigg setting out his 
views on defence, and it is reasonable to assume that each member of 
the group received a copy. In it Grigg argued that there were a 
series of questions that required immediate answer which were "being 
neglected or deferred by the Government". Such, for instance, was 
the question whether the minimum production necessary to bring 
1 It was this episode that provoked Baldwin's remark about it 
being the time of year when midges came out of dirty ditches. 
2 Diary entry, 26 May, 1936, The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, p. 61. 
Chips also recorded that the group was now known as the "House 
Party". 
3 Austen to Ida Chamberlain, 23 February, 1936. Austen Chamberlain 
Papers. 
4 
My Life of Strife,, p. 285- 
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Britain's defences up to security level could be undertaken by 
industry without disturbance of its commercial programme, or whether 
emergency measures should be imposed to speed up production, which 
would inevitably result in commercial sacrifice. The industrial 
aspect of the defence probleAi was "undoubtedly the most serious" but 
Grigg did not see how a decision could be taken upon it until "a 
general Defence Plan comprising all the three Services" was worked 
out. Such a plan would have to take into account certain factors: 
ground and air defence of England against air attack; the protection 
of ports and sea-borne trade; the provision of a Field Force for 
action on the Continent; the co-ordination of Army and Air Force 
expansion; and, the scale and range of the air forces required for 
attack on enemy supply and nerve centres. Only in this way would 
it be possible to get a clear outline of the equipment necessary 
for Britain's security, in order that a well-grounded decision on 
production could be taken. In the war, Grigg recalled, the "problem 
was easier to solve because commerce went by the board and every effort 
was bent to secure the maximum output by the earliest date. That 
is what Germany is doing today. But England cannot be turned into 
a vast munitions factory in time of peace to the sacrifice of 
everything else. The Government must therefore plan its minimum 
requirements in order to decide whether or not special measures are 
indispensable and, if so, what. " 
Grigg went on to argue that somebody should be commissioned 
with the duty of working out an "organic and articulated Defence 
Plan" at once. "Frankly I believe", he wrote, "that some authority 
should be set up to produce a Defence Plan within a maximum period 
of two months. " Similarly a Ministry of Munitions should be 
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established through w6ich all orders to industry could pass in 
the order of priority laid down by the authority responsible for 
the Defence Plan as a whole. 
1 
At one of their informal meetings the idea was conceived that 
leading Unionists in both Houses should act together, bringing 
pressure to bear on the Government to accelerate the pace of 
rearmament. What they had in mind was either a secret session 
of Parliament or a deputation to Baldwin and senior ministers. 
During the Defence Debate on July 20, Churchill put forward the 
alternatives. Scrupulously refraining, so he told the Commons, 
from saying anything which was not obviously known in foreign 
countries, he and his associates had a number of questions to ask 
which were not for public consumption. 
"They are questions to which full answers could not 
be given in public. We have statements to make which we 
should like to have answered, but not here before all the 
world. The times have waxed too dangerous for that.,, 
3 
Either a deputation or a secret session would meet the need for 
secrecy. 
In fact both alternatives had already been mooted by Austen 
Chamberlain with his brother Neville. Austen had informed the 
Chancellor, early in July, how concerned he was with the situation 
of this country and of Europe. "For the first time since the 
late Marquess of Salisbury's Government he noticed that the House 
Memorandum from Grigg on Defence, 11 May, 1936. Austen 
Chamberlain Papers. 
2A 
secret session is an occasion when it is felt proper to exclude 
strangers. It is done by Standing Order. Strangers are excluded 
by a motion carried without amendment or debate, reserving to the 
Speaker or Chairman the power to order the withdrawal of strangers 
from any part of the House. 
House of Commons Debates, 20 July, 1936, Col-839- 
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of Commons was divided on foreign policy. " To remedy this he suggested 
a secret session, at which the Government could give information, which 
could not be given in ordinary debate, with a view to "bringing the 
various parties together and securing a united front". If this 
proved impossible the Government should receive certain influential 
members of the House including the leader of the Labour Opposition. 
1 
Neville raised Austen's proposals at the Cabinet meeting on 
6 July. The ministers were unanimous in rejecting the secret session 
idea, Ramsay MacDonald arguing that there was "no precedent except 
in time of war". As to a deputation the Chancellor was afraid lest 
"it would lead to a series of conferences at each of which 
Mr Winston Churchill would probably adopt an increasingly aggressive 
line. Very likely he and Mr Lloyd George would work together and 
would accuse the Government of not taking Defence sufficiently 
seriously and eventually they might insist on telling the country, 
or at any rate Parliament, what they thought about it. " The Lord 
I 
President of the Council, Ramsay MacDonald, expressed similar fears 
concerning Churchill. He asked whether the Cabinet "would welcome 
the prospect of having to face his criticisms in Parliament 
... 
The 
more he thought about it the less he liked the idea of a meeting 
attended by Churchill, whether Attlee accepted or not. " 
Whatever may be said about the accuracy of Churchill's 
warnings it is clear that in his self-appointed role as defence 
watchdog he was much feared by his own Government. Baldwin had 
excluded Churchill because of his disturbing and forceful nature: 
Cabinet Minutes, July 6,1936. Both the Labour and Liberal 
Parties were to decline to be represented in the deputation. 
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"Winston is a blister and I came to the conclusion 
that it is more comfortable to have a blister outside 
than inside. " 1 
Yet here was Churchill proving he could be almost as great a thorn 
outside the Cabinet as inside. 
After considerable discussion the Cabinet agreed that they could 
not refuse the request. Lord Swinton, the Secretary of State for 
Air, expressed the hope that the deputation might turn out to the 
Government's advantage. Under the scrutiny of Churchill and his 
friends the administration seemed uncertain. On their chosen subject 
of rearmament it was most difficult to give a wholly frank and 
convincing answer in Parliament, as it was necessary, for security, 
that the country remained ignorant of what went on behind the 
scenes. Yet at such a deputation, Swinton argued, "things might be 
said which could not be spoken of outside but which would convince 
any unprejudiced mind". By giving the critics, in particular 
Churchill, precise information as to the real state of affairs 
their criticism might be stilled. 
2 
On 28 July, the deputation was received by Baldwin, Lord Halifax 
and Sir Thomas Inskip at the Prime Minister's room in the House of 
Commons. The deputation from the Commons consisted of Camberlain, 
3 Churchill, Horne, Amery, Sir John Gilmour, Captain FE Guest, 
Quoted in Sir Percy Harris's Forty Years in and out of Parliament, 
P-131- 
2 It is interesting to note that Churchill recorded that as a result 
of his confidential contacts at home and abroad, he was as "well 
instructed as many Ministers of the Crown", The Gathering Storm, 
P-70- Middlemass and Barnes, in their biography of Baldwin, 
contest this claim, p. 945- 
3 Gilmour: MP East Renfrew, 1910-18, Pollok, 1918-4o; Secretary of 
State for Scotland, 1924-29; Minister of Agriculture, 1931; 
Home Secretary, 1932-35; Minister of Shipping, 1939-40. 
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Sir Roger Keyes, Winterton, Page Croft, Grigg, Wolmer, JTC Moore- 
Brabazon 1 and Sir Hugh O'Neill. 
2 That of the Lords included 
Salisbury, Viscount Fitz Alan, Viscount Trenchard, Lord Milne and 
Lord Lloyd. Churchill noted that this was "a great occasion. I 
cannot recall anything like it in what I have seen of British public 
life. The group of eminent men, with no thought of personal advantage, 
but whose lives had been centred upon public affairs, represented 
a weight of Conservative opinion which could not be easily 
disregarded". 3 
The proceedings, which were confidential, occupied three to four 
hours on two successive days. As Chamberlain was the Senior Privy 
Councillor there, he introduced the deputation: 
"We are profoundly anxious about the European conditions, 
which to us are extremely menacing, and about our own 
position faced with these conditions 
.. 
I do not think 
there is much dispute about the enormous preparations 
which Germany has made and is making, for what purpose 
we may guess, but the information that reaches us as 
Brabazon was the first English pilot, holding the Number 1 
Certificate granted by the Royal Aero Club for Pilots. He 
served in the 1914-18 war, and was made responsible for the 
Photographic Section of the Royal Flying Corp. Entering 
the House in 1918 he was twice Parliamentary Secretary, 
Ministry of Transport. Brabazon was, however, plagued with 
financial troubles which hindered his Parliamentary career, 
although he was later to be Minister of Transport, albeit 
briefly, in the Coalition Government (1940-41). 
2 O'Neill: Ulster Unionist MP, 1915-52; Chairman, Conservative 
Private Members Committee, 1935-39 (1922 Committee); Under 
Secretary of State for India and Burma, 1939-4o. 
3 The Gathering Storm, p. 201. 
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to the progress of our own programme and the adequacy of 
our programme does leave us with grave anxieties and 
doubts. We wish to put that information before you. 
If you can remove our doubts and fears, no one will 
be more pleased than we. " 
1 
Churchill, however, was the chief spokesman and put the greater 
part of their case against the Government. He led of f with a 
statement on the dangers of the situation in which Britain found 
herself, and the inability of the government's efforts to overcome 
it. He touched on munitions, and then dwelt on the danger from 
the air, emphasising the problems of supply. Stating firmly that 
the Government's programme of 120 squadrons and 1500 first line 
aircraft for Home Defence would in no wise meet the deadline of 
1 April, 1937, he doubted whether even 30 squadrons would be ready 
on time. It was imperative, he said, that the Government should 
act at once to ensure that industry carried out their plans. 
Once Churchill had concluded the rest of the delegation made 
their various contributions: Keyes 
2 
reviewed the position of the 
Navy, while Grigg concentrated on the Army; Guest, 83 chosen field 
1 Cabinet Papers, Memorandum on the July 28-29 Deputation, 1936. 
2 Keyes: Director of Plans, Admiralty, October, 1917-January, 1918; 
implemented audacious operation of storming the German batteries 
and sinking of blockships at Zeebrugge, April, 1918; Deputy Chief 
of the Naval Staff, 1921-25; Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, 
1925-28, and of Portsmouth, 1929; Admiral of the Fleet, 1930; 
1934 stood for Parliament in the naval constituency of Portsmouth 
North, and during the by-election was supported by Churchill and 
the India Defence League; represented Portsmouth until 1943, and 
throughout was recognised as an outspoken champion of the Navy. 
3 Guest: Private Secretary to his cousin, Winston Churchill, 1907-10; 
Liberal MP, 1910-29; Joint Patronage Secretary to the Treasury, 
1917-21; Secretary of State for Air, 1921-? 
-2. In 1929 he lost his 
seat in North Bristol and when he returned to the Commons, two years later, he represented Drake, Plymouth as a Conservative. He died 
in 1937- 
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war, the Royal Air Force, and Amery, as he recorded, mainly confined 
himself to the question of anti-aircraft defence. 
I At the end of 
the two days the whole gamut of Britain's defences had been 
covered by the deputation. In reply Baldwin and Inskip assured 
the delegation that the various aspects of the defence problem 
which had been brought to their notice would receive attention and 
promised a more complete statement in the autumn. 
This was given on November 23 when all those involved in the 
deputation were invited by the Prime Minister to receive a 
comprehensive statement on the whole position. Inskip gave them 
a frank account of what he considered to be the situation, saying 
that he felt the estimates given him by the deputation were too 
pessimistic; that everything possible was being done, short of 
emergency measures which would only upset industry, cause wide- 
spread alarm and advertise the existing deficiencies. 
In detail, Inskip informed Churchill that his figures for 
the front line strength of the German Air Force were, according 
to the Air Staff, too high: Churchill disputed this, although as 
has since become apparent, his figures were exaggerated. As to 
the suggestion that in numbers of aircraft the programme would 
not be completed by the appointed date, Inskip admitted that there 
would be a delay of approximately three months in the completion 
of the 1937 programme. The principal reason for this was the 
failure of the aircraft industry to keep to the delivery programme. 
An added factor was the Air Ministry policy of going for the 
newest types with a view to their bulk production. In effect this 
1 The Unforgiving Years, P-197- 
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was a telling criticism of Churchill's views. It would have been 
quite easy to order a large number of older types - as in fact 
Churchill was requesting 
- 
instead of the later machines, the 
production of which would not begin before the end of the year. 
Their prototypes were first seen by the public in 1936: the 
Wellington, Blenheim and Hampden bombers, the Spitfire and 
Hurricane fighters, on which Britain's survival in 1940 largely 
rested. Even so Churchill's statement that only 25% of the air- 
craft promised (120 squadrons) by March 1937 would be available 
by then was denied. The Air Staff's figure was as high as 80%. 
As to the deficiencies in Army Equipment, a subject raised by 
Grigg, the War Office had prepared a memorandum for Inskip's use 
with the deputation. Grigg had suggested that machine-guns, anti- 
tank rifles and stokes mortars hardly existed. In fact there were 
ample machine-guns, but not enough mortars or rifles. Elsewhere 
a sorry picture was painted: field artillery was short; mechanised 
transport lacking; tanks not up to strength. The War Office 
memorandum concluded with the suggestion that the deficiencies 
could be remedied sooner if the Government were prepared to interfere 
with normal trade. This of course was what the critics were 
suggesting, that in the emergency the Government should impinge to 
a certain extent on the ordinary industries of the country 
-a half- 
way house between peace and war industry. The Government, regarding 
such a step as "a gigantic stride" that would damage trade and do 
harm to Britain's international interests, remained unconvinced. Thus 
it was not until 22 March, 1938 that the Services were freed from 
the restriction not to interfere with normal trade. 
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Inskip's reply then ranged over several fields: the low 
recruiting figures for the Services, shipping, the Fleet Air Arm 
and air raid precautions. In effect it was a comprehensive state- 
ment, but it failed to relieve the anxieties of the majority present. 
Churchill made this clear: 
"I think you have given a very full and interesting 
answer to the points which have been raised but I do not 
feel you have made us a party to the grave situation which 
you have before you except in regard to one or two 
particular points where you have not contradicted the 
assertions which were made. " 
In a similar vein Amery recorded that "we all went away with long 
faces". 1 Clearly Swinton's hopes that the Deputation would 
redound to the Government's advantage were mislaid. Although 
"things were said which could not be spoken outside", Churchill 
and his associates were not, as had been hoped, convinced. 
Dissatisfied with the Government's answer to their criticisms, 
the critics continued their efforts to force the pace of rearmament. 
Feiling's Life of Neville Chamberlain recorded how persistent they 
were and how "the Government was daily under critical scrutiny by 
powerful elements 
-.. 
Austen, Churchill, Amery, Londonderry, 
Winterton and Lloyd, ex-ministers or would-be ministers, whose 
chosen ground was a subject of which several of them were masters, 
and concerning which the country was fully perturbed, the need of 
defence". 2 In fact Page Croft commented that "we had such a galaxy 
of talent in Parliament that I was not called on to intervene but I 
The Unforgiving Years, D. 197. Amery was the MP for Sparkbrook, 
Birmingham, 191175--, Unher Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
1919-21; Parliamentary and Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, 
1921-22; First Lord, 1922-4; Secretary or State for Colonies, 
1924-29; not included in the National Government because of his 
strong and unpopular imperial views, which on one occasion provoked 
a row with Neville Chamberlain. 
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delivered a series of warning speeches in the country". 
1 
Sir Thomas Inskip had doubted whether the deputation would 
quieten the fears of the Government's critics, and had predicted 
further attacks. When Parliament reassembled, he wrote "we must 
anticipate a continuance of the attacks made on the Defence 
Programme before the Recess, mostly by supporters of the 
Government". 2 Sure enough, the group raised the matter in the 
debate over the Address. Churchill made what was to be one of 
his greatest and most memorable 
- 
if somewhat unjust 
- 
speeches: 
"The Government simply cannot make up their minds, 
or they cannot get the Prime Minister to make up his 
mind. So they go on in strange paradox, decided only 
to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute. adamant 
for drift, solid for fluidity, all-powerful to be 
impotent. So we go on preparing more months and 
years 
- 
precious, perhaps vital, to the greatness of 
Britain for the locusts to eat.,, 
3 
Churchill was followed by Winterton who took the opportunity to 
challenge the Government for its "soothing syrup" of Ministerial 
generalities: 
"Are you doing all you might do, or only what 
it is comparatively easy to do without upsetting 
2 (from previous page) 
The Unforgiving Years, p. 285. 
1 My Life of Strife, p. 286. 
2 Cabinet Memorandum entitled The Defence Programme, 30 October, 1936. 
3 House of Commons Debates, 10 November, 1936, Col-925. 
91. 
anybody's feelings or causing political difficulty 
among a population that is notoriously adverse to drastic 
measures in peacetime? ". 
1 
Such persistency in critical scrutiny can be gauged by the 
frequency of their interventions in the House. In the two year period 
from November, 1935, to November, 1937, fifteen members on the 
Government benches, excluding Ministers, spoke three or more times 
on defence matters. Seven of the fifteen were Amery, Brabazon, 
Churchill, Grigg, Keyes, Sandys and Winterton, who respectively 
spoke on six, four, ten, five, nine, four and three occasions. 
In fact both Churchill and Keyes intervened on more occasions than 
any Defence Minister. The other eight were WJ Anstruther-Gray, 
23 
Viscountess Astor, Captain HH Balfour, Wing Commander James, 
45 0 Simmonds, Major Sir RD Ross, Rear Admiral Sir Murray Sueter 
and Vice Admiral EA Taylor. 
6 
They were also anxious to force the 
1 House of Commons Debates, 10 November, 1936, Col. 934. 
2 Astor: wife of Viscount Astor; the first woman to take her 
seat in the House of Commons; MP for SuttonPlymouth, 1919-45. 
3 Balfour: attached to the Royal Air Force, 1918-23; MP Isle of 
Thanet, 1929-45; Under Secretary of State for Air, 1938-44. 
4 
Simmonds: aeronautical engineer; MP Duddleston, 1931-45; 
Chairman of the Air Raid Precautions Committee of the National 
Government supporters. 
5 Ross: MP Londonderry, 1929-45; Parliamentary Private Secretary 
to First Lord of the Admiralty, 1931-35- 
6 
Taylor: MP South Paddington, 1930-59. 
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Government's hand over rearmament but did not associate themselves 
with Churchill. 
Another platform for the dissidents was the Annual Conference 
of the National Union of Conservatives, at which they were extremely 
active in using as a goad and stimulant to Government policy. Indeed 
the principal preoccupation of Conferences during the 1930's could 
be said to be the problem of defence. Beginning with 1933 the 
Conference, "amid scenes of great enthusiasm", passed a resolution 
stating "that this Conference desires to record its grave anxiety in 
regard to the inadequacy of the provisions made for Imperial Defence". 
In 1934 the Conference underlined its anxiety by passing a resolution 
identical in wording to that of the previous year, while Churchill, 
in 1935, secured the passage of a resolution requiring the Government: 
11(l) To repair the serious deficiencies in the defence 
forces of the Crown, and in particular, first, to organise 
our industry for speedy conversion to defence purposes, 
if need be. 
(2) To make a renewed effort to establish equality in the 
air with the strongest foreign air force within striking 
distance of our shores. 
(3) To rebuild the British Fleet and strengthen the 
Royal Navy, so as to safeguard our food and livelihood 
and preserve the coherence of the British Empire. " 
2 
IAter Conferences, 1937 in particular, spoke with an equally clear 
voice urging the Government to substantially increase its armaments 
3 
programme. 
IR MacKenzie, British Political Parties, p. 228. 
2 The Gathering Storm, p. 156. 
3JP MacKintosh, British Cabinet, P-581. 
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The pressure on the Government at Conference, in Parliament 
and the Press, as well as the many warning speeches delivered 
throughout the country, were not the only symptoms of concern over 
the state of Britain's defences. In the autumn of 1936 there was 
established an Army League Committee, a private organisation of men 
who were anxious about the decline of the Army. It included several 
members of Parliament including Amery, who was Chairman of the 
Committee, WJ Anstruther-Gray, 1 Grigg, Horne, William Mabane, 
JRJ Macnamara, 3 O'Neill, and Sandys. 
The Committee felt that public attention had been focused 
almost exclusively upon the serious state of Britain's air defences, 
and, to a lesser degree upon the Navy. "The nation", so a 
manifesto claimed, "is prepared to vote whatever sums are needed 
to bring both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force up to the 
strength required to cope with any probable contingency. The work 
of re-equipment and expansion in both of these vital services is 
well in hand. " 
4 
But what of the Army, the remaining link in the 
chain of security? The no less serious problem of land defences, 
both as regards the small regular army and the calls that might be 
made upon it, and also as regards the reserves of expansion behind 
the Regulars, remained neglected, alike by Cabinet and by public 
opinion. This had resulted in Britain's foreign policy being 
1 Anstruther-Gray: Member for North Lanark, 1931-45- 
2 Mabane: National Liberal Member for Huddersfield, 1931-45- 
3 Macnamara: elected Member for Chelmsford, Essex in 1935, a 
division he represented until his death in action in 1944; 
he was associated with Eden's 'glamour boys', 1938-39; he 
voted against Chamberlain in May, 1940. 
4 
Rising Strength, 1 March, 1938. 
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"weakened during the past few by the known inferiority of our 
military position, which has caused certain militaristic powers 
to question the continued vitality of our people". 
1 More serious, 
as Amery later warned, "in any crisis we should find our present 
Army and its reserves woefully inadequate". 
2 
After considerable discussion the Committee presented to the 
Government, in July, 1937, a report suggesting the re-organisation 
of the Army. 
The report contained a careful analysis of the whole military 
position, both from the strategical and recruiting aspects, and 
put forward a number of proposals. 
3 It urged that the whole 
structure of the Army be changed from the sixty-year-old Cardwell 
system, with its scheme of linked battalions, which bore no 
relation to Britain's needs in war; that the pay, general conditions 
and terms of service should be improved in order to secure the 
type of men required; 
4 
the reconditioning of both wings of the Army 
simultaneously, and not the Government's proposed gradual renovation 
of the Territorial Army so that it did not interfere with the 
Regular's programme. 
In the report the Committee visualised the further step of 
forming an Army League, the object of which would be "to explain 
1 Beddinton Behrens, 'How the League Started', Rising Strength, 
March, 1938. 
2 Amery, speech to Army League luncheon at Leeds, 17 June, 1938. 
Recorded in The Times, 18 June, 1938. 
3 Rising Strength, January, 1939 issue. Article by Behrens. 
4 
Amery had long advocated this in the House. See his speech 
on the Army Estimates, 12 March, 1936. 
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to the public the necessity for maintaining an Army, for assisting 
its recruitment, and for raising its status in the eyes of the 
people". 
1 The idea was not original. The League was to do for the 
Army very much what the Navy League had done for the Navy. To 
achieve its aims, the League sought to obtain a national membership 
of men and women, and to establish branches throughout the country. 
It organised demonstrations, indoor and open air meetings, invited 
social and political organisations to arrange for League speakers 
to address them. It assisted local authorities in instructing the 
public on air raid precautions. Study groups were formed and an 
attractive monthly magazine called Rising Strength was published. 
2 
"We are not concerned to criticize the Government", announced 
Amery. "They are doing the best in accordance with what they 
believe to be the support that public opinion will give them. Our 
business is to create the public opinion which will enable the 
Government, or any other Government, whatever its complexion, to do 
those things which we believe to be essential to the very existence 
of our country. 
0 Despite these assurances the League, by ignoring 
the deliberate Government policy of neglecting one service in favour 
of the other two, and drawing attention to the army's weaknesses, was 
flying in the face of the Administration. Small wonder one of the 
participants later recorded that t1official circles frowned on our 
1 Rising Strength, January, 1939. 
2 Rising Strength featured articles like 'Berlin's Air Raid 
Precautions' by Dr Haden Guest (Labour MP for North Islington), 
'War in the Air' by Duncan Sandys, and 'Women in War' by 
Winston Churchill. 
3 From a record of Ameryis speech to the annual meeting of the 
League, Rising Strength, February, 
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agitation for improved defence, on the general grounds that a 
breath of criticism weakens the Government". 
1 Such a clash, however, 
had been foreseen by the Army League's founders who, in Amery's 
words, wanted at all costs to "strengthen the hands of the Secretary 
of State for War". In fact Leslie Hore-Belisha was very "receptive" 
to their proposals, and was soon to put underway a fundamental re- 
organisation of the army's structure. 
2 Rising Strength was able to 
boast, in January, 1939, that the League's proposals "have very 
largely been carried out or known to be under consideration". But 
before the Army League seriously got underway, the whole situation 
was transformed by the Munich Crisis of 1938, with its drastic 
warning of the perils of unpreparedness, and of the need of prepara- 
tion for instant readiness on a scale, both in numbers and in 
adequacy of training, far exceeding anything contemplated in 1937- 
Amery noted that "the situation revealed by Munich gave a new 
direction to our activities". 
3 
As we have already noted a Navy League was in existence, having 
been established some years before. This had the dual purpose of 
interpreting to civilians the fighting forces at sea, and keeping 
the needs of maritime defence before the political eyes of the people. 
Several Conservative MPs were associated with it, including several 
of the aforementioned: Horne, Keyes, Sandys, Amery, Guest and Grigg. 
Lord Lloyd was its President throughout this period, while Churchill 
I Behrens, 'The League, Citizen Service, June, 1939- 
2 The Unforgiving Years, p. 200. 
3 Ibid, p. 200. For the new direction see PP-565-6. 
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was a frequent guest and speaker at League functions. Consistently 
the League bewailed the fact that the fleet had been "allowed to 
fall into decline" and pressed for the construction of adequate 
naval forces so vital to the "one Power which was absolutely 
dependent on the sea for its existence". 
1 Although it welcomed 
the Government's awakening on the naval issue a certain jealousy 
of the priority given the air force was apparent in League circles. 
It was admitted that there was a need for a strong air force "but 
to suggest that the arm by which we alone really lived, and without 
which nothing could fly in the air for lack of fuel, did not need 
further strength and vigilance, was very dangerous folly indeed". 
2 
Another aspect of the defence question, in which the Government's 
critics were to have some success, was in the appointment of a 
Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence. Early in 1936 a campaign 
had been launched for a Ministry of Defence, backed by The Times 
and instigated in the Commons by the Member for Wellingborough, 
Wing Commander AWH James. 
3 It was not simply a question of 
spending more on existing forces as they stood, so James and the 
other critics argued; what was needed was a plan to relate those 
forces, both in total strength and in relation to each other, to 
the dangers Britain might have to meet. The situation required a 
Minister of Defence to co-ordinate the scale and the tasks of the 
three Services in the light of a coherent plan and commend this plan 
to the Cabinet. Such a Minister, the critics felt, should have a 
jellicoe addressing the Trafalgar Day Dinner, The Times, October 18, 
1935- 
2 Lord Lloyd addressing the Navy League, The Times, 16 May, 1935. 
3 James: MP, 1931-45; formerly instructor RAF College, Cranwell. 
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staff of his own, to work continuously on the central problem of 
defence, in conjunction with the three Service Ministers, and so 
get better value for the large sums of money devoted to Imperial 
Defence. 
Re-organisation was urged in a Private Member's Bill on 
14 February, the Ministry of Defence Creation Bill. This called 
for an end to the "three tremendous vested interests" which did 
not give way an inch to one another, especially in the financial 
allocations each year; the introduction of one Service, the 
amalgamation of the three, was proposed. The Bill was presented 
by Sir Murray Sueter 
1 
and supported by George Lambert. 
2 Amery 
took the opportunity to associate himself wholeheartedly with the 
concept of a Minister of Defence. He proceeded: 
"What is needed is a Minister who shall be free 
from administrative preoccupations of a great Department 
and who can give his whole time to the problem of 
co-ordination and supply. " 
It was necessary, he suggested, to make sure that too much money did 
not go to any one Service. Rather money should be related to 
strategic needs, and this task was work for a co-ordinator: 
"There must be someone with a co-ordinative conception 
of our strategical needs to stand between the Chancellor 
and the Departments when the main issue of the allocation 
of money is being considered. 
Sueter: a Rear-Admiral; Conservative MP for Hertford, 1921-45. 
By all accounts he had a very fertile mind and was in part responsible 
for the introduction of submarines in the British Navy (1902-03) 
and the creation of the Royal Naval Air Service, the first Anti- 
Aircraft Corps for London, and the Armoured Car Force. He made a 
contribution to the evolution of the tank, helped develop the 
Empire airmail services and invented the torpedo carrying air- 
craft. 
2 Lambert: Liberal MP for South Molton, 1891-1924 and 1929-31; 
Liberal National, 1931-45; Civil Lord of the Admiralty, 1905-15. 
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Another speaker in support of the bill was the elder statesman, 
Sir Austen Chamberlain, who intervened with damaging effect. Quoting 
from a letter by Lord Trenchard to The Times, he alleged that the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee deliberately shelved important decisions 
if they could not reach agreement and did not refer them to the 
Committee of Imperial Defence or the Cabinet. 
1 However, what 
"caused a mild sensation" was Chamberlain's attack on the Prime 
Minister. 
2 Baldwin's biographers put this down to "a desire to show 
the true feeling in the party and his opinion that Churchill 
should have the job (the new ministry),,. 
3 However, Chamberlain's 
colleague Earl Winterton, wrote "that it meant no more than he was 
seriously alarmed, like the rest of us, at the turn of events and 
at a certain mental inertia on Stanley Baldwin's part. 
4 
That 
Winterton was closer to the truth can be gauged from a letter sent 
by Austen to his sister Hilda: 
"It did rather flutter the journalistic dovecotes 
and I think rather surprised S. B. To tell the truth I 
thought that the time was overdue for trying to shake 
him out of his self-complacency. of course it is true 
that no man can do all the work which in these days the 
(from previous page) 
House of Commons Debates, 14 February, 1936. Cola-301-635. 
1 Lord Trenchard, the former Chief of the Air Staff. 
2 Jones, Letter dated 17 February, 1936, A Diary With Letters, 
p. 174. 
3 Middlemass and Barnes, Baldwin, p. 908. 
Winterton, Orders of the Day, p. 214. Another member of the July 
deputation, Moore-Brabazon, shared this view: "I became more and 
more irritated with Mr Baldwin, who seemed to be drifting rather 
than doing anything constructive on many questions of policy. " 
The Brabazon Story, p. 161. 
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Prime Minister is supposed to do, but what angers me 
is that the present P. M. does none of it and this, 
mastering all my self-restraint, I refrained from 
saying. 
1 But S. B. had better show himself more alive 
to his duties or he will get into serious trouble, 
for discontent is spreading and becoming more serious. 
It is discontent bred of anxiety as to the results of 
his slackness and having done much to save him in 
December when an adverse vote would have been a direct 
vote of censure and necessitated his resignation, I 
decided to use this non-party debate when no vote 
would be taken to tell him what not only the older 
but many of the younger members are privately saying. " 
2 
Altogether a total of 20 members spoke during the course of the 
debate: 6 Labour, 1 Liberal, 1 Communist and 12 supporters of the 
Government. Only 3 were opposed to a measure of reorganisation: 
Lord Eustace Percy, the Government spokesman; George Hardie, the 
Chamberlain would have been less than human if he had not felt 
bitter to Baldwin following the December days. Acting upon the 
hint that once the Hoare-Laval crisis was over Baldwin would 
"Want to talk" to him about the Foreign Office he had rallied 
support for the Government only to be then bypassed in favour 
of Eden. His feelings were well expressed in a letter to his 
sister Ida: "I should like to write about the real Baldwin 
whom we know does not fit in at any point with the picture 
which the public have made of him for themselves 
... 
we 
know him as self-centred and idle; yet one of the shrewdist 
not to say slyest of politicians but without a constructuve idea 
in his head and with an amazing ignorance of Indian and foreign 
affairs and of the real values of political life. 'Sly, sir 
devilish sly' would be my chapter heading, and egotism and 
idleness the principal characteristics that I should assign 
him. " Letter to Ida, 28 December, 1935, Austen Chamberlain 
Papers. 
2 Letter to Hilda, 15 February, 1936. Austen Chamberlain Papers. 
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pacifist member for Springburn; Willie Gallacher, the lone 
Communist, representing West Fife. 
1 The general tone of the 
debate therefore was that the system was inadequate, especially 
at a time when a reconditioning of the defence forces was an 
admitted necessity. 
That same day Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet, 
wrote to Sir Warren Fisher, the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury 
and Head of the Civil Service: 
"After today's debate I am afraid we have got to 
make some concession for a Minister of Defence. " 
Hankey therefore recommended a compromise to Baldwin in order "to 
meet the widespread desires in Parliament and elsewhere for a 
Minister concentrating on the central problems of defence". 
2 Three 
days later the Cabinet appointed a Ministerial Committee under the 
Chairmanship of the Prime Minister, with the following terms of 
reference: 
"To consider the question of co-ordination of defence 
in the light of the Debate in Parliament on Friday, 14th 
February, 1936, and the Cabinet discussion, and report 
their conclusions.,, 
3 
The report by the so-called Committee on the Co-ordination of Defence 
was ready by 20 February and, almost inevitably, concluded that 
a new Minister should be appointed. A White Paper on these lines 
was issued within a few days. 
The Government reply to the debate, made by Percy, was somewhat 
ineffective. His speech was described by Tom Jones as but a 
"thick cloud of words". Letter dated 17 February, 1936, A Diary 
With Letters, P-174. 
Cabinet Papers, Memorandum on Defence Co-ordination, 14 February, 
19T. - 
3 Committee on the Co-ordination of Defence Report, 20 February, 1936. 
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The Government's moves offer a splendid illustration of the 
way in which the House of Commons is able to influence the conduct 
of the Nation's affairs. Criticism in the House, and complaint in 
the lobbies, combined of course with agitation outside, forced the 
Government to amend its policy. 
1 Although the new departure was 
limited in scope and in some ways a sop to Parliament, it showed 
that Baldwin's government, despite its large majority, was not 
impervious to criticism. 
Austen Chamberlain welcomed the new arrangement, writing to 
his sister Hilda that he was "very well satisfied with the Government 
reorganisation of the Defence duties". 
2 Some of the other critics, 
however, were far from satisfied with the new post. Amery dismissed 
it as a "concession" to the "general demand for such an appointment", 
reflecting Baldwin's desire not to "upset the even tenor of the 
Government's life by creating a new office with formidable powers". 
3 
Churchill, too, considered the constitution of the new office and 
its powers unsatisfactory. 
4 
Both were of the opinion that no Minister 
entrusted with the work of co-ordination would achieve it without some 
It does appear that Baldwin had begun to realise that the co- 
ordination of the new programme and the mobilisation of industry 
would require full-time attention. Prior to the February Debate 
he was already feeling his way to the creation of a Minister 
responsible for Defence, answerable to Parliament. Doubtless the 
Debate gave a new direction to his activities, both forcing immediate 
action and aiding him to steer the proposal through a hostile 
Cabinet. Middlemas and Barnes, pp. 908-10. 
2 Letter to Hilda, 29 February, 1936. Austen Chamberlain Papers. 
3 The Unforgiving Years, p. 196. 
4 
The Gathering Storm, P-175. This criticism proved most perceptive; 
because of the circumscribed nature of the post "no living man 
- 
not even Winston Churchill 
- 
could have made a success of the 
appointment. " Ismay, The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay, P-75- 
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greater share of executive authority than the White Paper of 
3 March gave him. It would be only too easy for that Minister to 
offer advice which none of the heads of the three Service Departments 
would take. There was also the danger that co-ordination of the 
Defence plans and the question of the industrial side of arming 
would become intermingled with the result that the task would be 
beyond the capabilities of any one man. And even Austen Chamberlain 
admitted that the "new man will have a terrific task and I do not 
believe that anyone now in the Government is fit for it except 
Neville, who I am glad to know has definitely refused it, and I am 
dreadfully afraid that Baldwin will appoint some incompetent". 
1 
To prevent the new minister being bogged down with the industrial 
side of arming Churchill, and others closely associated with him, 
began to advocate the need for a separate Minister, who would set up 
something in the nature of a Ministry of Supply. Such a Ministry, 
by co-ordinating the demands of the three Services, would go a long 
way towards the re-equipment of Britain's expanding forces and 
adapting industry to war production, should the emergency arise. 
2 
Despite their pleas no action was taken until the spring of 1939- 
Churchill's views at this time were clearly set out in a 
Cabinet note circulated by Sir Maurice Hankey. He happened to live 
close to the ex-Minister, and attended a dinner at Chartwell on the 
19 April. Xhurchill used the occasion to have a full and penetrating 
discussion on Britain's defences. Points arose which gave an 
1 Letter to Hilda, 29 February, 1936. AU8ten Chamberlain Paper8. 
As urged by Grigg and Horne in the Defence Debate of 
29 May, 1936. 
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indication of the line that Churchill was likely to take in the 
forthcoming debates in Parliament and Hankey considered the 
conversation important enough to warrant informing Baldwin and 
Inskip of its content. He wrote: 
"My impression is that he intends to be rather 
aggressive on Imperial Defence during the remainder 
of the present session. The point on which he was 
strongest was the desirability of setting up a Ministry 
of Supply. " 
1 
Churchill's main criticism as to the duties of the Minister 
of Defence Co-ordination was his assumption of the chair at the 
Principal Supply Officers Sub-Committee. Inskip's role, he said, 
should be confined to questions of general policy, such as bombs 
versus battleships, the value of Russia as an ally, and so forth. 
To chair the Supply Officers Sub-Committee should be the role of a 
Minister of Supply or Munitions. Churchill, according to Hankey, 
"went out of his way to explain that he did not want the job for 
himself. He had already held the post in war and would not touch 
it again% 
2 
What intrigued Parliament, however, was not the duties or 
limitations of the new post, but the identity of the new Minister. 
Austen Chamberlain backed Churchill and openly stated that it was 
an "immense mistake" to exclude him. 
3 
"There is only one man", he 
1 Cabinet Note, 21 April, 1936. 
2 Ibid. Apparently Hankey suspected Churchill of advocating 
the new Ministry as a means of getting back to power. 
3C Petrie, Austen Chamberlain, Vol. 2, p. 413- 
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wrote, "who by his studies and his special abilities and aptitudes 
is marked out for it, and that man is Winston Churchill. I don't 
suppose that Baldwin will offer it to him and I don't think that 
Neville would wish to have him back, but they are both wrong. He 
is the right man for the post, and in such dangerous times that 
consideration ought to be decisive. " 
1 The Defence White Paper 
Debate in March also witnessed the recommendation of "the Right 
Honourable Member for Epping" by Winterton and Keyes. Even though 
this chorus came from his friends, there is no doubt that Churchill 
was expecting the appointment, as his subsequent disappointment 
revealed: "to me this definite and as it seemed final exclusion 
from all share in our preparations for defence was a heavy blow". 
2 
According to his biographers Baldwin went through "agonising 
difficulties" in selecting the new Minister and considered several 
individuals for the post, including Hoare, Neville Chamberlain, 
Churchill and Inskip. "The Chief Whip pressed for Inskip as the 
safest man, and Chamberlain (Neville) advised Baldwin to accept him. 
The events of the weekend (the violation of the Rhineland) afforded 
a good reason for discarding both Churchill and Hoare since they had 
European reputations which might be held to be provocative, and Inskip, 
while exciting no enthusiasm, would involve the Government in no 
fresh complexities. 1,3 
1 Letter to Hilda, 15 February, 1936. Austen Chamberlain Papers. 
2 The Gathering Storm, p. 176. 
3 Middlemas and Barnes, p. 916- Apparently Hoesch, the German 
Ambassador in London, was later to write that if Churchill had 
been Minister of Defence and Austen Chamberlain at the Foreign 
Office, there would have been war. Ibid, p. 917. 
lo6. 
It has become very fashionable to condemn the choice. Churchill's 
unkind description of the appointment as the most remarkable since 
Caligula had made his horse Consul is often referred to by writers 
on the period. 
1 Inskip, of course, had no knowledge of service 
administration at the highest level, and although already over sixty, 
he had not served in the Cabinet before. With such a background it 
was likely that there would be difficulties in him establishing any 
effective control over the policies and the plans of the three 
Services. Nevertheless, what should be remembered in Inskip's favour 
is that Lord Chatfield, who subsequently succeeded him as Minister, 
heartily approved of his appointment, and that the crucial decision 
to give increased priority to the fighter element of the Royal Air 
Force, which helped to win the Battle of Britain, was due to Inskip. 
2 
The fact remains, however, that Inskip, for the most part, made 
himself useful in minor ways, lacking the authority to co-ordinate 
effectively the three Services. He was increasingly absorbed - as 
the critics predicted 
- 
in what should have been the task of quite 
a different office, namely that of a Minister of Supply. 
In 1938 the critics of the Government's rearmament programme 
possibly had a further, if somewhat limited, success when the 
Secretary of State for Air was forced to resign. Between the beginning 
of 1936 and the outbreak of war the main progress made in rearmament 
was in the enlargement and re-equipment of the Royal Air Force. This, 
Amery recorded that at the time Churchill "only asked me whether 
there was any prospect of his being offered the vacant Solicitor- 
Generalship. 111. The Unforgiving Years, p. 196. 
2 Chatfield was then First Sea Lord. 
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however, was not enough to save the Government from severe 
criticism at the hands of some of its supporters, let alone the 
Opposition Parties. According to Winterton, the Chancellor of the 
Duchy of Lancaster, who had been appointed in March 1938 to be 
Lord Swinton's deputy in the Commons, the critics were impatient 
at "the inevitable delays in producing new types of aircraft off 
the drawing board, and in having to build and equip new factories". 
Most of this impatience, he wrote, was "unjustified". The great 
progress made in offensive and defensive methods and weapons for 
the air "could not be disclosed in detail to Parliament for security 
reasons; the invention of radar was a case in point". In any case, 
neither he nor Swinton had "a free hand to spend as much money as 
they would have wished in re-equipping, enlarging and modernising 
the Royal Air Force". 1 Naturally these facts could not be used in 
the Air Ministry's defence should a debate arise, so that the 
position always appeared worse than it really was. 
The anxiety about air defences continued to grow. In April, 
1938, Dalton recorded a conversation he had had with a young 
Conservative Member, Ronald Cartland. The latter apparently was 
greatly concerned at the failure of the Air Ministry and of Inskip 
to speed up the production of military aeroplanes. "The shadow 
factory business was, up to date, a flop 
... 
We were steadily 
falling behind the Germans in air strength. Swinton as Air 
Minister was deeply responsible for the state of things. He did 
not know why he kept in favour with Chamberlain, as previously with 
Baldwin. 12 
1 Orders of the Day, p. 233. 
2 Diary entry, 7 April, 1938, Dalton Papers. 
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This growing disquiet reached its climax on 11 May when there 
occurred a debate, most damaging to the Government. With the 
Secretary of State for Air in the Lords he was not able to defend 
himself or his department in the House of Commons, but was forced 
to rely on Winterton, formerly one of Churchill's associates, to 
state the Air Ministry's case. Reactions to his speech were uniform. 
"The spokesman, " recorded Churchill, "who was chosen from the 
Government Front Bench was utterly unable to stem the rising tide 
of alarm and dissatisfaction. " 
1 Dalton was more forthright: 
"His speech was a fiasco. " 
2 Even Winterton admitted that he 
"underestimated the extent of the feeling against the Ministry in 
the Commons" so that his presentation of the case had "a very bad 
reception". Nevertheless, the critics, he maintained in his 
memoirs "were wrong in their facts. I was right. 
0 
All this caused a great Parliamentary stir. On the following 
day three separate motions were placed on the Order Paper, demanding 
an inquiry into Britain's air defences; two were on the behalf of the 
Opposition Parties, while the third was initiated by Churchill and 
backed by over 20 Government supporters. It read simply that "this 
House would welcome the appointment of an independent committee of 
inquiry into the state of our air defences". Excluding Churchill the 
signatories were: Nicolson, Spears, Oliver Simmonds, Walter Perkins, 
William Craven-Ellis, Samuel Storey, Cartland, Boothby, Alan Graham, 
1 The Gathering Storm, p. 203. 
2 The Fateful Years, p. 165- 
3 Orders of the Day, p. 235. 
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Macmillan, John McKie, Adams, Emrys-Evans, J Sandeman Allen, 
Sandys, Mavis Tate, Keyes, Leonard Plugge, Dudley Joel, Ian Hannah, 
Sir Sidney Herbert, Charles Emmott, Alan Dower and Frederick MacQuisten. 
Naturally a critical motion, however mildly phrased, called for a 
reply and sure enough loyal Government supporters signed an 
amendment assuring the Government of the House's "whole-hearted 
support in their efforts and determination to bring our air defences 
to the highest pitch of efficiency, but deprecates the suggestion 
of an inquiry into those defences as calculated to interfere with 
and hamper the speed and success which the House desires to secure 
from both the Air Ministry and the industry itself. " 
The damage, however, had already been done and it became 
obvious to the Prime Minister that the Air Minister should be in the 
House of Commons. Chamberlain thereupon dismissed Swinton and 
installed in the Air Ministry Sir Kingsley Wood. This 'official 
explanation' has of late been challenged. JP Mackintosh writes: 
"There is an element of mystery about this episode. 
The official explanation was that there had been trouble 
in the House of Commons and Swinton was asked to resign 
so that a Secretary of State could be found who was able 
to defend the Air Ministry in that House. Yet the 
Government's very large majority was absolutely secure 
and nothing could be more out of character than the 
suggestion that Neville Chamberlain would abandon a 
man he wanted to keep, and who was doing good work, just 
because of a single row in the Commons. There is 
evidence that Swinton had crossed some powerful 
industrialists by being tough in his handling of 
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aircraft contracts and that those men, who had close 
connections with the Conservative Party, approached 
the Prime Minister directly and asked for the removal 
of Swinton. " 
1 
This view, in fact, partly refutes itself. If nothing could be 
more out of character than Chamberlain dismissing Swinton after a 
row in the Commons, then the same argument could be applied to a 
behind-the-scenes approach of industrialists. That is not to say 
that the latter might not have influenced Chamberlain's mind, but 
it would not explain the removal of Muirhead, the Under Secretary 
for Air, to the India Office, and the subsequent announcement that 
Winterton, though he remained Chancellor of the Duchy of lancaster, 
would never speak for the Air Ministry again. Clearly such a clean 
sweep reflected deep dissatisfaction with Air Ministry personnel, 
particularly when one considers that the new Under Secretary, 
Harold Balfour, was noted for his interest in the Royal Air Force, 
in which he had served for 8 years. No, the most likely reason is 
the 'official' one, however tempered this may have been by the 
approach of certain industrialists. Chamberlain may also have 
been influenced, if not annoyed, by reports of Swinton's 
indiscretion at a dinner party in February. 
2 
Whatever the reason for it, the Ministerial earthquake gave 
some Tories, who had signed Churchill's motion, an excuse to with- 
draw, on the grounds that there was now a fresh man at the top of 
the department. Churchill apparently only "assented grumpily" to 
1 The British Cabinet, p. 438- 
2 See P. 441. 
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the motion's withdrawal. 
1 Both Opposition Parties, however, stuck 
to theirs necessitating a further debate on air defence, which took 
place on 25 May. At the close of the day's proceedings, a handful 
of Tories, including Churchill, chose to abstain rather than vote 
with the Government. 
A Conservative participant in the events of the 1930's has 
recorded that it was "the England of the extreme Right" where the 
most acute awareness of the weakness of Britain's defences existed. 
An analysis of those Tories who met regularly, pooling their 
information on defence matters, and those involved in the July 
Deputation revealed several who could be described as belonging to 
the extreme Right. Taking the Government of India Act as a yard- 
stick, Churchill, Keyes, Wolmer, Croft and Bracken, by their 
opposition, warrant inclusion amongst the diehards. Amery too can 
be described as belonging to the extreme Right, as the stand he 
took over Mussolini's invasion of Abyssinia and his opposition to 
sanctions revealed. Similarly Moore-Brabazon, representing the 
strongly armed Britain tradition within the Tory ranks, was drawn 
from the Right of the party. Writing of the 1920's Brabazon recalled 
that he had been "very keen on the growth of air power in relation 
to the older Services, and yet there we were, in a critical situation 
1 Letter dated 17 May, 1938, Diaries and Letters 1930-39, P-341. 
2 Quintin Hogg, the victor of'the famous Oxford by-election. 
Elsewhere he described 'a great armed strength' as a Conservative 
principle: "In so far as the Conservative Party was to blame (for Britain's slow rearmament) it was not their principles 
which were wrong; it was that they did not adhere sufficiently 
strongly to their principles. " The Left Were Not Right, 
pp-55,86. 
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I thought in the world, with very little air power and the Secretary 
of State for Air not even in the Cabinet". 
1 In effect, Brabazon had 
been pressing the Government to increase the size of the Royal Air 
Force in the quiet years of Baldwin's Second Ministry! 
The presence of such extremists, even if we exclude Amery and 
Brabazon, throws doubt on Neville Thompson's claim that "with the 
passage of the Government of India Act the bond between Churchill 
and the die-hards was finally severed and they went their separate 
ways". 
2 The rearmament issue, like that of India's future, was near 
to the heart of many a right-wing Tory MP, and its growing signifi- 
cance politically made possible continued links between Churchill and 
the die-hards, although it is apparent that they were not so closely 
associated as before. Churchill was now, of course, attempting to 
undo the extremist image he had constructed over India, but the bond 
with the Right was never "finally severed", as the Munich vote later 
revealed. Equally in need of modification is Thompson's further 
claim that the die-hards went on to "support" the Administrationb 
foreign policy. 
3 Most of them did, but some dissented, a group 
not allowed for in such a blanket generalisation. 
Not all of the Members of Parliament anxious to spur the Government 
out of what they considered its tentative steps in rearming can be 
categorized as Tory extremists. Churchill, in fact, later recorded 
that an "the German danger I found myself working in Parliament with 
a group of friends. It was composed differently from the India 
1 Brabazon, The Brabazon Story, p. 161. 
The Anti-Appeasers, p. 24. 
Ibid, p. 24. 
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Defence League. Sir Austen Chamberlaint Sir Robert Horne, Sir Edward 
Grigg, Lord Winterton, Mr Bracken, Sir Henry Croft and several others 
formed our circle. " 
1 Amongst the dissidentst therefore, there were 
those who were moderate, middle of the road Conservatives, and others 
who were 'liberal' or progressive in outlook. Moderates included 
Horne, O'Neill and Gilmour while Boothby and Sandys could be termed 
progressive Conservatives. 
2 Austen Chamberlain, throughout his 
long and distinguished career, never referred to himself as a 
Conservative but rather as a 'Unionist' after the example of his 
Liberal Unionist father. Both Grigg and Guest had also been 
influenced by some form of Liberalism and, in contrast to Churchill, 
did not move to the Right of the Unionist Party during their later 
careers. 
Belonging to the extreme Right, therefore, was not an essential 
prerequisite for the rearmament critics associated with Churchill. 
Yet did they differ in any respect from their fellow members? Their 
average age was 53 years 2 months, almost four years above the party 
average, while in education a higher percentage had attended public 
school and university. In occupation they were almost equally drawn 
from the professions, the armed forces and official services, and 
the great landowning families. It is noticeable that the business 
community was hardly represented at all within their ranks, even 
1 The Gathering Storm, p. 70. 
Both Boothby and Sandys belonged to the Conservative Special 
Areas Committee formed in 1936 "to press for vigorous action 
in gloomy areas". The difficulties of classifying British 
politicians as right or left is amply illustrated by reference 
to the same committee: its leader was Wolmer and Churchill 
was the first MP to enlist. B Cartland, Ronald Cartland, 
p. 82. 
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though this made up the largest section of the parliamentary party. 
Apart from this characteristic, it is in the constituencies where 
the most interesting pattern emerges: O'Neill was unopposed, while 
a further 9 had majorities exceeding 10,000. Of the remaining six, 
two had majorities of 9,000, two majorities of 7,000, one of 6,000, 
and the last, Boothby, 3,000 in East Aberdeen, a seat which did not 
change hands in 1945. Another feature of note is the large 
proportion of members who had seen long service in the House: 
12 were first returned before or at the General Election of 1922; 
8 had been members at the time of the outbreak of the Great War. 
It cannot have been entirely accidental that the majority of the 
dissidents represented safe seats and were not young in terms of 
Parliamentary service. Doubtless the large majorities and their 
long-standing as Mps meant that they had relatively little to fear 
from the wrath of party whips and Central Office as a result of their 
intransigence. 
It is further apparent that as a group they had a wealth of 
experience in the field of defence which enabled them to speak with 
no little authority in the Commons. Churchill, Amery and Chamberlain 
were ex-First Lords of the Admiralty, to which Horne had once been 
attached as a junior minister. Guest had been Secretary of State 
for Air, a post Churchill had once held, combined with the War Office. 
Of the others, although no longer on active service, Keyes, was an 
Admiral of the Fleet; Moore-Brabazon, the pioneer aviator, had held 
high office in the Royal Flying Corp; Croft was a Brigadier-General 
in the Territorial Army; Grigg was a Colonel in the Grenadier Guards 
Amery, Chamberlain, Churchill, Croft, Gilmour, Guest, Winterton 
and Wolmer. 
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and Gilmour a Colonel in the Fife Yeomanry. Winterton, Wolmer and 
O'Neill had also served in the Army, experiencing action in the 
Great War. The expert technical knowledge gained as a result of 
these various fields of activity equipped them, in the words of 
Neville Chamberlain's biographer, to be 'masters' of their 'chosen 
ground' of defence. 
1 
Three of the dissidents, Churchill, Horne and Gilmour, were to 
be described by Stanley Baldwin as "flotsam and jetsam of political 
life thrown up on the beach". 
2 In fact several of the group are 
reminiscent of a former age: the Lloyd George Coalition Government, 
overturned in 1922. Not only had Churchill, Horne and Gilmour served 
under Lloyd George but also Austen Chamberlain, Guest and Amery, 
while Grigg had been the Prime Minister's personal secretary. Naturally 
such names imparted a 'has been' air both to the deputation and the 
group, and it is not surprising, with such a background, that 
contemporaries suspected their motives, implying what was afoot was 
a drive to recover power rather than a real concern for the state 
of Britain's defences. 
The other critics, not associated with the group or the July 
Deputation were similarly drawn from all sections of the party, not 
3 
exclusively from the extreme Right. They differed in various aspects, 
both from the party and their fellow rearmament dissidents: their 
average age was 41 years 1 month, considerably lower than the Unionist 
Party's; they were drawn, by and large, from the professions and the 
The Life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 285- It is interesting to note 
that a considerable number of those involved in the group or 
deputation were later to hold ministerial office: Churchill's case 
speaks for itself; Winterton, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster; 
Gilmour, Minister of Shipping; O'Neill, Under Secretary of State 
for India and Burma; Croft, Under Secretary of State for War; 
Bracken, Minister of Information; Brabazon, Minister of Transport; 
Amery, Secretary of State for India; Wolmer, Minister of Economic 
Warfare; Grigg, Financial Secretary to the War Office; Boothby, 
Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Food; Sandys, Financial 
Secretary to the War Office. 
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armed forces and official services; 
1 
no definite pattern emerged 
from the constituencies. 
2 Again, several of them had expert technical 
knowledge or experience of aspects of Britain's defences: Rear 
Admiral Sir Murray-Sueter, Vice-Admiral EA Taylor, Brigadier- 
General EL Spears, Wing-Commander AH James, Oliver Simmonds, the 
Chairman of the Parliamentary Air Raid Precautions Committee are 
examples worthy of note. 
It was soon to become apparent that the unity of the Government's 
critics, including those that grouped together and the wider number 
of backbenchers that expressed alarm at the slow progress of rearma- 
ment, lay essentially in the necessity for improving Britain's 
defences. There was no unanimity amongst them on the far more vital 
necessity of how to defend Britain's strategical position. When 
the issue was joined, in 1938, the result was division. The majority, 
including Croft, Grigg, Brabazon and Gilmour followed the Government 
into the orthodix policy of appeasement. Others, such as Churchill, 
Amery, Wolmer and Keyes remained in 'opposition', urging the 
Government to construct an alliance of peace-loving nations to 
thwart Nazi designs. 
One further question remains to be answered 
- 
the effectiveness 
or otherwise of the dissidents in their self-appointed role of goading 
and stimulating the Government towards what they considered adequate 
2 (from previous page) 
Jones, diary entry, March 15,1937, A Dairy with Letters, P-324. 
3 (from previous page) 
In addition to the 16 already analysed a further 31 MPs have been 
referred to: 
. 
28 Unionists, 2 Liberal NationalB, 1 National Labour. 
1 
Their occupations broke down as follows: 12, Armed Forces and 
Official Services; 7, Professions; 1, Land; 5, Business (excluding 
Mavis Tate and Lady Astor). 
2 Three were unopposed; 8 had majorities in excess of 10,000; 
1,9,000; 2,6,000; the rest, 5,000 and less. 
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rearmament. Straightway one thing is apparent, and this is that 
despite their persistent pleas the Government did not commence 
rearmament until 1934, and not seriously until 1936. Even so the 
dissidents 
- 
with their exaggerated fear of Hitler's preparations - 
were to be far from satisfied with the extent of the Government's 
programme of rearmament and the subsequent progress made towards 
its completion. Vociferous in their criticisms though they were, 
it is unlikely that they had more than marginal influence on the 
programme and its timing, at least until the spring of 1938, when 
their alarm was more generally shared. Similarly as regards a 
Ministry of Supply, not set up until 1939, they were singularly 
unsuccessful, although by contrast they played a significant role 
in the establishment of a Ministry for the Co-ordination of Defence, 
structurally unsound as it was, and the dismissal of Lord Swinton, 
unjust as that may now seem. When all is said and done, however, 
even if we assume a marginal influence for the dissidents, and 
something fruitful must have come from such a persistent critical 
scrutiny of Ministers and Departments, that could well have made 
considerable difference once hostilities commenced. 
The Labour Party 
Issues of defence sharply divided the Labour Party in the 
thirties, as they to today. The movement was, and remains, an 
alliance of men with widely differing views, not a disciplined 
army, and this added considerably to its contradictions over 
rearmament. According to Ralph Miliband and Samuel Davis there 
were four currents of thought existing over such issues: "The 
first 
... 
was the straightforward pacifist view; the second 
... 
was a waning, but still powerful, belief in Labour's traditional 
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programme of disarmament by international agreement coupled with an 
increasingly inconsistent acceptance of the obligation of collective 
action in defence of Labour's principles, and support for the League 
of Nations 
... 
A third view, rapidly gaining in strength 
... 
was 
that Labour had no alternative but to support British rearmament. 
The fourth view was that of the Labour Left, the most 'ideological' 
of the four, which entailed both an ardent demand for resistance 
to Fascist aggression, and a no less ardent refusal of support for 
the Government's programme". 
I 
These four currents of thought, which are very convenient for 
classification purposes, have been adopted here. However, it is 
well to remember that the party was at a watershed, and its policies 
and ideology were confused, so much so that it is not strictly 
accurate to add Labour MPs up and divide by four. Many there were, 
in fact, that could be fitted into more than one category and others 
it is difficult to distinguish at all. 
What follows is a brief analysis of the basic outlook of each 
of the party's main groups, for within certain broad units the 
approach of each was surprisingly individualistic. Labour's policy 
on rearmament depended on the interplay of the outlook of these 
groups. 
(a) The Pacifists 
The tradition of pacifism and anti-militarism was deeply rooted 
in the Labour movement. Francis Williams wrote of it as "an 
expression of its (Labour's) idealism, of its belief in human 
brotherhood and international socialism, its suspicion of imperialism 
Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism, pp. 246-7. See also the 
introduction to Davis, British Labour and British Foreign 
Policy 1933-9, Ph. D Thesis, University of London, 1950- 
119. 
and the economic exploitation of man by man. It represented much 
that was best and most inspiring in early socialism. 111 Pacifism 
ran deep in Labour's parliamentary ranks, touching several of the 
party's leaders as well as the membership generally. The party, 
in fact, had badly split on this issue in 1914; its new leaders 
after 1931 had then been divided. Clement Attlee, Albert Alexander 
and Hugh Dalton had joined the Army immediately, fighting with 
distinction, while George Lansbury, Herbert Morrison, Tom Johnston, 
Pethick-Lawrence, Morgan Jones, Noel-Baker and Lees-Smith had been 
pacifists. 
By the middle thirties except for a few, Lansbury chief among 
them, the idealist pacifism of Labour's early years had been abandoned, 
and had been replaced by a faith in the League of Nations. Thus it 
is true that there was still a small minority in the Labour Party who 
took up the pacifist point of view; they did not believe that war 
was right, and they were prepared to disband the whole of Britain's 
defence forces. Their attitude was respected but they were not in 
any sense representative of the Labour Party as a whole. "As a 
party", said Attlee in May 1935, "we do not stand for unilateral 
disarmament. There are members of our party for whom we have the 
greatest respect, and whose entire sincerity we recognise, who do 
take that line, but as a party we do not stand for unilateral 
disarmament". ?- Seen in this light, the view of WR Rock, that 
"at the beginning of 1938 in the Labour Party, there was a 
multitude who had not decided in their own minds whether they were 
1 Williams, Ernest Bevin, p. 189. 
2 House of Commons Debates, 22 May, 1935, Col-375- 
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first and foremost champions of the League of Nations and collective 
security or first and foremost pacifists", is difficult to substantiate. 
' 
Of the parliamentary party elected in November, 1935, Lansbury, 
Salter, Sorensen, Wilson, Barr, McLaren and Davies were associated 
together in an "ethical-religious" pacifism. 
2 Lansbury was a member 
of the 'cloth cap' brigade, being educated at elementary school, 
with a career consisting of manual and office work. 
3 Although 
elected MP for Bow and Bromley in 1910 he did not consistently 
sit for that division until 1922. Seven years later MacDonald 
appointed him First Commissioner of Works in the Second Labour 
Ministry. The landslide of 1931, which deprived the parliamentary 
party of its senior members, resulted in Lansbury's elevation to 
the vacant leadership. He retained the post for four years until 
his resignation, following the Brighton Conference of 1935. 
Throughout his remaining years in the House he was still held in 
great regard by his fellow MPs: 
"George Lansbury personified the Socialism which had 
won our minds and stirred our bearts. His life of dedicated 
service had made him the best loved leader of our movement 
He represented the religious idealism and compassion which 
made our movement a cause. " 
4 
Throughout his life he was to remain a staunch member of the 
Church of ]England, and it was from the Christian faith that he 
derived his pacifism. 
1 Appeasement On Trial, P-13- 
2RW Sorensen, Letter to the author, 2 April, 1969. 
3 MP, Bow and Bromley, 1910-12 and 1922-40. 
4 
James Griffiths, MP for Llanelly, 1936-66. Pages From Memory, 
pp-59-60. 
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"I'm a Pacifist and Socialist because the principles 
embodied in the life and teaching of the founder of 
Christianity appeal to me as those which form the 
standard of life and conduct which, if followed by even 
one nation, would ultimately save the world from war 
and give peace and security at home and abroad. " 
1 
Alfred Salter was the Member for West Bermondsey. 
2 Behind him 
lay a very distinguished medical career, which began with a Triple 
First Class Honours at London University. An eminent physician he 
nevertheless devoted much of his working life to tending the sick 
in the poorer, industrial areas of London. It was such an area he 
had represented since 1922. A Quaker, from which he derived his 
pacifism, he informed his constituents in 1935: 
"I stand for Peace, for Disarmament and for refusal 
to go to war under any circumstances. " 
Another Friend was Cecil Wilson, MP for Attercliffe, Sheffield 
from 1922-31 and from 1935-45. Educated at various denominational 
schools and Manchester University, he had for 37 years been a 
Director of the Sheffield Smelting Company. The November 1935 edition 
of the Congregationalist Christian World described him as "an 
honorary deacon of the Zion Congregational Church, Attercliffe". 
In fact Wilson had joined the Friends and was an active member of 
the Westminster meeting. During the 1935 Parliament he held the 
posts of Chairman of the Executive of the National Anti-Gambling 
League and Convenor of the Political Pacifist Group. 
1 
Why Pacifists Should be Socialists, p. 12. 
2 1922-45, except for a brief interlude 1923-24. 
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Reginald William Sorensen, MP for West Leyton, 1929-31 and 
from 1935-64, was educated at elementary school. After working in 
factory, office and shop he studied for four years in a Unitarian 
Religious Community and became the Minister of the Free Christian 
Church, Walthamstow. From there he turned to active politics, 
anxious to apply his religious views in public life. Another 
pacifist minister was James Barr, MP for Motherwell, 1924-31 and 
Coatbridge, Lanark from 1935-45. Educated at Glasgow University he 
had undergone theological training at Glasgow Free Church College. 
For over 30 years Barr had been a Presbyterian minister and author 
of religious books until the time he had entered Parliament. At 
the General Election he wrote in his manifesto: 
"As to the colossal increases to be proposed for Army, 
Navy and Air Force, I will resist these to the very utmost 
of my power. Let your increases be for the social services, 
and not for the armed forces of the land; and remember that 
but for the mad expenditure on War and Armaments "This country 
might have been a garden, every dwelling might have been 
of marble, and every person who treads its woil might have 
been sufficiently educated". " 
Andrew McLaren, aged 52 at the General Election, represented 
the Buslem Division of Stoke-on-Trent for almost 20 years. 
1 
Educated at elementary school he later attended a Glasgow school 
of art. By trade he was an engineer although he occasionally 
dabbled in journalism. He is best remembered for the remark "Thank 
God for the Prime Minister" after Chamberlain's return from Munich 
in 1938. 
1 MP 1922-23,1924-31,1935-45. 
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The last of the religious-motivated pacifists was Rhys John 
Davies, MP for Westhoughton, Lancashire. 1 Davies had been educated 
at elementary school and went through a variety of occupations: farm 
servant, coal miner, and official of the Distributive Workers, Union. 
Within three years of entering the House in 1921, he held his only 
ministerial post, that of Under Secretary of State for the Home 
Department. Outside Parliament Davies led a very full Church life 
with the Congregationalists, being a Sunday School teacher, choirmaster 
and local preacher. During the late 120s and early '30s he had been 
an advocate of the League of Nations until, at the time of the 1935 
election, he wrote a letter to his constituency party saying that he 
would go no further than economic sanctions against Italy. 
2 His 
League conception had come into conflict with his Christian faith's 
teaching on war: 
"It is obvious that these are difficult times in the 
history of the Churches. What would be the Saviour's 
answer to the present challenge? If I am not mistaken, 
He would declare himself a conscientious objector.,, 3 
These ? MPs, then, can be associated together in the belief 
that Christianity taught that it was wrong to hate and kill fellow 
human beings. In his election address, November 1935, Lansbury set 
out their faith: 
1 MP, 1921-51. 
2 
Barr had included words to that effect in his manifesto: ''A 
consistent supporter of pacifist principles, and an un- 
compromising opponent of all war, I have always actively 
supported the League of Nations, with the reservation only, 
that it should stand ever for the maintenance of peace, and 
never for the promotion or perpetuation of war. " 
3 The Christian and War, p. 10. 
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"I am a Pacifist because I accept as literally true 
the words "those who take the sword perish by the sword". 
It is impossible to cast out war by war, or to establish 
peace by brute force, whether the war is a collective or 
national war. I cannot support war under any conditions. 
Give up reliance on brute force, accept and 
act on the teaching "do to others as you would be done 
by", and you will live. This promise of our Lord's is 
true. once we go to the world in His spirit, once we 
offer to co-operate and to share our gifts and our resources 
with other nations we shall become the strongest, most 
powerful people in the world. Our armour will not be 
poison gas, or machine guns, but the armour of righteousness, 
peace and love. " 
1 
Other Labour MPs were pacifists, not on religious but practical 
grounds. Frederick Messer, Henry McGhee and William Leach believed 
that the employment of force was worthless because it involved too 
much destruction. Instead of settling anything war created untold 
misery and more problems than it could possibly solve. The first 
of this group, Messer entered the House in 1929 as Member for South 
Tottenham. 2 Throughout his life he displayed a passionate interest 
in hospital work, a vocation in which the highest premium is placed 
upon the preservation of life. Such were the sentiments with which 
he approached the question of war, and consequently he renouced the 
use of any form of violence upon his fellow human beings. During the 
1 Lansbury Papers, November 3,1935. 
MP, 1929-31 and 1935-59- 
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inter-war period Messer was a executive member of the No More War 
Movement and a member of the editorial board of the pacifist paper 
Peace. In 1937-38, together with Lansbury, he negotiated with 
Hore-Belisha, the Secretary of State for War, to get appellate 
tribunals established to deal with conscientious objectors' appeals. 
Leach, educated at Bradford Grammar School, was a retired 
worsted manufacturer, who represented Central Bradford somewhat 
intermittently in the period between the wars. 
2 Somewhat 
surprisingly MacDonald, in 1924, appointed him Under Secretary of 
State for Air, and Leach, in bringing in the air estimates that 
year, went out of his way to make the Sermon on the Mount a feature 
of his address. The last of the three, McGhee, was the Member for 
Penistone, Yorkshire. He had been a practising dentist prior to 
his elevation to the Commons. 
3 
A further three, George Hardie, brother of the famous Keir, his 
wife Agnes, and Ellen Wilkinson can be termed ideological pacifists. 
All three believed that war was the product of imperialist rivalries, 
which enriched the armament makers but debased the position of the 
working-class still further. Workers, they argued, should resist 
war, if necessary by industrial action, rather than. take up weapons 
against fellow workers. George Hardie, a foundation member of the 
Independent Labour Party, represented Springburn, Glasgow from 1922-31 
and 1935-37- 
4 
In February, 1936, during the debate over the Ministry 
1 Letter, Sir Frederick Messer to the author, 17 April, 1969. 
2 MP, 1922-24,1929-31 and 1935-45; a member of the Union of 
Democratic Control. 
3 MP, 1935-59- 
4 
Hardie began his working life as a miner at the age of 12. 
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of Defence Creation Bill, Hardie openly disagreed with his leader, 
whom he claimed, by supporting the Bill, was not speaking for the 
Party, and went on to declare his total opposition to a move designed 
to make Britain 'strong for war and not for peace'. 
1 On his death 
in July, 1937, Agnes Hardie was elected in his stead, standing for 
much the same policies as her late husband. 
Wilkinson, MP for Middlesborough 1924-31 and Jarrow 1935-47, 
was a University of Manchester graduate. In 1915, at the age of 24, 
she became National Organiser for the National Union of Distributive 
and Allied Workers. At this time her political leanings were to the 
extreme Left for in 1920 she joined the newly-formed Communist Party. 
Although her independent spirit soon resulted in her breaking with 
that organisation, she remained 'Left' in outlook, which explains the 
nickname 'Red Ellen'. The early thirties saw her involvement with 
the cause of the unemployed and participation in the hunger marches. 
As part of that agitation she contributed the highly successful work, 
The Town That Was Murdered to the Left Book Club publications. 
In her 1935 election manifesto she was to write: 
"War has never settled anything. It creates more 
misery and problems. In any war the workers always lose 
the bankers and the armaments shareholders of all countries 
always profit. $' 
The following summer, the very eve of the Spanish Civil War, witnessed 
her taking the peace pledge. 
2 
Events, however, particularly the 
1 House of Commons Debates, February 14,1936, cols. 1362-63- 
2 Founded in October 1934 by Canon Dick Sheppard. He appealed to 
men and women to pledge against war by sending him a postcard 
saying that they bound themselves by the pledge: "I renounce war 
and never again will I support or sanction another, and I will 
do all in my power to persuade others to do the same. " Sheppard 
died in October, 1937, and was succeeded as President by 
Lansbury. 
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Spanish conflict, with which she was to deeply embroil herself, soon 
resulted in the abandonment of her pacifist beliefs- 
Pacifists, Christian or otherwise, were wholly united in the 
belief that another war would bring down the curtains on civilisa- 
tion. Salter informed his constituents that in the event of a war 
"Bermondsey will be bombed to smithereens". 
1 Similarly T-ansbury, 
in a speech to the House, argued that another war would "bring a 
catastrophic ending to the period in which we are living". 
2 
So great was their loathing of war that the pacifists displayed 
no concern for the problem of confronting agression. Following the 
German seizure of Austria in 1938, Salter remarked, "I denounce 
Hitler's brutal methods as much as anyone but there is no cause 
on earth that is worth the sacrifice of the blood and lives of 
millions upon millions of innocent and helpless men, women and 
children". 
3 Similarly Lansbury considered that the Abyssinians had 
been wrong to resist the Italians. 
4 
Far better if nations abolished 
their defence preparations: 
"Somewhere, in some land, there will arise, and I 
pray it may be here, a people who will say to the world: 
'Throw down your arms'. We have thrown ours away never to 
take them up again. We have renounced imperialism, 
cast away all thoughts of domination and fear, and are 
now determined to live with all the world as friends 
and partners in a true commonwealth of peoples working 
and sharing life and all it has to give one another. 1,5 
1 Election Address, November 1935- 
2 House of Commons Debates, June 23,1936, Col. 1661. 
3 Fenner Brockway, Bermondsey Story, p. 208. 
4R 
Postgate, George Lansbury, P-311- 
-5 Lansbury, Why Pacifists Should Be Socialists, p.? 4. 
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Yet Labour's pacifists had something more positive to offer than 
refusal to fight or disbandment of the armed forces. In fact they 
had developed a coherent peace policy. The British Government, they 
argued, should call all the nations to Geneva and say, "Let us give 
up this tomfoolery about guns and poison gas. Let us get rid of all 
the questions about armaments and disarmaments and get down to the 
bedrock. " 1 'Bedrock' was leading the world away from war by paying 
some attention to its cause: developing and growing nations with 
insufficient land, home-grown food supplies and resources, while 
other countries had more than they needed. Their answer then, was 
a voluntary economic reorganisation of the world, the only alterna- 
tive to a war which would destroy Empire, homeland and civilisation. 
Early in the new Parliament the pacifists had an opportunity 
to state their case. Lansbury won the ballot for private members' 
motions and in February 1936 introduced a resolution calling for a 
world conference to give all countries access to raw materials. 
The resolution read: 
"That this House affirms its profound belief in the 
futility of war, views with grave concern the world-wide 
preparations for war, and is of the opinion that, through 
the League of Nations, His Majesty's Government should 
make an immediate effort for the summoning of a new 
international conference to deal with the economic factors 
which are now responsible, such as the necessity for 
access to raw materials and to markets and for the 
migration of people, with a view to arriving at an 
1 Lansbury, House of Commons Debates, FebruarY 5,1936, Col. 212. 
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international agreement which will remove from the nations 
the incentive to pile up armaments and establish the peace 
of the world as a sure foundation. " 
1 
The motion was supported by David Lloyd George and received in support 
some 1.50 votes, the vast majority of which were Labour. 
The plan was by no means visionary in itself. Two years later 
the Belgian Liberal ex-Premier, Van Zeeland, at the request of the 
British and French Governments, produced a detailed plan based on 
similar principles which was recognised as practicable. Lansbury, 
Salter and Labour's other pacifists adopted it and included it in 
their propaganda. 
2 
In 1936 Iansbury and Salter decided to carry their peace campaign 
to America. Lansbury had a 45 minute interview with President Roosevelt 
and urged him to call a world conference of the leaders of various 
nations. Roosevelt showed interest but doubted whether other 
important powers would. He was willing to participate if only 
Lansbury could line up enough support elsewhere. 
3 
Upon his return 
to Europe, Lansbury undertook, under the auspices of the 
International Fellowship of Reconciliation, to sound out rulers of 
other states as to their views regarding his project. In the late 
1 House of Commons Debates, 5 February, 1936. Col. 213- 
2 Postgate, P-311- 
Two years later Roosevelt proposed such a conference. The British 
Foreign Office received a tPlegram from Washington on 12 January, 
1938, in which Roosevelt, troubled by the deterioration of the 
international situation, proposed a conference in Washington of 
representatives of certain governments to consider the underlying 
causes of tension, with the hope of agreement on essential 
principles to be observed in the conduct of international 
relations. Camberlain rebuffed the offer, see P. 418. 
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summer of 1936 he went to the Continent and obtained interviews with 
the Prime Ministers of France, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. 
Their leaders agreed with his proposals but either, as in the case 
of France, would not take the initiative or considered that there 
was no chance for a tiny power successfully to call such a 
conference. 
Although his 1936 trips aroused interest it was Lansbury's 
visit to Hitler the following spring that caused the greatest stir. 
From the talks, Lansbury received a favourable impression of the 
German leader. "Hitler treated the interview very seriously", he 
was to write, "I think he really wants peace. " 
1 Nevertheless, the 
Fuhrer declared that he could not take the initiative in calling 
such a conference: nobody trusted him and if he attempted to take 
the lead it would spoil the prospects of any proposed international 
gathering. Lansbury went away well-pleased, writing the following 
month to Lord Allen that Hitler would not go to war "unless pushed 
into it by others". 
2 
Elsewhere he wrote that history would record 
Hitler as "one of the great men of our time,,. 
3 
The visits were then extended to Mussolini, President Benes of 
Czechoslovakia, Prime Minister Smigly-Ridz of Poland, and Schuschnigg, 
Chancellor of Austria. From all these heads of state and more he 
received an assurance that if a world conference was called they 
would attend. His tours now complete, he was able to announce, 
somewhat naively, that he was "gratified to discover that every 
Note by Lansbury, Lansbury Papers, April, 1937. According to 
Herbert Morrison the reverse was true. Hitler regarded Lansbury 
as a "simple fool" and went on reading official papers while 
Lansbury tried to dissuade him from his policies. Morrison, 
An Autobiography, p. 162. 
2 Letter, Lansbury Papers, 11 May, 1937- 
3 My Quest for Peace, p. 141. 
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single ruler of all the countries agreed with my proposal for a 
conference". 
1 
Parallel with Lansbury's efforts abroad, the Labour pacifists, 
under the lead of Salter, organised a campaign in Britain to arouse 
public opinion in favour of a world conference. A Parliamentary 
Pacifist Group was formed to conduct such a campaign with Salter, 
Lansbury, George Hardie, Sorensen, Barr, Messer, McGhee and Wilson 
taking an active part. Large pacifist conventions were held in the 
leading centres of population throughout the country: Manchester, 
London, Bristol, Birmingham, Southampton, Sheffield, Norwich and 
Carlisle. "The campaign", wrote Fenner Brockway, "caught on; it 
probably represented the peak of pacifism in Great Britain. " 
2 
Nevertheless, the absolute pacifism which Lansbury represented 
increasingly lost its hold over sections of the Labour Movement. The 
rise of Hitler and the aggression of Mussolini marked the parting of 
the ways. Labourites had to decide whether to cast out their 
pacifism in order to pursue a crusade for collective security, or 
to renounce their allegiance to collective security to keep their 
pacifism inviolate. Most chose the former so that the growing 
League conception made great inroads into pacifist and war resistance 
circles. The case of Morgan Jones is a prime example. 
3 In 1914 Jones 
had been a teacher, but because of his objection to the war, he was 
dismissed from his post and imprisoned. Upon release he had gone 
underground as a colliery worker, refusing reinstatement into the 
This Way to Peace, p. 23. Lansbury's visits are recorded in detail 
in My quest forPeace. 
2 Bermondsey Story, p. 200. 
3 MP, Caerphilly, 
132. 
teaching profession. In 1921 he entered the House of Commons and 
soon associated himself with the League of Nations approach to 
international questions, while at the same time retaining his 
pacifist ideals. With Mussolini's aggression against Abyssinia 
Jones abandoned the beliefs that he had suffered for, accepting that 
collective security rested ultimately on force. 
Ernest Bevin's brutal attack on Lansbury at the Brighton 
Conference, for "hawking his conscience round from body to body", 
was symptomatic of the rising tide against pacifism within the 
party. 
1 While The Times commented that "at no time since 1918 has 
pacifism so small a Labour following", a Daily Herald editorial high- 
lighted the change. 
2 It spoke of pacifism as "a certain kind of 
peace campaign" which no longer had very much to give. It went on: 
"The old fashioned peace propaganda which denounced 
the horror and wickedness of war and stopped at that has 
no real message today. It is no longer necessary to argue 
that peace is better than war. Men need no further 
convincing on this point. What they ask urgently is: 
'How shall we prevent war, how shall we be sure of 
peace? 1.11 
Neither incantation nor pious aspiration, the editorial concluded, 
would prevent war but only the massing of force behind the law. 
3 
Although no longer a real force, the pacifist MPs still played 
an important, albeit negative role. To quote Richard Acland, then 
1 Labour Party Conference Report, p. 179. 
2 March 13,1936. 
3 April 28,1936. 
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Liberal MP for Barnstaple: "the pacifists inhibited the Opposition 
from saying unequivocally: 'If we want to avoid the certainty of a 
disastrous war, we must now look at the would-be aggressors and say 
to them beyond all doubt 'If you commit your aggression anywhere we 
will fight'. " 
1 In effect the Labour leadership were forced to make 
a special calculation regarding the anti-war wing of the movement, 
and the knowledge that a more militant stand would split the party, 
doubtless acted as an important brake on the development of a viable, 
international policy. The pacifists, too, were in part responsible 
for helping to compromise the party over the Service Estimates. By 
the unfortunate formula of 1934, whereby Labour insisted on regarding 
armaments policy and foreign policy as inseparable, the party remained 
united and joint action was made possible with the limited number 
who were opposed to all armaments. However the unity obtained was 
at the expense of Labour Members being mis-represented as 'mouth 
fighters' and 'tongue heroes'. 
2 
Furthermore, a pacifist legacy remained: what GDH Cole has 
described as a "strong, instinctive revulsion against contemplating 
the idea of warw, a feeling that "the wish to avoid war would somehow 
make avoidance possible without surrender to the dictators if only 
3 it was strongly enough felt". The experience of Pethick-Lawrence, 
Labour's front-bench spokesman on finance, illustrates this well: 
"I did not arrive at my own personal conclusion 
(to support the League) without great searchings of 
heart. War was to me a hideous evil both in itself and 
1 Acland, Letter to the author, 11 November, 1969. 
2 House of Commons Debates, 28 November, 1934, Col. 926. 
3 History of the Labour Party From 1914, P-320. 
134. 
its repercussions. It not only brought immediate ruin, 
but it rarely achieved any lasting settlement. It aroused 
many of the ugliest of human passions. I was under no 
illusion that a war waged on behalf of the League would 
materially differ from any other war, either in its 
conduct or in its results. My whole being revolted 
against being instrumental in sending other men to their 
doom, and in depriving women of their husbands, children of 
their fathers, and mothers of their sons. " 
1 
This vague sort of pacifism was not open or definite like 
Tansbury's. 2 Those affected by it knew that the dictators had to 
be stopped but felt a profound distaste for the means necessary to 
stop them. On national and humanitarian grounds they felt there 
must be an alternative to war. Even when it became certain that 
they were living in a world shaped not by men of goodwill, like 
themselves, but by men of violence, they clung to the hope of 
discovering some means to avoid another life-and-death struggle, 
which at best could only end in a pyrrhic victory. "They had 
preached the iniquity of war and armaments so long", wrote Josiah 
Wedgwood of some of his Parliamentary colleagues, that faced with 
the threat of Fascism "many wilfully shut their eyes and brains". 
3 
Fate Has Been Kind, P-185- Pethick-Lawrence: MP, West Leicester, 
1923, defeating Churchill; lost seat in 1931 but re-elected at 
Edinburgh, 1935; Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 1929-31- 
2 James Griffiths, MP for Llanelly, was another Labourite torn 
by mental conflict over the alternatives: dumb submission to 
Nazism or meeting force with force. In 1935 he supported 
Lansbury at Brighton, but the following year, after his election 
to Parliament, became a staunch supporter of collective security. 
Yet he could still describe himself in 1939 as "by temperament 
a pacifist". Pages From_Memory, p. 61. 
3 Quoted in Last Of The Radicals, CV Wedgwood, p. 212. 
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The thirteen avowed pacifist Labourites differed in some respects 
from their fellow Labour Member8 in the parliamentary party. In 
education they were not representative but had better averages: 
Pacifists Party 
Elementary 38-5% 56.5% 
Grammar 7-7% 11-7% 
College 23-0% 14. c)% 
University 30.8% 18.2% 
occupation also set them apart from their colleagues, revealing a 
professional/commercial bias to the group: 
Pacifists Party 
Trade Unions 30-8% 59.1% 
Professions/Commerce 53.8% 28.6% 
The group possessed the relatively high average age of 57 years 7 months, 
years above that of the party. In fact Barr, Lansbury and Wilson 
were in their seventies while Salter and Leach were in their sixties. 
It is interesting to note that between them the Christian pacifists 
averaged 62 years 7 months while the non-religious averaged 48 years 
9 months, almost 6 years below the party's. Such figures imply that 
Lansbury and his fellow religious motivated pacifists represented a 
tradition that was passing away. This was indeed so, for Labour's 
pacifists of the new generation were to be ideologically or politically 
motivated, very rarely religious. Symptomatic of the change was the 
language Lansbury used at the Brighton Conference, when he was still 
the party leader: 
"I cannot believe that the Christ whom you worship, or 
the saints whose memory you all adore, that for any reason 
or cause, they would be pouring bombs and poison gas on 
women and children for any reason whatsoever. Not even in 
retaliation, because also it is written, 'Vengeance is mine, 
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I will repay 
... 
If mine were the only voice in this 
conference, I would say in the name of the faith I hold, 
the belief I have that God intended us to live peaceably 
and quietly with one another, if some people do not allow 
us to do so, I am ready to stand as the early Christians 
did, and say: 'This is our faith, this is where we stand, 
and, if necessary, this is where we die", 
the like of which was never to emanate from the platform again. 
(b) The Left 
The chief stimulus towards socialism within the Labour Party 
came from its numerically small Left. The Left - though by no 
means all, for there were a number of Left-leaning MPs who chose 
not to be associated with a formal grouping - was crystallised in 
the Socialist League, founded at Leicester in 1932, prior to the 
party conference there. In effect it took the place of the disaffiliated 
Independent Labour Party as the driving force towards socialism within 
the Labour Movement. Its name, a direct reminiscence of William 
Morris, was a sure indication of the Left political line it was to 
take. The League stood for a rapid advance towards a socialist 
Britain, including a decisive change in the whole basis of production 
and distribution. Its leading members included Sir Stafford Cripps, 
Aneurin Bevan, Ellen Wilkinson, Denis Pritt and George Strauss. 
Cripps, a barrister since 1913, had joined the Labour Party in 
1929.2 The following year, as the parliamentary party was very short 
1 Labour Party Conference Report, p-177- 
2 Served with the Red Cross in France during the Great War; 
MP East Bristol, 1931-50- 
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of good lawyers, MacDonald appointed him Solicitor General, although 
he did not gain a seat in the House until 1931. Narrowly surviving 
the 'deluge' of that year he rose fast and, with Lansbury and Attlee, 
soon became, in effect, joint leader of the little party of 50 members. 
He was much influenced by the events of 1931 and moved violently to 
the Left, in the sense that he came to believe that Socialism in 
Britain must be established very quickly, by means which some would 
regard as undemocratic, and in the face of opposition from King, 
capitalists, civil servants and armed forces. 'Elected to the 
National Executive in 1934 he resigned the following year, before 
the annual conference, because he disagreed with the party over 
sanctions against Italy. 
Bevan, in contrast, was the son of a coal miner who followed 
his father's occupation upon leaving school at the age of 13. After 
studying at a Labour College he soon attained prominence in the 
councils of the South Wales Miners Federation, and entered Parliament 
in 1929, as the Member for Ebbw Vale. "Almost from the start", his 
biographer has recorded, "he stood squarely on the Left of the Party 
against the leadership. " 
1 Following the 1931 election he came 
increasingly in contact with Cripps, with whom he was closely involved 
in the Socialist League and the Left's newspaper, Tribune. 
Strauss, like Cripps, was a man of substantial means. 
2 Elected 
to Parliament in 1929, he served for two years as Parliamentary Private 
Secretary to Herbert Morrison, then Minister of Transport. Rejected 
by the electors in 1931, he too was greatly influenced by the events 
of that year, and his analysis of them began to draw him Leftwards. 
He soon became involved with the Socialist League and Cripps, whom 
1 Foot, Aneurin Bevan, Vol. 1, p. 98. 
MP, 1929-31,1934 onwards. 
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he helped to finance Tribune. 
Pritt, a barrister by occupation, entered the Commons in 1935 
as MP for North Hammersmith. 
' He had already established a reputation 
in Labour circles through his chairmanship of the Reichstag Fire 
Inquiry Commission, which sat in London in 1933 and established Nazi 
guilt. For that reason he was excluded from Germany, the following 
year, on Hitler's orders. As an MP he quickly became prominent in 
Left-wing circles and was elected both to the party's National 
Executive and to the Parliamentary Executive. In 1936 he attended 
the Zinoviev Trial in Moscow and subsequently wrote a pamphlet 
claiming that the trial was fair. Four years later he again defended 
the Soviet Union, by publishing two books and many articles "white- 
washing the Russian aggression against Finland". For showing "himself 
to be in violent opposition to the declared policy of the Party" 
over Finland he was subsequently expelled. 
2 
As regards defence and foreign policy the Left took up the 
traditional Marxist line, which with its elaborate ideology was ill- 
adapted to the rapidly changing international scene. It started with 
the premise that capitalism caused the imperialist rivalries which in 
turn caused war. "The connection between imperialism and war is very 
close. War is not merely a regrettable but accidental feature in 
imperialist politics. War is an inevitable product of imperialism.,, 
3 
1 MP 1935-50; author of Light on Moscow, 1939, and Must The War 
Spread?, 1940, for which he was expelled from the party. 
2 The Fateful Years, p. 293- 
3 Why War? by Ellen Wilkinson and E Conze, p. 27. 
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The only effective way of preventing war, according to the Left, 
was by abolishing imperialism and with it the whole capitalist system. 
Thus the widely accepted belief in Labour circles, that the 
League of Nations would deter nations from resorting to force, was 
completely misplaced. The League was itself the creation of 
capitalism, its objective being to secure the spoils of the victor 
powers against the revisionist nations. "The League of Nations", 
Bevan announced, "is increasingly a conspiracy to maintain the 
frontiers imposed by the peace treaties in an attempt to keep some 
countries financially dead. " 
1 By defending the satiated imperialist 
powers against the hungry ones the League was preserving a state of 
division, in which lay the seeds of future war. 
Confident in their reasoning the Socialist Leaguers declared 
that any war waged by the Government in support of the League or 
otherwise, would be a capitalistic war. "The primary objective of 
this Government", said Cripps, "has always been and is now the main- 
tenance of British Imperial interests, just as Hitler's objective 
is the maintenance of German Imperial interests, and Mussolini's 
objective is the maintenance of Italian Imperial interests, and 
Japan has the same objective as regards Japanese Imperial interests. 
In that rivalry of Imperial interests in the world, world peace 
comes in a very bad second as regards the foreign policy of any of 
those countries in the world today. It is hardly to be wondered at 
that, when you get a collection of Imperialist exploiters, they will 
from time to time fall out over the division of the swag. " 
2 
1 Aneurin Bevan,, p. 207- 
2 House of Commons Debates, 23 June, 1936, cols. 1697-8. 
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In such circumstances it was Labour's duty, the Left argued, to 
resist any war entered by the National Government with every means 
in its power. 
Seen in this light, rearmament and increased military strength 
would only be used by the Government for imperialist policies as "the 
Imperialist nations must prepare for the inescapable results of the 
policies they are pursuing". 
1 It was therefore in the interests of 
the working classes that Labour should avoid being sucked into a 
full bi-partisan defence policy with a capitalist Government, whose 
purposes it could neither share nor control. The party should 
"oppose the Government's arms plans root and branch", said Bevan, 
while his colleague Cripps counselled the workers to "fight tooth 
and nail against the rearmament programme of the National 
Government. " 2 
To the accusation that their analysis did not distinguish 
between the aggressive Fascist nations abroad and the British 
Government, Cripps and the Socialist League revealed that they saw 
Fascism almost wholly as a threat at home. Cripps declared: 
"Money cannot make armaments. Armaments can only 
be made by the skill of the working class, and it is 
the British working class who would be called upon to 
use them. 
Today you have the most glorious opportunity that 
workers have ever had if you will only use the necessity 
of capitalism in order to get power yourselves. 
1 Why War? E Wilkinson and E Conze, p. 27. 
2 Bevan, Tribune, 19 February, 1937: Cripps, a speech at 
Eastleigh, Hampshire, recorded in the Daily Herald, 19 December, 
1936. 
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"The capitalists are in your hands. Refuse to 
make armaments, refuse to use them. That is the only 
way you can keep this country out of war and obtain 
power for the working class. 
Refuse to make armaments, and the capitalists are 
powerless. 
One of the saddest things about the Labour Party 
is its respectability. 
Some people say that we in Great Britain are 
immune from the Continental diseases of Fascism and 
Nazism. Those of us who sit in the House of Commons 
and watch what goes on know that there would be no 
difficulty for those who form the National Government 
today to form a Fascist Government tomorrow. " 
1 
Yet it would be unwise to dismiss the stand of the Socialist 
League as being wholly a "catastrophic counsel of paralysis", for 
there was more to its case then this. 
2 Their hope for the future 
lay in the prospect that the energies of the workers, in being used 
to oppose the National Government, would also be concentrated on 
returning a Labour Government. This government would not rely on 
the League of Nations but would seek peace by establishing the 
closest possible relations with the Soviet Union and other countries 
where socialist governments were in control. In this way it would 
be possible "for a strong group of states, all determined upon a new 
method of co-operation in the economic life of the world, co-operating 
in the use of their resources and in the government of their 
1 Daily Herald, 15 March, 1937. 
2 Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism, p. 226. 
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dependencies to lay a real foundation for a policy of peace". 
1 
Such a socialist confederation', as Cripps termed it, would attain 
security by working together to deter and frustrate any member being 
"set upon one day and left an isolated carcase to be picked by the 
new imperialist vultures". 
Nevertheless the Socialist League's approach to rearmament and 
defence questions was remarkably unrealistic. It altogether failed 
to discriminate between the British Government and the Fascist powers 
and to appreciate that salvation lay, not in the denial of arms to 
the Government, but in trying to compel it, by democratic means, to 
pursue a foreign policy which would use the arms, if they had to be, 
for the right purposes. The League's determination to displace the 
National Government was fine, but its evaluation of defence and 
foreign affairs was almost completely negative. At a time when the 
German threat was growing the Left sought to strip its own Government, 
or a future Labour one, of any power to deal effectively with 
aggression abroad. 
It is interesting to note that of the five MPs prominent on 
Labour's Left 
- 
and it must be stressed again that there were others 
not attached to the Socialist League - only one, Bevan, could be 
described as a 'worker', despite all the talk of working-class 
interests that emanated from these quarters. Cripps, Pritt and 
Strauss had all attended public school while Wilkinson, Pritt and 
Cripps undertook courses at university. The odd man out, Bevan, 
was educated at elementary school and later went to Labour College, 
but still obtained a better education than the majority of Labour 
1 House of Commons Debates, 23 June, 1936, Col. 1699. 
2 From a Cripps letter quoted in Estorick, Stafford Cripps, p. 148. 
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Members. In occupation the group were equally un-representative of 
the parliamentary party, containing two barristers, a metal merchant, 
a trade union organiser and a coal miner. Similarly their average 
age, 43 years 2 months, was extremely low. Omitting Pritt, whose 
connection with the party ceased in 1940, the other four were to 
become ministers in Attlee's Government, with Cripps rising to be 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and Bevan deputy leader of the party. 
(c) Supporters of the League of Nations 
The election manifesto of 1935 clearly set out Labour's devotion 
to the League: 
'The Labour Party 
-.. 
seeks wholehearted co-operation 
with the League of Nations and with all the states outside 
the League which desire peace. It stands firmly for the 
collective peace system. ' 
Members of Parliament that supported the League as the most likely 
instrument through which to establish international peace, were drawn 
from all sections of the party, including many who in 1914 had held 
pacifist or war resistance views. 
Philip Noel Baker has been described as "the chief figure among 
the League of Nations idealists". 
1 His attachment to the League 
dated from his membership of the League section of the British 
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, and he remained on the 
League Secretariat until 1922, returning the following year as 
.2 
personal assistant to the British delegate to the Assembly. 
1M Phillips Price, Letter to the author, 25 February, 1969. 
2 Pacifist during the Great War but commanded an ambulance unit 
in Italy, 1915-18; Cassel Professor of International Relations, 
University of London, 1924-29; MP, 1935-70. 
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Elected Member for Coventry in 1929, he served as Arthur Henderson's 
Parliamentary Private Secretary, and after the Labour knockdown, became 
his principal assistant at the Disarmament Conference. Five years 
later he captured JH Thomas's seat at Derby, at a time when he 
combined his appeal for a strong League policy with insistence on 
disarmament as a means to peace. He persisted in this attitude long 
after all real hope of agreed disarmament had disappeared. 
"The people in the Labour Party", wrote Noel-Baker, "with 
whom I worked most closely in the House of Commons on these questions 
were Attlee, Tom Johnston, Arthur Henderson and Herbert Morrison-"' 
Interestingly enough for a Tabour leader, Attlee had "a fine war 
record" having served in the Gallipolli Campaign, in Mesopotamia and 
France, eventually being demobilised with the rank of major. 
Elected Member for Stepney in 1922 he held office in both Labour 
administrations, becoming deputy leader in 1931 in the absence of 
more senior colleagues, and finally leader in 1935 
.3 Although in the 
'twenties Attlee experienced an anti-war phase and played a prominent 
part in the No More War Movement, his leadership in the 1935 
Parliament was closely identified with strong support for the League 
of Nations. 
Johnston, a pacifist in World War I, was another of Labour's 
leading League enthusiasts. 
4 
After graduating from Glasgow University 
at the turn of the century, Johnston had thrown himself into the task 
1 Noel-Baker, Letter to the author, 31 March, 1969. 
2 The Gathering Storm, P-153- 
3 MP, 1922-55; Under Secretary of State for War, 1924; Chancellor 
of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1930-31- 
4 
MP, 1922-31,1935-45. 
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of launching a socialist magazine Forward, which he was to edit for 
27 years. In 1922 he entered the Commons as Member for West 
Stirlingshire, winning preferment seven years later when he was 
appointed Under Secretary of State for Scotland. Out of the Commons 
until 1935 his return was marked by his elevation to the Labour 
Front bench, a position he retained until his departure from active 
politics in 1945- 
Arthur Henderson was not the former Labour Foreign Secretary 
of that name, but his son. 
1 Unlike the father who had risen 
through the trade union Movement, Henderson had a public school and 
university background. An MP briefly in the 1920s he re-entered 
the House in 1935, sitting for the Kingswinford Division of 
Staffordshire. There he soon established a reputation for specialising 
in foreign affairs, frequently intervening in debates. 
Another of Labour's leading supporters of the League was 
Morrison, Attlee's rival for the leadership in 1935- 
2 Beginning 
his working life as an errand boy Morrison had made his way up through 
the Labour Party machine. He entered Parliament in 1923 and six years 
later was made Minister of Transport in the Second Labour Government, 
a post in which he gave full play to his administrative talent. 
Defeated in 1931 he devoted his considerable energies to organising 
London's Labour Party which he spearheaded to victory in the local 
elections of 1934, when he became head of the London County Council. 
Re-elected to Parliament in 1935, and then occupying a central role in 
Labour politics, he betrayed few traces of his opposition to the Great 
1 MP, South Cardiff, 1923-24; Kingswinford, 1935-50- 
2 MP, Hackney South, 1923-24; 1929-31; 1935-45. 
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War, being closely associated with a League approach to international 
questions. 
1 
Although Noel-Baker, Attlee, Johnston, Henderson and Morrison 
were the most prominent League of Nations idealists they "had 
quite a following within the parliamentary party". 
2 Some of these 
can be distinguished by their membership of organisations; connected 
with the League or the policy of collective security. Four Labour 
Members, Alexander Walkden, 3 Fred Marshall, 
4 
Richard StokeS5 and 
John Leslie 
6 
had held, or were at that time holding, executive 
positions on the League of Nations Union. In fact Leslie, the 
Member for Sedgefield, Durham, had been a foundation member of the 
Union. David Chater, Seymour Cocks 7, Josiah Wedgwood, George Hall 
8 
and Morgan Jones belonged to the New Commonwealth Society, an 
organisation which, with Churchill as its President, advocated the 
1 It is interesting to note that of the four that Noel-Baker worked 
closely with, Johnston and Morrison had been pacifists during the 
Great War, as had Noel-Baker, while Attlee had experienced an 
anti-war phase. For more detailed information on Morrison's 
commitment to the League see PP-300-302. 
2 Price, Letter to the author, 25 February, 1969. 
3 General Secretary of the Railway Clerks' Association; member of 
the General Council of the TUC, 1921-36; MP, South Bristol, 1929- 
31,1935-45. 
4 
MP, Sheffield, Brightside, 1930-31,1935-50. 
5 Chairman and managing director of Rapier Ltd; MP, Ipswich, 1938- 
57; when Japan attacked China, his firm refused to have business 
relations with Japan, and refused to carry out Government orders 
for Italy at the time of the Abyssinian War. In 1937 he offered 
to make shells for the Government on a no profit basis. 
6 
General Secretary National Union of Shop Assistants, 1925-35; 
MP, Sedgefield, Durham, 1935-50- 
7 Member of the party's Advisory Committee on International Relations 
during the 130s; MP, Broxtowe, Derbyshire, 1929-53. 
8 
Hall: MP, Aberdare, 1922-46; Civil Lord of the Admiralty, 1929-31. 
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strengthening of the machinery of the League of Nations by the 
creation of an International Police Force. A further three, Arthur 
Hayday, 1 George Lathan and William Sanders had personal contacts with 
Geneva and the League of Nations. Each had been attached to the 
Staff of the International Labour Office, an offshoot of the League, 
with Sanders 
2 for nine years deputy-chief of the administrative 
section there. 
3 
Although "the supporters of the League of Nations Covenant were 
much the largest group in the House of Commons", the aforementioned 
members appear to have been the most active of their number. 
4 
The 
bulk of Labour MPs seem to have followed their lead. 
An analysis of the main League enthusiasts revealed an average 
age of 54 years 8 months, remarkably close to that of the party's. 
In education and occupation, however, they were quite unrepresentative: 
League Enthusiasts Party 
Education 
Elementary 
Public School 
University 
Occupation 
Trade Unionists 
Professions, 
Services and 
Business 
41.2% 57.1% 
29.4% 9.1% 
41.2% 18.2% 
35.3% 59.1% 
52.9% 28.6% 
1 Hayday: MP, West Nottingham, 1918-31,1935-45. 
2 Sanders: Secretary of the Fabian Society, 1914-20; MP, North 
Battersea, 1929-31,1935-40; Financial Secretary to the War 
Office, 1930-31- 
3 
"The International Labour Office is the first effort to try and 
secure international arrangements with regard to wages and conditions 
of labour and hours, and it is an essential part of the League. " 
David Lloyd George, House of Commons Debates, 27 July, 1936. Col. 1204. 
Noel-Baker, Letter to the author, 31 March, 1969. 
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The figures indicate that there was a preponderance of well-educated 
and affluent members, in short, representatives of the middle class, 
quite out of proportion to the parliamentary party. This perhaps 
explains why a majority of their number had held or were to hold, in 
the wartime or post-war Governments, ministerial posts. 
Despite their devotion to the League the attitude of many of 
Labour's League enthusiasts had been riddled in ambiguity: 
"If an act of aggression occurred, it was assumed 
that, provided that the British Government stood by its 
obligations to the League, moral sanctions, the solemn 
naming of the aggressor, or at most economic sanctions 
would be sufficient to halt it. Support for the League, 
therefore and the campaign for disarmament, collective 
security and resistance to war went hand in hand. " 
In fact, at the Hastings Conference of 1933 a resolution, which 
pledged opposition to any war and called upon the/movement to resist 
a threat of war by organised working class action, including a 
general strike, had been carried enthusiastically, while at the 
same conference the delegates had received an orthodox collective 
security speech from Arthur Henderson with equal enthusiasm. 
Clouds, however, were already beginning to gather over the 
international horizon for in Italy Mussolini was making preparations 
for his nefarious raid on Abyssinia. Labour was thereby confronted 
with the paradoxical situation that the pursuit of peace might involve 
the country in a war which would bear many of the features of the 
1 Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Volume 1, P-549. 
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old imperialist conflictsq that the party so deplored. A division 
of opinion occurred. "Up to then', ' Pethick-Lawrence recalled, "it 
had seemed possible to ride at once the two horses of pure pacifism 
and loyalty to the League. But now it had become apparent that the 
time might come when they would take us in opposite directions. 
Loyalty to the League meant support of collective security and a 
willingness, if need arose, to co-operate in the application of 
sanctions. If there was actual aggression, that might involve us 
in war. It was therefore necessary for the members of the Labour 
Party, individually and collectivelyq to choose which horse, in 
that event, they would continue to ride. " 
1 
At the Brighton Conference of 1935 a majority of the party 
accepted that support for the League meant sanctions and that 
sanctions might mean war. Dalton moved a resolution which 
condemned Mussolini's defiant attitude towards the League and 
proclaimed Labour's readiness, in co-operation with other nations, 
to use all measures provided under the Covenant to restrain Italy 
and uphold the League's authority. Despite the intervention of the 
Left and the pacifists, an overwhelming majority of the party voted 
in favour of Dalton's resolution. Noel-Baker wrote that the 
objections of Lansbury and Cripps were "rejected by a 95-4% majority 
vote in favour of sanctions". 
2 
The Conference was applauded, particularly outside the party, 
as the beginning of a more realistic Labour approach to the international 
situation: "A very strong desire", wrote Churchill, "to fight the 
1 Pethick-Lawrence, Fate Has Been Kind, P-185- 
2 
Letter to the author, 31 March, 1969. 
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Italian Dictator, to enforce sanctions of a decisive character, and 
to use the British Fleet if need be, surged through the sturdy wage- 
earners. "' It is true, as Churchill suggests, that Labour now stood 
unequivocally for collective security, but it is significant that 
many of Labour's League enthusiasts were convinced that economic 
sanctions would be sufficient to force Italy into line - as they 
might have been had they been effectively applied. Although they 
were prepared to contemplate the use of British forces "if need bell 
a new departure they had not faced up to its implications. Their 
policy of collective security was not related to the problem of 
defence. In effect they combined their appeal for a strong League 
policy with a belief that an attitude of full loyalty to the League 
would generate forces powerful enough to restrain the aggressorl 
and consequently refused to acknowledge the need for increased 
armaments. Collective security, they argued, would stop the 
aggressor, therefore rearmament was unnecessary. "I stand firmly by 
the League of Nations", stated Chater in his election manifesto, but 
"I am opposed to Britain joining a new armaments race". 
2 
In theory of course, it was possible to show the plain superiority 
of League forces against any likely combination of aggressors. Albert 
Alexander, for instance, in opposing the Naval Estimates simply 
reckoned up the forces of good and evil and decided that those of the 
former were sufficiently superior. "If you", he addressed the Government 
front bench, "are really working to a policy of pooled security and 
a collective peace system through the League, there is no case for 
the wide expansion of naval expenditure which is proposed at the 
1 The Gathering Storm, P-153- 
2. Chater: MP, South Hammersmith, 1929-31; Bethnal Green, 1935-50; 
Chairman, Political Committee of the London Co-operative Society. 
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present time. " 
1 But the collective peace system that Alexander spoke 
of was not in existence, and even if it had been there would have been 
serious obstacles to its working with a British Government whole- 
heartedly behind it or not. That is not to imply that it was 
impractical to labour for collective security. What is meant is that 
it was really impossible to calculate the British contribution to 
the task of resisting aggression on the basis of an assumption that 
all other contributors would supply theirs, or that sufficient force 
would be available in the region where the conflict arose. In short, 
many Labourites seemed not to realise how much of the burden of resisting 
an aggressor would fall upon Britain, with her world-wide commitments. 
Inevitably, in regarding collective security as an alternative to 
rearmament, Labour's League supporters laid themselves open to attack 
by their political opponents, including one in a lighter vein by 
Sir John Simon: 
"You cannot treat collective security as though it 
were an arrangement by which you are going to receive a 
contribution without making one. When I hear that argument 
I am always reminded of the passage in Lewis Carroll's 
famour book The Hunting of the Snark in which he describes 
a man who 
'At charity meetings stands at the door 
And collects 
- 
though he does not subscribe'. " 
2 
Simon's wit fell on the altogether unappreciative ears of the League 
enthusiasts, who failed to see the force of his argument, that a measure 
of rearmament, carried through as a purely British act, would make 
I House of Commons Debates, 16 March, 1936. Col. 82. 
2 Ibid, 18 February, 1937. Col. 1407. 
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a vital contribution to a strongly-armed system of collective security, 
which alone stood any chance of holding the dictators in check. 
This continuing inability to recognise that the coupling of 
collective security with opposition to rearmament resulted in the 
divorce between their foreign and defence policies moved one of 
Labour's parliamentary candidates to describe the League enthusiasts, 
policy as being "hatched in the conceptual heaven of Geneva 
politics". "We have behaved", he continued, "as if Fascism could be 
stopped by resolutions, protocols, pacts and covenants; and 
whenever anyone enquired what force would be required for the job, 
we airily totted up the populations of the 'good' countries and 
their mineral wealth. And we have always avoided consideration of 
the naval and military technicalities by repeating that what we 
wanted was not an alliance to fight a war, but a Peace Front to 
prevent it. " 
1 
Opposition to Rearmament 
Having set out the basic outlook of three of the party's main 
groups, it remains to be said that Labour's policy on rearmament 
depended on the interplay of the views of these groups. Thus when 
rearmament tentatively began in 1934, with the 41 squadron increase 
in the Royal Air Force, the pacifists, the Left and the League 
supporters united to denounce even such a modest measure, just as 
they were equally firm in their opposition to later increases. Their 
opposition, according to official statements, would cease when the 
National Government based Britain's international policy on League 
of Nations tenets, and took steps to brganise a system of collective 
RHS Crossman, Labour and Compulsory Military Service, Political 
Quarterly, 1939. 
153. 
security. As the Government did no such thing Labour announced 
that it would continue to oppose the defence programme until 
Ministers did. 
For the next three years Labour outwardly continued to maintain 
that while they had "steadily opposed the rearmament policy of the 
Government" their opposition was "not on the ground that the level 
of armaments 
... 
is inadequate, or even that the present level is 
excessive, but because it is impossible to tell what the scale of 
armaments should be in the absence of any sound foreign policy". 
1 
This was all very well but it ignored, if not deliberately glossed 
over, the fact that there were several currents of opinion on 
rearmament within the party, each with its own peculiar reason for 
opposing, and in some cases raising definite resistance to, the 
defence estimates. Seen in this light, Labour's formula of opposing 
rearmament so long as the Government opposed collective security 
owed its adoption not only to a wish to register disapproval of 
existing foreign policy but also to the fact that it offered a 
convenient screen to the divisions within the party, uniting those 
pacifists outrightly opposed to the existence of arms, those on the 
Left that believed the Government would misuse its strength, and 
those League enthusiasts, some of whom still clung to their hopes 
of disarmament, who doubted whether more arms were necessary to 
the British contribution to pooled security. 
Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that when Churchill 
made his request that the Labour Party accompany him in the July 
deputation to the Prime Minister, it was declined. As far as the 
1 Attlee, The Labour Party in Perspective, p. 108. 
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majority of Labour Members were concerned an even wider gulf separated 
them from Ghurchill, a 'die-hard Tory', as the Daily Herald loved to 
refer to him, than from Baldwin. 
1 That he advocated an even larger 
armaments programme confirmed many in their views of him. "Naturally", 
remarked James Milner, Labour Member for South East Leeds, "we on this 
side expected the bellicose and extravagant speech which was in fact 
delivered by the right honourable Member for Epping. He made it 
clear 
... 
that he and his friends stand for increased rearmament, 
increased armaments, and increased armaments again, without consider- 
ation for cost, or effort, or time, or anything else. " 
2 
In fact Labour's inability to face up to the realities of the 
situation caused no little concern to those members involved in the 
deputation, both backbenchers and ministers alike. Sir Austen 
Chamberlain confessed that he had originally hoped that "we could 
arrange some kind of meeting with you (Ministers) to which the 
leaders of the other Parties would come. I wanted it to be educative". 
The Prime Minister replied to the effect that he too desired a meeting 
with the leaders of the other Parties, but particularly with Labour. 
"I think it would be an extraordinary valuable thing. I still hope it 
may be possible. At the moment they are showing 'no inclination., 13 
There were some exceptions of which Jack Lawson, a mining MP, was 
one. "In a Parliamentary sketch now in my possession and written 
in April, 1936,1 wrote "War is coming as sure as night follows 
day". It was entitled "Watch Winston", and these words were 
written of him who was then a voice crying in the wilderness. 
"Now that he is further off the chief place in the government 
than he has ever been before, he is nearer to it than he has 
ever been". The editor of the paper rang me up in 1942 and 
asked if I remembered the article. I said I did. "You were 
a prophet" he said. "Yes, a miner prophet" was my reply. The 
article was in the Sunday Sun, 26 April, 1936. A Man's Life, 
p. 183- 
2 House of Commons Debates, 10 March, 1936. Col-1013. 
3 Cabinet Papers, Memorandum on the July Deputation. 
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Baldwin guaged Labour feeling correctly. Neither the party 
leaders nor the Parliamentary Party at large were in a co-operative 
mood. That same month the Supplementary Estimates came up before the 
Commons and the Party announced its intention to vote against them. 
Unlike March, when the main estimate had not been challenged. but 
token reductions moved, Labour decided to vote against every penny 
of them. The movement's belligerence to the Government had been 
notably increased with the raising of sanctions the previous month, 
and with it the realisation that the League and Labour's foreign 
policy had been dealt a crushing blow. Voting against the Supplementary 
Estimates was therefore an expression of the anger and bitter 
frustration that the movement found itself in. 
A manifesto was issued in which great pains were taken to stress 
the symbolic character of the act: 
"In order to mark its entire opposition to the 
international policy of the Government, of which the 
rearmament programme is an integral part, the Labour 
Party will on 27-8 July vote against the Estimates for the 
Fighting Services. " 
Voting against an estimate, so the manifesto went, was not a vote for 
the abolition of the Service concerned but opposition to the policy 
of which the estimate was an expression. Labour, far from advocating 
unilateral disarmament, had definitely declared its willingness to 
provide such defence forces as were required for the country to do 
its part in a system of collective security through the League. ' 
Hugh Dalton challenged the decision to vote against the Estimates 
and tried to persuade the parliamentary executive and then the party 
1 Daily Herald, 25 JulY, 1936. 
156. 
to desist from the practice of voting against the estimates. On the 
executive he had only three supporters: Alexander, Lees-Smith and 
Clynes, the latter, however, being absent from the discussion. At 
the party meeting Dalton was defeated by 57 to 39- 
1 Sixty Labour 
MPs were either absent from the meeting or present and abstaining. 
When the Service votes came on, Dalton and other Labour Members 
claimed the conscience clause and abstained from voting. 
When the Liberal Geoffrey Mander summed up the 1935-36 session 
of Parliament, "dominated by the increasing gravity of the international 
situation", he noted that Labour had found itself in a very difficult 
position in connection with the defence programme. Distrusting the 
purpose for waich the arms would be used by the Government, the party 
had voted against the Service Estimates. "This", Mander wrote, "has 
secured unity and made possible joint action with the very limited 
number who are opposed to all armaments, but it has seriously 
compromised them politically". It laid Labour open to the embarrassing 
taunt that they would not provide the means for the collective system 
to work. Mander went on to refer to the growing number of Labourites 
who felt it would be tactically wiser to adopt the same course as 
the Liberals and support the Army, Navy and Air Force votes while 
opposing those for the Foreign Office, in order to emphasize their 
divergence on foreign policy. 
2 
(d) The Rearmers and the Policy Switch 
A conviction of the need for rearmament, even under the National 
Government of Stanley Baldwin, was particularly strong among the 
This would be the weekly meeting when the party met in full 
caucus to discuss parliamentary business, to allocate speakers 
for the important debates and to receive reports from the 
Executive and the various party committees. 
2 
'The Session, Quarterly Review, September, 1936. 
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leaders of the larger trade unions: Sir Walter Citrine, General 
Secretary of the Trade Union Congress; Ernest Bevin, General Secretary 
of the massive Transport and General Workers, Union; Charles Dukes 
of the General and Municipal Workers; John Marchbank of the National 
Union of Railwaymen. These individuals, however, are outside the 
scope of this thesis, but their recognition of the need to back up 
ethical convictions with force was paralleled within the parliamentary 
party. Among Labour MPs there was a group peculiarly free from the 
old pacifist tradition, wanting the party to rid itself of the charge 
that it was calling for resistance to aggression while refusing to 
give the nation the arms with which to resist. 
Dalton has been described as the "most prescient of socialists; 
he tried to bring his side down to earth again". 
1 The son of a 
clergyman, he was educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge, 
qualifying as a barrister in 1914. That same year he volunteered 
to fight inthe Great War, and served on the French and Italian 
Fronts. Following demobilisation he lectured in Economics at London 
University, and was first elected to Parliament in 1924. Five years 
later he was appointed Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
a post which he held throughout the life of the Second Labour 
Government. Re-elected to Parliament in 1935 he took his place on 
Vansittart, The Mist Procession, p. 510. Like Churchill, Dalton 
maintained close contact with Vansittart. Regular meetings 
between the two men are recorded in Dalton's diary, s1though 
they become less frequent and more furtive with the approach of 
war. "There was need", noted Dalton during the Czech crisis, 
"for even greater care in the arrangement of meetings between 
him and me. (For some time past we had agreed not to meet at 
the Foreign Office. ) He (Vansittart) did not think he was 
suspected by Ministers of contact with the Labour Party, but 
they knew that he and Winston were old friends and that he 
sometimes saw some of the more active critics in the Conservative 
Party. " Diaries, 19 September, 1938- 
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the front bench, establishing himself as one of Labour's leading 
spokesmen. 
1 
It is to Dalton's credit that he did not adhere to traditional 
Labour policy but chose, at the expense of his own personal standing, 
to oppose the tactic of voting against the Service Estimates. The 
Government, he was willing to admit, was pursuing a lame foreJgn 
policy, but the fact remained that if Great Britain was ever to 
protect herself from the Fascist states she required a more effective 
arms'establishment. He had held this view since April, 1935, the 
time of Hitler's claim to have reached air parity with Britain: 
"From then on I was sure that, although ire must still 
negotiate, we must-also immediately rearm. I was becoming 
very impatient with the opposite view still held by many 
of my colleagues. To argue that, in the sorry pass to 
which we had now come, because we had a damned bad British 
Government therefore the British nation should not be 
better armed, was piffle 
- 
the arms, one hoped, would 
outlast the Government. And it was damned bad politics 
as well. " 
2 
By the summer of 1937, with the Spanish Civil war in full swing, 
Labour's attitude, as Mander had foreseen, became more and more 
impossible. The party's policy being "Arms for Spain" and by contrast, 
at least to the man in the street, "No arms for Britain". That the 
public were confused can be gauged from the following remarks of 
a Labour candidate: 
"People only understand a straight and simple line. 
I am told that in by-elections people have been saying of 
1 MP, Peckham, 1924-29; Bishop Auckland, 1929-31,1935-59. 
2 Dalton, The Fateful Years, p. 63- 
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the Labour Party that it was "against the country being 
defended", that it "didn't want us to protect ourselves" 
etc. I can well believe it; exactly what they would 
think, however unjustified it is. " 1 
This was not new. Labour's policy since 1934 had given great 
opportunity for misunderstanding and misrepresentation by political 
opponents. Amery, for instance, had written in his 1935 election 
manifesto: 
"The Socialist Party had war so much in mind that 
they have got rid of their leader because he was opposed 
to military sanctions against Italy. But they have taken 
good care, by opposing every vote required by the Navy, 
Army and Air Force, to make sure that if we did go to 
war we should be defeated and ruined. " 
With the Spanish conflict leading to a further deterioration 
in the international situation it was inevitable that Labour Members 
began to question the Party's standpoint. William Dobbie, the 
Member for Rotherham and an ex-President of the National Union of 
Railwaymen, in speaking of Spain, indicated that once Labour 
abandoned support for non-intervention the Government's rearmament 
programme could no longer be opposed: 
"When I cameback from the war in 1918 1 did not 
think I should ever again be under the necessity to 
advocate provisions of munitions of war. I have had 
to alter that opinion. When the Fascist danger comes 
it cannot be met by resolutions and arguments. " 
2 
Rowse, The present and immediate future of the Labour ParjZ, 
Political Quarterly, 1938-. 
The Times, 16 November, 1936. 
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Similarly George Ridley, a leading figure in the Railway Clerks 
Association and Member for Clay Cross, Derbyshire, explained his 
unease at Labour's policy: 
"One of the things that troubled me most 
... 
was 
the fact that the most vociferous demands for intervention 
(in Spain) came from people who, for the sake of a 
gesture, were prepared to defy half Europe without being 
willing to equip themselves with the instruments of 
defence. " 1 
On 19 July Dalton raised the matter on the executive, again 
with the support of Lees-Smith 
2 
and Alexander. 
3 Clynes was in 
agreement, but was once more absent from the crucial meeting. 
Noel-Baker, new to the executive, sat on the fence, as at first did 
Pethick-Lawrence and Greenwood, but in the end both voted for the 
existing policy. All of Dalton's other colleagues were exactly 
where they were twelve months before. 
Two days later the party met to consider a change. On the 
first day Attlee stated the majority view from the chair and was 
followed by Lees-Smith: Johnston and Shinwell, among others, supported 
Attlee; Alfred Barnes 
4 
and George Lathan5 followed Lees-Smith's lead. 
1 Labour, November 1936. 
2 Liberal MP Northampton, 1910-18; joined Labour, 1919; MP, Keighley, 
Yorkshire, 1922-23,1924-29,1935-41; Postmaster-General, 1929-31; 
President of the Board of Education, 1931- 
3 MP, Hillsborough, Sheffield, 1922-31,1935-50; First Lord of the 
Admiralty in the Second Labour Government and from then on he 
specialised in defence matters. 
4 
MP, East Ham South, 1922-31,1935-55; Labour Whip, 1925-31; 
chairman of the Co-operative Party, 1924-45. 
5 MP, Park, Sheffield, 1929-31,1935-42. 
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on the second day Morrison, William Lunn 
1 
and Griffiths 
2 
spoke 
strongly against a fresh approach while Sorensen, Jimmy Walker and 
Ernest Thurtle backed Dalton's proposals. Dalton himself spoke last 
but one, making an effective plea to stop "dodging the issue and 
playing the fool". Twelve months ago, he reminded them, there had 
been a similar discussion, giving a narrow majority for going on as 
before. "That was after Abyssinia 
... 
But it was before Spain. 
Now we had had twleve months of Spanish Civil War, in relation to 
which, as in relation to Abyssinia, we had pressed the Government to 
follow a stronger foreign policy. There was no doubt at all that we 
had been very close to a general war in the last twelve months ... 
The Labour Party's policy was 
.. - 
Arms for Spain. But what 
possible answer had we got in the country to the accusation that we 
wanted Arms for Spain, but no arms for our own country? ". People 
were simply bewildered by their attitude on foreign policy and defence, 
and unless the party ceased voting against arms it was "putting a gun 
into the hands of the National Government, with which they would shoot 
down our candidates like rabbits all over the country". 
3 
Greenwood, who wound up the debate, was apparently very halting 
and unhappy. Whatever way they voted, he said, the party would be 
misrepresented. Yet it would make a bad impression to change course 
now and Labour must simply go on trying to wear down misrepresentation 
by the other side. When the issue was put to a vote the Party, by 
45 to 39, decided to upset the majority recommendation of the executive 
1 MP, Rothwell, Yorkshire, 1918-42. 
2 MP, Lianelly, 1936-66. 
3 The Fateful Years, PP-134-36. 
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and to abstain from voting on the Defence Estimates. Only slightly 
more than half the Labour Members cast ballots, but Dalton assumed 
that a larger attendance would have increased the majority: "If I 
polled all my promises, the majority would have been nearly 30"- 
1 
The Press took quite an interest in the affair, one or two 
newspapers arguing that Dalton had either been supported by the 
"intellectuals" or the "trade unionists". The political correspondent 
of the Daily Express wrote: 
"Old Etonian ex-Foreign Under-Secretary Dr Dalton and 
his powerful group of 'intellectuals' contend that, while 
they are asking the Government to stand by 'collective 
security', it is illogical to deny the country the force 
with which to carry out that policy 
... 
And trade union 
leaders add their weight to the arguments of Dr Dalton 
by making it plain that they are on the side of rearmament-" 
2 
To discover, as far as possible, the composition of Dalton's 
followers, and ascertain whether they were trade unionists, intellec- 
tuals or a combination of both, it is first necessary to examine the 
division lists for July, 1936, the occasion of the party's voting 
against the total estimates. 
On July 20 the parliamentary party moved a token reduction of 
C100 in the Navy Supplementary Estimates, voting 134 in favour; 
after that defeat only 116 voted against the Estimate. Exactly one 
week later the party voted against the final stages of the total 
Supply Estimates. By consulting division lists for both days, we can 
isolate 9 Labour MPs who were consistent abstainers: Barnes, 
1 The Fateful Years, P-135- 
2 Daily Express, 22 July, 1937. 
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Bellenger 1, Dalton, Fletcher 
2, J Henderson3, Lees-Smith, Leslie, 
G Mathers 
4 
and Price5. In addition Alexander, Clynes and W Green6 
abstained on the 20th, though they cannot be placed definitely in 
the Commons on the 27th. A further seven abstained on the second 
occasion: J Compton, J Gibbins7, D Logan F Montague, G Oliver99 
10 11 
W Robinson and Sir Robert Young 
. 
Gibbins, Logan and Montague 
had been absent on the 20th while the others voted against the 
Estimate on that occasion. 
Dalton had recorded that he was supported in his technique 
of passive opposition "by 20 others". 
12 In fact it did not reach 
such a figure: 12 on the 20th; 16 on the -27th. Unlike the Tory 
1 Married, in 1922, Marion Theresa, daughter of Generalkonsul Karl 
Stollwerck of Cologne; MP, Bassetlaw, 1935-68. 
2 Liberal MP Basingstoke, 1923-24; Nuneaton (Labour) 1935-42. 
3 President of the NUR, 1933-36; MP, Ardwick, 1930-31,1935-50- 
4A 
prominent member of the Railway Clerks Association; MP, West 
Edinburgh, 1929-31; Linlithglow, 1935-50- 
5 The son and grandson of Liberal Mps and himself Liberal candidate 
for Gloucester, 1911-14; joined Labour 1919; MP, Whitehaven, 1929- 
31; Gloucester, 1935-59- 
6 
Political Secretary to the Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society; 
MP, Deptford, 1935-45- 
7 MP, West Toxteth, 1924-31,1935-50- 
8 
General Secretary of the National Pawnbrokers' Assistant Approved 
Society; MP, Scotland, Liverpool, 1929-64. 
9 MP, Ilkeston, 1929-31,1935-64. 
10 MP, St Helens, 1935-45; General Secretary of the National Union 
of Distributive and Allied Workers. 
MP, Newton, 1918-31,1935-50; General Secretary, 1913-19, of the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers. 
12 The Fateful Years, P-133- 
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dissidents at Munich Dalton and his associates did not sit osten- 
tatiously in their seats. "We simply left the House and went home, 
and said nothing to the Press about it. A study of next day's 
Hansard was required to ascertain who had been absent from these 
deplorable divisions". 1 There was good reason not to attract the 
attention of the Press, as one of the abstainers indicated when 
writing of one of his colleagues, Fred Bellenger: 
"he abstained somewhat reluctantly, however, because 
he was out for a career which this sort of action was 
bound to endanger. That, I think, was true of others 
who sympathised with us but did not want to prejudice 
their chances of preferment when Labour came to power". 
2 
The whole incident, in fact, passed without a ripple on the surface 
of the newspapers so that a minimal amount of friction was caused 
within the parliamentary party, and the future prospects of the 
abstainers remained unblemished. 
John Naylor has also made an attempt to ascertain the size 
and composition of the rearmament lobby within the parliamentary 
party, but restricted himself to the abstentionists of July, 1936. 
Of these he wrote "no striking generalisations emerge". This 
conclusion may have been due to the small numbers involved and 
therefore it is necessary to delve further and widen the numbers of 
the rearmers before an analysis is made. Turning to the July 1937 
party meeting Dalton is very informative as to the members voting to 
reverse the Executive's decision by 45 votes to 39. He received the 
support of all the Co-operative MPs save GS Woods: F Broad 
3, Chater, 
1 The Fateful YearS, p. 90. 
2 Price, Letter to the author, 14 February, 1969. 
3 MP, Edmonton, 1922-31,1935-45. 
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T Henderson, 
1W Leonard, 2 Alexander, Barnes and Green. All the 
Lancashire Miners voted his way: G MacDonald3, J Parkinson 
4G 
Rowson5 
and J Tinker. Other members noted for their support included G Lathan, 
J Lawson, J Ritson 
6, 
E Thurtle7 and R Sorensen. 
It is surprising that the latter, a pacifist, should be found 
in their number. His reasons were complex. He recorded that he was 
"increasingly disturbed and critical of those who having failed to 
convert the nation to pacifism or non-violent methods then found 
compensation in obstruction. I felt this was dishonest, confusing, 
unscrupulous and did nothing to encourage appreciation of pacifism. " 
Thus he argued that it was "futile both to oppose rearmament and to 
obstruct those who sincerely and consistently believed military defence 
against possible Nazi aggression was imperative". As rearmament was 
the consequence of deep-seated wrongs in the international order and 
not the cause of war, Sorensen felt that pacifists should concentrate 
attention on the alternatives to mass conflict rather than hindering 
war preparations. 
8 
Such a fresh approach to the question, entailing 
1 MP, Tradeston, Glasgow, 1922-31,1935-45. 
2 MP, Rollox, Glasgow, 1931-50- 
3 MP, Ince, 1929-42. 
4 
MP, Wigan, 1918-41. 
5 MP, Farnworth, 1929-31,1935-37- 
6 
MP, Durham, 1922-31,1935-45- 
7 MP, Shoreditch, 1923-31,1935-54. 
8 
Sorensen, Letter to the author, 2 April, 1969. 
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the abandonment of opposition to the rearmament programme, was to 
result in Sorensen being severely criticised by his fellow pacifist 
members. 
Four other known rearmers can be added to Dalton's lobby: 
W Dobbie, J Walker, G Hicks, and J Wedgwood. Walker, the Chairman 
of the Scottish Trades Union Congress, and a leading figure in the 
Iron and Steel Trades Federation, had been one of the first supporters 
of British rearmament in the 1930s- 
1 According to Dalton he was one 
of those who steadily abstained from voting in Parliament against the 
arms estimates or against conscription claiming the conscience 
clause usually monopolised on such issues by pacifists. BY 1935, 
however, he was nearly blind and for this reason took little part 
in parliamentary debates, though he sometimes intervened effectively 
at party meetings. Despite his blindness he was Chairman of the Party, 
1940-41, and was "a great power on our National Executive. Often he 
beat Laski and other intellectuals by sheer weight of logical 
argument". 
2 
Wedgwood, the eccentric member for Newcastle-under-Lyme, had had 
a somewhat different background from the majority of Labour MPs- 
Educated at the Royal Naval College in the 1890s, he had commanded 
a battery in the South African War, and remained attached to the 
services until 1918 when he was demobilised, serving as he then was 
as Assistant Director of Trench Warfare, with the rank of Colonel. 
From 1906 he had sat as a Liberal Member of the House of Commons, but 
had transferred his allegiance to the rapidly growing Labour Party 
in 1919. His memoirs record that in the thirties he kept on "year by 
1 MP, Newport, 1929-31, Motherwell, 1935-45. 
2 Dalton, The Fateful Years, P-307. 
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year, asking for more planes, more tanks, small ships instead of 
monster battleships; but also pressing for better relations with 
possible allies, and for standing up to obvious bluff. "' 
By contrast, Hicks had commenced his working life as a general 
builder's youth at the age of eleven, making his way up through the 
Operative Bricklayers Society. 2 In 1921 he became the first General 
Secretary of the newly formed Amalgamated Union of Building Trade 
Workers, a post he continued to hold after his entry to Parliament 
in 1931 as Member for Woolwich Fast. Despite his hitherto narrow 
horizons, Hicks soon began to take a particular interest in foreign 
affairs, probably as a result of his membership of the International 
Federation of Trade Unions, in which he rubbed shoulders with leading 
socialists from the continental parties. His advocacy of rearmament 
derived in part from an increasing awareness of the Nazi threat, 
coupled with a realisation that rearmament would give increased 
utilisation to Britain's industrial facilities, benefitting the workers 
in many trades, including his own. 
An analysis of the members sympathetic to Dalton's move revealed 
that whereas the average age of the party was 54 years 7 months, 
that of the rearmers was 55 years 2 months, a minute rise of 7 months. 
Similarly, in education the rearmament lobby approximated to the 
figures obtained from the party analysis, save for a rise in 
elementary trained members receiving some form of further education, 
and a 10% drop in the numbers attending university. The full 
figures were: 
Memoirs Of A Fighting Life,, P-234. MP, Newcastle, 1906-42; 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1924. 
2 President of the TUC, 1926-27; MP, 1931-50- 
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Education Rearmers Party 
Elementary only 56.8 5? 
-l 
Elementary plus some 
later training 2?. 8 16.9 
Public School 8-3 9.1 
University 8-3 18.2 
If possessing a good education can be equated with being an intellec- 
tual then Dalton's followers cannot, for the most part, be described 
as an intellectual grouping as opposed to the party as a whole. 
But were they a trade unionist grouping? Sir Walter Citrine 
has judged that Dalton would have got nowhere, without the consider- 
able pressure exerted by the Trades Union Congress. 
1 Ernest Bevin's 
biographer, too, recorded that he also lent "strong support" to 
Dalton's advocacy of rearmament within the Parliamentary ranks. 
2 
A breakdown of the trade unionists and other occupations is as 
follows: 
Occupation Rearmers Party 
Trade Unionists 62.2 59.1 
Co-operative Members 22.2 6.5 
Professions, Armed 
Forces, Land 19.4 28.6 
The results indicate that the numbers grouped under land, armed forces 
and professions have fallen by almost ten per cent, while the co- 
operative percentage has risen by over sixteen per cent. Twenty of 
the 36, or 55.6%, can be classed as trade unionists and of these six, 
Clynes, Compton, Henderson (J), Lathan, Robinson and Walker, were 
1 Recorded in Naylor, Labour's International Policy, p. 192. 
2 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Vol. 1, P-593- 
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members of the General Council of the Trades Union Council, as well 
as being trade union representatives on the National Executive 
Committee of the party. Doubtless this explains the remark of one 
of Dalton's colleagues on the Parliamentary Executive, after the 
vote, urging him not to make a speech emphasising the new policy 
and requesting him to keep the "troops quiet and particularly the 
Trade Union leaders on the General Council". 
1 
With only a slight rise of 3.1% in the trade union percentage 
it would appear that the view that but for trade union pressure 
Dalton would have got nowhere seems for the most part unsubstantiated. 
But is it? It is well to remember the corresponding figures for the 
pacifist, Left and League enthusiast groupings. The analysis revealed 
that on each occasion there existed a non-manual, middle-class 
preponderance, whereas in the case of the rearmament lobby the reverse 
held true, a majority was drawn from the "cloth-cap" or trade union 
circles. With the groups taken together some credence is thereby 
given to Citrine's statement that the policy switch was in large 
measure dependent on the trade unions. 
2 
But why should the trade union circles, in particular, support 
rearmament? Price considered that they "were more inclined to favour 
some form of rearmament largely because they were dealing with 
practical affairs than the intellectuals of the party". 
3 Organising 
a union, dealing with disputes, negotiating with employers left 
1 The Fateful Years, P-136. 
2 It is interesting to note that an examination of the 23 trade 
unionists, and the unions that sponsored them, revealed that only 
one known rearmer, GH Oliver, was sponsored by the TGWU, Bevin's 
own creation, although 8 had been at the 1935 election. 
3 Price, Letter to the author, 25 February, 1969. 
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little time for theorising as such, and consequently the unionists 
as a whole were neither essentially idealistic nor, for the most 
part, even imaginative. Therefore when approaching the question of 
rearmament their down-to-earth manner and trade unionists' common 
sense brought them to realise that the circumstances necessitated 
Labour's support, whatever the movement thought of the Government's 
foreign policy. 
Had the 37 been connected in some way with the Armed Forces 
or with Service Departments? Eleven, in fact, of whom 7 had risen 
to be officers, had served in the forces, while a further four had 
been attached to a Service Department in the course of their 
parliamentary careers. In this sense the rearmament group were not 
a cross-section of the party, as the following table indicates: 
Rearmers Party 
Members serving in 
the Armed Forces 
Members attached to 
a Service Department 
12 or 32.4% 24 or 15.6% 
or 11.1% 10 or 6.5% 
There seems therefore to be a link, as one would perhaps expect, between 
experience in the Armed Forces or Service Departments and the 
rearmament lobby in the party. 
Dalton's speech to the parliamentary party on 22 July had 
laid great stress on electoral considerations: 
"this was, perhaps, the most important decision 
that the party would have to take in this Parliament. 
This decision might make all the difference between 
victory and defeat at the next election 
... 
one reason 
for our poor polls in the by-elections was that people 
were bewildered by our attitude on foreign policy and 
defence 
-.. 
If we went on without a change, I believed 
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that not only should we not win a majority next time, 
but that there were men sitting in that meeting with 
small majorities and vulnerable seats who would not 
come back. (This remark of mine caused great 
resentment among some people with safe seats. They 
said it was "a craven appeal to fear". I am sure, 
however, that it was true, and I think it turned a 
few votes)-" 
In order to discover whether a slender majority, and therefore a 
greater susceptibility to public opinion, characterised Dalton's 
followers, the election results of the 154 Labour Members were 
broken down and contrasted with those of the rearmers: 
Majorities Rearmers Party 
0-1000 3 12 
1000-2000 6 21 
2000-3000 2 17 
3ooo-4ooo 3 9 
4000-5000 5 17 
5ooo-6ooo 4 12 
6ooo-7000 4 7 
7000-8ooo 1 9 
8ooo-gooo 2 7 
9000-10,000 
- 
5 
10,000 upwards 5 24 
Unopposed 2 14 
37 154 
As the table indicates, small majorities and vulnerable seats were 
far from being a hallmark of the rearmament lobby, although this does 
not rule out the possibility of what Dalton termed "a few" being so 
influenced. 
It is possible, however, that some of the rearmers were swayed 
by the interests of their constituents or an organisation to which 
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they belonged. The Member of Parliament is, after all, not only 
attached to his party; he is the representative of his constituency 
and must bear its interests in mind. Again, a Labour Member might 
belong to an organisation such as a trade union, which would 
benefit from the pursuit of a particular policy. Such Labourites, 
representing areas or unions that would benefit from rearmament, 
were naturally faced with the vexed conflict of constituents' or 
union demands with the professions of the party. It was all very 
well to say that expenditure on arms was uneconomical and might lead 
to war but the fact of the matter was that an armaments boom would 
give increased utilization to Britain's idle industrial resources, 
bringing with it employment and a measure of prosperity. Thus the 
interests of workers likely to benefit from expenditure on armaments 
must have presented a serious problem to Members who did not wish to 
be accused of depriving their constituents or fellow trade unionists 
of much-needed employment or prosperity. 
Ever since the establishment of the parliamentary party when 
it came to voting against the naval or arms estimates, there were 
always some who did not follow the party lead. An instance of this 
was in 1909 when Alexander Wilkie, the Member for Dundee and leader 
of the Shipwrights Union, advocated an efficient navy. He pleaded 
eloquently for that superiority in the men behind the guns by which 
"in the old days we were not afraid of tackling an enemy twice or 
thrice our strength". 
1 That the effectiveness of Labour's opposition 
to increased armaments was seriously injured by this Party split is 
indicated by the comments of other Members of the House. Said the 
1 House of Commons Debates, Vol. 2, PP-1548-1550- 
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Conservative Member, Arthur Lee, in 1911: 
"I have noticed when Members of the Labour Party 
happen to represent a dockyard or a district in which 
armaments are created that there are no greater jingoes 
in the House. " 1 
Although the Labour Members were much more united in their 
support of armament reductions after the war than before, in the 
1935 Parliament the contradiction re-emerged. When it became 
clear that the Government's proposed rearmament programme would 
benefit workers in many trades, including engineering, mining, 
chemicals, textiles, shipbuilding and iron and steel, some Labour 
Members were naturally reluctant to appear the underminer of their 
constituents or fellow trade unionists' livelihood by opposing the 
estimates. 
2 George Hicks, Labour MP for Woolwich East, and General 
Secretary of the Building Trade Workers, openly defied the party 
on the occasion of the Defence White Paper Debate, and offered the 
Government the co-operation of the trade union movement in its 
rearmament programme. 
3 Conscious of the resulting prosperity and 
employment, he was anxious to be consulted in the carrying out of 
the industrial programme involved in order to maintain and better 
wages, hours and working conditions. It was probably no coincidence 
that he also represented a constituency where there existed an army 
barracks, a military academy and an arsenal employing many workers. 
4 
1 Quoted in Pelling's History of the Labour Party, p. 79. 
The Times noted "Industrial Labour may not be so bitterly opposed 
(to rearmament), for it is recognised that there is a time of 
great prosperity in store for the skilled worker, and that a few 
trade unions will attain a position of great power and authority 
in the carrying out of the programme. '? 4 March, 1936. 
3 House of Commons Debates, 10 March, 1936, Cols-? 
-029-30. The 
Government failed to consult the General Council, Baldwin 
presumably not taking the offer seriously. 
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Several rearmers sat for constituencies where heavy industry 
existed, particularly engineering or iron and steel works, whose 
prosperity depended in large measure on orders from the forces., 
Alexander and Lathan, for instance, represented Sheffield divisions, 
traditionally an iron and steel centre, while Leslie, MP for 
Sedgefield, Durham, sat for another area of heavy industry. Other 
members belonged to trade unions with much to gain from increased 
arms. Walker, for instance, was a leading figure in the British 
Iron, Steel and Kindred Trade Association. Similarly Compton, of 
the Union of Vehicle Builders, Young, of the Amalgamated Society 
of the Engineers, Oliver, of the Transport and General Workers, Union, 
and Broad, of the Scientific Instrument Makers, represented organisa- 
tiona with much to gain by co-operating in the Government's rearma- 
ment programme. 
Out of this general survey, what generalizations as to the back- 
ground of Labour's rearmers may be drawn? In the first place, it 
would appear that they were fractionally older than their colleagues, 
and there were few who could be described as middle class, the 
majority being trade unionists and "cloth-cap" politicians of 
humble origins. Vulnerable seats was not a clear characteristic. 
In addition, a small number represented constituencies or were 
officials of trade unions which would benefit from the increased 
employment and prosperity accruing from rearmament. Finally, one- 
third approximately, had connections with the Armed Forces and 
Service Departments, as one would expect in such a grouping. 
The decision to abstain, instead of trooping into the Opposition 
lobby, did not go unchallenged. There existed what Dalton called 
(from previous page) 
For the importance of the armaments issue in Woolwich politics see 
P Thompson's Socialists, Liberals and Labour, p. 254, and Pelling's 
Social Geowraphy of British Elections, p. 40. 
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'a very violent feeling among the minority'. 
1 The South Wales 
Miners, led by Jim Griffiths and Arthur Jenkins, attempted to form 
a Miners' block to oppose the Estimates. Unfortunately for the 
Welsh miners, MacDonald, who had supported Dalton, was Secretary of 
the Miners' Group and effectively frustrated their moves. Attlee, 
when approached by the defeated minority, scrupulously refrained from 
entertaining a suggestion that another meeting should be held to re- 
consider the declsion. Several MPs however, including Morrison, 
hastened in public to express their disagreement with the majority 
decision. 
The pacifists were among those who severely criticised the move 
of their fellow MPs. The Times, in fact, referred to Lansbury as 
"the leader of opposition to the Labour Party's rearmament plan" 
when he presided at a National Convention of the Parliamentary 
Pacifist Group at Central Hall, Westminster on September 18.2 it 
was the occasion for Labour's policy to be severely criticised by 
a number of MPs including Salter, Wilson, McGhee, Messer and 
Sorensen. 3 Lansbury moved an emergency resolution: 
"that the Convention deplores the rearmament policy 
of the National Government and regrets the acquiescence of 
the Parliamentary Opposition in these measures. " 
In support of the resolution Lansbury said that they did not in any 
light-hearted manner set themselves in opposition to colleagues with 
whom they were on terms of friendship, which they highly valued and 
The Fateful Years, P-136. 
2 The Times, 20 September, 1937. 
3 Sorensen's presence is surprising in view of his attitude in 
July. 
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esteemed. Yet they had no option but to refuse to accept the 
ghastly doctrine that only massed force could bring peace to a 
distracted world. 
Nevertheless the parliamentary party, whatever the real thoughts 
of some of its members, rallied to the policy change. When the 
Service Estimates were voted upon on 26-27 July, only 6 Labour MPs - 
Barr, Salter, Messer, McGhee, Silverman and S0 Davies - joined 4 
members of the Independent Labour Party and the lone Communist in 
opposition. Four of the 6 were avowed pacifists, while the other two, 
Silverman and Davies, were of the Left. "This, in view of the strong 
feelings of many of our colleagues", commented Dalton, "was a most 
remarkable display of loyalty and discipline. It was a great 
disappointment to the Tories in the House. They had been grinning 
beforehand in anticipation of a wide and open split. " 
1937, too, saw the real resistance to the change of policy die 
away. 
2 Silverman did move a resolution, at the Annual Conference at 
Bournemouth in October, instructing the parliamentary party to "vote 
against the Arms Estimates of the National Government", but this was 
heavily defeated. Morrison, however, did not raise the question 
there, as in the first flush of defeat he had threatened. Meanwhile 
a statement, on International Policy and Defence, was issued by the 
The Fateful Years, P-13?. 
2 Quibell (the Member for Brigg), for instance, following a central 
European tour, came to see the considerable effect that Britain's 
Defence Programme was having abroad. "Throughout the tour I never 
met anyone who did not glory in the fact of British rearmament 
against the fear of aggressor countries. They feel there is no- 
one to whom they can look to check aggression except Britain and 
other members of the League of Nations. " E Dodd, David Quibell, 
P-105. 
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National Council of Labour, and it contained the outline of the 
policy of a future Labour administration. "Such a Government", 
it said, "must be strongly equipped to defend this country, to play 
its full part in collective security, and to resist any intimidation 
by the Fascist Powers designed to frustrate the fulfilment of our 
obligations. Such a Government, therefore, until the change in the 
international situation caused by its advent had had its effect, 
would be unable to reverse the present programme of rearmament. " 
The statement was understood, both within and without the movement, 
as a declaration in favour of supporting the Government's rearmament 
programme, though as far as words went it was nothing of the sort. 
Thenceforward the Labour Party stood, in the words of Gordon 
MacDonald, "for all the armaments required to safeguard British 
interests. We think that disarmament today, with the world as it is, 
with Germany and Italy in their present state of mind, would be 
disastrous 
... 
the best contribution Britain could make for peace 
in the present circumstances is by arming, but, having armed, let 
us use those arms for the cause to which the Prime Minister referred 
on the 24 March 
- 
"the hope of averting the destruction of those 
things which we hold most dear - our liberty and the right to live 
our lives according to the standards which our national character 
have prescribed for us". "' 
Labour's record on Defence 1935-39 
It is easy, considering the party's hesitations over rearmament, 
to write Labour off as uninterested in defence questions, and yet 
1 House of Commons Debates, 4 April, 1938, Col. 81. 
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this would be far from the truth. Following the 1935 election the 
party was increasingly concerned with the condition and effectiveness 
of Britain's armed forces. This was in part due to the elevation of 
Attlee to the leadership. Until then the Parliamentary Party had 
given little or no serious attention to such problems and this was 
not wholly due to the climate of opinion within the party. tabour 
had held office in only two short Governments in a period following 
World War I, when it had been laid down that there was no danger of 
war and when all emphasis was on disarmament. After 1931 the party, 
now led by a pacifist, was small with most of those who had been 
in the Service Ministries going down to defeat. In such circumstances 
and at a time when the Disarmament Conference functioned 
- 
it was 
natural that no consideration should be given to technical problems 
of defence. 
The General Election of 1935, however, returned to the ranks of 
the Parliamentary Party a number of badly-needed recruits with some 
knowledge of, and interest in, defence questions. Of the 154 newly- 
elected members 24 had at one time or another seen service in a branch 
of the Armed Forces. This was 15-6% of the party. Seventeen of this 
number had been elected or re-elected in 1935, not sitting in the 
House during the course of the previous Parliament. None of Labour's 
service members, however, had risen to the position of high-ranking 
officers, as many of their Conservative counterparts had; the most 
senior were Wedgwood and Harry Day, 
1 both holding the rank of 
Colonel. A further 10 had had connections with the service ministries, 
and of these, six did not sit in the previous House. Here Alexander 
1 MP, Central Southwark, 1924-31,1935-39- 
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was the only Labour Member with major experience of a service depart- 
ment, dating from the Second Labour Government when he had been First 
Lord of the Admiralty. The others had held lesser Posts such as 
under-secretary, parliamentary secretary and parliamentary private 
secretary. 
It was not only the influx of 'service' members but Attlee's 
assumption of the leadership which changed the party's outlook on 
defence. "When I became leader in 1935", he told Francis Williams, 
"I determined that we must look at the matter more realistically. 
I set up a Defence Committee, with people who had experience at 
the Service Ministries and some, like Dalton, who'd served in the 
First World War, and we started to look at things pretty seriously. 
We didn't like what we found. " 
1 Dalton, too, recorded the getting 
together of the Defence Committee, noting that they met regularly and 
sometimes invited to the meetings outsiders who could claim to be 
expert witnesses. "We had", he wrote, "some useful discussion on 
the need for a Ministry of Defence and a Ministry of Supply". 
2 
Membership included Attlee, Dalton, Alexander, Ammon 
3, Lawson 
Shinwell and Montague5. 
Attlee recorded that he was particularly interested in the 
higher direction of defence. During the debate over the Ministry of 
Defence Creation Bill, in February 1936, he urged the introduction 
1 Williams, A Prime Minister Remembers, p. 10. 
2 The Fateful Years, p. 91. 
3 MP, North Camberwell, 1922-31,1935-44; Parliamentary Secretary 
to the Admiralty, 1924,1929-31. 
4 
MP, Chester-le Street, 1919-49; Financial Secretary to the War 
Office, 1924. 
5 MP, Islington West, 1923-31,1935-47; Under-Secretary for Air, 
1929-31- 
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of such a department. 
1 His ideas met with general acceptance in the 
House, Amery remarking that he "should like to associate himself 
wholeheartedly with them. 
2 Although Attlee's suggestions were not 
then acted upon, ten years later he introduced into the House a 
Ministry of Defence Creation Bill which, though slightly modified 
by experience gained in the Second World Idar, was in essence, the 
same proposal he had made in 1936. 
In response to demands from Left and RiCht Baldwin established 
the office of a Minister of the Co-ordination of Defence.. The 
parliamentary party, or rather the handful of members with an 
interest in the question, expressed disappointment with the Prime 
Minister's action, since the powers of the new post fell considerably 
short of those they envisaged. Furthermore what powers Inskip had 
were not clearly delineated. "It was a speech", said Lees-Smith on 
one occasion when he followed Inskip, "almost exclusively of a 
Minister of Supply, and not, except in a very small part of it, the 
speech of a Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence Services.,, 3 
As the Minister was not giving his mind to what he was appointed 
to survey, Labour began to advocate the establishment of a Ministry 
of Supply, which the Government eventually created in 1939. One 
Labour Member of the Defence Committee prided himself that "we were 
their (Ministries of Defence and Supply) active advocates in the 
middle thirties when most of the highest authorities were against us. " 
1 Attlee, As It Happened, p. 99. 
2 House of Commons Debates, 14 February, 1936, C01-1317- 
3 House of Commons Debates, 20 July, 1936, Col. 202. 
4 
The Fateful Years, p. 91. 
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A further measure of Labour's growing sense of reality was the 
approval by the party leaders, particularly Morrison, in his vital 
position as Chairman of the London County Council, of the Government's 
plans for preparing civil defence against air attack. At the 
Brighton Conference the Executive had prevailed against an attempt 
to put Conference on record in opposition to Government proposals for 
civilian air raid practices, which the mover considered "not only 
futile as a means of protection against aerial attack but a definite 
attempt to arouse public opinion in favour of the Government's arms 
policy". Morrison, in a strong speech, replied that "aerial 
attack 
... 
is possible, and if it occurs many people will be 
injured 
.. 
I cannot say there will be no co-operation". 
2 
The party leaders, approval of Air Raid Precautions did not go 
unchallenged within the parliamentary party. Alfred Salter was 
uncompromisingly opposed to the Government plans and strongly 
criticised Labour municipalities which co-operated with them. In 
words reminiscent of the Brighton motion he argued that precautions 
would be the first step towards persuading the public to accept a 
costly rearmament programme, conscription and military regimentation. 
"By helping the Government in these precautions", he wrote, "I am 
identifying myself with its war preparations and methods. I cannot 
- 
I must not. ,3 He argued that there was a moral difference between 
organised precautions in advance and impromptu precautions in an 
emergency; the former was equivalent to increasing armaments and 
1 labour Party Conference Report, 1935, p. 196. 
2 Ibid, p. 200. 
3 Brockway, Bermondsey Story, p. 204. 
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therefore indefensible whereas the latter was a genuine attempt to 
save life. When his own Borough, in 1936, appointed a special 
committee to consider what action should be taken, Salter, shocked 
by the action, bitterly criticised the Council. His criticism had 
the effect that in December 1937 Bermondsey Council declined to 
appoint an Air Raid Precautions Committee. 
Nevertheless, the Opposition's most important contribution to 
Britain's war preparations lay in its concentration on the obvious 
shortcomings in air defence. In this area strong pressures were 
brought to bear upon the government so that Dalton could claim, with 
some justification, "that the Labour Party takes some credit, by 
reason both of our public criticisms and of our private representations 
to the Prime Minister and yourself (Kingsley Wood), for the great 
increase and efficiency of the Royal Air Force". 
1 
Yet Labour's 
constructive role in the air defence discussions only really dated 
from a conversation between Attlee and Chamberlain, which took place 
during the Christmas Recess of 1937-38. Labour's leader told the 
Prime Minister that he had a number of points he wished to raise 
about Britain's air preparations, but owing to their nature he did 
not wish to discuss them in debate. Chamberlain then suggested that 
Attlee should send him a note of the questions he wished to raise 
and promised an early reply. 
The resulting questionnaire was forwarded to the Prime Minister 
in January 1938. By drawing attention to specific allegations of 
incapacity and negligence, which were directed against the administra- 
tion of the Air Ministry and of the Royal Air Force, it built up a 
1 The Fateful Years, p. 273- 
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case for an inquiry. Ten points were raised, of which the following 
is a summary. The technical knowledge of the higher officers on the 
Air Council was questioned, as was their lack of flying experience - 
if any 
- 
in modern aircraft. With vast sums of money being spent 
in research at Farnborough, why did the principal inventions still 
come from abroad? Why was it, the questionnaire went on, that 
although Britain had now changed to the monoplane, aerodromes were 
still being equipped with high hangers which offered far more 
conspicuous targets than the low ones of Germany? "Is it true that 
the officer in charge of aerodrome design did not realise the 
change-over to the monoplane? " Concern was then evinced about what 
learning, air-wise, if any, had been gleaned from the conflict in 
Spain. Was it a fact, the questionnaire continued on a different note, 
that although the majority of British planes were bombers, they had 
an effective range insufficient to operate against the aerodromes of 
Germany? Time, it was noted, was the essence of air defence, but 
London's air defences were manned by the Territorials, hardly a 
sound system in the circumstances. As to the question of completed 
air squadrons "it is stated that we have 200 squadrons; how many 
of these are really ready? " Attlee also wished to know what percentage 
of Britain's pilots were capable of flying to Germany and back, and 
whether it was true that the country's metereological service was 
very inferior to that of the United States. Finally, he asked if the 
types of aeroplanes currently being manufactured were really up to 
date. 
In a covering note to the questions Attlee wrote: 
"I should like you to consider the suggestion which 
I made that there should be an investiCation by qualified 
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and independent persons. It would, I think, be the 
most satisfactory way of dealing with a matter of great 
delicacy without repercussions of an undesirable kind 
on the international situation. " 
1 
Chamberlain speedily gave a detailed and somewhat comforting 
reply to the questions, but turned down the request for an investi- 
gation into the workings of the Air Ministry on the grounds that it 
would not serve any useful purpose. With disquieting rumours over 
air production continuing to circulate, Dalton was entrusted with 
the task of "accumulating material on our air defences, and building 
a case both critical and constructive". 
2 Dalton, regarding the 
failure of the Air Ministry, and of private enterprise, to produce 
aircraft as the "biggest single issue at the present moment, both 
in the national interest and as political dynamite", set about his 
task without delay, using the research facilities of Transport House 
as well as the willingness of a few Royal Air Force officers to supply 
accounts of the serious deficiencies and long delays in the proposed 
3 
programme. 
In the initial stages of the Air Estimates, in March 1938, Labour 
again requested an independent inquiry into the wasteful procedures 
of the Air Ministry, but Chamberlain heatedly denied the need for such 
action. 
4 
Needless to say, the Prime Minister's assurances did not 
1 Labour Questionnaire on Air Defences, Cabinet Papers, Premier 518. 
2 The Fateful Years, p. 165. 
3 Ibid. Apparently a team of 3 officers brought the same informa- 
tion to various Government critics, one to Dalton, the second to 
Churchill and the third to Sinclair. 
4 
House of Commons Debates, 15 March, 1938, Cols. 254-55. 
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still the Labour criticism, and when the Air Estimates were debated 
on 12 May the party formed a front with the Liberals and Tory 
dissidents. The defence of the air programme fell to the lot of 
Earl Winterton, who had assisted Swinton at the ministry for only 
ten weeks. The Earl, as we have noted elsewhere, made an unconvincing 
speech and completely failed to still the criticism of Swinton's 
stewardship. All this caused such a parliamentary stir that three 
motions were placed on the Order Paper, including one by Labour. It 
stood in the names of Attlee, Greenwood, Alexander, Dalton, Cripps 
and Sir Charles Edwards, and was to the effect that "the growing 
public concern regarding the state of our air defences and the 
administration of the departments concerned, calls for a complete and 
searching independent enquiry conducted with despatch and conditions 
consistent with the national interest". Before any of the motions 
could be debated Swinton was sacked, victim of the united barrage of 
criticism. In mounting this successful attack, the party played a 
significant role, though the opposition of Tory back-benchers, led 
by Churchill, was probably as telling. 
Although Churchill declined to press an enquiry upon the new 
Minister, the Labour leadership reasoned that as the "ministerial 
earthquake" had proved their point, the inquiry should follow. 
1 
In speaking to the debate, Dalton argued that "on any view of 
foreign policy 
... 
in this danger zone that we are now traversing 
an emphatic inferiority of British to German air power is for this 
country a most grim and unwelcome relationship". To remedy the 
situation an inquiry should be held "into our air defences, while 
1 The Fateful Years, p. 166. 
186. 
there is yet time, though not perhaps much time. Is our request 
to be met in a reasonable spirit, or have we to go drifting on with 
these weaknesses, perhaps fatal weaknesses, with our air defences 
unexposed and unrepaired, until, it may be, the tragedy comes and 
the first bombs fall on this beloved, ill-defended native land of 
ours. 11 
In attempting to establish the Government's failure, Dalton 
recalled that Baldwin had opted for air parity in 1934-35, conveniently 
overlooking Labour's resistance to that course at the time. 
Chamberlain, however, refused to consider the past as dead, raked 
over a few embers and then rejected the Labour motion, wanting no 
part of what he described as a "sort of fishing and roving" investi- 
gation, which he contended would distract the Ministry from its 
essential work. 
2 
Soon after the debate, on 5 July, Attlee, Greenwood and Dalton 
saw Chamberlain and presented him with Dalton's document on Air 
Defence. This contained not only the charges that Dalton had made 
public in the debate of 25 May, but much other critical material, 
some very detailed. The conclusion drawn by Labour's leaders and 
set out in the memorandum was, naturally enough, that "there has not 
been that degree of efficiency and speed in the carrying out of air 
rearmament which it is reasonable to expect in the circumstances; 
sufficiently so to call for the setting up of a co-ipetent, impartial, 
independent and thorough enquiry". 
3 After a brief and none too 
1 The Fateful Years, p. 166. 
2 
House of Commons Debates, 25 MaY, 1938, Col. 1255- 
3 Labour Party Questionnaire on Air Defences, Premier Papers, 238. 
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cordial discussion, the Prime Minister said he would ank the 
Secretary of State for Air, Sir Kingsley Wood, to study the 
document and discuss it with Labour's leaders at a later date. 
The following day the Daily Herald ran an article headed 
"Air Ultimatum to the Prime Minister". -After relating how a 
statement containing the conclusions of a Labour Party investigation 
on air defneces had been handed to Chamberlain, the article announced 
that the Government "must set up an immediate inquiry into the state 
of Britain's air defences, or, in the national interest, the whole 
truth will be published". The memorandum, in the compilation of 
which nearly 60 witnesses were cross-examined, "contains many damaging 
facts and figures concerning the inefficiency, backwardness and 
general muddle of our air defences". Although inside information was 
required to write the article, it does not appear that there was any 
truth in the allegation that if the inquiry was not granted Labour 
would publish the evidence at their disposal. Neither Dalton, in his 
memoirs, nor the official papers make any reference to such an 
ultimatum, and it is unlikely in any case that Labour would have 
been so irresponsible as to advertise Britain's alleged weaknesses 
to the world. 
Prior to any meeting between Labour's leaders and Kingsley Wood, 
the Air Ministry examined the memorandum in detail, criticising, not 
unjustly, the Opposition's past role in air defence: 
"The complaint that the expansion of the Royal Air 
Force has been delayed is not easy to understand when 
put forward by a party who opposed by voice and by vote 
any kind of expansion of the air forces of the country. 
Attlee and the Labour Party voted against the first 
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scheme of enlargement 
... 
announced 
.-- 
on July 19th, 
1934 
... 
Attlee and the Labour Party also voted against 
the measures of acceleration of that programme which were 
announced on November 28th, 1934. When a further expansion 
... 
was announced on May 22nd, 1935, Attlee and the 
Labour Party again voted against the Government's policy 
... 
the Labour Party was now (1938) recognising facts 
to which they were then blind. It is fortunate that in 
1935 others were less slow and reluctant than themselves 
to read the writing on the wall and to initiate measures 
accordingly. " 
Consequently, the Air Ministry concluded that any reproaches on the 
speed of air rearmament camewith singular ineptness from Attlee, 
Dalton and their friends, whose counsel, if followed, would have 
further delayed any expansion. 
1 
The Ministry's observations on the memorandum revealed some 
concern with the Labour Party's sources. It was felt that the 
conclusions in the memorandum were based on a "multiplicity of 
detail which has evidently been collected at great labour". Certain 
of the statements were correct and authentic 
- 
and indeed appeared 
to be taken from documents prepared within the Air Ministry. Obviously 
"confidential information has reached the person responsible for the 
compilation". other portions were derived from less satisfactory 
sources 
- 
possibly retired officers 
- 
and the views based on these 
were of less value, if not misleading. Certain examples were given: 
the general tendency to exaggerate German front-line strength; the 
performance of British types was consistently under-estimated; the 
1 Labour Party questionnaire on Air Defences, Premier Papers, 238- 
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official figures for service pilots were compared with vague claims 
by Hitler and Mussolini. On the other hand it was admitted that there 
were many matters on which the memorandum "quite rightly shows concern", 
and it was suggested that Labour should be informed of what was being 
done. Many of the points of criticism had already been appreciated 
and action being taken to remedy them. Nevertheless, there were 
other points, raised in the memorandum, that were significant and 
needed looking into by the Ministry. 
As to the question of an inquiry the Ministry frankly admitted 
that mistakes would be found, but argued that the arrears of achieve- 
ment in the Government's programme and the shortage of adequate 
equipment were not primarily due to the "mess and muddle" in the Air 
Ministry as outlined in the memorandum. Greater results would only 
have been achieved if the British Government had possessed, and been 
prepared to exercise, during the last three years, the powers of 
drastic control over the resources of the country in terms of capital, 
manpower and materials. An inquiry now, however, was undesirable on 
two counts. It would be regarded as an admission that there was some- 
thing in the charges of muddle and mess, which the Government had 
denied all along. More important, at a time when the international 
situation was growing increasingly grave, the acceptance of an inquiry 
would upset the work of the ministry, preventing it from getting on 
with the vital air programme. 
Eventually Kingsley Wood met the Labour leaders to mull over 
their document, and then with the agreement of his colleagues, Dalton 
met the Minister frequently, following up points already raised or 
calling his attention to new information which had reached the 
Labour Party. The meetings continued until, six months after the war 
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Wood left the Air Ministry. Although Labour did not get its inquiry, 
Dalton had no doubt that the improvements in the strength and equip- 
ment of the Royal Air Force, and in the organisation of the Air 
Ministry and of the aircraft industry, followed Wood's appointment 
and Labour's constant pressure on him. 
' Although it may be said that 
Labour had taken a belated interest in air defence, even belated 
attention to Britain's air needs may have made quite a difference in 
ig4o. 
Contributions to Defence Debates 
In order to ascertain which Labour Members were particularly 
active in the field of defence, an examination was carried out into 
those contributing to debates connected with service matters in the 
period November 1935 
- 
September 1939. By recording the number of 
speeches made by individual members, it is possible to gain an 
impression as to who displayed the greatest political activity in 
these matters. Such a quantitive study cannot, of course, be a 
measurement of the effectiveness of any member as a parliamentarian, 
but it is of some interest in indicating those who were most 
frequently party spokesmen. 
The following were found to be Labour's most active Members 
with respect to defence questions; 
2 the later columns denote the 
proportion of total activities devoted to the various branches 
of the forces: 
1 The Fateful Years, P-171- 
2 Nine, including Dalton, supported the move to abandon opposition 
to the Government's rearmament programme. There may, of course, 
have been more. A further six were known members of the partyls 
Defence Committee, constituted by Attlee in 1935- 
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Member Total Air Army Navy Other 
1 
speeches 
RT Fletcher 20 
.526 
GM Garro-Jones 15 6144 
HB Lees-Smith 15 27-6 
AV Alexander 11 
-- 
10 1 
iC Ede 11 171 
E Smith 2 11 632 
CG Ammon 9--2 
CR Attlee 927 
F Montague 971- 
jJ Tinker3 92412 
WM Watson 
48--62 
WT Kelly 724 
jJ Lawson 7-7- 
iC Wedgwood 72-23 
j Parker 6-33- 
F Bellenger 53-2 
S Cocks 5--41 
H Dalton 53-2 
A Greenwood 5--5 
G Hall 541 
The results show clearly that only a portion of the party took 
part in debates on defence with any consistency and those who did so 
were usually members with some sort of service experience, either in 
the forces or at a service department. Twelve in all had had military 
experience of one kind or another: Fletcher was an ex-lieutenant 
commander in the Royal Navy; Garro-Jone5 served in the army, but 
1 
'Other' includes those debates not connected with an individual 
service estimate, such as the proposed ministries for defence and 
supply, conscription, air raid defences and Government White 
Papers. 
2 MP, Stoke South, 1935-66. 
3 MP, Leigh, 1923-45- 
4 
MP, Dumfermline, 1922-31,1935-50. 
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soon switched to the Royal Flying Corps, in which he rose to be a 
captain; Lees-Smith, although not engaging in combat, was an ex- 
cadet of the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich; Alexander entered 
the army in 1914, saw service on the Western Front and was gazetted 
out four years later with the rank of captain; Ede, a sergeant, served 
with the East Surrey Regiment in the Great War; 
' Attlee, a major, 
fought at Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, and France, and Montague, a 
lieutenant, also served on both Fronts; Wedgwood, the most experienced, 
looked back on a military career that had begun before the Boer War, 
and only ended in 1918 when he was a Colonel and Assistant Director 
of Trench Warfare; Bellenger saw active service in France and was 
subsequently with the Army of Occupation of the Rhine, being demobi- 
lised as a captain; Dalton, a lieutenant, served on the French and 
Italian Fronts; at a more humble level Tinker and Ellis Smith served 
and remained in the ranks, the latter in the same regiment as Attlee. 
A further three had experience of a service department, while 
four of the above could also be included in the same category: 
Ammon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Admiralty in both Labour 
Governments; Lawson, Financial Secretary to the War Office in 1924; 
Hall, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, 1929-31; Alexander, the only 
Labourite in the 1935 Parliament with major experience of a service 
department, First Lord of the Admiralty, 1929-31; Attlee, Under 
Secretary of State for War, 1924; Montague, Under Secretary of State 
for Air, 1929-31; Tinker, Parliamentary Private Secretary to the 
Secretary for War in 1924 and the First Lord of the Admiralty, 1929-31. 
The results also revealed that the leader of the party, the 
deputy-leader, or a member of the executive, in this case Lees-Smith, 
assumed the leadership in debates of major importance, such as those 
1 Ede: MP, Mitcham, 1923-24; South Shields, 1929-31,1935-64. 
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on the White Papers relating to defence. 
1 Garro-Jones and Montague 
were particularly concerned with questions connected with the Royal 
Air Force, while Fletcher, Alexander, Ammon and Hall were interested 
in matters relating to the Navy. Lees-Smith, Ede, Tinker and Lawson 
concentrated chiefly on the Army. 
2 
An analysis of the twenty members taking part in defence debates 
with any consistency revealed an average age of 51 years 7 months, 
exactly 3 years lower than that of the party. There were only seven 
elementary educated members in their number, whereas five went to 
public schools, one was educated privately, four attended colleges 
of various descriptions and six, university. As to occupation, ten 
could be classed as professional and two under armed forces, while 
those remaining had come up through the trade union and co-operative 
movements. Not only were the twenty, in these respects, unrepresenta- 
tive of their colleagues in the parliamentary party, but they were 
also a distinguished grouping. Thirteen had either held ministerial 
rank or were to hold it in the war-time coalition or post-war Labour 
Governments, while a further three were at one time or another 
Parliamentary Private Secretaries. It is also worthy of note that 
Bellenger and Lawson were to hold the post of Secretary of State for 
War, Alexander and Hall that of First Lord of the Admiralty, Dalton, 
Minister of Economic Warfare, and Montague and Garro-Jones that of 
Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Aircraft Production. 
That the General Election of 1935 returned to the ranks of the 
party a number of badly-needed recruits with some knowledge of and 
See the high figures for Attlee, Greenwood and Lees-Smith under 
'Other'. 
2 That members specialised on the Army etc can be related to their 
experience in the Armed Forces or at a Service Department. 
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interest in defence questions is evident from tho, twenty's parlia- 
mentary record. Thirteen were elected or re-elected in 1935, not 
sitting in the previous House, and of the remainder Greenwood had 
entered the Commons as a result of a by-election. Between them the 
twenty delivered a total of 179 speeches, and of this number 132 were 
made by the 13 absent from the House in the 1931-35 Parliament. 
Such figures indicate that the members returned in 1935 were 
to make amends for the party's weakness on defence in the previous 
parliament, and perhaps, in part, explain why Labour,, after 1935, 
travelled a considerable distance alonS the path of national defence, 
emerging from what has been described as a Itweb of sophistries and 
conflicting emotions". 
1 It was discovered that the party could not 
continue to advocate a foreign policy based an the League and 
collective security while its attitude to defence problems ignored 
the implications of how potential aggressors could best be resisted. 
The scrapping of opposition to rearmament, which implied tacit 
acceptance of rearmament under a National Government, the advocacy 
of the Ministries of Defence and Supply, and, above all, the attention 
to the shortcomings in air defence were to do much to bridge this 
gap between the party's defence and foreign policies. Nevertheless, 
the rejection of the Military Training Bill, in April 1939, was to 
reopen the divide between the two. 
The Liberal Party 
Roy Douglas has written that the Liberal Party "may properly 
claim to have shown an early appreciation of the danger of the 
European situation coupled with a frank acceptance of distasteful 
1 Bullock, The J, ife of Ernest Bevin, Vol-1, P-532- 
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measures in order to combat it, long before any other party". 
1 
There is considerable truth in this. Significantly the parliamentary 
party made an important policy change in 1935; during the spring it 
was decided that Liberals should now vote in favour of the defence 
estimates. Hitherto the party had united with Labour in criticising 
proposed arms increases. When, in February 1934, Churchill had 
painted a picture of the dangers for London of inadequate aerial 
defence, Samuel, at that time party leader, had described him as 
standing for "anarchy" and a world in which "all go rattling down 
to ruin together". 
2 Relying on the "false" impression given by 
Baldwin concerning the strength of the Royal Air Force, the Liberals 
felt that Britain was adequately prepared to meet any contingency. 
Then, in the spring of 1935, came the news that Germany had attained 
parity with the Royal Air Force, and immediately the party changed 
course. On 22 May Sinclair agreed "with deep reluctance 
-I would 
even say with repugnance 
- 
that the case for an expansion in our 
air armaments has been made out" and declared that the party would 
now support the measures envisaged. 
3 Samuel later informed the 
Commons: 
"I do not believe this nation would ever consent to 
an avowed inferiority in its defences compared with its 
neighbours in Europe 
... 
if the danger did become 
actual and if the House had rejected the proposals which 
were laid before it by the Government how could any of 
us have justified to our consciences the votes we would 
have given on that occasion. " 
4 
1 
The History of the Liberal Party, P-239- 
2 
House of Commons Debates, 7 February, 1934, Col. 12o6. 
3 Ibid, 22 May, 19,35, Cols-393-94. 
Ibid, 31 May, 1935, Col. 1421. 
196. 
From that time on, the Liberal standpoint, unlike tabour which 
laid itself open to the charge of unwillingness to provide armaments 
to defend the country, was clearer and open to little misunderstanding. 
Liberals, too, felt that the Government's foreign Folicy was ill- 
conceived but they did not oppose defensive measures 
- 
the nation, 
even as then governed, deserved armaments. Their tactics, as 
explained by Geoffrey Mander, were to support "consistently the Army, 
Navy and Air Force votes, though they have opposed the Foreign Office 
and other Departments in order to emphasize their disagreement on 
policy". 
1 
At the General Election of 1935 the Liberals went to the country 
supporting the view that any weaknesses that had arisen in Britain's 
defence preparations should and must be made good. Sir Francis Acland 
informed his constituents: 
"As to armaments, I accept the fact that we must have 
adequate defences, and must remain in a position to play 
our part in a system of collective security under the League 
of Nations. I shall speak and vote with a feeling of deep 
responsibility, for I have been, as a Member of the Army 
Council, for many years a responsible Minister in a 
Defence service. " 
His son, Richard, standing at Barnstaple, echoed the view that "if 
there are proved to be gaps in our defences I will agree to the 
filling of them", but added the proviso that the nation "ought not 
to be asked to endorse enormous expenditure on a rearmament policy, 
Quarterly Review, September 1936, article entitledOThe Session'. 
Mander: MP, Wolverhampton East, 1929-45- 
2 Election manifesto. Acland: MP, Richmond, 1906-10; Camborne, 
1910-22; Tiverton, 1923-24; North Cornwall, 1932-39; Financial 
Secretary to the War office, 1908-11; Under Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, 1911-15; Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 
1915. 
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the details of which are not disclosed"s 
1 Similarly, Megan Lloyd 
George argued "Our national defence must be kept in an efficient 
state, but this necessity must not be made an excuse for a new 
armaments race. " 
2 
Filling gaps in Britain's defence preparations was not enought 
however. The Liberal Party consistently maintained that the only 
Possible Justification of any measure of rearmament would be that 
if it formed "part of a policy which aims at increasing collective 
3 
security". Clearly Liberals - like Churchill - had sensed that 
the moral climate of the time was turning against arms races, the 
balance of power and imperial greatness. If rearmament was to be 
attained and the risk of war undertaken, it had to be in the name 
of a higher cause, that of the League of Nations and its offspring, 
collective security. "I do not believe", wrote Mander, "that the 
people of this country will ever be prepared to enter into the old- 
fashioned obsolete, all-again8t-all, war of the 1914 type, but I do 
believe they would respond and risk all if it were clear that they 
were making for the organised maintenance of world peace through 
the League of Nations. " 
4 
There was, however, one notable dissenter from the party's 
support of rearmament. David Lloyd George once again Opposed the 
1 Election manifesto. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Sinclair, speech at the National Liberal Club, 12 February, 1936. 
Liberal Magazine, March 1936. 
4 
Contemporary Review, MaY 1936. 
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party line and vigorously attacked the Government's rearmament 
programme. One such occasion was a speech at the Free Trade Hall, 
Manchester, in October 1936, when he said there was no need for 
British rearmament because the world's most powerful armies were the 
French and the Russian and the world's two most powerful fleets were 
the British and the French. Air power in itself could not be 
decisive, and Russia and France certainly had air preponderance over 
Germany. It was not rearmament that was wanted but the consolidation 
of the power of the League of Nations, collective security and all- 
round disarmament. Fortunately for his party's standing in the 
country little attention was focussed on Lloyd George's aberration, 
and he shortly abandoned his opposition to rearmament. 
' 
Unlike many of Labour's League idealists, who tended to emphasize 
the more optimistic aspects of the Covenant, the Liberals looked 
equally to definite provisions for collective defence in order to 
establish a realistic scheme of mutual security. That they advocated 
a strongly armed system of collective defence was clear from speeches 
and official statements. These called for the British Government to 
organise within the League such a concentration of resources, economic 
and military, which would be "so strong and certain in action that 
it would deter any potential aggressor from the use of force". 
2 To 
create such a system of mutual defence, countries, said a statement 
issued in 1936, should be "invited to state what military naval or 
air force, if any, they are prepared to contribute for the maintenance 
AJ Sylvester, Life With Lloyd George, p. 158. Lloyd George: 
MP, Caernarvon, 1690-1945; President of the Board of Trade, 1905- 
08; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1908-15; Minister for Munitions, 
1-915-16; Secretary for War, 1916; Prime Minister, 1916-22; 
Chairman of the Liberal Party, 1924-31- 
2 From a speech by Sinclair at the opening session of the Liberal 
Convention in Kingsway Hall, London on 18 June, 1936. it was 
later published in pamphlet form. 
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of the public law in specific areas. This is the only sound basis 
for regional pacts, which must be strictly within the framework of 
the League, and be supplementary to the general obligation. The 
vital thing is that the plans concerted for the restraint of aggression 
should be thought out beforehand and be certain in their operation". 
The National Government, too, spoke of collective security, 
arguing that any increase in armaments was made for the purpose of 
defending the League system. Yet in the opinion of Liberals such 
vague references to the League and the collective system were intended 
only to keep the administration right with public opinion. "It would 
be much easier", argued the deputy-leader Sir Francis Acland, "for 
those of us who find difficulty in attuning our minds to the Government's 
defence policy if the Government, in referring to that policy, did 
not always use what seems to me to be a wholly false and misleading 
phrase as things are at present, that it is a contribution to pooled 
security. Whenever I hear that phrase I am reminded of that official, 
well known to the British Constitution, the Judge Advocate-General, 
who is neither a judge nor an advocate nor a general. Similarly, if 
we call our Defence Policy a contribution to pooled security, I would 
say that there is at present no contribution, there is no pool and, 
in consequence, not a great deal of security. " 
2 
It was on these grounds, and not, as has been argued by Quintin 
Hogg, because "they opposed the rearmament of the country", that 
Liberals objected to the Defence White Paper of 1936.3 "We on these 
1 Quoted in Geoffrey Mander's We Were Not All Wronpq pp-59-60. 
2 House of Commons Debates, 17 March, 1937, Col. eO14. 
3 The claim was made in The Left Were Not Right, p. 69. 
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benches", Mander informed the House, "voted against the White 
Paper 
... 
because we distrusted the policy associated with it. 1t 
1 
Their objections were clearly set out in a motion tabled in the 
names of Sinclair 
2, F Acland, Graham White3, Harris 
4 
and Gwilym Lloyd 
George5q and read: 
"This House reaffirming its belief in the system of 
collective security, regrets that His Majesty's Government's 
proposals for defence do not include any definite plan to 
secure, by consultation with other nations, that the 
increase in British armaments shall be related to those of 
other nations pledged with us to the principle of security 
under the League of Nations. " 
6 
The motion further regretted the Government's reluctance to take 
other necessary steps to establish real security: 
"His Majesty's Government, while declarine its adherence 
to the policy of international disarmament, makes no definite 
proposals for stopping the world race in armaments nor for 
removing the causes of war by international discussion and 
conference. " 
1 House of Commons Debates, 17 March, 1936, Col. 288. 
2 MP, Caithness, 1922-45; Liberal Whip, 1930-31; Secretary of 
State for Scotland, 1931-32. 
3 MP, Birkenhead East, 1922-24,1929-45; Member, Council of Royal 
Institute of International Affairs; Member of the Executive Committee 
of the League of Nations Union, 1923-24,1930. 
4 
MP, Harborough, Leicester, 1916-18, Bethnal Green South West, 1922- 
45; Assistant Director, Volunteer Service, War Office, 1916-1.8; 
Chief Liberal Whip, 1935-45. He had the distinction of travelling 
round the world three times. 
5 MP, Pembrokeshire, 1922-24,1929-50; Parliamentary Secretary, Board 
of Trade, 1931,1939-40. 
6 
Notices of Motions, Questions and Orders of the Day, 9 March, 1936. 
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Thus effective security - and here the Liberals were not alone in 
their convictions 
- 
could only be accomplished by the reduction of 
armament levels, and the removal of the economIc causes of war, 
which destroyed overseas trade, blocked migration, and created 
unemployment, impoverishment and discontent throu. -hout the world. 
Like Labour the Liberal Party, while challenging the underlying 
basis of the Government's handling of the international situation, 
also concentrated attention on the shortcomings of Britain's defence 
preparations. The party backed the widespread call for a Minister 
of Defence to co-ordinate the principles of naval, military and air 
force strategy into one strategic doctrine, to which the thref% services 
would rake their appropriate contributions. To carry out such a 
vital role, argued the Liberal Member for the Tsle of Ely, James 
Armand de Rothschild, "a watchdog of the finest breed" was required. 
one was at hand in Churchill, although Rothschild confessed he had 
scant hope on that score, as he was conscious of the Government's 
need for "a good humoured mastiff" who would not be troublesome. 
Neither was the party satisfied with the scope of the new 
department. The design of the post, Sinclair told the Commons, 
revealed a lack of authority "to fuse the strategic doctrine of each 
of the three Services into one combined strategy". 
2 Sinclair's 
critique of the Minister's limited powers closely followed that of 
Churchill's, with whom he "worked closely 
... 
in his study of 
defence problems". 
3 Their association in fact was one of longstanding. 
1 House of Commons Debates, 9 March, 1936, Col. 1909. Rothschild: 
mp, 1929-45. 
2 House of Commons Debates, 21 May, 1936, coi. i4i2. 
3 Forty Years In and Out of Parliament, P-138. 
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Sinclair had been personal military secretary to Churchill, 1919-22, 
when the latter was successively Secretary of State for War and the 
Colonies. More recently Sinclair belonged to Churchill's 'Focus' 
group and was involved, with him, in the Arms and the Covenant 
Movement. 
The party also "persistently and consistently advocated the 
creation of a Ministry of Supply". 
1 What was envisaged was a 
ministry, presided over by a minister responsible to Parliament, having 
executive powers over all matters relating to the supply and manufacture 
of arms and munitions. On 10 November, 1936 the parliamentary party 
raised their proposals in an amendment to the Address, moved by 
Frank Kingsley Griffith. 2 He argued that the Government "should 
assume complete responsibility for the arms industry of the United 
Kingdom, and should organise the regulate the necessary collaboration 
between the Government and private industry; that this responsibility 
should be exercised through a controlling body presided over by a 
Minister responsible to Parliament". That Minister would be a Minister 
of Supply "having executive powers in peace-time and in war-time". 
Rather than repeat the experience of the last war, when, at very 
short notice, the Government was forced to take complete control - 
and the nation was indeed fortunate that it had at its disposal at 
that time for that purpose allman of genius" 
- 
it had better set up 
3 
a machine which could be manipulated by ordinary men. Seconding, 
1 Forty Years In and Out of Parliament, P-130- 
2 Griffiths: MP, Middlesborough West, 1928-4o. 
3 House of Commons Debates, 10 November, 1936, Cols-? 15-16. 
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David Evans, drew attention to the considerable dislocation in 
ordinary peace-time industry that had already been caused by the 
rearmament programme. By creating a Ministry of Supply the industry 
for peace purposes could be carried on successively: 
"It 18 only by the method of co-ordination, by 
Government determination of priority that the ordinary 
trade and manufacture of the country can be carried 
on today. 
1 
But the Prime Minister rejected the proposal as unnecessary. 
The Government was achieving results through the work of the Service 
departments, aided where necessary by the Minister for the Co-ordination 
of Defence. It would therefore be wrong at this stage to attempt to 
arrest the ordinary industries of the country. With the Government 
stubbornly resisting, the Liberal Amendment was defeated by 337 votes 
to 131, the Opposition Parties uniting in support of action. 
Further appeals for a Ministry of Supply were made during the 
course of the following two years, occasionally with the support of 
Churchill. As these pleas fell on deaf ears, in November 1938, 
Sir Hugh Seely 2 and Major Goronmy Owen3 moved a similar amendment to 
the Address, regretting that "although deficiencies both in military 
and civil defence are admitted by Your Majesty's Ministers as well 
as a serious delay in the execution of the programme of rearmament 
stated to be necessary by the Service Departments for national safety, 
House of Commons Debates, 10 November, 1936, Cols-722-23. Evans 
was MP for Cardiganshire, 1932-45- 
2 MP East Norfolk, 1923-24; Berwick, 1935-41; Squadron Leader 
Auxiliary Air Force, 1937-40. Dingle Foot remembered Seely's 
close attachment to the Liberal leader and described him as being 
more like an eighteenth century Whig than a twentieth century 
Liberal. "He was a wealthy man and, together with de Rothschild 
and Harcourt Johnstone, he largely financed the Liberal Party during 
the thirties and forties. " The Times, 8 November, 1973- 
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no mention is made in the Gracious Speech of the creation of a 
Ministry of Supply, both to secure efficiency and prevent waste and 
profiteering". 
1 It was the occasion when Churchill intervened to 
admit "indebtedness to the Liberal Party for having brought the House 
of Commons squarely up to the fence" and to call upon members of the 
Conservative Party to stand up and be counted on this issue. However, 
only a handful ventured into the opposition lobby and the Amendment 
was defeated by 326 votes to 130, despite the appeal of Sinclair that: 
"every vote cast tonight against our Amendment will 
be a vote against acceleration and against the enlargement 
of a programme which leaves us in an inferiority to Germany 
in the air. I ask the House, by passing our Amendment 
tonight, to assert the will and to provide the means which 
are necessary to defend our honour and freedom. " 
2 
Following the occupation of Prague, Sinclair again pressed the 
Government to consider whether the time had not now come to re-consider 
the question of a Ministry of Supply. 
3 Chamberlain replied that the 
matter had not yet been considered, but that it certainly would be. 
(from previous page) 
MP, Caernarvon, 1923-45; Liberal Chief Whip, 1931- Owen dismissed 
the reasons advanced by the Prime Minister against a Ministry of 
Supply as "completely unconvincing", and suggested the real reason 
was his inability to find a suitable man for the job, as all the 
ablest among his supporters are to be found criticising his policy. 
"The best man for the job is ineligible, because he dissents from 
and criticises the Prime Minister's policy. " 
1 House of Commons Debates, 17 November, 1938, C01-1087- 
Ibid, Col. 1193. 
3 Ibid, 29 March, 1939, Col. 2055- 
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Three weeks later, in reply to a question by Graham White, the 
Prime Minister announced that a Bill would be introduced as soon as 
possible to set up a Ministry of Supply under a Minister who would 
be a member of the Cabinet. The Ministry came into being on 1 August, 
1939. 
The Liberal Opposition also concentrated much of its attention 
upon the shortcomings in air defence. As early as March, 1936, Mander 
informed the House that there had been a very considerable delay in 
the carrying out of a number of Air Ministry contracts, and expressed 
alarm that Great Britain had fallen a long way behind Germany despite 
the Government's parity pledge. 
1 Thenceforward members of the 
parliamentary party regularly raised the issue in the House, question- 
ing the Government again and again as to reports of serious deficiencies 
and long delays in the proposed Air Ministry programme. Sir Hugh Seely 
on one occasion remarked that Britain had not "really got (adequate) 
striking power. You say it is coming along. Yet we were told that 
last year and the year before. " 
2 
"1 ask again", announced an impatient 
Sinclair, after informing the House that he had not received a satis- 
factory reply to his questions about Britain's progress in aerial 
rearmament, "is the production of aircraft in this country catching 
up with that of the strongest air force within striking distance of 
our shores? That is the only question which matters when we are 
considering air affairs.,, 
3 
In fact it was the Liberal Party that initiated the memorable 
debate on air defences on 12 May, 1938. Seely, already a squadron 
1 House of Commons Debates, 17 March, 1936, Col. 291. 
2 lbid, 15 March, 1938, Col. 261. 
3 Ibid, 27 February, 1939, Col-951- 
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leader in the Auxiliary Air Force, and soon to be an Under Secretary 
of State for Air, opened the debate by moving a reduction in the 
salary of the Air Minister, whom he held responsible for misleading 
the House and the country into a false sense of security. After 
several reassurine speeches the Minister's announcement that Britain 
was to buy aeroplanes in the United States had come as a shock. 
Information might be withheld if it was against the public interest 
to disclose it, but now one was beginning to see that it was not in 
the interest of the Air Ministry to disclose certain facts which 
would have proved that they were not carrying out what they said 
they were doing, and, what was even more serious, would prove that 
they would not be able to carry out in the future. The production 
of planes was vital in a situation where "we are dealing today with 
Germany. Whether we like it or not she has an enormous number of 
aeroplanes. I believe she has some 8,000 machines 
... 
and has 
the power to produce 400 or 500 a month. Nor is she working at full 
capacity. That is the serious matter we have to face. 
... 
What 
are the Government trying to do in order to achieve parity? " 
1 
Though Seely's motion, fully supported by speeches from Sinclair 
and Mander, was defeated, the stewardship of the Air Ministry remained 
an open question and the Liberal Party decided to table a motion 
expressing "grave concern at the condition of our defences", and 
calling for thellappointment of a Select Committee to investigate the 
problem of aircraft supply, anti-aircraft defence, and air raid 
precautions". It stood in the names of Sinclair, Harris, Seely, 
Gwilym Lloyd George and Mander. By pressing for an inquiry the Liberal 
Party completed a solid front of opposition with Labour and dissident 
1 House of Commons Debates, 12 May, 1938, Cols-1752-53, 
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Conservatives, and within days Swinton and his colleagues were removed 
from their posts. In mounting this successful attack the Liberal 
Party played a significant role, though the opposition of Labour and 
Tory back-benchers, led by Churchill, was probably as, if not more, 
telling. 
Contributions to Defence Debates 
In order to ascertain which Liberal parliamentarians were 
particularly active with respect to defence questions, an examination 
was carried out into those participating in debates connected with 
defence matters in the period November, 1935, to September, 1939- 
Thus the same process, used for Labourites and National Government 
supporters, has been applied to the Liberal Party. The results were 
as follows: 
Member Total Number Air Navy Army Other 
of Speeches 
Acland, F 3 1 2 
Acland, R 1 1 
Evans, D0 1 1 
Evans, E 1 
Foot, D 1 1 
Lloyd George, D 2 2 
Lloyd George, G 6 5 
Lloyd George, M 1 1 
Griffith, FK 1 3 
Harris, P 3 3 
Mander, G 10 2 2 1 
Owen, G 1 1 
Roberts, W 2 2 
Rothschild, J 1 1 
Seely, H 11 7 2 2 
Sinclair, A 12 2 2 1 7 
White, HG 2 1 1 
Bernays, RH 1 a 
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The results show clearly that the majority of the party took part in 
debates on defence, though not with any consistency. 
1 Nine, in fact, 
intervened on one occasion only. As with the other parties, those 
intervening regularly were usually members with service experience, 
either in the forces or at a service department. Five of those 
speaking on three or more occasions had had military or service 
department experience of one kind or another: Francis Acland had been 
Financial Secretary to the War OffiCE), 1908-11; Gwilym Lloyd George 
had joined the Royal Artillery in 1914, rising to the rank of major; 
Harris served at the War Office, 1916-18, as Assistant Director of 
Volunteer Service; Seely had been a lieutenant with the Grenadier 
Guards, 1917-19, and from 1937 headed an Auxiliary Air Force Squadron; 
Sinclair, after training at Sandhurst, served with the Life Guards, 
1910-21, attaining the rank of major. 
With these members to the fore, the Liberal Party, too, played 
a responsible and constructive role in the defence discussions prior 
to the outbreak of war. Perhaps 
- 
and this holds true of the other 
Opposition element 
- 
Swinton was condemned urfairly and the complacency 
and self-deception of the Government exaggerated. Neverthelesj, in 
the vital area of air defences strong pressures were brought to bear 
upon the administration. When coupled with the demands for a Ministry 
of Supply and a Minister of Defence, it becomes apparent that Liberal 
efforts in the direction of war preparation were also commendable; 
the party was not only prepared, but concerned with how to combat 
actual aggression. 
In all a total of 18 Liberal Members intervened in defence 
debates. This represented 85-7% of the Parliamentary Party and 
says much for their determination to remain a national party 
concerned with national issues. 
2og. 
0HAPTERTIT 
THE APPROACH TO FOREIGN AFFATRS 
Conservatives sharing misgivings over recent developments in Germany 
Within the ranks of the Conservative Party and its political allies 
there existed serious misgivings as to the character and methods of 
those governing Germany. That is not to say that the predominantly 
Tory National Government and its supporters grasped the significance 
of what was happening in Germany. Indeed, as Harold Macmillan, MP for 
Stockton-upon-Tees, wrote of his colleagues during the Rhineland 
crisis, "in the House of Commons nearly all my friends ... on the 
Right 
... 
seemed comparatively undisturbed. " 
1 it was a mere hand- 
ful of the body of National supporters, members like Vyvyan Adams$ 
Amery, Katherine Atholl, Boothby, Robert Bower, 
2 Bracken, Cartland, 
Austen Chamberlain, Churchill, Anthony Crossley, 3 Paul Emrys-Evans, 
Grigg, Oliver Locker-Lampson, John McEwen, Tiarold Macmillan, 
Harold Nicolson and Sandys, that were alive to the dangers from Nazi 
Germany and were beginning to diverge from the prevailing attitude 
towards that country. 
1 Macmillan, Winds of Change, p. 461. 
2 MP, Cleveland, Yorkshire, 1931-45. Bower was somewhat abrasive 
and not at all popular with his colleagues. Channon wrote of 
him: "Bower is a pompous ass, self-opinionated, and narrow, who 
walks like a pregnant turkey. I have always disliked him, and 
feel justified in so doing since he once remarked in my hearing 
'everyone who even spoke to the Duke of Windsor should be 
banished 
- 
kicked out of the country'. Diary entry 4 April, 1938, 
Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, P-154. In April, 1938, Bower was 
involved in an unfortunate incident with Shinwell, see page 361. 
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At an early stage in the prelude to what was to become the Second 
World War these members openly expressed their suspicions of the men 
then controlling affairs in Germany. They were not "German-haters"; 
they drew a distinction between Weimar and Nazi Germany, regrettine 
the failure to treat the former fairly. Vyvyan Adams, MP for West 
Leeds, put it thus: 
"There is a current of opinion running through this 
country which is roughly expressed in the notion that 
Germany has not had a square deal. I am one of those 
that in 1932 and early in 1933 urged the giving of equality 
to Germany by the qualitative disarmament of the victorious 
Powers down to her own level. In those days Germany was 
impotent, vanquished and democratic. It' 
But things had changed. Germany, since Hitler's accession, had 
become "heavily armed, ruthless and totalitarian; to all her 
neighbours she causes terror, and to most of them she may constitute 
a danger 
... 
I wish 
... 
to emphasise the danger implicit in the 
(from previous page) 
MP, Stretford, Lancashire, 1931-39; killed in an air crash in 
August, 1939- Channon recorded that he sat next to Crossley on 
the occasion of Chamberlain's announcement of the Munich Conference: 
"I was next to that ass, Crossley 
... 
and whenever there was 
any remark depracating the Germans he cheered lustily, 'That's the 
way to treat them' - once when the tide was going with him, he 
turned scoffingly to me and said 'Why don't you cheer? ' - again 
he asked 'How are your friends the Huns now? ' Diary entry 
28 September, 1938, The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, P-171. 
Adams: MP, West Leeds, 1931-45; Member, Executive League of 
Nations Union, 1933-46; Vice President, New Commonwealth 
Society; foreign affairs were his special study. 
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Nazi system in Germany. Never to my mind has there been a danger 
more manifest than that which Nazi Germany today presents to 
Christendom. "' 
Katherine, Duchess of Atholl, the Member for Kinross and West 
Perthshire, recorded that she felt frightened when a man as 
unbalanced as Hitler became the leader of a great nation like 
Germany. 2 Hitherto she had confined herself to domestic and imperial 
matters but the advent of the Nazis to power marked the beginning of 
her rapidly growing interest in foreign affairs. Her alarm was 
further increased when she was shown certain passages in Mein Kampf: 
"In them he (Hitler) had made clear his policy was an 
unashamedly aggressive one. I had just read a recently 
published EngliBh translation of the book, and I was 
horrified to find that it was only about one-third the 
length of the original, and that all the bellicose passages 
had been watered down as to have lost their meaning.,, 
3 
Convinced that Mein Kampf still represented the aims of Hitler she 
contributed to a series of pamphlets, published by a Labour member, 
giving a translation of the more alarming passages in the book. It 
was to be the first step along the path that led to the sacrifice 
of her political career. 
1 House of Commons Debates, 21 May, 1936, Cols. 1034-35. 
2A Working Partnership, p-101. Atholl: wife of the Eighth Duke of 
Atholl; MP, 1923-38; Parliamentary Secretary, Board of Education, 
1924-29; Delegate to the Assembly of the League of Nations, 1925; 
She has been described by Eleanor Rathbone's biographer as a "one- 
time anti-suffrage right-wing Conservative 
... 
she opposed 
cruelty with a consistency which bred indifference to the political 
colour of its perpetration. She was thus prepared to welcome the 
victims of Russian tyranny, and of German racialism and of Fascist 
Nationalism to the flowing hearth of her indignation, ensuing for 
herself, according to the affiliations of her critics, the 
alternative titles of "Red Duchess" and "Fascist Beast". " 
MD Stocks, Eleanor Rathbone, p. 218. 
A Working Partnership, p. 101. 
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Harold Nicolson, National Labour Member for West Leicester, had 
had first-hand experience of National Socialism. 
1 His last years in 
the diplomatic service, from 192? 
-30, had been as Counsellor at the 
British Embassy in Berlin, where he had seen the Nazis in action. 
Authoritatively he could tell Henry Channon, the Conservative Member 
for Southend: 
"We represent a certain type of civilized mind, 
and that we are sinning against the light if we betray 
that type. We stand for tolerance, truth, liberty and 
good humour. They (the Nazis) stand for violence, aggression, 
untruthfulness and bitterness 
.. -I love Germany and hate 
to see all that is worse in the German character being 
exploited at the expense of all that is best. " 
2 
Such was the strength of his feelings about the Nazis that he 
consistently refused to visit or even travel through Germany after 
1933- 3 
Similarly, the young Member for Lambeth, Duncan Sandys, had 
worked at the British Embassy in Berlin, where he had been third 
Secretary to the Ambassador, Sir Horace Rumbold. For five months of 
Nicolson: joined Foreign Office 1909; served on the British 
Delegation to Peace Conference, 1919; League of Nations, 1919- 
20; MP, 1935-45; prolific author including Peacemaking 1919, 
Curzon, and Diplomacy. 
2 Diary entry, 20 September, 1936, Diaries and Letters, p. 273- 
3 On one occasion Nicolson attended a dinner party and sat next 
to a German woman who tried a little Nazi propaganda. "Poor 
wretch, she did not know that she had a tiger lurking beside 
her. 'Do you know my country, Sir? ' she said. 'Yes, I have 
often visited Germany. ' 'Have you been there recently, since 
our movement? ' 'No, except for an hour at Munich, I have not 
visited Germany since 1930. ' 10h, but you should come now. You 
would find it all so changed. ' 'Yes, I should find all my old 
friends either in prison, or exiled, or murdered. ' At which 
she gasped like a fish. " Diary entry 12 June, 1936. Diaries and 
Letters, p. 265- 
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Hitler's rule Sandys was actually on the scene and quickly made up 
his mind that the new regime meant troubles ahead for Britain. In 
June, 1933, on Rumbold's retirement, Sandys returned to the Foreign 
Office in London to work in the Central Department, and there he 
expressed his fears on a despatch. In late 1933 he urged the 
Government to think ahead. The Rhineland was clearly a potential 
problem. The Germans, when they felt strong enough to do so, would 
seek to re-militarize it. Britain and France must decide what their 
attitude would be when Hitler's troops marched into the Rhineland. 
If they intended to do nothing, it was better to concede the point 
to the Germans before they took it. If this were handled properly, 
some quid pro quo might be obtained. But if the Western Allies were 
determined to resist re-militarization they should make their deter- 
mination quite clear to the Germans. They should also work out some 
plan of action with France should Germany decide to move. A firm 
stand by the two Governments would impress the Germans and deter 
them. The absence of any agreed plan for joint Anglo-French action 
would encourage the Germans to take advantage of Western indecision. 
Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, was unimpressed and commented 
on Sandys' minute "we cannot consider hypothetical issues". 
Realising that he could not hope to exercise any influence from 
his lowly position inside the Government machine, Sandys resigned 
from the Foreign Office to go into politics, hoping to infuse the 
Government with the gravity of the situation. 
' Two years later, at 
a by-election, he entered the House, where he paid particular attention 
to foreign and imperial affairs. 
Another MP sharing their misgivings, Paul Emrys-Evans, had also 
served an apprenticeship in the diplomatic service, both in London 
1 Quoted in The Appeasers, by Gilbert and Gott, PP-33-4. 
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and in the Embassy at Washington. 
1 Entering the Commons in 1931, as 
Member for South Derbyshire, he specialised in foreign affairs, and 
was soon of the opinion that Germany would shortly-pose the greatest 
threat ever presented to the British Empire. He informed the Commons: 
"We are facing a nation which is chloroformed and which 
is deaf and blind to anything but Nazi doctrines. Everywhere 
there is marching and everyone is preparing for war. They 
are utterly opposed to our ideals 
... 
As Germany only 
believes in force, so she will only respect strength. We 
are like someone walking through a jungle. Those who are 
around us cannot appreciate anything about us except the 
rifle in our hands. f12 
owing to his experience in the field of foreign relations Emrys-Evans 
held the important back-bench post of Chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the supporters of the National Government. However, 
his strong views on the international situation were to lead to his 
forced resignation in 1938.3 
Sir Austen Chamberlain, erstwhile Foreign Secretary, had been 
a frequent critic of the Nazi regime since its emergence in 1933. 
That year, in a speech to the House of Commons which brought him the 
"largest correspondence"he had had on any subject for a considerable 
time, 
4 he asked: 
1 Emrys-Evans: Foreign Office, 1917-23; MP, 1931-45- 
2 House of Commons Debates, 23 June, 1936, Col. 149. 
3 Harold Nicolson was Vice-Chairman of the same Committee. 
4 Copy of a letter from Austen to ER Canning, 25 April, 1933, found 
in the Austen Chamberlain Papers, 40/4. Part of his increased post- 
bag was due to his reference to the persecution of the Jews, for 
many had taken the trouble to write and thank him for mentioning 
the plight of their "nationals". "The spirit which inspires this 
campaign against the Jews", commented Austen to Canning, "is the 
spirit which inspired the attempts of Germany to dominate the 
world before the Great War. It fills me with anxiety for the future. " 
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"What is this new spirit of German nationalism? 
The worst of all Prussian Imperialism, with an added 
savagery, a racial pride, an exclusiveness which cannot 
allow to any fellow-subject not of a 'pure Nordic birth' 
equality of rights and citizenship within the nation to 
which he belongs. " 
1 
Chamberlain was convinced that although Germany had undergone two 
revolutions since the Great War little had changed. The brutality 
and provocation which characterized the Nazi regime, the conscription, 
the massive rearmament, were to him but a modern variation of Prussia's 
past history, replete with the same methods and the same tenacious 
goal of universal domination. 
The root of the trouble, as he saw it, was that Germany's well- 
established educational system was directed towards producing a race 
of militarists. Every child was taught that the proudest fate which 
could overtake it was to die on the field of battle, that war was the 
noblest of man's ends, and that Germany must rely upon her armaments. 
2 
Inevitably a war spirit was thereby nurtured which, as in the years 
preceding 1914, was now being plainly demonstrated. 
Such was the strength of his feelings on the German issue that, 
like Nicolson, Chamberlain consistently refused to visit Germany 
while the Nazis remained in power. On one occasion when he was a 
guest on a yacht moored in a German river, he still refused to 'put 
foot on German soil,. 
3 
1 House of Commons Debates, 13 April, 1933, Col-308- 
2 House of Commons Debates, 26 March, 1936, coi. 819. 
3 Diary entry, 8 August, 1936. The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, 
P-108. 
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It has been argued by HB Gotlieb that as Chamberlain based his 
interpretation of the Nazi regime upon what may at times have appeared 
to be rather meaningless analogies, he was of little use to the basically 
sane educational campaign which was waged by the anti-Nazis. Gotlieb 
goes on to suggest that his speeches could even have been detrimental 
to their activities. 
1 In fact his name could not but have helped 
their cause, but there is some truth in this statement. All too 
often Chamberlain lapsed into references to Prussian militarism and 
pre Great War German history, which must have seemed not only far 
fetched but almost anti-German to his listeners. There is no evidence, 
however, of his being a German-hater - the close relationship with 
Streseman is testimony to that. Nevertheless his intemperate 
language could give that impression. Small wonder Chips Channon 
attacked him for criticising Germany with unreasoning violence and 
being "ossified, tedious and hopelessly out of date". 
2 
A close associate of Chamberlain's, indeed his erstwhile 
Parliamentary Private Secretary, was Commander Oliver Locker-T-Ampson. 
On repeated occasions, according to the historian of the Focus Group, 
he fearlessly attacked the activities of the Nazis, both within and 
without Germany. Yet he was conscious that these attacks produced 
no positive results, except to make him unpopular with the Government 
and discredit him with his party. 
3 
HB Gotlieb, England and the Nature of the Nazi Regime: A Critical 
Assessment of British Opinion, 1933-36, (Ph. D Thesis) p. bg. 
2 Diary entry, 27 July, 1936, The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, P-? 3- 
3E Spier, Focus, p. 49. Locker-T. Ampson: Commander, Royal Navy, 1914- 
18; MP, Handsworth, 1910-45; Parliamentary Private Secretary to 
Sir Austen Chamberlain, 1919-22; accompanied Chamberlain to 
Versailles; a leading member of Focus and Arms and the Covenant. 
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Apparently his most notable criticism of the Nazis, and Government 
policy to them, was when Sir Samuel Hoare expressed delight at the 
great possibilities of Britain's future association with Nazi Germany, 
from which he visualized eternal benefits for the human race and 
the coming of a Golden Age. Locker-Lampson branded his statement 
as 'blatant insanity', and an 'ugly betrayal of democracy, endangering 
the very existence of our democratic institutional. To speak of 
a Golden Age, he continued, amounted to nothing less than a 
recognition of the Nazi terror regime, with a record of more than 
fifteen years of continuous acts of perjury, foul murder, tearing up 
of treaties, imprisoning and torturing to death of hundreds of 
thousands of innocent men, women and children without any charge or 
1 
ra. 
Boothby was another Unionist who became early aware of the 
threat posed by Nazi Germany. In the course of 1933 he paid a 
prolonged visit to the continent and upon his return delivered a 
warning to his constituents in Aberdeenshire, at Tarriff, on 19 October. 
Germany, he announced, was in the grip of something very like war 
fever. 2 The following year, after a similar visit, he wrote and 
circulated a confidential report, warning of the massive German 
rearmament and mentioning how children were "taught that might is 
the only Right, that the noblest life is that of the warrior, and 
that the highest honour to which a men may aspire is death in the 
service of the Fatherland". 
3 Boothby's warnings became more and more 
insistent as he repeatedly took the opportunity to pass comment on 
the German situation. on 24 October, 1934 at Strichen, he declared 
1 Focus, p. 145. 
2R Boothby, I Fight to Live, p. 124. 
Ibid, p. 12?. 
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that the life and soul of democracy and the freedom of the individual 
were being challenged as they had not been challenged for 2,000 years. 
"The issue which will shortly confront the British people is whether 
they are prepared if necessary, to fight for freedom and liberty; or 
submit to tyranny and force. " 
1 
Similarly Ronald Cartland, the boyish member for Kings Norton, 
had visited Germany after the Nazi conquest of power. 
2 Like Boothby 
his impressions were very clear cut. According to his biographer, 
Cartland was convinced that the Germans hated the English; that they 
would annex Austria; that ultimately, and sooner than anyone expected, 
they would fight Great Britain. 
3 In his writings he put forward 
the view that the challenge of National Socialism lay not simply in 
the force of arms but through the force of ideas. Therefore Britain 
should be vigilant on two fronts, and be prepared to defend the 
democratic way of life in both word and deed. 
4 
Cartland was influenced in his views, as were several of the 
dissentients, by Churchill. His sister recorded the great admiration 
1R Boothby, I Fight to Live, p. 129. 
2 Cartland: MP, 1935-May, 1940; a social reformer; he made his maiden 
speech in May, 1936, on the Distressed Areas, some of which he had 
visited. "There is a very general feeling", he declared, "that 
the Government is not facing up to this problem. " He often returned 
to this theme during the next three years, and criticised the 
Government for inertia. In November 1936, he and three other 
Tories, of whom Harold Macmillan was one, voted with the Labour 
Party against the Government on this issue. Owing to his votes 
and speeches in the House he got into considerable trouble with 
his Constituency Association. The Labour leader, Dalton, 
apparently was encouraging him to join the Labour Party but that 
point was never reached owing to his untimely death. The Fateful 
Years, p. 163- 
3 Ronald Cartland, p. 101. 
4R 
Cartland, The Common Problem, p. 27. 
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and growing affection he began to hold for Churchill, and how on one 
occasion a fellow member had said, "Let me give you a word of advice, 
Ronnie. Winston is no good to a young man. Keep away from him. tt 
The icy reply was to the effect that he would "choose his own friends". 
Similarly of Nicolson, it has been written, "he was coming more and 
more under the spell of Churchill, who held no office at the time 
but used his immense influence to persuade the House that if Germany 
were not stopped now, it would be much harder to stop her later. " 
2 
Harold Macmillan also admitted that he would doubtless"have shared 
the general complacency of public opinion had I not by now come to 
3 be more frequently in Churchill's company"* 
In the same way Bracken's biographer, Andrew Boyle, put his anti- 
German views down to Churchill, whom he "fell in nonchalantly behind". 
1 Ronald Cartland, p. 181. 
2 Nicolson, Diaries and Letters, p. 248. 
3 Macmillan, Winds of Change, p. 165- MP, Stockton, 1924-29,1931- 
45. His later career should not blind one to the fact that in the 
'30s he was, in Lord Kilmuir's phrase, "a lone independent gun 
barking on the left of the Conservative Party". Political 
Adventure, p. 45. He was a persistent rebel, an intellectual and 
essentially solitary. Another of his colleagues wrote of him: 
"Macmillan is no ordinary man. He votes as he feels inclined, 
treating Parliament not as a playground for parties but as an 
assembly where men must speak and act as they think 
... 
he is 
quite fearless 
... 
He has often been expected to join the 
Labour Party. " V Adams, What of the Night?, P-152. 'His political 
path and Churchill's very rarely converged until the end of 1936, 
but even then he could not be described as one of Churchill's 
adherents until later. In his attitude to defence and foreign 
affairs, as in domestic matters, Macmillan made his own decisions. 
4 
Poor, Dear Brendan, p. 207- 
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In fact, Churchill, as early as 1932, was disturbed by the revival 
of the 'war mentality$ in Germany. In his visit to Bavaria in the 
summer of that year to see the battlefields of Marlborough's campaigns, 
he gained an unpleasant impression of"bands of sturdy Teutonic 
youths, marching through the streets and roads of Germany, with the 
light of desire in their eyes to suffer for their Fatherland". 
1 
When Hitler came to power in 1933 the European situation, for Churchill, 
was transformed, with the danger of a new war with Germany becoming 
a future prospect. 
It has been claimed that the internal critics of the Government, 
in particular, Churchill, were opposed to Germany "for traditional 
not ideological reasons". 
2 This view has been supported by 
AJP Taylor, who wrote of Churchill's conduct of the Second World 
War: 
"He was only fighting a nationalist war aCainst 
Germany, not an ideological war against Fascism ... 
It is true Churchill was only interested in overthrowing 
Hitler. He had no desire to disturb Franco in Spain nor 
much in overthrowing Mussolini.,, 
3 
Credence is given to such statements by Churchill's unfortunate 
outburst in Rome, in 1927, when he declared to assembled Fascists: 
ItIf I had been an Italian, I am sure I should have 
been entirely with you from the beginning to the end of 
your victorious struggle against the bestial appetites and 
passions of Leninism. 11 
4 
1 Article dated 23 November, 1932, Arms and the Covenant, P-38. 
2 Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 220. 
3 English History 1914-45, P-56o. 
4 
Quoted in Salvemini's The Fascist Dictatorship, p. 20. 
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And to this can be added Churchill's equivocal stand over Mussolini's 
aggression in Abyssinia, when he: clearly dreaded the move of Italy 
from one side to the other; voiced hopes of a compromise solution; 
doubted whether Great Britain ought to have taken the lead in 
sanctions; and willingly acquiesced to their abandonment, in the hope 
that Fascist Italy might once again be persuaded to participate in 
the containment of Germany. Consequently he "applauded" the January 
193? Anglo-Italian Agreement of friendship and goodwill and "hoped 
that the antagonism created between the two western democracies and 
Italy, by the Abyssinian conquest, may gradually be mitigated". 
1 
It seems, therefore, that as far as Italy was concerned Churchill 
had made the mistake of forgetting the wide gulf that divided Britain, 
a liberal and free Parliamentary democracy, from ýbscism. Yet with 
Germany, if one takes Churchill's views at their face value, ideology - 
a recognition that Nazism's code of ethics and standards of conduct 
were not those of Britain - was an important factor in his thinking. 
Thus in 1933 he warned Members of the character of the new Germany, 
and drew attention to its departure from accepted standards: 
"We watch with surprise and distress the tumultuous 
insurgence of ferocity and war spirit, the pitiless ill- 
treatment of minorities, the denial of the normal protection 
of civilised society, the persecution of large numbers of 
individuals solely on the ground of race - when we see all 
that occurring in one of the most gifted, learned, and 
scientific and formidable nations in the world, one cannot 
help feeling glad that the fierce passions that are raging 
in Germany have not yet found any other outlet but upon 
themselves. 11 2 
1 Step By Step, pp. 116,94. 
2 House of Commons Debates, 23 March, 1933, Col-352. 
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What are we to make of this contradiction? The above seems to 
show that traditional interests played the decisive role in Churchill's 
view-point. And yet is this too cynical a view of Churchill? Tt might 
be argued that he may have been led, through an early conviction of 
the German danger to Britain's interests, into an awareness of the 
ideological differences separating the western democracies from 
National Socialism, and, more gradually, Italian Fascism too, although 
remaining of the opinion that Hitler's threat was so much greater to 
Britain than Mussolini could ever be. Such a view, however, would 
be difficult to substantiate. There is no evidence whatsoever that 
he later equated the two regimes together. Rather the reverse was 
true. As late as March 1938, after twenty months of Italian-German 
co-operation in Spain, he could still write, if somewhat doubtfully: 
"If Mussolini is willing to separate from Hitler, 
to take his stand with France and Britain, and help sustain 
the independence of Austria, there will be an undoubted 
gain. it' 
There remains a further question to be answered. Tf traditional 
interests were central to his opposition to Nazism, why, then, did 
he make so much of the ideological divide between Britain and Germany? 
It may be that Churchill found it expedient to use this additional 
argument against Germany, as it was more fashionable, in an ideological 
age, than traditional reasoning. This is quite feasible in that a 
more idealistic approach might gain him some of the support he so 
needed to awaken the Government to the reality of the Nazi challenge. 
Certainly this was so in the case of rearmament, which he deliberately 
linked with the cause of the League of Nations in the programme 
1 Article dated 4 March, 1938, Step By Step, pp. 220-221. 
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, arms and the covenant#, 
' 
Whatever the reason for Churchill's opposition - and the evidence 
appears to favour the traditional interests view - there were others, 
including Austen Chamberlain and Bob Boothby, who shared the contra- 
diction, as will become apparent. 
2 But before one generalises and 
assumes, along with Hugh Thomas, that the critics of the Government 
as a group were solely influenced by international power political 
consideration, it is well to remember the views expressed by Adams 
and Macmillan 
- 
and alluded to in these pages. These require a 
conclusion that both traditional interests and ideology shaped the 
thinking of the dissidents. 
Although Churchill had expressed relief that the "fierce passions" 
raging in Germany were only finding an outlet internally, both he and 
the other dissidents soon noticed that the regime was proving as 
aggressive abroad as it had already shown itself at home. "They 
give the greatest assurances, " Boothby said on the occasion of the 
Rhineland coup, "and smooth everybody down, and when everybody is 
feeling happy and nobody is lookingg they pounce. ,3 It was this 
state of affairs which worried the future anti-appeasers, for it 
was impossible to base European civilisation, as the Government 
seemed to be attempting, on a system in which treaties bound the 
parties only so long as it suited their convenience. If Diropean 
peace could only be founded on confidence, and as long as treaties 
1 See Churchill's remarks to Hankey, P-255- 
2 Apparently Eden thought that Austen (and Neville) Chamberlain had 
a "certain sympathy for dictators (Mussolini and Primo de Rivera 
are mentioned) whose efficiency appealed to him". Harvey Papers, 
diary entry for September 22,1937- 
House of Commons Debates, 26 March, 1936, coi. 16og. 
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continued to be broken with impunity time and time again by the 
same Power, how was it possible to have confidence in the future in 
any new treaty that might be ma e1 
An analysis of the National Members acutely aware of the 
potential danger from Nazi Germany produced some interesting conclusions. 
Their average age was 44 years 11 months, 4 years 5 months younger 
than the party as a whole. The most notable public schools were very 
strongly represented, as were Oxford and Cambridge Universities. The 
most striking feature, however, was the overwhelming professional 
armed forces and official services slant to the group. Four, in fact, 
had once belonged to the diplomatic service, and Chamberlain had been 
Foreign Secretary. Of the others there is sufficient background evidence 
to indicate that they had travelled widely and in this way come into 
contact with foreign interests. Turning to the constituencies, a 
different pattern emerges from that of the defence critics of the 
Government, with which there was a certain amount of overlapping; 
less than one-third had majorities in excess of ten thousand votes. 
It is necessary to add that it would be misleading to think that 
this handful of members addressed themselves single-mindedly to the 
deteriorating German situation. On the contrary, there were many 
other questions of a foreign and domestic nature, which ranked 
extremely high on their order of priorities, and on many of these 
matters, as we shall see, they followed the Government loyally. 
All endorsed Chamberlain's efforts to restore a fair degree of 
prosperity to the nation's trade, while a majority were to agree 
to the lifting of sanctions against Italy, in June 1936, and were 
See Churchill's article, 'Stop It Now', 3 April, 1936, Step By 
Step, pp. 17-20. 
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to approve Eden's endeavours to preserve neutrality in the Spanish 
Civil War. Churchill, in fact, was so impressed with Eden's 
performance as Foreign Secretary that he was able to associate himself 
fully with Government foreign policy, at least until February 1938. 
Indicative of this was a speech that he made the previous summer, 
to his constituents: 
"During the last year we have grown in strength and 
in reputation. We have more friends in the world: we are 
more closely united to our old friends; we have not 
abandoned the principles of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations; we have never been on terms of greater goodwill 
and understanding with the United States. The vital thing 
now is not to change policy. " 
1 
Thus Churchill and those sharing his views on Germany were much nearer 
the majority of their party than has been generally recognized or 
that they admitted. 
2 Nor were they yet, and not all of them were 
to belong to, coherent groupings within the National Government's 
ranks but rather individuals who, lacking unanimity of thought, tended 
to act as such when a crisis struck. 
The Rhineland Coup 
While most of the British Press, with The Times and the Daily 
Herald in the van, expressed their belief in the sincerity of Hitler's 
offer, several of the aforesaid members, includinC Chamberlain, Grigg 
and Churchill, proclaimed the opposite view, endeavouring to acquaint 
1 The Times, 5 July, 1937- 
2 See the article by RH Powers, 'Winston Churchill's Parliamentary 
Commentary on British Foreign Policy 1935-381, Journal of Modern 
History, 1954. 
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the Government and the nation with the real significance of the coup. 
Austen Chamberlain's first reaction was guarded, for although he 
wrote to his sister, Ida, describing the news as 'gravel, he added 
that he had not yet committed himself on the matter. 
1 Four days 
later, however, speaking at the annual dinner of the Cambridge 
University Conservative Association, he sharply denounced the action 
of Germany in violating the Treaty of which he had played so great 
a part in framing. He emphasised that Locarno was not a dictated 
Treaty. Hitler, he said, had on more than one occasion drawn 
attention to the distinction between a dictated peace, which he felt 
free to break, and the negotiated voluntary treaty, which he pledged 
himself to observe. The German Government had considered the 
demilitarised zone a contribution to the appeasement of Europe. That 
contribution had now been withdrawn without negotiations, without 
consultation, by an act of brutal force. "Is any treaty", he asked, 
"with Germany more than a scrap of paper? " He concluded: 
"With my mind quivering at this moment with the 
events that led up to the Great War; impressed by the 
similarity of Germany's policy today to the policy 
which rendered the Great War inevitable; that is as 
passionless and as objective a statement as I can make of 
the history of this question. " 
2 
Despite the colourful language, Chamberlain did not want war. What 
he had in mind was a symbolic German withdrawal while the International 
Court discussed the Franco-Soviet treaty, the avowed pretext for 
Hitler's move. 
3 
1 Austen to Ida Chamberlain, 7 March, 1936, Austen Chamberlain Papers. 
2 The Times, 12 March, 1936. 
3 Austen to Ida, 16 March, 1936. 
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With no action forthcoming, either from Germany to withdraw 
or from the League Powers to pressurize Germany to do so, Austen, 
in a letter to his sister, confessed that public affairs and public 
opinion made him very unhappy. That had happened "against which we 
guaranteed France, and Press and Public seek excuses for evading our 
pledge. The Government 
... 
hesitates to keep its solemn engagement. " 
As to Germany, her army would now be "much stronger, the Army chiefs 
will not again seek to hold him (Hitler) back, every country in 
Europe will feel that England is a broken reed and the end can only 
be the complete triumph of Germany and I fear our own ultimate ruin. 
And our Government has no policy. As far as I can make out it is as 
much divided as Asquith's Cabinet on the eve of the Great War. My 
confidence is rudely shaken. " 
1 
Sir Edward Grigg, another National backbencher early aware of 
the potential danger from Nazi Germany, also outspokenly denounced 
Hitler's move. In a speech to his constituents he declared: "The 
breach of the Treaty of Locarno is only the latest of many acts of 
violent self-assertion characterising German policy during the last 
three years". He went on to bewail the fact that "our only care is 
to avoid war", ruling it out as a feature of international life. 
2 
Like other critics Grigg was to spend much time and energy in the 
run-up to 1939, drawing attention to Germany and the need to prepare. 
In 1938 he published a book, Britain Looks at Germany, in which he 
depicted the reality of the German threat against the deficiencies 
of Britain's preparations. 
In fact Churchill was probably the most clear-sighted of those 
voicing alarm at the German action. To him Hitler's violation of the 
Austen to Hilda Chamberlain, 15 March, 1936. 
The Times, 14 March, 1936. 
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Rhineland marked the opening strategic moves of a second world war 
and ought as such to be challenged. France, the aggrieved party, had 
appealed to the League of Nations for justice and it remained for 
that body to enforce the law upon the treaty-breaker. Churchill 
regarded this confrontation with Germany as the League's supreme trial' 
and its 'most splendid opportunity'. 
1 His thinking was quite simply 
the assembly of overwhelming might in support of international law, 
and as the forces at the disposal of the League were four or five times 
as strong as those of Germany the chances of a peaceful settlement, 
so he believed, were good. Faced with superior strength Hitler would 
be forced to withdraw, his pretensions would be given a resounding 
check. 
Unfortunately for Churchill, with political opinion in England 
complacent, there was little likelihood that the British Government, 
so soon after the Hoare-Laval fiasco, would allow itself to be 
persuaded to take action against Germany. Predictably Baldwin's 
inclination was matched by the mood of the majority of his followers 
and that of the Opposition Parties, a mood gauged accurately by 
Nicolson. The latter recorded in his diary two days after the Rhineland 
move: "General mood of the House of Commons is one of fear. Anything 
to keep out of War. " And the following day- "The country will not 
stand for anything that makes for war. On all sides one hears 
sympathy for Germany. Tt is all very tragic and sad. " 
2 
Accordingly the Council of the League of Nations met in London 
and Flandin, the French Foreign Minister, attended its sessions. 
During his stay in London private dinners were arranged, such as those 
From the article, 'Britain, Germany and Locarnol, 13 March, 1936, 
Step By Step, p-13. 
2 Diary entries, 9 and 10 March, 1936, Diaries and Letter5, pp. 248-49. 
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organised by Churchill and Louis Spears, as forums for Flandin to 
say exactly what he thought about the crisis to an audience of 
British politicians, journalists and industrialists. 
' Boothby and 
Nicolson recalled attending Spears' luncheon and both were impressed 
by Flandin's apparent firmness: "We know that Hitler is bluffing and 
that if you (Britain) remain faithful to your engagements we shall 
be able to obtain satisfaction". 
2 Churchill, too, was taken in by 
the Foreign Minister's hard-line attitude: "Flandin 
... 
came to 
my flat in Morpeth Mansions. He told me that he proposed to demand 
from the British Government simultaneous mobili-sation of the land, 
sea, and air forces of both countries, and that he had received 
assurances of support from all the nations of the 'Little Ententel 
and from other States. He read out an impressive list of the replies 
received. There was no doubt that superior strength still lay with 
the Allies of the former war. They had only to act to win-" In fact 
Flandin was greatly exaggerating the determination of French Government 
and people to see the matter through to a successful conclusion, let 
alone the resolution of her allies. Perhaps Churchill sensed as much 
when writing the story of these years: "These were brave words; but 
action would have spoken louder". 
3 
Although Churchill had admitted to the French Minister there was 
little he could do in a "detached private position", he promised him 
any assistance in his power. Undoubtedly he did his best to reinforce 
Flandin; but Neville Chamberlain informed Flandin that public opinion 
Spears: Brigadier-General; Head of th(, Rritish Military Mission 
ib Paris, 1917-20; MP, National Liberal, T, oughborough, 1922-24; 
Conservative, Carlisle, 1931-45. 
2 Nicolson, letter dated 17 March, Diaries and Letters, p. 251. See 
also I Fight to Live, P-136. 
The Gathering Storm, pp-171-72. 
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would not support any form of sanctions. 
1 
Baldwin also told him as 
much: "If there is even one chance in a hundred that war would follow 
from your police operation I have not the right to commit England. " 
2 
Flandin, perhaps not too unwillingly, thereupon let negotiations replace 
'action'. 
The crisis provoked anxious debates in the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the supporters of the National Government. Cn the evening of 
12 March the position was fully discussed at a meeting of the Committee 
when the speakers included Austen Chamberlain, Churchill and Hoare, 
until recently Foreign Secretary. No official report of the proceedings 
were issued but The Times commented that the impression among those 
that attended was that quite three-quarters of those present were 
prepared to support France in her demand that the number of German 
troops in the demilitarised zone should be reduced, and that Germany 
should in some way prove to the world that future treaties would be 
observed. "Everyone felt that the breach of the Locarno Treaty must 
not be condoned by the British Government; but there was also general 
agreement that every effort must be made to find a peaceful solution 
of the deadlocks 
.,, 
3 
Five days later, on the 17, the discussion was 
resumed when nearly 200 MPs attended the Committee. 
4 
The following day reports of a split in the Government ranks began 
to reach the newspapers. Thereupon the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
1 Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, p. 2? 9. 
2 The Gathering Storm, P-173- 
3 The Times, 13 March, 1936. 
4 According to Tom Jones, "In two meetings of back-benchers last week, 
the first, addressed by Austen and Winston, was on the whole pro- 
French; but two or three days later opinion had swung round to a 
majority of perhaps 5 to 4 for Germany". Diary entry, 4 April, 
1936. A Diary With Letters, p. 185. The Committee's about-turn was 
doubtleg-s in-part responsible for the forthcoming rumours of splits 
and divisions. 
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Committee, J de V Loder found it necessary to write a letter to The 
Times in order "to remove some of the misapprehensions which may have 
been created by certain accounts in the Press of yesterday's meeting". 
He discounted the idea that the proceedings were held in a "highly 
inflammable atmosphere, that a bellicose pro-French faction stood 
out against a pacifist pro-German faction, that secrecy was enjoined in 
order that a fundamental rift in the ranks of the Government supporters 
should be concealed, and that a possee of Parliamentary Private 
Secretaries, Whips and Junior Ministers stood ready to put a black 
mark against the name of any speaker who might dare to criticise official 
policy". The facts were quite contrary. Not only was there a 
perfectly calm atmosphere but there was an evident concensus of opinion 
that treaty obligations must be maintained and violent methods 
avoided. "Differences of opinion, of course, emerged, but they 
represented not so much rival policies as varying interpretation of 
the intention of foreign Governments, and of the effect of particular 
actions-"' 
Split there may not have been but marked divergencies of opinion, 
inevitably reflecting differing lines of future 
- 
both immediate and 
long-term 
- 
policy, there certainly were, divergencies skated over 
in Loder's letter. Katherine Atholl recalled that "two points of 
view emerged. One side for accepting the position; the other, 
headed by Churchill, stood out for a firmer line. I sided with 
Churchill. " 2 The differences were also noted by Nicolson who 
remembered Victor Raikes urging that sanctions in any form against 
Germany would "mean war and that the country is not prepared to 
The Times, 20 March, 1936. Loder shortly succeeded to the title 
of Lord Wakehurst and his place as Chairman of the Committee was 
taken by Emrys-Evans. 
A Working Partnersnip, p. 201. 
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fight for France. I reply by saying that while we must restrain 
France from any rash demands we must never betray her. " 
It was not until the 26 March that the House of Commons debated 
the Rhineland question, almost three weeks after Hitler's move. 
Clearly nothing that Churchill and company could then say would 
reverse the situation, a conclusion reflected in their speeches that 
day. Nicolson, in fact, looked ahead to future difficulties, advocating 
a close association with France 
- 
an attitude common to those National 
backbenchers critical of the Nazi regime. Believing that what he 
was about to say flew in the face of a "great wave of pro-German feeling 
at this moment sweeping the country", he bewailed the fact Britain 
did not give the encouragement which she should have tendered to Weimar 
Germany in order "to build up all that is best in German life and 
character". Now "when Germany is strong, we fall upon our knees, we 
bow our foreheads in the dust, and we say "Heil Hitler". " While Britain 
could count on France not possibly recommending an aggressive war, 
did they know the same about Germany? "Is there any Member in the 
House who believes that Germany is no war danger? " 
2 
Austen Chamberlain attempted to broaden the issue from the 
"small matter of the demilitarisation of the zone" to the great 
issuesat stake at that moment. After strongly condemning German 
standards of conduct and German ethics he announced that the "real 
issue before us and Europe is whether in future the law of force 
shall prevail or whether there shall be substituted for it the force 
of law". European civilisation could not be based on a system in 
Diary entry for 17 March, Diaries and Letters, P-252. Raikes was 
the Member for South East Essex. 
House of Commons Debates, 26 March, 1936, Cols. 1471-72. 
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which treaties bound the parties only so long as it suited their 
convenience. European peace could only be founded on confidence, 
and as long as this continued to be broken with impunity time and time 
again by the same Power, how could there be any confidence in the 
future in any new treaty that might be made? " 
I In a letter to his 
sister two days later he confessed that what he had said did not 
represent public opinion at present, "but what I say needs saying 
and can better be said by one like me, who will never arain hold 
office, with a freedom and a plainness that Ministers and potential 
Ministers would be unwise to use. " 
2 
Boothby, Spears and Emrys-Evans also tried to call the attention 
of the House to the seriousness of the situation and the significance 
of what had happened three weeks before. None of them put much faith 
in Hitler's promises, and each saw the future need for resolute action 
on the part of Britain and other European countries. "We have to 
consider", said Emrys-Evans, "where we will draw the line 
... 
When 
she (Germany) finds a treaty inconvenient she is going to break it. " 
The solution to the problem of Germany lay in making the League of 
Nations an effective body, but if that could not be, as Boothby more 
or less assumed, Britain might be forced back into a policy of 
alliances. 
3 
Churchill, the last of the future anti-appeasers to speak, claimed 
that Nazi regime had gained an "enormous triumph", the repercussions 
of which were grave for Britain: 
1 House of Commons Debates, 26 March, 1936, Cols. 14K-87- 
2 Austen to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 March, 1936, Austen Chamberlain 
Papers. 
3 House of Commons Debates, 26 March, 1936, C01-1509- 
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"the violation of the Rhineland is serious from the 
point of view of the menace to which it exposes Holland, 
Belgium and France. it is also serious from the fact 
that when it is fortified 
... 
It will produce great 
reactions on the European situation. It will be a barrier 
against Germany's back-door, or front-door, which will 
leave her free to sally out eastward and southward by 
the other doors. " 
In the company of the above members Churchill called for an alliance 
of the peace-loving countries to resist any further aggression 
collectively and within the framework of the League of Nations: 
"we should endeavour now with great resolution to establish 
effective collective security". 
1 
But opinion in the country and the House was not with Churchill 
and company, and speculation over the Rhineland move soon faded away, 
as did Britain's interest in the diplomatic comings and goings that 
marked the aftermath of the Rhineland Coup. The centre of interest, 
much to the chagrin of the handful of aforementioned members on 
the Government benches, shifted from Germany back to Mussolini's 
venture in Abyssinia and its consequent effects on the future working 
of the League of Nations. 
The Division of opinion over How to Combat Germany 
The Government's policy, so the critics felt, was one of mere 
drift, as if things would settle themselves if they were left alone. 
The conception of a strong and forceful direction to foreign policy 
seemed wholly alien to its way of thinking. Macmillan witheringly 
1 House of Commons Debates, 16 March, 1936, Cols-1523-30. 
235. 
attacked the men he held responsible: 
"Drift is fatal 
- 
and drift is the habit which the 
two elder statesmen - the Prime Minister and the Lord 
President 
- 
seem to have adopted as a policy - almost 
a creed. " 
1 
Ironically it was not long before they were to lament what they had 
called for, a strong and forward line in-foreign affairs, but 
provided by Chamberlain in what was considered the wrong direction. 
With Baldwin's Government, the critics felt, it wus quite 
uncertain what action Britain would take if trouble broke out any- 
where in Europe: what Britain's attitude would be, for example, in 
the event of Austrian or Czech independence being threatened wa3 
unclear. This situation was an encouragement to Nazi Germany. Thus 
it was imperative to inform her at what point Britain intended to say 
enough, or as Nicolson put it, "let Europe and the world know 
exactly what we intend to do". 
2 
What was required was for the 
Government to take up a line and say to Germany, ItWe are not going 
to let this happen, you have got to stop. ". 
Although the dissidents were agreed on the necessity for a clear 
and firm policy towards Germany, agreement on the actual details of 
the proposed policy was far from complete. Basically th, ý differences 
revolved around two interlinking issues: the re-establishment of good 
relations with Italy, thereby preventing her falling into the German 
orbit; the utilisation of the League of Nations and the collective 
security provisions of the Covenant. 
The Star, 20 March, 1-036. The reference is to 3-ildwin and 
MacDonald. 
2 House of Commons Debates, 2ý March, 193r, Col-1039. 
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Leo Amery was a firm advocate of Anglo-Italian friendship and 
co-operation, the key to his solution of the lerman problem. He 
was convinced that there could be "no danger to compare with that of 
a German menace to the heart of the Empire coinciding with a Japanese 
attack on the whole of the Commonwealth east of Suez, while a 
hostile Italy barred our free passage of the Mediterranean and 
threatened the Suez Canal. If ideology was increasingly drawing 
the dictators together, history and geography alike made it all 
against Italy's interests to bring Germany down to the Brenner and 
to make an enemy of what was still the world's most formidable naval 
power-" 
1 Therefore he hoped that it would be possible to build a 
Four Power basis for peace in which Britain's part would be limited 
to the Locarno Treaty and friendly support of France and Italy in 
keeping Germany within bounds and preserving Austrian independence. 
Such were the views that Amery continued to expound, both in 
Parliament and the country, until Austria fell in March, 1938, the 
date he finally abandoned hope of restraining Hitler. Nevertheless 
he still clung, then more than ever, to that elusive Italian friend- 
ship. 
To establish the policy that Amery advocated required the calling 
off of the folly of sanctions and a return to what for fifteen years 
had been the Tory conception of the League. This was the view he put 
to Baldwin, on 15 October, 1935, when he led a delegation of both 
Houses of Parliament to urge the Prime Minister to make a declaration 
that it would neither advocate nor be a party to any sanctions that 
could lead to war. 
2 
"British policy", he contended, "over the Italo- 
1 The Unforgiving Years, p. 192. 
2 Thompson sets the delegation to Downing Street at "almost a hundred 
members"; The Anti-Appeasers, p.? A. In fact thpre were only 23, 
including the following MPs: Sandeman Allen, R Blaker, Craven-Ellis, 
C Emmott, A Knox, AT Lennox-Boyd, T Levy, F Sanderson, W Smiles, 
C Taylor, J Walker-Smith, A Wilson, AR Wiee and HG Williams. 
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Abyssinian dispute since the spring had been a complete and inexpli- 
cable reversal of what it had been since Austen Chamberlain made 
his statement at Geneva in 1925 rejecting the Geneva Protocol, and 
with it the whole sanctions system". The Locarno method had then 
been adopted instead, and by the spring of that year British foreign 
policy had been on the "verge of happy fruition" (a reference to 
Stresa). But now the Government had been pursuing a Peace Ballot 
policy, despite the fact that earlier that year Simon had criticised 
the ballot and the Conservative Central Office would have nothing 
to do with it. Baldwin made a short reply to the effect that he would 
give consideration to their views, but added that "there were obviously 
great difficulties in saying now in public exactly how far one would 
go". Small wonder Amery commented in his diary that the delegation 
went away "depressed and angry", convinced that the "whole thing 
figured in his mind as a useful aid to the General Election, and 
that he had no idea of its repercussions outside". 
1 The sequel 
proved Amery's fears to be correct, casting doubts upon the sincerity 
of the Government's conversion to a League policy. 
Apparently the idea of a delegation had been hatched at a 
meeting, convened by Amery, which met at the Constitutional Club on 
the llth. Those present corresponded with the Imperial Policy Group 
of National Members, plus one or two others including Amery, although 
there were others not there who concurred with their point of view. 
It appears, from what the secretary, AR Wise, later made clear, that 
the Group endorsed the latter's views but "regarded him as a rather 
late convert to their policy of rearmament and withdrawal from the 
League of Nations. Also they rather suspected him of some ulterior 
1 Diary entry 15 October, 1935, The Unforgiving Years, p. 176. 
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design", although exactly what was not stated. 
1 When on the 23 October 
Amery further developed his views in the House of Commons just before 
it was dissolved for the general election, one member of the delega- 
tion, Sandeman Allen, was moved to write to the Prime Minister 
disassociating himself from the views expressed by Amery. 
Amery continued to be the most outspoken opponent of the 
Government's course prior to the raising of sanctions. In February, 
1936, he informed the House that it was time to get away from the 
"arid pedantry which would deal with great international issues 
on the principles of a stipendary magistrate's court, and would fine 
a great nation 40s. and costs for having started a public brawl". 
2 
By reforming the League's constitution, by making clear that it 
existed for conciliation and better understanding between nations, 
and that it neither claimed nor pretended to be a world justice 
of the peace nor a world policeman, it would be possible to "bring 
back to the League the nations that are now outside" and in the process 
renew the "precious friendship with the warm-hearted, gifted Italian 
people". 
3 
As 1936 progressed Austen Chamberlain, too, questioned the Wisdom 
of continuing sanctions against italy. This appeared to be a complete 
reversal of the attitude he had adopted the previous year when, 
through his membership of the League of Nation's Union executive, he 
had seemed a leading supporter of collective security and was noted 
for his seemingly stalwart pro-League pronouncements. In July, 1935, 
for example, he told the House: 
1 Prime Minister's Papers, Premier 177. 
2 House of Commons Debates, 24 February, 1936, Col-382. 
House of Commons Debates, 24 February, 1936, col. 984. 
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"What is at stake is the system of collective 
security. We cannot be a policeman of the world - that 
is an impossible position - but we ought to take our 
fair share in promoting security in co-operation with 
other members of the League particularly with those 
who in a particular case can give the most effective 
support and are best situated to uphold its authority. 
We ought to do that only after discussion in the Council, 
and if it can be obtained with that authority. But if 
we do not live up to these obligations, then the whole 
collective system is gone. It is not merely that it has 
failed to protect Abyssinia; it is that it is a broken 
reed for any European Power to rely upon. " 
1 
In fact Chamberlain had never been a confirmed League of Nations's 
man and had always held grave doubts about the efficacy of collective 
security, doubts that are quite apparent from a cursory reading of 
his private papers. 
2 Nevertheless, like the Government, he had 
come down in favour of a League policy over Abyssinia, albeit after 
considerable soul-searching, as he remained convinced that Germany 
posed a more serious threat to the peace, and had hitherto hoped 
that Italy would continue to help to restrain her. Even then, 
however, he did not give up hope of restoring good relations with 
Italy, by reaching an bonourable settlement of the conflict, and 
then return to the Stress policy of holding nermany in bounds. 
I House of Commons Debates, 11 July, 1935, Col-567. 
2 Thompson has shown how Austen was persuaded by party leaders to 
join the League executive in order to keep the appearance that 
Conservatives were not wholly unfavourable to the League. 
Apparently Chamberlain thought the executive was composed of 
11some of the worst cranks I have ever known". The Anti-Appeasersi 
P-37- On February 9,1935, he wrote to Ida remarking that he had 
had a cold that day but had pursued his work, "infecting I hope 
most of the members of the 1, 
-N. U. J)cecutive Committee". 
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This inability to plump convincingly for either poltcy explains 
Chamberlain's attitude throughout the Abyssinian crisis and is best 
illustrated by the debate over the Hoare-Taval proposals. On 18 
December, at a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National 
Government supporters, Austen defended the agreement as the best of 
several bad alternatives. As the feeling was strongly against him 
he immediately changed course and raised the temperature by a speech 
of high moral indignation at the betrayal of the T, eague. 
1 
Again with the cracking of the Abyssinian resistance In the new 
year and Hitler's march into the Rhineland, Chamberlain swung away 
from sanctions back to a Stresa Front policy. Together, he hoped, 
Britain, France and Italy could come to terms with Germany or, if not, 
fortify peace against her. Thus, on 6 May he urged the Government 
to end sanctions on the grounds that they had failed to force Mussolini 
to withdraw from Abyssinia. The keynote of his speech was "'Europe 
has been occupied with Abyssinia. It Is true that only prolongation 
of the situation brings the peril of Europe daily nearer and nearer". 
2 
Four days later he wrote that his speech had brought him, a 
"shoal of abusive letters. I really did not want to make it but I 
felt it would be cowardly to shirk saying what I thought and that it 
might help Eden and the Government If I belled the cat. They are in 
an extraordinary difficult position with a public opinion that is all 
sentiment and passion and will not face realities. I wish that I 
could see any issue from our troubles, but T don't see my way at all 
clearly. That is not because I don't know my own mind but because I 
I Templewood, Nine Troubled Years, pp. 186-87. 
2 House of Commons Debates, 6 may, 1936, Col-958. 
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don't believe public opinion will at present allow us to pursue the 
only wise policy which is to call off sanctions and restore what is 
called the Stresa Front and then to nit down seriously to try to come 
to terms with Germany if possible and to fortify peace against her 
if it is not. But how is this to be done when the country is irritated 
with France and so determined to have no dealings with Italy? I am 
in fact very gloomy and unhappy. " 
1 
The following month he resigned his seat on the Executive Committee 
of the League of Nations Union, and his membership of the Union, in 
consequence of his disagreement on the sanctions issue. In his letter 
of resignation he wrote that the Union was committed to "a policy 
in which I can have no part 
... 
To continue sanctions, still more 
to increase them, would be futile for the purpose for which they 
were designed, and fraught with peril for the peace of Europe, already 
so dangerously threatened". 
2 
Nevertheless it must be stressed that he was not completely 
cynical about the League of Nations, unlike some of his National 
colleagues. Chamberlain was much attached to the underlying concept 
of the League, referring to it on one occasion as "the greatest 
hope that humanity had before it for the peaceful future of our 
common civilisation". At present, however, its action was slow 
and uncertain where swiftness and certainty were essential. Its 
imperfection involved great risks for those countries which, like 
Britain, based their policy on support of the League. He went on: 
"If some day the League could realize, even imperfectly 
the conception of its founders, then they would have indeed 
the greatest instrument for preventing war from arising 
Austen to Hilda Chamberlain, 10 MAY, 1936. 
2 The Times, 29 June, 1936. 
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and for stopping war if the peace was broken, that thP 
human mind has ever conceived. " 
I 
Boothby also shared Chamberlain's reaction to what had been the 
party's traditional attitude to the League of Nations' security 
provisions. At one time Roothby, no lukewarm supporter of the 
League, had been one of the tiny minority of Conservatives that 
had urged the application of oil sanctions against Italy. However 
the Government, in his view, had not pursued a League policy, nor 
even a non-League one, but was simply "dithering along, hoping 
for the best". 
2 When it became clear that Abyssinia was collapsing 
he called for the ending of sanctions and the avoidance of more 
bloodshed. Like Chamberlain he hoped that Italy would once again 
side with Britain in keeping Germany within bounds: "I still had a 
sneaking hope that Mussolini would never tolerate German troops 
on the Brenner.,, 
3 
Whereas Amery, Chamberlain and Boothby looked to a restoration 
of good relations with Italy in order to forestall Germany, most of 
those acutely aware of the German threat viewed the League, pkrhaý, r' 
containing a reconciled Ttaly, as the necessary instrument. Neville 
Thompson is therefore incorrect in assuming that after the "AhYssinian 
fiasco mor-t of the National. Government's internal critics were too 
convinced that the League had failed to expect an eff-ctive barrier 
to Go-man expansion to be created within its framcwork". 
4 
Although 
1 Speech at the Hotel Metropole, The Times, 2 April, 1936. 
2 House of Commons Debates, 9 April, 1936. 
31 Fipht To Live, p. 145- 
4 
The Anti-Appeasers, p. 100. 
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considering the continuance of sanctions an inefficacious, they did 
not write the Learue off but saw its role as more localized, confined 
to Europe. With this in mind Katherine Atholl wrote in her resigna- 
tion letter to the Edinburgh branch of the League of Nations Union: 
"I observe that the President Mord Cecil) is appealing 
to the branches of the Union to put pressure on the Government 
and on Parliament to maintain, and, if need be, increase 
the sanctions imposed by the League on Ttaly ... Tn view 
of the Crave dangers threatening the peace of Europe, I am 
of the opinion that sanctions should now be called off, 
and that efforts should be concentrated on buildinF up an 
effective system of mutual assistance against at7gression in 
Europe. " I 
The Duchess was growing increasinFly anxious about German 
foreign policy. If German activity was causing concern in Western 
Europe what about the smaller states In the East? 
2 When therefore, 
in November 1936, after thirteen years as a member of the ffouse, 
she made her maiden speech on foreign affairs she stressed the 
importance of remembering Britain's obligation under the Covenant 
of the League to such countries as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and 
Rumania, earnestly begging the Government to regard it as "their 
first endeavour to keep alive and to strengthen the principle of 
1 The Times, 13 June, 1936. 
2 Interestingly enough, in an article published in April, 1937, she 
gave voice to s fear which became fact in 1938.11(7zechoslovakiall, 
she wrote, "may seem far removed from Great Britain, but, unless 
there is prompt collective action by the LeaFue in the event of 
Germany attemptinC to incorporate in th,, Reich the three million 
German subjects of Czechoslovakia, a democratic state .. - the 
integrity of which has been guaranteed by the Tealrue, may be 
unable to withstand riermany's superior military forep and 
favourable strategic position. " New Outlook, April, 1937- 
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mutual assistance within the League, at any rate for Furope"* 
I 
Within weeks of her speech Athol] was deluged with letters and 
telegrams from Eastern Europe, thankinv her for the stand eshe had 
taken in the House of Commons. Among them were invitations to visit 
their countries. Atholl consulted Sir Robert Vansittart who 
encouraged her to go, stressing how these countries were being 
continually cajoled and threatened to throw in their lot with Germany. 
To offset this an immense amount of good could be done by Britons show- 
ing the flag and taking an interest in them. At length, in the early 
months of 1937, Atholl, accompanied by Eleanor Rathbone, the 
Independent Member for Combined University, paid a highly successful 
visit to Eastern Europe. 
Winston Churchillis mind was working along similar lines. 
Toward the end of March 1936 he addressed the Foreign Affairs Committee 
of the Supporters of the National Government. 
2 
He told the assembled 
Members that for 400 years the foreign policy of England had been 
to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating Power on 
the continent. "It seems to me that all the old conditions present 
themselves again, and that our national salvation depends on our 
gathering once again all the forces of Europe to contain, to restrain 
and if necessary to frustrate German domination. " Germany was arming 
in a manner which had never been seen before, and was led by a handful 
of triumphant desperadoes. Very soon they would have to choose on 
the one hand between economic and financial collapse or internal 
upheaval, and on the other a war which would have no other object, 
and which if successful could have no other result, than a Germanised 
1 House of Commons Debates, 5 November, 1936, Col-563- 
2 The Gathering Storm, pp. 182-86. 
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Europe under Nazi control.. "It is at this stage that the spacious 
conception and extremely vital organisation of the League of Nations 
presents itself as a prime factor 
... 
it harmonises perfectly 
with all our past methods and actions 
... 
in the fosterine and 
fortifying of the League of Nations will be found the best means 
of defending our island security". Tn summing up he set out his 
three main propositions: "first, that we must oppose the would-be 
dominator or potential aggressor; secondly, that Germany, under its 
present Nazi regime, and with its prodigious armaments, so swiftly 
developing, fills unmistakably that part; thirdly, that the League 
of Nations rallies many countries, and unites our own people here 
at home in the most effective way to control the would-be aggressor". 
This was to be Churchill's continual theme in the later 
thirties. Tn July, at the University of Bristol, of which he was 
Chancellor, he appealed for a League of Nations to be created in 
Europe which would confront a potential aggressor with overwhelming 
force. 1 And again, in a newspaper article he wrote the month 
before: 
"safety will only come through a combination of pacific nations 
armed with overwhelming power 
... 
there must be a Grand 
Alliance of all the nations who wish for peace against the 
Potential Aggressor 
... 
Let all the nations and states 
be invited to band themselves together upon a simple, 
single principle: 'who touches one, touches all'. " 
2 
Privately he informed Sir Maurice Hankey that he would hammer away 
at the League for a complete encirclement of Germany. The various 
1 The Times, 6 July, 1936. 
2 Step By Step, article dated 12 June, 1936, P-38. 
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countries of the Baltic, Holland, Belgium, France, Italy, Switzerland, 
Austria, the Balkan States, Russia and Poland, must all, as Members 
of the League, be induced to make such an effort as to deter and, if 
necessary, stop an aggression by Germany. As part of this plan 
Churchill had the "fantastic" idea, so Hankey thought, of sendinp, to 
the Baltic a sufficient part of the British Fleet to ensure superiority 
over Germany in that sea. Its mere arrival, with its menace to 
German communications, would, hp sugFested, be a severe shock to 
German opinion and put a stop to further mischief. 
1 
In the light of these statements it is interesting to note that 
WR Rock, in his study of the eighteen months following Eden's 
resignation, has assumed that Churchill on 14 March, 1938, put forward 
a "new policy", described as the 'grand alliance', which gave "definite 
form to the vague Labour-Liberal demand for a return to collective 
security". He writes that "after the German occupation of Austria, 
Winston Churchill proposed to the House of Commons his 'grand 
alliance' 
-a number of nations gathered together in a solemn 
treaty for mutual defence against aggression". 
2 
Tn fact there was 
nothing 'new' about the grand alliance for it was part of Churchill's 
stock in hand after, but including, 1936. And the Labour-l, iberal 
call for a return to collective security by March 193F was not 'vague' 
save for that of a small number of Labourites - but had taken the 
precise shape that Churchill was also advocating. 
Tn effect Churchill, Atholl and a majority of those alarmed at 
German policies saw in the T, eague the machinery to secure a European 
Cabinet Minutes. Conversation between Hankey and Churchill, 
21 April, 1936. Cab 21/435. Hankey commented that "all this 
seemed to be very fantastic and to ignore many realities". 
2 
Appeasement on Trial, P-X, 322. 
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coalition against Hitler. 
1 
What their beliefs boiled down to was 
the simple, old-fashioned formula which Britain hid followed for so 
long 
- 
the maintenRnce of the balancP of power. As Emrys-Pvans 
put it: "We will never allow in the future as we have never allowed 
in the past only one nation to become prý-Hominant on the Continent 
of Europe. We have always gravitated towards those Powers which 
will oppose the hegemony of any one nation. " 
2 In this way, collective 
security, or an understanding with those European powers whose 
interests were congruent with 'Britain's own, had been a principle of 
British foreign policy for generations. Support of a localized LeaguP 
therefore was not altruistic but "corresponded to our own vital 
3 
interests" for in "defending the League we defended our own shores" . 
The practical conclusion to be drawn from this was that Britain 
should become more involved in "European affairs and direct its efforts 
to building a front to contain Germany. Yet this was exactly the 
course the National Government was reluctant to follow, for it would 
mean opposing German expansion in the east and dividing Europe into 
two armed camps, like those which had lurched into war in 1914. Rather 
they saw the situation as requiring a different approach, the path 
of reconciliation with Germany, which would offer an escape from the 
necessity and the inherent danger of the above. 
The critics' conception of the T, eague laid great emphasis on the 
overwhelming force that had to be assembled to make the institution 
effective. During the June debates on the abandonment of sanctions 
At the same time they hoped that by such a policy the sympathy, 
and ultimately the help, of the United States might most easily 
be enlisted. 
2 House of Commons Debates, 23 June, 19,16, C01-785- 
3 Austen Chamberlain, The Times, 2 April, 1936. 
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Nicolson and Wolmer pinned their faith on the construction of a 
new League from the ruins of the old. "One of substance", said 
Nicolson, "not shadow, and of practice not theory. It is by the 
organisation, the co-ordination and the planning of force that 
the new League of Nations must be built. " 
I Similarly, but more 
graphically, Wolmer told the Commons: 
"There must be the employment of the policemen's 
truncheon against the gangster 
.. - 
unless there is 
that force behind the League, that power of armaments in 
the hands of those nations who are loyal supporters of 
peace, then the authority of the League can never be 
what nearly every member of this House wants it to be. " 
2 
Though this was a more realistic conception of the League, 
it was largely restricted to the preservation of the Europenn 
status quo. Churchill clearly made the distinction. The League, 
he said, was "the best means of defending our island security, 
as well as maintaining grand universal causes with which we have 
very often found our own interests in natural accord.,, 
3 Needless 
to say, the attitude of Churchill and those of likemind to the 
extra-L'uropean problem of Abyssinia, something which ranked as a 
'grand universal cause', was equivocal. There was a natural 
aversion against involvement in an area where Britain had no real 
interests. They also knew Germany to be a far greater danger to 
the peace of the world than Italy, and in their hopes of keeping 
1 House of Commons Debates, 23 June, 1936, coi. 746. 
Ibid, Col-765. 
The Gathering Storm, p. 184. 
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the peace they had no wish to drive Mussolini into the irms of 
Hitler. 
Tt has even been su! %ested ttiat Churchill remained out of the 
country during the autumn of 1935 so as to avoid having to pronounce 
for or against Italy. 
I 
This is not 8trictly accurate. Churchill's 
hopes of n League to restrain Germany decided him to endorse the 
Government's policy towards Italy, but it is true that hc remained 
seriously disturbed at the situation. Hc dreaded the movement of 
a first-class power, as Italy was then rated, from one side to the 
other, and did not think that Abyssinia was a very reputable state. 
He regretted that it had ever been admitted to the League. These 
misgivings he expressed in a letter to Austen Chamberlain: 
am very unhappy. It would be a terrible deed to smach 
up Italy, and it will cost us dear 
... 
I do not think 
we ought to have taken the lead in such a vehement way. "2 
Such apprehensions were clearly apparent in his first parliamentary 
speech on Abyssinia, on 24 October, before the dissolution, when he 
made clear his support of the Government although wonderin,,, r at its 
rashness. He was not brief, but, in essence, said that the bounds 
of caution had been over-stepped. The Government had tried Mussolini 
sorely. Members were a--ked to remember that the original error had 
been the admission of Abyssinia to the League, and now a war had been 
risked for a barbarous State. He urged the Government not to abandon 
hopes of an acceptable compromise, trusting that the hope "of a 
satisfactory settlement being reached" wRs not completely dead. Then 
casting off gloomy misgivings, if not chanminC course, he declared 
1 Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, p. 1-23. 
2 The Gathering Storm, p. 152. 
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that the crisis hnd vi(le the Lenfrue into n livinC orCnnIsm, nnd 
ended with a tremendous eulogy of the new-born Leagru(%: 
"The League of Nations has passed from shadow into 
substance, from theory into practice, from rhetoric into 
reality. We see a structure always majestic, but hitherto 
shadowy, which is now being clothed with life nnd power, 
and endowed with coherent thought and concerted action. " 
Churchill did in fact remain out of the country Huring the 
Hoare-T, aval storm. His reason for remaining in Barcelona, prolonping 
a holiday planned prior to the election, wns fear of doing himself 
harm politically. An immediate return to England, so his friends 
warned him, would be regarded as a personal challenge to the Government. 
In retrospect he thought he ought to have come home. "I might have 
brouoht an element of decision and combination to the anti-Government 
gatherings which would have ended the Baldwin regime. Perhaps a 
Government under Sir Austen Chamberlain might have been established 
at this moment. " 
2 This exaggerates the determination and numbers of 
those angered by the Tfoare-T-aval proposals, for on Amery's count, if 
House of Commons Debates', 24 October, 1935, col. 741. Thompson has 
written that Chamberlain 11was in the House during the debate but 
rather surprisingly took no part in it. Perhaps he was deterred 
by the difficulty of trying to reconcile his contradictory inclina- 
tions in order to present a coherent argument". The Anti-Appeasers, 
p. 84. In fact Chamberlain did account for his non-involvement in 
the debate. In a letter to his sister Ida, dated 26 October, 
Chamberlain explained that he had had a cold and a woolly head 
"which was one of the reasons why I did not speak in the debate - 
the others being that Hoare's and Eden's speeches both put the 
case very well while Winston in his admirable speech on the last 
day said the only things which I desired to add. " 
2 The Gathering Storm, p. 162. From his papers it appears that 
Chamberlain was more attracted by the prospects of the Foreign 
Office, the bait that Baldwin danaled before him in order to 
ensure his support. See Thompson pp-91-95. 
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the Government had persisted in its course, only a score of 
Conservatives would have voted against the Government while a few 
more might have abstained. 
I Even Chamberlain's celebrated outburst 
at the Foreign Affairs Committee, Amery was informed, had never 
meant to imply that he or any other Conservative would vote against 
the Government. 2 More to the point, was Churchill in any position 
to lead a revolt over the Hoare-Laval proposals? Like Chamberlain, 
he had pressed the Government to find a compromise settlement to the 
Abyssinian conflict and only by standing on his head could he have 
been in a position to lead irate League supporters against the 
Foreign Secretary's agreement. Seen in this light Churchill's friends 
were correct to advise him to stay away as he clearly would have further 
tarnished his already weak reputation for consistency. 
Churchill's position on Abyssinia is well illustrated by reference 
to the after-dinner conversation he had with Hankey in April 1936. 
At one point he advocated the deliverance of an ultimatum informing 
the Italians that unless they agreed to come to terms with the League 
the Suez Canal would be closed. "Ile talked", Hankey noted, "of 
delivering heavy bombing attacks on Italy which showed he had not 
thought out how it was to be done, from what bases or with what air- 
craft,,. 
3 later on in the discussion Churchill, somewhat contradic- 
torally, mentioned the possibility of inducing Italy, as a member 
of the League, to prevent an aggression by Germany. The conclusion 
to be drawn from the Hankey memorandum is that the Abyssinian episode 
1 The Unforgiving Years, p. 185- 
2 Ibid, P-185. 
3 Cabinet Papers, 21 April, 1936. A seemingly impulsive statement 
by Churchill, comparable to his suggestion of sending part of the 
British Fleet into the Baltic. 
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was something of an embarrassment to Churchill and of little moment 
compared to the threat emanating from Germany. 
In June Churchill and a majority of those who shared his views 
were to support the Government against the vote of censure moved by 
the Opposition and thus to acquiesce in the abandonment of sanctions. 
An analysis of the division list showed that only two Conservative 
MPs, Macmillan and Adams, took the serious step of voting in the 
Opposition lobby. Macmillan, however, accepted 'the logic of 
abandoning sanctions' but opposed the Government on the grounds that 
he could not see "how I could honourably go back upon those who had 
voted for me". 
1 After some reflection he wrote to the Prime Minister 
that "although I am still in favour of a National Government in these 
difficult times, and shall probably be found in the great majority 
of cases in the Government Lobby 
... 
I am unable to give the 
Government the support which it has, perhaps, the right to expect 
from those receiving the Government Whip. It occurs to me, therefore, 
that it would perhaps be more satisfactory if I was no longer 
regarded as being among the official supporters of the present 
administration. " Baldwin replied formally to the effect that he 
regretted the decision which Macmillan "thought it necessary to 
take". 2 
By contrast Adams did not accept the 'logic' of abandoning 
sanctions, nor a limited concept of European collective security. 
His was the pure doctrine of the Covenant, an all-embracing 
collective security, touching all Members of the League: 
1 Winds of Chan*ge, p. 458- 
2 Winds of Change, p. 459- Macmillan, as MP for Stockton-on-Tees, 
was the holder of a vulnerable seat where the League's 'vote, 
counted. The same could be said of Leeds West which Adams 
represented. 
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"If we do not today make a reality both in Europe 
and in North East Africa of the principle of collective 
security, if we, in a word, do not dedicate the strength 
of all to the defence of each, we are deferring a collision 
whose momentum may be increased by the postponement. " 
1 
Here was no 'grand universal cause', as Churchill had put it, nor a 
quixotic impulse, but the protection of British interests in the 
maintenance of those of other nations. 
2 Doubtless Adams was 
influenced in his thinking by his membership, throughout the 
thirties, of the Executive Committee of the League of Nations Union. 
Despite his profound disagreement with the Unionist party he did 
not resign the whip, nor was he deprived of it. 
These two apart, the critics acquiesced in the Government's 
abandonment of sanctions although it was another damaging blow to 
the effectiveness of the League, the institution on which they 
placed their hopes. The contradiction between advocating collective 
security against Germany while resigning themselves to the most 
flagrant violation of the Covenant by Italy, did not occur to them. 
Moreover, as to the hopes, which some of them held, of renewed 
friendship with Italy, Labourite Price saw through them: 
I House of Commons Debates, 21 May, 1936, Col-1039. 
2 As was his indicated by another speech, made to the Commons the 
same month: "Does not the League of Nations exist to protect our 
interests no less than those of other nations? To put it at the 
very lowest, it is the worst patriotism to ignore the danger 
to Egypt and to our communications with the East. " The Member 
for East Surrey, Charles Emmott: "A Tory after all. "'. Adams: 
"That is the first time that it has ever been alleged against 
me that I am not a member of the Conservative Nrty". House of 
Commons Debates, 29 May, 1936, col. 2484. 
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"What they are now envisaging is the possibility 
of buying off Mussolini, settlinC him in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and bringing him back to the Stresa Front, 
using him as a make-weight against Hitlerite Germany ... 
They think that they can buy off these aggressors one 
against the other, but these dictators are no fools. 
They will play us off one against the other. That is 
what they are doing-" 
1 
Although the National Government's internal critics can be 
criticised for their ambivalent attitude throughout the Abyssinian 
dispute, Thompson goes too far when he attributes the "end of 
collective security" to their "failure to put pressure on the 
Government to continue the course on which it was embarked". 
2 
And again he writes: 
"By failing to press the administration to stand by the 
policy it had announced in September, 1935, the back- 
benchers were not only in a weak position to demand 
resistence to Germany but they were also largely responsible 
for breaking the instrument which could have been used 
to restrain Hitler. 1,3 
They were in a weak position and, failing to put pressure on the 
administration, in part responsible for the breakdown of the collective 
security system. But to attribute a major portion of the blame to 
a handful of back-benchers, excluded from office, is stretching 
1 House of Commons Debates, 18 June, 1936, col. 1438. 
2 The Anti-Appeasers, p. 78. 
Ibid, p. 100. 
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credibility too far. Baldwin and the National Government were the 
main arbiters of Britain's fate and it is at their door that one 
must place the prime responsibility for the consequences of the 
policy pursued over Abyssinia. 
Support f or the Leagu 
Churchill's SuPPort of the League of Nations was not merely 
to secure the encirclement of Germany. He favoured, according to 
Hankey, "continued support of the League and was very down on 
Conservative MPs who he said were widely criticising our League 
policy. He himself has no illusions about the weakness of the 
League, but sees that the British people will not take rearmament 
seriously except as part of the League policy. " 
1 By linking 
rearmament with the League of Nations, Churchill hoped, the public 
would readily accept the most rapid large-scale rearmament of 
Britain. 
The twin policy of arms' and the covenant' was to be the 
name given to the tovement which sprang up in the autumn of 1936. 
Churchill saw this as a "great drawing togethpr of men and women 
of all parties in England who saw the perils of the future, and 
were resolute upon practical measures to secure our safety and the 
cause of freedom, equally menaced by both the totalitarian impulsion 
and our Government's complacency. Our plan was the most rapid 
large-scale rearmament of Britain, combined with the complete 
acceptance and employment of the authority of the League of 
Nations. I called this policy 'Arms and the Covenant'. " 
2 
In fact 
Cabinet Papers. Conversation between Hankey and Churchill, 
21 April, 1936. 
2 The Gathering Storm, p. 191. 
256. 
Churchill's title may have been retrospective, for Sir Walter 
Citrine, a leading figure in the movement, had no recollection of 
it, nor are there any contemporary references to it. Tt is 
probable as Citrine recalled, that the organisation was known as 
Defence of Freedom and Peace, to which there are allusions in 
newspapers of the thirties. 
1 
Arms and the Covenant or Defence of Freedom and Peace appears 
to have been the fruit of an association of two groups, the World 
Anti-Nazi Council and Focus. Neville Thompson has these organisations 
muddled as he refers to the 1936 movement as Focus for the Defence 
of Freedom and Peace, which were in fact two entities, although the 
latter was in part made up of the former. To give the World Anti-Nazi 
Council its full name it was the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi Council to 
Champion Human Rights, and had been formed in America by an eminent 
lawyer, Samuel Untermeyer. As its title suggests it was designed to 
be a non-sectarian and non-political body whose membership was open 
to anyone who subscribed to the principles of democracy and freedom. 
When Citrine, in the spring of 1936, paid a visit to the United States, 
the idea was conceived, out of a conversation with Untermeyer, of 
the establishment of a British section of the Council, both to awaken 
the British public to a realisation of the German menace and to take 
"lawful measures to boycott German goods until such times as complete 
freedom of belief and all civil rights are restored to all German 
subjects without distinction". 
2 
In practice the latter activity 
involved two things: persuading wholesalers and retailers to buy 
1 Letter dated 16 November, 1972, from Lord Citrine to author. 
2 Information derived from the Rathbone Papers. Citrine was the 
President of the Council, George Lathan, Member for the Park 
Division of Sheffield, was Chairman, and its membership included 
Vyvyan Adams. 
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British and not German Zoods: mob! 1007 public ojAnion to boy- 
cotting German Coods in the shops. 
I To such ends pamrill-ts wey, - 
published, info-mntion circulated and public meetin7s organised. 
One such meeting, Civen extensive press coverage, was a lunch 
organised on 19 April, 1936, at which Citrine, Norman Angell and 
Wickham Steed spoke strongly about the "new savagery" in Germany 
putting the clock back to the Dark Ages. 
2 
As 1W6 progressed the Committee of the Council felt that it 
needed the presence of some prominent personalities at its series of 
meetings in order to arouse the public to an understanding of the 
threat Germany constituted to the peace. Churchill's name was 
suggested, and at length an approach was made which resulted in the 
association of the Anti-Nazi Council with Focus. Th-- latter body hac; 
been described by one of its leading members as a "small grouln of 
likeminded individuals swimminZ aeainst the tide 
- 
not only of 
government policy but of the prevailing public attitude and mood". 
3 
The aim of this grouping, as was apparent from Churchill', 
-- 
address 
to the inaugural meeting, was to educate the nation as to the 
nature of the Nazi regime, building up a public ground-swell of 
feeling strong enough to force the British Government into active 
opposition to Hitler. 
4 
1 The TUC, which was associated with the Council, instituted a boy- 
cott of German goods and services, but Citrine later confessed, 
"it was not very successful". Men and Work,, P-356. 
2 
Daily Herald, 20 April, 1936. 
3 Lady Violet Bonham Carter, Foreword to Spier: Focus, p. q. 
4DC 
Watt, Personalities and Policies, P-133- 
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It held its first meeting at thp Victoria Hotel in June, 1935, 
when 16 persons had attended including Churchill, Sinclair, 
Locker-Lampson, Wickham Steed and Violet Bonham Carter. Churchill 
spoke after the lunch, beginning with "some general references to 
the unsatisfactory state of our defences compared with the all-out 
effort being made by the Nazis. The Government was just shutting 
its eyes to these disquieting facts. Virtually the whole population 
of Germany was being turned into a gigantic war-machine and the 
individual German was being denied every personal right and freedom, 
reduced to a mere cog in the wheel of destruction 
... 
At present 
the British public and press are very much the victims of the Nazi 
Ministry of Information and its lies. 
.-. 
The task of this assembly 
is thus as difficult as it is indispensable and urgent. We must 
make an all-party effort, cýeate a source from which unbiased and 
objective information will constantly flow to the government and to 
the whole country. We must spare no effort to enlist the support of 
our community irrespective of party, creed and class. " At the end 
of his speech he urged that the group should issue a manifesto and 
attempt to recruit members, and a drafting committee for this 
purpose was set up, with Steed as its chairman. 
The existing members proceeded to make contact with a number of 
prominent and representative individuals, many of whom expressed 
agreement with their aims and principles. But when it came to 
getting actual support "we discovered to our distress that most of 
those who had expressed their agreement with us, drew a sharp 
distinction between their personal views and an official statement 
1 Focus, pp-20-21. 
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with which they would be prepared to be publicly associated". 
1 
Such an association might lead people to believe that these were 
the views of the party or organisation to which they belonged. In 
order to overcome the difficulty it was decided that the group should 
not become formalized, but should describe itself as "a 'focus' for 
defence of freedom and peace, and to have neither rules nor members". 
2 
Those connected with Focus included 17 Members of Parliament: Unionists 
- 
Atholl, Cartland, Austen Chamberlain, Churchill, Emrys-Evans, Sandys, 
Locker-Lampson and John McEwen3 ; Labourites 
- 
Cocks, Fletcher, Arthur 
Henderson and Noel-Baker; Liberals 
- 
Dingle Foot, de Rothschild and 
Sinclair; Independents 
- 
Eleanor Rathbone and Sir Arthur Salter. 
4 
There were also distinguished outsiders such as Lord Cecil, Kingsley 
Martin and Professor Gilbert Murray. 
Focus, p. 24. Dalton is a case in point. In his memoirs he 
confessed to being in sympathy but taking no overt part in it, 
a fact that Thompson found revealing considering that the IAbour 
Party's "apologists maintain that armed collective security was 
orthodox doctrine by the end of 193611. The Anti-Appeasers, P-130- 
Most apologists would put a later date than 1936, and Thompson's 
censure underestimates Labour politics and the weight of Dalton's 
explanation: "We should have lessened our influence within our 
party, if, on this controversial question, (arms) we had publicly 
associated with members of other parties". The Fateful Years, P. M. 
2 Focus, P-25. 
3 McEwen: Diplomatic Service, 1920-29; MP Berwick and Haddington, 
1931-45- 
4 
Salter: General Secretary Reparation Commission, 1920-22; 
Director Economic and Financial Section, League of Nations, June 
1919 
- 
January, 1920, and 1922-31; Professor of Political 
Theory, Oxford University, 1934-44; MP Oxford University 1937-50; 
Parliamentary Secretary to Ministry of Shipping, 1939-41. 
I 
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As the membership increased so did confidence. It was 6ecided 
to work out a detailed programme of activity, of which the main feature 
was a public meetinG in the Albert Hall. This was planned in 
conjunction with Citrine and the World Anti-Nazi Council, and was 
intended to be the first of a series, in which leading representatives 
of the main political parties and the distinguished outsiders would 
put forward the case for strengthening the League of Nations and 
British defences. I Originally it was hoped to hold the meeting in 
April but Churchill pressed for a postponement, as he indicated in 
a letter to Lord Cecil: 
"After our talk I told Mr Richards of the Anti-Nazi 
Council that I thought it would be absurd to have an 
Albert Hall meeting against the dangers of the German 
dictatorship on April 29 within a few days of your Albert 
Hall meeting of May 8 against the Italian Dictatorship, 
and that it must be put off till later in the year. This 
has accordingly been done. " 
2 
It is apparent from the same letter that Cecil and "his friends", 
as one would expect, tended to favour the League as opposed to the 
defence plank, so that Churchill was moved to argue: 
"Once you and your friends have formulated your 
principles you must face 'ways and means'. You need a 
secular arm. I might help with that. 
It seems a mad business to confront the dictators 
without weapons or military force, and at the same time to 
Churchill (The Gathering Storm, PP-195-96) gives the incorrect 
impression that the Albert Hall gathering was the culminating 
meeting of the campaign, when it was in fact the beginning of 
it. Boyle has it that Bracken "planned" the meeting, Poor, Dear 
Brendan, p. 215. He did not. 
2 Churchill to Cecil, 9 April, 1936. Cecil Papers. 
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try to tame and cow the spirit of our people with peace 
films, anti-recruiting propaganda and resistance to defence 
measures. Unless the free and law-abiding nations are 
prepared to organise, arm and combine, they are going to 
be smashed up. This is going to happen quite soon. But 
I believe we still have a year to combine and marshall 
superior forces in defence of the League and its Covenant. " 
It is possible that Cecil's associates expressed fears concerning 
the future of the League of Nations' Union. At any rate, in October, 
Churchill felt moved to write another letter reassuring Cecil that 
there was "no question of the eclipse of the New Commonwealth Society 
nor the League of Nations Union, but only for the fusion of practical 
working effort and for united advance". 
2 In the event the Albert 
Hall meeting was held under the auspices of the League of Nations 
Union, as were later gatheringsthat were staged around the country 
in the later 1930s, which explains why they were so frequently 
attributed to the Union. 
Prior to the meeting at the Albert Hall, finally set for 
December, the objects and principles of Defence of Freedom and Peace 
were announced: 
"Objects 
To unite British citizens, irrespective of politics or 
creed; 
In defence of Freedom, secured by democratic government 
and public law; 
1 Churchill to Cecil, 9 April, 1936. Cecil P3pers. 
2 Churchill to Cecil, 21 October, 1936. 
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In resistance to all efforts to diminish or destroy this 
freedom by violence at home or attack from abroad; and 
In support of our international duty to join with others 
in preserving peace and withstanding armed aggression. 
Principles 
The cause of ordered freedom is in danger. Peace itself is 
in jeopardy. The foes of both are vocal, organised and 
strong. "Defence of Freedom and Peace" offers common ground 
to all who hold that without peace, freedom cannot be sure; 
and that without freedom there can be no true peace. 
The central mass of temperate, tolerant humanity must not 
be found feeble in action and leadership. Parliamentary 
governments of self-ruling peoples need, therefore, to 
know they are upheld by the resolute will of citizens 
who are ready to stand for the rights of man and for 
justice among the nations. 
The ideals enshrined in the League Covenant and the Kellogg 
Pact grew out of man's bitter need after uncountable 
sacrifice. Those ideals alone must stand between the 
world and nameless woe. Great Britain must be strong 
to bear her part in banning war from the life of nations, 
so that well-Cuarded peace may lighten the burden of the 
peoples and offer to states great and small just redress 
for proved wrong. 
British, leadership and action may yet save peace and 
civilisation. The aim of 'Defence of Freedom and Peace, 
is to prosper this work. " 
1 
1 Focus, pp-75-6. 
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On 2 December, the eve of the great meeting in the Albert Hall, 
Churchill wrote to Lord Cecil indicating the line he would be taking 
in his speech, the hopes he had for the future, and the fears he 
held regarding potential Tory supporters: 
"At the present time the improved attitude of Poland 
and the Little Entente give me hopes that these four countries 
in more or less good relations with Russia, will form an 
Eastern insurance group similar to that waich exists in 
the west between England, France and Belgium. In my 
speech tomorrow I shall be indicating that the mutual 
association of these groups through the League of Nations 
and under the Covenant give the League for the first time 
a very great nucleus of solid strength against at least one 
potential aggressor. Nothing could give better hope of 
preventing a war. Any undue stressing of Russia would 
simply drive an overwhelming amount of Tories into violent 
opposition to the League of Nations cause. But I think 
on the whole matters aýe moving in the direction you wýsh, 
and the League may well become more powerful. " 
1 
Although Churchill's assessment of the Tory reactions to the stressing 
of Russia was realistic, that of Russia's good relations with Eastern 
European countries was not. For them there was little to choose 
between Germany and Russia, and this was to prove a formidable 
obstacle in 1939- 
The following day the Albert Hall meeting went ahead as planned. 
Citrine was in the chair, while leading members of the Conservative, 
Labour and Liberal Parties, the League of Nations Union and the trade 
I Churchill to Cecil, 2 December, 1936. Cecil Papers. 
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union movement were present on the platform. 
1 Looking back on this 
remarkable gathering Macmillan has written that those involved might, 
given favourable circumstances, "have been able to force a change of 
policy or of government or of both". 
2 It is remarks like this, and 
similar sentiments expressed by contemporary political commentators, 
that have probably led Thompson into writing that Defence of Freedom 
and Peace was a "move to put Churchill at the head of a Popular 
Front", and of Churchill failing to "achieve office as the leader of 
the collective security forces". 
Whatever the hopes of a number of those involved, it would do 
many of the participants less than justice to assume that as a body 
they were formina- a new political alliance and endeavourinZ to secure 
office for Churchill. Citrine directed most of his openin. - remarks 
at the meeting to clearing up that sort of "speculation about our 
purposes". "We have been described", he went on, "as a group who have 
come together for the purpose of forming a popular front or a centre 
party, or some new political combination. There is not a vestige of 
truth in any of these statements. None of us would be associated 
with any such manoeuvre.,, 
3 
Over 20 Members of Parliament appeared on the platform: Unionists 
- Atholl, Boothby, Churchill, CK Entwhistle, Oscar Guest, Emrys-Evans, 
Locker-Lampson, Moore-Brabazon, Sandys and Wolmer; Liberal 
Nationals 
- 
Bernays and William Mabane; labourites 
- 
Haden-Guest, 
Joseph Henderson, Wedgwood and John Wilmot; Liberals 
- 
Richard 
Acland, Kingsley Griffith, Harris, de Rothschild and Sinclair; 
Independent 
- 
Rathbone. Messages of support were also received 
from Austen Chamberlain, Clynes, Seely, Adams and Cartland. 
2 
Winds of Change, p. 479. 
3 Daily Herald, 4 December, 1936. 
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Nor were they there, Citrine insisted, as representatives of 
groups, parties or organisations. Everyone who spoke from the 
platform did so in his or her personal capacity. "All of us in our 
-own 
separate ways have come to the conclusion that our people must 
be brought to a recoFnition of the grave r3anger to p-ace and freedom 
through which the world is passing. " 
1 
Churchill, however, was the main speaker and got "a tremendous 
reception" indicative of the way his stock had been rising. 
2 The 
keynote of his speech was that of "arms and the covenant"i 
"If we wish to stop this coming war 
- 
if coming it is 
- 
we must in the year that lies before us 
- 
nay 
- 
in the next 
six months 
- 
gather together the great nations, all as well 
armed as possible and united under the Covenant of the 
League in accordance with the principles of the League, 
and in this way we may reach a position where we can invite 
the German people to join this organisation. of world security; 
where we can invite them to take their place freely in the 
circle of nations to preserve peace, and where we shall be 
able to answer them that we seek no security for ourselves 
which we do not extend more freely to them. 
We should rally and unite under the League of Nations the 
greatest number of strongly armed nations that we can 
marshall. Let us invite Germany to take her part among us. 
Then we should be sincerely believed, having done not only 
our best but having succeeded in warding off from the world 
1 Focus, p. 62. 
2 
Lady Violet Bonham Carter, Daily Telegraph, 11 March, 1965. 
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calamities and horrors the end of which io man can 
foresee. " 1 
The Albert Hall meeting took place at the very moment the 
Abdication crisis was upon Britain. Although not permitted to 
voice a few words of sympathy for Edward at the meeting, he 
subsequently pleaded, in the House of Commons, for time and 
deliberation to see Whether a way out could not be found. 
2 His 
intervention was ill received and he was denied a proper hearing. 
Such taunts as 'Drop it', 'Twister' were hurled at him. 
3 Winterton 
has described this episode as "one of the angriest manifestations 
I have ever heard directed against any man in the House of Commons". 
ItIn five minutes", noted Nicolson, "he had undone 
... 
the 
5 
patient reconstruction work of two years". All the effect of the 
Albert Hall meeting was destroyed 
- 
first by the Abdication and 
secondly by the catastrophic fall in Churchill's prestige. Churchill 
himself recorded that all the forces he had "gathered together in 'Arms 
and the Covenant'. of which I conceived myself to be the mainspring, 
were estranged or dissolved, and I was myself so smitten in public 
opinion that it was the almost universal view that my political life 
was at last ended". 
6 
Kingsley Martin, a member of 'Focus', reinforced 
this verdict: 
1 The Times, 4 December, 1936. 
2 Citrine refused to chair the meeting if Churchill alluded to the 
Abdication Crisis. "But though Winston was obliged to bow to 
Citrine's ultimatum, I could see how much he minded being over- 
ridden". Bonham Carter, Daily Telegrap 
, 
11 March, 1965. 
3 Diary entry, 7 December, 1936. The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon, P-95- 
4 
Orders of the Days p. 223. 
Letter dated 9 December, 1936. Diaries and Letters, p. 284. 
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"I think that Churchill's growinp reputation has 
been damaged; that if he held an Albert Hall meeting 
now Citrine would hesitate to take the chair for him 
and that people who were rallying round him are beginning 
to mutter again about his notorious 'lack of judgement'. " 
Churchill has suggested that but for the Abdication crisis the 
Arms and the Covenant Movement would not only have gained respect 
for its viewpoint but have become dominant. "Here", Amery commented, 
"wishful thinking bore little relation to reality. My own recollection 
is that the movement never showed any sign of influencing the main 
body of the two leading Parties. " 
2 Even if Amery's impressions were 
incorrect, which it is unlikely, Arms and the Covenant could not have 
continued much longer in its existing form. The Labour and trade 
union members, particularly Citrine, were finding it increasingly 
difficult to maintain their association with Churchill in the face 
of widespread criticism. An example of this was when John Marchbank, 
General Secretary of the National Union of Railwaymen, confessed in 
the Union's journal to a "sense of relief in hearing that it has been 
decided to reconstitute in the House of Commons the trade union group 
of Labour Members which existed in previous Parliaments. The object 
is to concentrate the influence of the trade union members of 
6 (from previous page) 
The Gathering Storm, p. 192. Churchill shared this view. Meeting 
Beaverbrook in Paris, he said that his political career was over 
and that the time had come for him to retire. Taylor, Beaverbrook, 
p. 488. Churchill also told JCC Davidson that "his political 
career was finished". Memoirs, p. 415- 
1 New Statesman and Nation, 12 December, 1936. 
2 The Unforgiving Years, p. 180. 
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Parliament in the counsels of the Party and the work of Parliament. " 
1 
His hope was that trade union MPs would come down firmly against any 
entanglements with members of other parties, like that with Churchill 
in Arms and the Covenant. 
2 
It is interesting to note that Naylor has argued that "the 
effect of the failure of the campaign was to divert the pro-rearmament 
activities back to the conversion of the parliamentary party to the 
acceptance of rearmament. In that sense the failure of Arms and the 
Covenant conceivably was a boon to the Labour Party". 
3 There is 
little evidence however to support such a view. Few of Labour's 
rearmers took part in the campaign as they were probably conscious, 
as Dalton was, that they might thereby have undermined their 
influence for rearmament within the party. In this sense the 
failure of Arms and the Covenant had little effect either way on 
the Labour Party. 
Although the forces assembled in Arms and the Covenant were 
dissolved, Focus continued to function until the outbreak of war 
- 
"fighting against this Nazi danger and to enlighten the public both 
at home and overseas, and the British government. " 
4 
Public meetings 
were held in Manchester, Hull, Sheffield, Birmingham and other towns, 
and were moderately successful, but they were relatively few in number 
The Times, 27 November, 1936. 
2 See also Dalton's comments, P-259- 
Labour's International Policy, p. l'? 2. 
Focus, p. 84. The Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi Council also survived, 
organising meetings, issuing pamphlets etc. See Labour Party 
Conference Report, 193?, p. 16. 
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and were inadequately reported in the press, if they were noticed 
at all. This can, in part, be ascribpd to the failure of the group's 
more important members to lend their oratorical presence after the 
meeting in December 1936 at the Albert Hall. Eugen Spier, however, 
blamed the lack of press coverages on the control exercised, on the 
one hand by Dawson through The Times and, on the other hand, by the 
press lords, Beaverbrook and Rothermere. But it is odd that no reports 
were carried by the Daily Herald, the News Chronicle, the Manchester 
Guardian or the Daily Telegraph, all of whom were to some degree at 
least anti-appeasement. 
Focus ramphlets such as Churchill's The Truth about Hitler and 
Amery's Hitler's Claim for Colonies were published and were issued 
on request. 
1 Group lunches also continued, and Nicolson recorded 
attending one. In a letter to his wife, he wrote: "I went to such 
an odd luncheon yesterday. It is called 'the Focus Group', and is 
one of Winston's things 
... 
I was made to make a speech without 
any notice and was a trifle embarrassed 
... 
Don't be worried, my 
darling. I am not going to become one of the Winston brigade. " 
2 
Overall Focus did not, in itself, achieve very much. As one of 
its members concluded: "It may be said, and with some justice, that 
we strove in vain. Although I believe we helped to turn the tide of 
public feeling, it turned too late to keep pace with events or to 
arrest their course 
... 
we had lost the race with time. 
0 In 
effect the group was never able to penetrate the administration, nor 
convert any of its leading figures to their recommendations, and at 
Focus, p. 78-9. 
2 
Letter dated 2 March, 1938, Diaries and Letters, PP-327-28. 
Bonham-Carter, Foreword to Focus, p. 11. 
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no time did they mobilise anything like the public pressure required 
to induce the Government to take notice of their contentions. Their 
major role perhaps was to disseminate information on the pace of 
German rearmament and the development of Nazi plans against Austria 
and Czechoslovakia, but to counter the widespread sympathy for Germ3ny 
they needed time and access to the organs of publicity which was 
denied to them. 1 Nevertheless, Focus was of importance in another 
context, for it brought together men and women with very different 
political backgrounds, thereby providing a platform for Churchill, 
and, at a time when most needed, helped to keep his "flag flying". 
2 
Focus, and the movement in Defence of Freedom and Peace, were 
not the only symptoms of Churchill's interest in the LeaOue of Nations. 
In June 1936 he accepted an invitation from Lord Davies, the Chairman 
of the New Commonwealth Society to become President of its British 
section. 
3 The Society, an international movement founded in 1933, 
was dedicated to the strengthening of the League of Nations by the 
creation of an international police force to make aggressive war 
impossible and to compel respect for international law. Tt also 
advocated the establishment of an Equity Tribunal for the peaceful 
settlement of all disputes. Each of the member sections attempted to 
propagate and popularise these ideas, in particular that of an 
international police force. 
In November Churchill delivered his first presidential address 
to the Society, at a luncheon held in the Dorchester Hotel. Thompson 
1 Personalities and Policies, P-133- 
2 Focus, P-138. 
3 The Times, 8 June, 1.936. 
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has described the occasion as a "major political and social event", 
which it was certainly not. 
1 Judged by the lack of newspaper 
coverage and general interest shown, the New Commonwealth Society was 
not, and was never to be, in the mainstream of British politics in 
the 1930s. 
Although Churchill privately confessed that he did not feel 
"bound by all their views", 
2 
on this occasion he immediately 
associated himself with the organisation's aims: 
"Nothing is easier to mock at than the plan of an 
international force, to carry out the decisions of a European 
or, if possible, of a world council. Nothing is easier 
than to marshal and magnify the obvious difficulties which 
stand in the way. But no one can dispute that the 
achievement of such an ideal and its acceptance simultaneously 
by many countries would be the greatest blessing that could 
come to mankind. " 
Nevertheless, as this aim was not yet practical politics, it was 
expedient that peoples and governments should rely on their own 
means of defence and the covenant: 
"All true members of the League of Nations in Eurore 
must play their part and each must do his share and it must 
be proved quite plainly that there are enough when added 
together to restrain, to overawe, and in the last to over- 
come the aCgressor, from within the League or from without. " 
Without that, collective security would be a fraud and only a 
disastrous means of deceiving well-meaning pacific communitie6 into 
1 The Anti-Appeasers, p. 127. 
2 Churchill to Cecil, 21 Octobar, 1936, Cecil Papers. 
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putting themselves at the mercy of predatory -overnments. "Ide do not 
want", he concluded, "to have the 'ind of collective oecurity we 
see in a flock of sheep on their way to the butcher. " 
1, 
Six months later, at another society dinner at the Dorchester, 
Churchill spoke again. He c2aimed that they were one of the few 
Deace societies that advocated the use of force, if possible over- 
whelming force, to support international law. Central to their 
thinking was a strong Britain, playing its part with other peace- 
resolved, well armed nations in building up a system of efficient 
resistance to aggression. Taking his argument one step further than 
usual he envisaged a universal system of collective security: 
"to prevent the horrors of another war we must work towards 
a larger synthesis and the permanent organisation, first of 
Europe, but as soon as possible of the whole world, to redress 
legitimate grievances and to overawe aggression. " 
2 
Affiliated to the New Commonwealth Society was a Parliamentary 
Group, which included members of all parties. It was this body that 
had appealed to Churchill to become President of the Society. 
3 The 
Group met regularly to hear addresses on matters connected with the 
League or the Society's own policy, as when General Sir Frederick 
Maurice spoke on 'Aspects of the Organisation of an International 
Police Force'. 
4 
Government supporters that were members of the Group 
, Mr Winston Churchill and the New Commonwealth', New Commonwealth, 
December, 1936. 
The Times, 26 May, 1937. 
Daily Herald, 8 June, 1936. 
4 
The Times, 17 April, 1936. 
273. 
included: Adams, Boothby, Cyril Entwistle, 
1 Sir Patrick Hannon, 2 
Henry Haslam'3 Dudley Joel, 
4 
Macmillan, Henry Morris-Jones, 5 
Nicolson, Sir Walter Smiles 
6 
and Sir John Withers. Those drawn 
from the opposition benches were: Cocks, Grenfell, Mander, Wilf Roberts, 
Sinclair and Wedgwood. 
The, D, aily Herald commented that "the grouping is so entirely 
different from the Tory diehards with whom Churchill is normally 
associated that it is bound to create particular interest", while yet 
another mouthpiece of the Left, the New Statesman, paid tribute to 
the New Commonwealth's president, describing him as the National 
Government's "most effective opponent" who "has no use for their 
pretence about collective security".? Both comments are indicative 
of Churchill's new standing in quarters from which he was traditionally 
poles apart. Tom Jones noted this when he wrote that Churchill 
"has commended himself to the Labour Party by his support of the League 
in his recent speeches and articles". 
8 
1 Liberal MP South West Hull, 1918-24; Unionist, Bolton, 1931-45. 
2 General Secretary of the Navy League, 1911-18; MP Moseley, Birmingham, 
1921-50- 
3 MP Parts of Lindsey, Horncastle, 1924-45. 
4 
Memberof the Eden Group, 1938-39; MP for Dudley, 1931-41. 
5 Liberal MP Denbigh, 1929-31; Liberal National, 1931-50; Assistant 
Government Whip, 1932-37; a Lord Commissioner of the Treasury, 
1935-37. 
6 
MP Blackburn, 1931-45. 
7 Daily Herald, 8 June, 1936; New Statesman, 13 June, 1936. 
8 
Letter dated 20 March, 1938, A Diary With Letters, P-397- 
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Although the Society continued to do some useful work in trying 
to popularize the idea of an international police force and providing 
Churchill with a platform for his twin themes of Arms and the Covenant, 
politically it cannot be said to be significant. Only one attempt, 
and that in March 1938, following Eden's resignation, appears to have 
been made to get away from the study group cum international generalities 
image, and that resulted in complete discord. On 23 March the 
Parliamentary Committee of the New Commonwealth group met to 
endeavour to frame a policy to meet the situation. There were 
however, wide differences of opinion and a resolution which had been 
prepared was not put to the vote, so that the meeting broke up with- 
out anything agreed. 
1 As with other inter-party movements of the 
thirties, the New Commonwealth's membership was loosely connected 
and for the most part unwilling to commit itself too far to amount 
to much politically. 
A more important pre-League organisation than either the New 
Commonwealth Society or Arms and the Covenant was the League of Nations 
Union. The Union, as set out in its Royal Charter, existed to 
educate and organise public support for the League within the United 
Kingdom. It was a democratic organisation and was governed by a 
General Council, elected by members of the Union, and an Executive 
Committee elected from the Council. From tfie period of the 1935 
General Election to the outbreak of war a total of 17 supporters of 
the National Government occupied positions on the Executive Committee 
of the Union. They were Adams, Atholl, Cartland, Cazalet, 
2 
1 The Times, 23 March, 1938. 
2 MP Chippenham, 1924-43; travelled extensively in Europe, Africa, 
Middle, Near and F! ar East. 
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Austen Chamberlain, Viscount Cranborne, Crossley, Grigg, Gunston, 
Jack Hills, 2 Daniel Lipson, 
3 Loder, Nicolson, Gerald Palmer, Patrick, 
Sir John Power 
4 
and Spears. 
Thus thirty-six supporters of the National Government can be 
distinguished, by their participation in the League of Nations Union, 
the New Commonwealth Society and Arms and the Covenant, as firm 
advocates of the League of Nations-5 Doubtless there were others, 
but they did not make their views known by actively engaging in a 
pro-League organisation. An analysis of the 32 Unionists in their 
number revealed some interesting conclusions. Although their 
average age, 47 years 9 months, was close to the party's (a difference 
of 1 year 7 months), in education and occupation the figures showed 
a marked variance. There was a higher percentage of members attend- 
ing public school and university, and whereas the numbers under land 
and professions stayed roughly the same, those engaged in business 
slumped by almost 2(Yý, and armed forces and official services rose 
by virtually the same amount. Thirteen had majorities in excess of 
10,000, while 19, or 59.3%, occupied seats that could change hands 
at the result of a general election. Twelve of the latter had 
1 MP Thornbury, Gloucester 1924-45. 
2 MP Durham, 1906-22; Ripon, Yorkshire, 1925-38; Financial Secretary 
to the Treasury, 1922. 
3 Independent National, Cheltenham, 1937-50. 
4 
Founder Royal Institute of International Affairs and Treasurer, 
1920-43; MP Wimbledon, 1924-45- 
5 It should be remembered, however, that only two of their number 
voted against the raising of sanctions in June 1936. All the 
others, as an examination of the division list revealed, sided 
with the Government. 
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majorities of 4,000 or less, seats which were harily immune to a 
minor swing, and of these, five Guest, Gunston, Lipson, Macmillan and 
Spears were elected on a minority of the votes cast. It is possible, 
of course, that some members with slender majorities favoured the 
League, or were selected by their constituency partly because of their 
pro-League views, in order to appeal to the 'liberal' or floating 
vote at election time. 
For the most part there appears to be a link between support for 
the League and the more progressive brand of Unionism. Boothby, 
Macmillan, Sandys and Cartland belonged to the Conservative Members 
Special Areas Committee set up to press for Government action in the 
depressed areas. Two other organisations committed to securing 
action by Parliament to get the economy moving in the interests of 
the unemployed were the Next Five Years Group and the Council of 
Action for Peace and Reconstruction. Pro-League members of these 
organisations included Adams, Crossley, Entwistle, Hills and Joel. 
Furthermore, Austen Chamberlain, Grigg, Spears and Bernays, with 
Mabane and Morris-Jones of the non-unionists in the group, had all 
in the past been influenced by some form of liberalism. Similarly 
&=ys-Evans, Lipson and Power could be termed liberal or progressive 
in outlook. 
That is not to say that some of the pro-League Nationals were 
not drawn from the councils of the Tory Right Wing. Atholl, Churchill, 
Smiles and Wolmer had opposed the Government's proposals for the 
constitutional future of India. 
I Others, from the beginning of the 
Neither Wolmer nor Churchill fit neatly into the "true blue" pattern. Wolmer was in fact the Chairman of the Special Areas Committee where- 
as Churchill was one of its first members. Ronald Cartland, p. 82. 
1 
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Spanish Civil War, supported the cause of General Franco. Both 
Cazalet and Hannon made known their sympathies for the Spanish leader 
and his cause, while McFwen and Wolmer belonged to the Committee of 
the United Christian Front which "fought to prove 
... 
that General 
Franco was fighting the cause of Christianity against anti-Christ". 
1 
Of the remainder neither Locker-Lampson nor Moore-Brabazon could be 
referred to as progressive in their views. 
A number of those who were distinguished by their having joined 
or associated themselves at some time with one or other of the League- 
supporting organisations were to oppose the foreign policy of Neville 
Chamberlain and were to abstain either on the occasion of Eden's 
resignation or at the time of Munich. 
2 These were Cranborne, Gunston, 
Hills, Joel and Patrick. To their number, in opposition to Government 
policy, can be added those who, over a number of years, had held 
serious misgivings as to the character and methods of those governing 
Germany, and although a majority of this group were staunch supporters 
of the League of Nations, other, such as Amery and Keyes, dismissed 
the security provisions. 
3 The latter when invited to attend a youth 
peace rally oreanised by the Portsmouth branch of the League of 
Nations Union, indicated his views of both League and Union in no 
uncertain terms: 
"The misguided efforts of the League of Nations 
Union are a menace to the security of the Empire and 
The Chairman of the Front, Captain AHM Ramsay, in a letter to 
the Free Press, February, 1939. 
2 Others including Cazalet, Entwistle and Yoore-Brabazon, drifted 
into the orthodox policy of appeasement. It was one thing believing 
in the potential of the League but another to push their differences 
with their leaders and front bench spokesmen too far. 
3 There was, of course, as names have indicated, a considerable 
amount of overlapping between those alarmed at what was afoot 
in Germany and those who might be described staunch supporters 
of the League of Nations. 
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world peace and unfair to the LeaCue of Nations. It is 
deplorable that the youth of Britain sftould be misled into 
imagining that the rolicy of the Union can contribute anything 
towards the preservation of pcace. 11 
1 
The views of Keyes, when contrasted with those of Churchill or 
Adams, reveal somethinT that is often overlooked, that within the 
small numbers of members who criticised the Government's foreign policy 
there existed very important differences of view. 
2 
', ýbile expressing 
serious disagreement with the Government's course the dissidents 
nevertheless presented a picture of confusion, advocating irreconcilable 
points of policy. In such circumstances the most vigorous prosecution 
of an alternative line in foreign affairs, naturally dependent on 
the unity of the critics, was not possible and not even the crisis 
resulting in Munich rallied all the dissidents to a completely clear 
and firm policy towards Germany. 
Participation in Foreign Affairs Debates 
By recording the number of speeches bearing on international 
relations made by individual supporters of the National Government 
it is possible to gain some idea as to who displayed the Createst 
political activity in this field. From November, 1935 to September, 
1939 the following were the most active members, on the Government 
side of th2 House, with respect to international affairs: 
Daily Herald, 9 January, 1936. 
2 See Rock's comments on the Tory dissidents, Appeasement on Trial, 
P-15. 
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Number of Member Speeches 
Chamberlain, N 37 
Eden, A 35 (IO)l 
hurchill, W 19 
Cranborne, R 19 (3) 
Butler, RA 17 
Croft, HP 13 
Nicolson, H 12 
Southby, A 12 
Amery, L 11 
Simon, J 11 
Adams, V 10 
McEwen, J 10 
Atholl, K 9 
Boothby, R 9 
Wise, A 9 
Crossley, A 8 
Emrys-Evans, P 
James, A 
Raikes, V 7 
Chamberlain, A 6 
Sandys, D 6 
Spears, E 6 
Strauss, H 6 
Balfour, 11 5 
Lennox-Boyd, A 5 
Wardlaw-Milne, J 5 
The results show clearly the significance of the members who might 
be termed real-Icts with respect to Germany. In all, 11 of the 26 listed 
fall into this category. Of the others a further two, Eden and 
Cranborne, both shortly to resien office, were also to oppose Neville 
Chamberlain's policy of appeasement of Nazi Germany. Together they 
The figures in brackets are the speeches made by Eden and Cranborne 
in the period following their resignations. 
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accounted for 1-58 interventions out of -3 total 303. Tf one excludes 
the speeches made from the Government front bench, including those 
of Eden and I-ranborne during their period of office, the results 
are even more impressive, 117 out of 197- 
Taken as a body the 25 Unionists, that is excludin, - the National 
Labourite Nicolson, were over four years younger than their counter- 
parts. In education they were equally unrepresentative, for a higher 
percentage had attended public school and university. It is in 
occupation, however, where the most striking difference occurs: there 
was an overwhelming professional/armed forces and ufficial services 
slant to the Group. Eighty per cent fell into this cateZory, with 
a mere 121116 under commerce, as opposed to 40.9% of the Conservative 
Party at the time of the General Election. 
Arthur Ponsonby had remarked on Parliament before the war that: 
"Those Members who take any interest in foreign 
affairs will almost all be found to have lived abroad, to 
have travelled, or in some way to have been placed in close 
relations with particular foreign interests"', 
and the background of the members listed in the table certainly 
verifies this observation. Nine were connected with the Foreign 
Office, 5 in a ministerial capacity and 4 as diplomats, while 
AR Wise belonged to the Colonial Service and is known to have resided 
abroad for a number of years. Not only did the remainder possess the 
education, wealth and leisure essential to the cultivation of interest 
in foreign lands through travel or study, but there is evidence that 
many of them did just that. 
1 Democracy and Diplomacy, p. 50. 
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Labour 
Foreign Affairs 
-a Minority IEterest 
From its inception there existed within the lAbour Party a sense 
of detachment from world affairs - that what happened abroad was of 
little importance, and home policy could be framed as if Britain 
lived in a world of her own. This attitude was due to the community 
of purpose upon which the party rested, which was directed towards 
an alteration, not of the international situation, but of the 
domestic environment, attaining thereby a greater measure of 
social security and justice for the working man. M Phillips Price 
wrote: 
"It all goes back to the fact that the Labour movement 
as a whole was born in the middle of the prosperous mid 
and late Victorian times, when the problem was to secure 
for the working classes some share of the prosperity 
-- 
9- The background of the Labour movement was not such as 
to make foreign affairs a first class issue, as the 
struggle for better wages, shorter hours and improved 
conditions at home were. " 
1 
When the Parliamentary Party was organised in 1906, shortly after 
the election that brought 29 Members into the House, it became evident 
that the representatives reflected the movement's emphasis on domestic 
matters that bore directly on the conditions of life. There were a 
number of MPs who were well equipped to deal with particular issues 
such as coal mines, local governments unemployment assistance, health 
and so on. Such matters were bread and butter subjects to members who 
had derived from pit or factory via the trade union connection. By 
1 
Letter to the author, dated 25 February, 1969. 
I 
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contrast there were comparatively few whom the party could rely on 
to debate international policy 
- 
the average Labour member possessing 
neither the educationg wealth, nor leisure essential to the cultiva- 
tion of interest in foreign land through travel or study. 
It was not until the First World War, which brought home the 
relation between conditions abroad and welfare in Britain, that 
Labour began to take any practical interest in foreign affairs. 
Earliert of course, Labour had given lip service to international 
brotherhood, believing that foreign questions could be settled by 
arbitration and war could be averted by an international general 
strike of workers. Such views reflected the movement's vague 
aspirations for peacet justice and friendship of the working 
classes. 
Surprisingly a stream of recruits from the badly divided 
Liberals were attracted by just this 
- 
what they believed to be 
Labour's idealism in foreign affairs in contrast with the short- 
sighted diplomatic outlook of the Liberal-Conservative coalition. 
Lees-Smith, Liberal MP for Northampton, wrote in a newspaper, indict- 
ing the 'blind vindictiveness' of the Peace Terms imposed by Lloyd 
George and declared that Labour's attitude showed it to be "sensitive 
to the moral appeal" and "open to the impulse of the idealtt. 
1 
The Liberal recruits, important not in numbers but influence, 
talent and, in some casest wealthl came to be associated with the 
Labour Party through the Union of Democratic Control. This had been 
formed on the day after Britain's entry into the war from the remnants 
Article entitled "Why I have joined the Independent Labour Party", 
Labour Leader, 3 July, 1919- 
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of those that had opposed it. The founding members, Ttevelyant 
Angell, Morel, Ponsonby, and MacDonald, had been shocked by the 
revelation of secret commitments that had previously been denied 
and were anxious to ensure that the diplomatic blunders which had, 
in their opinion, caused the war should never be made again. Their 
twin demands throughout the war were for an ending of the conflict 
by negotiation, to be followed by the establishment of open diplomacy. 
Attracted by these views were a number of Liberal internationalists, 
who until the war had found themselves at home in the Liberal Party, 
and members of the Independent Labour Party, the main anti-war 
organisation in Britain. These Union contacts, once established, were 
instrumental in making possible the eventual association of the 
small band of Liberals with the Labour movement. 
By the end of the war the Liberal dissenters were thoroughly 
disgusted with the Liberal Party, one section of which had fully 
supported, while the other had done nothing to oppose the war. Unable 
to carry on effective political work independently the group joined 
the Labour Party, which by now adhered to the foreign policy ideas 
developed by the Union. 1 The socialism they came to profess was 
t1defined in terms of internationalism, open diplomacy and the 
democratic control of foreign affairs, coupled with a deep interest 
in social reform". 
2 
The Labour Party, despite some misgivings here and there, welcomed 
the adhesion of men who had established their reputations, through 
constant speaking or writing, in what was still the relatively obscure 
1 See M Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics 
during the First World War, p. 199. 
2 Miliband, Parliamentary Socialism, p. 46. 
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field of foreign affairs. Recognised as leading authorities on 
international questions, it was inevitable that such a group would 
intensify the movement's interest in, and knowledge of foreign 
relations, as well as play a large part in the formulation of future 
policy. In effect they furnished information, offered advice, aided 
in the preparation of literature and took a leading role in the foreign 
affairs debatesq thus raising the prestige of the Labour Party both 
in Parliament and the country. One historian has written that the 
influence of these members on the Labour movement "in the early post- 
war years would be difficult to exaggeratelf. 
1 
It is interesting to note that the attitude of the Liberal 
recruits towards their Labour colleagues appeared to be conditioned 
by a conviction of their own superiority. An outburst in this vein 
appears in a letter from Morel to Count Max Montgelas, the revisionist 
historian: 
"I can well understand your irritation with British 
Labour. But I have much more cause to be irritated with it 
than you have 
... 
It has never contained among its leaders 
intellectuals of even second-rate or third-rate type 
... 
It has been with, as I say, the exception of the small Socialist 
I. L. P. movement within it, a purely Trade Union manual 
labourers' movement, seeking one thing and one thing alone 
increased wages and betterment of industrial conditions. And 
the only influence since the war broke out which is 
"intellectualising" 
- 
in the international sense 
- 
this 
vast mass of ignorance is the influence welded by our 
small group 
... 
We are educating it daily, and have been 
.. 
But even so, we are only touching the fringe. That 
1 
HR Winkler, "Labour Foreign Policy in Great Britain, 1918-2911, 
Journal of Modern History, 1956, p. 249. 
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fringe, of course, leavens gradually the mass. But you 
have no conception of the enormous difficulties we have to 
face. "' 
The post-war years accordingly witnessed a developing Labour 
foreign policy. It included restoration and reconciliation in 
Europe, a peace policy based upon the democratic control of foreign 
policy, agreed disarmament, and the use of the conciliation machinery 
of the League of Nations. Nevertheless the emergence of a foreign 
policy and the existence of alert and distinguished parliamentarians 
interested in foreign affairs did not prevent its opponents accusing 
the party, prior to its taking office in 1924, of being solely 
interested in wages and employment, and with being lamentably 
incapable of conducting foreign affairs as a government. 
Ten years later, following two Labour Governments and their 
conduct of international relations, the Tory Member for Duddlestone, 
Oliver Si=onds, could still chide the party of being ignorant of 
conditions and feelings in Europe: 
"I sometimes wonder when I listen to speeches of 
right honourable and honourable Gentlemen opposite whether 
they have ever taken the trouble to familiarise themselves 
with conditions and feelings on the continent of Europe. 
How many honourable Gentlemen opposite have been in Europe 
during the last three months or even during the last year? 
Some, I dare says who speak volubly on the European situation 
have not been outside these islands at all. That is a 
matter of regret and it would be an excellent thing if all 
honourable Members in this House were obliged to spend a 
Dated 24 May, 1921. Found in the ED Morel Papers but quoted 
in Winkler, p. 249. 
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certain number of months each year abroad, and then there 
might be better international understanding and less chance 
of war. tt 
1 
The following speaker, the Reverend GS Woods, described it as 
"absurd to think that because we sit on the Labour Benches we are not 
as interested in the world and international affairs as are honourable 
Members opposite". 
2 The fact remained, however, that the international 
scene, of such overwhelming importance in these years, remained remote 
to the average Labour Member. The examples of two Labour MPs are 
revealing. TM Sexton, the Member for the Barnard Castle Division 
of Durham, announced on the occasion of Eden's resignation that it 
was with a "certain amount of diffidence that I intervene in this 
Debate. My main concern since I became a Member of this House has 
been for domestic affairs, and foreign affairs have seemed to be 
far away from most of the topics on which I have spoken in the House. 
My time has been spent very largely in looking after the Special 
Areas 
... 
I am principally what might be called a homer-113 Aneurin 
Bevan, too, had "only rarely in the House of Commons 
... 
strayed 
beyond the frontiers of his main domes tic argument". 
4 
In fact Bevan's 
official biographer had to establish his general approach to the 
foreign scene from speeches made outside the House and his political 
upbringingl Small wonder James Griffiths, then Labour MP for 
Llanelly, recorded that while the Labour benches of later years were 
1 House of Commons Debates, 17 March, 1936, Col-382. 
2 Ibid, Col-387- 
3 Ibid, 22 February, 1938, Col. 292. 
4M 
Foot, Aneurin Bevan, p. 207- 
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richer in academic talent those of the thirties were "richer in 
the character moulded in life's struggles". 
1 
This detachment from foreign affairs, and defence for that 
matter, cannot be over-emphasised. The party had come into being in 
response to a desire for a greater measure of social security and 
justice for working men and this continued to be its chief concern. 
Ten months before Munich the political correspondent of The Times 
wrote: 
"Some of the backbench Labour MPs and particularly 
those who represent trade unions are being forced to the 
conclusion that their supporters are growing weary of 
incessant debates on foreign affairs in the Commons to 
the apparent exclusion of domestic matters, such as the 
rise in the price of living, in which they are more 
directly interested. One Labour MP declared last night 
his constituents were far more interested in the cost of 
living than the struggle in the Far East. He expressed an 
opinion which is widely held, and which may be echoed in 
the policy of the parliamentary party. " 
2 
As foreign affairs was a minority interest in IAbour 
- 
on a 
scale far greater than that of the other major parties 
- 
an attempt 
has been made to discover which members made up that minority and why 
they, as opposed to the bulk of the partyt were concerned with the 
international scene. To this end the same process used for the 
supporters of the National Government has been applied to the Labour 
Party. From November 1935 to September 1939 the following were 
Pages From Memory, p. 54. Griffiths himself as an MP for three 
years before he "ventured" to speak on foreign affairs, ibid, p. 6.5. 
The Times, 9 November, 1937, 
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Labour's most active members with respect to foreign policy debates: 
Member Number of Speeches 
Attlee C 29 
Henderson, A 27 
Noel-Baker, P 21 
Wedgwood, J 17 
Fletcher, R 16 
Dalton, H 14 
Bellenger, F 14 
Greenwood, A 13 
Wilkinson, E 12 
Grenfell, D 11 
Cocks, S 10 
Alexander, A 9 
Lansbury, G 9 
Price, M 7 
Cripps, S 7 
Ede, J 7 
Morrison, H 6 
Benn, W 5 
Lees-Smith, H 5 
Pethick-Lawrence, F 5 
Riley, B 5 
A number of the above may be said to have sprung from humble, 
working class origins. Some of these had had to fight against every 
economic and social obstacle to gain their later position. Grenfell, 
for instance, started work in the mines after leaving school at 
eleven years of age. On the other hand, Sir Stafford Cripps was 
the son of a peer, Wedgwood Benn the son of a baronet, and Wedgwood 
descended from a long line of makers of famous pottery. 
A detailed analysis of the twenty-onel each intervening an five or 
more occasions, revealed that while the average age, 53 years 3 months, 
was close to that of the partyq in education and occupation they were 
totally unrepresentative. This is borne out by the following table: 
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Education: 
Elementary only 
Public School 
University 
Parliamentary Labour 21 Party 
53-5 23.8 
9.1 42.9 
18.2 57.1 
Occupation: 
Trade Unionists 
Professions, Services, 
Commerce, Land 
59-1 14-3 
28.6 71.4 
The general impression gained is that the parliamentary party's effective 
leadership in foreign affairs possessed, that is in the majority of 
cases, a good education and a non-manual occupation. In short, the 
prerequisite for a Labour member's consistent intervention in foreign 
affairs'debates appears to be membership of what is loosely termed 
the "middle class"s 
In terms of parliamentary distinction they were a significant 
grouping. Excluding Attlee, sixteen had risen or were to rise to 
ministerial rank, and several, including Dalton, Alexander, Cripps, 
Ede, Morrison and Noel-Baker, were to occupy the major officer., of 
state. A further two became Parliamentary Private Secretaries, while 
only two were to remain on the back-benches for the duration of their 
parliamentary careers. 
Cocksq Lees-Smith, Pethick-Lawrence and Wedgwood had belonged 
to the Union of Democratic Control, and their interest in the foreign 
scene can be traced back to Britain's entry into the Great War. 
Connected with this is the fact that Cocks, Lees-Smith, Price, Wedgwoodq 
Wedgwood Benn and Fletcher were converts from the Liberal Party. In 
all Benn, Fletchers Lees-Smith and Wedgwood had sat as Liberal Mps, 
while Price had contested an election in the Liberal Party's interest. 
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Three others had links with Labour's last foreign secretary, 
Arthus Henderson: Dalton, Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign 
Office, 1929-31; Noel-Bakerl Hendersonts Parliamentary Private 
Secretary and personal assistant thereafter at the Disarmament 
Conference; Arthur Henderson, son of the foreign minister, who, 
judging by the number of speeches made, closely followed his 
father's interest in international affairs. In addition, Dalton, 
Noel-Baker, Attlee, Cocks and Greenwood were all members, throughout 
the thirties of the Labour Party's Advisory Committee on International 
Questions, set up in 1918 in order to keep the party well informed 
on foreign matters. 
The characteristic most common to them all was foreign travel, 
either in a private or official capacity. Attlee, Cocks, Grenfell, 
Noel-Baker and Wilkinson are all recorded as visiting Spain during 
the course of the civil war to study the situation there. 
1 Grenfell, 
Riley, Daltoa and Pethick-Lawrence toured the Soviet Uaionq forming 
part of a small party invited by the New Fabian Research Bureau to 
carry out a general investigation into conditions in that country. 
2 
Those known to have travelled extensively on the Continent included 
Attlee, Daltong Grenfell, Pethick-Lawrence, Riley, Wilkinson, 
Alexander, Cripps, Lansbury, Lees-Smith, Morrisont Noel-Baker, 
Wedgwood and Price. The latter complained bitterly of the insularity 
of the parliamentary party which "naturally did not appeal to me who 
had seen quite a bit of the world by the time I was thirty-fivell. 
3 
Information derived from Republican literature circulated in Great 
Britain. 
2 Visit recorded in E Dodd's David Quibell (lAbour MP Brigg, 1929-45). 
P. 101. 
3 Price, My Three Revolutionsl p. 255- 
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Some of their number had been delegates to international labour 
and socialist conferences or to gatherings of foreign labour and 
socialist organisations. In fact Attlee and Dalton, successive front- 
bench spokesmen on foreign affairs, and Greenwood and Morrisonj 
frequently attended conferences in the European capitals. "Before 
the war", Attlee recorded, "I had little or no contact with foreign 
socialists except for hearing prominent leaders speak at meetings and 
conferences, but now I began to take part in international gatherings. 
In May, 1932,1 attended a conference at Zurich 
... 
Thenceforward 
I visited the Continent once or twice every year. " 
1 At such 
international conferences they met the chiefs of the continental 
parties, many of whom in the 1930s were in positions of power. 
Travel theng including attendance at conferences, was a 
factor of large importance in determining their pre-occupation, as 
indicated by the number of their speeches, with international questions. 
Labour's travellers would return from an excursion to Spain, a meeting 
in Eastern Europe, or wherever else it might be, and speak with an 
interest, an intimate knowledge and an air of authority that those 
who stayed at home could never claim. In fact what they said was 
accepted within the parliamentary party as authoritative. "The IAbour 
MP11, wrote WP Maddox, "who travelled abroad to attend international 
or foreign conferences, or who accompanied an investigative commission 
to a foreign country, or who had journeyed widely in a private capacity, 
found that his utterances on foreign affairs had greater weight because 
of the reputation of his wider experience and more intimate knowledge 
of international conditions". 
2 In practice this meant that the Party, 
1 Attlee, As it Happened, p. 89. 
2 Foreign Relations in British labour Politicsq p. 74. 
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on a scale greater than that of its rivals, followed the lead of a 
relatively few individual Labour MPs, who were in fact the custodians 
of the party's foreign policy. 
Abyssinia and the League of Nations 
Almost prophetically, Labour 
- 
particularly it8 Left 
- 
at the 
election of 1935, had maintained that the Government would not stand 
by its newly-proclaimed obligations to the League. A month later 
came the discreditable Hoare-Laval agreement, which allotted almost 
half of Abyssinia to Italy, together with special rights in the 
remainder. The agreement was negotiated by Hoare in Paris, and, never 
likely to be acceptable to the League or the emperor, was leaked to 
the presag to the discomforture of a Government which had not been fully 
consulted by the Foreign Secretary. Immediately Labour vehemently 
condemned what it felt to be the desertion of Abyssinia and the 
flouting of the League, and on 19 December the party brought in a 
motion of censure that "the terms put forward by His Majesty's 
Government as a basis for an Italo-Abyssiniaa settlement reward the 
declared aggressor at the expense of the victiml destroy collective 
security, and conflict with the expressed will of the country and 
with the Covenant of the League of Nations, to the support of which 
the honour of Great Britain is pledged; this House, therefore, demands 
that these terms be immediately repudiated" and gave the Government 
a very bad day. 
1 Baldwin, noting the country's strong reaction, 
assured the Commons that the proposals were obviously dead. 
2 
His 
Government were going to make no attempt to revive them. In view 
1 House of Commons Debates, 19 December, 1935, Col. 2013. 
2 Part of the credit for stirring the country against the proposals 
belongs to the Parliamentary Labour Party, whose leaders campaigned 
the country drawing attention to the principles involved. 
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of this assurances the House of Commons defeated Labour's motion$ 
397 votes to 165- 
An analysis of the Division Lists reveals that 141 Labour MPs 
voted, plus two tellers. Eleven MPs are unaccounted for: Brown, Grenfell, 
Hayday, John, Johnston, Lansbury, MK Macmillan, Parker, Pritt, 
Shinwell and D Williams. The elevens however, represented all shades 
of opinion within the party, not solely a Left or a pacifist viewpoint. 
The parliamentary party had united to denounce the Government's 
about-turn in its Abyssinian policy, but it cannot be said that it 
was agreed on an alternative policy. 
Thereafter the party urged the intensification of sanctions, 
with specific mention of oil, iron and steel, without which Italy 
would not have carried on the war. The will, however, was lacking, 
primarily an the part of a deliberately obstructive France - something 
seemingly ignored by Labour, which attributed the malaise almost solely 
to the Government 
- 
and Eden, backed by a Government now in favour 
of an intensification made little headway at Geneva. Time was now 
running out and the Abyssinian cause all but lost; the Ethiopian Army 
was crumbling in the face of bombardment and continued subjection to 
poison gas. At the beginning of May Haile Selassie fled to Jerusalem, 
declaring the war at an end, and within three days Italian troops 
occupied Addis Ababa. 
On the 6 May the House met to discuss Supply for the Foreign 
Office and Dalton used the occasion to charge the Government with 
having discredited the League of Nations and the whole idea of 
collective security, and "we charge them with having betrayed the 
trust of millions of electors who were foolish enough to vote for 
them at the last Election in the belief that they were going 
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effectively to support a League of Nations policy". 
1 At the same time 
the National Council of Labour met to object to Italy's conquest; 
sanctions should still be intensified, it urged, and the League 
vindicated. But the Government thought otherwise, mindful of the 
fact that Abyssinia was lost to the League, and hopeful of preventing 
Mussolini 
- 
with whom they felt there was still a risk of war - from 
moving closer to Hitler, with all the danger that that implied for 
the peace of Europe. Thus on 18 June Eden announced that as 
Britain had taken the lead in pressing for sanctions she should take 
the lead in bringing them to an end. 
In response Labour leaders bitterly attacked the Government at 
public meetings up and down the country, and a great protest meeting 
was held at Hyde Park the following Sunday. At Westminster the 
party angrily tabled a motion of censure, which was couched in the 
following terms: 
"His Majesty's Government, by their lack of a resolute 
and straightforward foreign policy, have lowered the prestige 
of the country, weakened the League of Nations, imperilled 
peace, and thereby forfeited the confidence of the House. " 
In amidst the spirited attacks on the irresolution of the Government 
there were fresh demands for the intensification of sanctions or, 
at the very least, the maintenance of existing ones. Behind the 
agitation lay the recognition that the failure to prevent the Italian 
conquest of another League member was a cruel blow to the League and 
to Labour's foreign policy which was based upon it. 
Naylor has argued that failure over Abyssinia "lay not in the 
irresolution of the British Government in 1936 but in their proclaimed 
1 House of Co=ons Debates, 6 May, 1936, Col. 1032. 
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resolution of 1935 that they would not use force in settling the 
disputelt. This is a strange comment to make as he maintains elsewhere 
that the French, not the British Government, must bear the main 
individual responsibility for the failure of collective security, 
while earlier he concluded that Britain "had to reap the harvest of 
her irresolution't. 1 And he continues that t1at the time of that 
declaration (not to use force), with which Labour sympathised, 
neither government nor opposition had foreseen that non-military 
sanctions, imperfectly applied, would not deter an aggressor". This 
is another puzzling comment in that 
- 
as he himself maintains 
- 
Labour 
had stood full square behind effective economic sanctions, including 
that of the vital commodity, oil, as the means of deterring Mussolini. 
Moreover, the whole basis of Labour's case against the Government, 
throughout the dispute, was that the imperfectly applied sanctions 
were not deterring Italy. Naylor is correct, however, in his 
assessment of Labour's position as regards military sanctions, for 
as we have seen, the party's majority view inclined to the belief 
that economic sanctions would be sufficient to force Italy into line. 
One question remains to be tackled 
- 
would Labour, given office, 
have prevented the conquest of Abyssinia and vindicated the League, 
the very things they now accused the Government of failing to do? 
Labour, of course, would not have been as irresolute as the Government, 
and there would have been no wavering in the form of the Hoare-Laval 
Pact. It is also likely that Labour would urgently have pressed for 
the intensification of sanctions, but the party would have had to 
deal with the same unyielding opposition of the French which so 
1 Naylor, Labour's International Policy, PP-137 and 127- 
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frustrated Eden's attempts. 
1 It is probable that lAbour might well 
have been forced to act unilaterally in the application of the crucial 
oil sanction and in the possible closing of the Suez Canal to Italian 
shipping. Yet whether such moves would have deterred or frustrated 
Italy's dictator it is impossible to say, but certainly IAbour 
continued to recommend them to the end. 
The Abyssinian episode was to affect IAbourls outlook on foreign 
affairs, until war broke out in 1939. Labour was thereafter thoroughly 
convinced that, in the General Election of 1935, the Government had 
used the collective security theme as just one more electoral trick. 
Consequently much of the party lost what little confidence it had 
in the Government's word and more than ever it stood exposed in 
Labour's eyes ! as caring little for morality in international affairs. 
Nowhere was this more true than on Labour's Left, where the conclusion 
was drawn that imperialism dictated the Government's course in foreign 
affairs. t1I do not know how better you can describe the proposals 
which were made to Italy and Abyssinia than as an imperialist deal", 
announced Cripps, "the very thing which ministers were disclaiming 
so vociferously for the purposes of the Election and immediately 
before it. " 
2 
Furthermore, the distrust engendered by the Government's 
Abyssinian policy did nothing to ease the ambiguity of Labour's 
defence and foreign policies. The party could not easily cross over 
to rearmament on any termsv and it was hardest of all when support 
According to DC Watt, "The Secret Laval-Mussolini Agreement of 
1935 on Ethiopia", The Middle East Journal, 1961, France gave a 
free hand for Italy in Abyss'iniat in return for close Italian co- 
operation in military affairs with France against Germany. 
House of Commons Debates, 19 December, 1935, Col. 2o67. 
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for the rearmament meant arming a Government which had shown its 
lack of faith in the League and which, it was argued, could by no 
means be trusted not to turn the arms it was asking for against, 
say, a colony instead of Italy. AL Rowse summed up this feelingg 
present in all sections of the party, over rearmament: 
"After that (Abyssinia) coming after the experiences of 
1931 and 1924 no Labour man would take anything from a 
Tory 
... 
I well knew the atmosphere of complete and 
justified distrust. I thoroughly understood it and shared 
it 
... 
The tragedy of all this was that after 1935 no 
Labour man would, accept anything that came from the 
Tories 
- 
even when they were right. And this is where 
I criticise the Labour Party. In spite of everything, when 
danger threatened, we ought to have pocketed our humiliation, 
our pride, our distrust, everything for the sake of the 
country and all that depended upon it.? ' 
1 
Labour's other dissident grouping, the pacifists, were also 
fortified in the views they held at Brighton. Not only had nothing 
been done to restrain Mussolini, so that the League was a broken 
- 
reed, but one of the last independent states left in Africa had been 
brutally enslaved. Nor was the danger over. The continuance of 
sanctions, the pacifists felt, would lead to war and such a war would 
extend to Germany, all Europe, the world. Their alternative 
- 
as we 
have seen 
- 
was to take action which would remove the reason for Italy's 
aggression and for all similar imperialist aggression. The nations 
of the world should agree to pool the earth's economic resources and 
1 Rowse, End Of An Era, p. 12. 
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then there would be no need for any nation to seek new territories 
and the raw materials which they could provide. Successive aggressions 
up to the outbreak of war and beyond, witnessed Labour's pacifists 
consistently advocating this panacea for the world's ills 
- 
the 
international conference. 
In spite of the Left and pacifist inclined members being confirmed 
in their suspicion of a League approach many Labourites clung 
persistently to their ideal, the whole emphasis of their defence 
and foreign policies remaining on a pure League system. In effect 
they shied away from the question, what was to be done now that the 
League had been decisively weakened. Thus Morgan Jones, the Member 
for Caerphilly, informed the Commons in July 1936: 
"I have never been able to feel sure that the Government 
mean the same thing as we do when they use the phrase 
'collective security'. My conception of collective security 
is that if any member of the League is attacked by another 
member of the League or any aggressor, all the'others 
pledge themselves, within their power and according to their 
ability, to make a collective effort to safeguard the 
aggrieved member of the League. t" 
Similarly Arthur Henderson expressed concern lest anything was 
done "to take away the universal conception of the League". 
2 
Small wonder that Labour's League idealists have had a bad press. 
Samuel Davis has written of them as "soaring above reality", clinging 
to the League long after it had ceased to be an active political force. 
1 House of Commons Debates, 27 JulY, 1936, Cols. 1200-1. 
2 Jbids 31 JulY, 1936, col. 1914. 
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His heroes are Dalton and more particularly the trade unionists, Bevin 
and Citrine: 
ItThey underwrote Labour's support of the League of 
Nations in 1934, and then in 1936 when it had ceased to be 
practical, they wrenched the party away from its adherence 
to the doctrine. " 1 
Similarly AL Rowse, who was then a Labour Parliamentary Candidate, 
not only described Noel-Baker as going on "with his mind in the 
cloud of 1929-3111, but the "League fanatical' generally, "the hopeless 
doctrinaires, illusionists, chronic unrealists", as being "the 
despair of the party". 
2 
Not all of Labour's League of Nations supporters, howeverl were 
quite as unrealistic as has sometimes been imagined. A number of 
them ceased to cling to the League ideal but trimmed their sails 
in the wake of the Abyssinian spisode, and began to modify their 
idealism and think of a more limited form of collective security. 
The attitude of two of Labour's leaders, Pethick-Lawrence and 
Morrison reflected the changing attitude in the party. The former 
informed the House: 
"Let us be clear. I- and I believe my party as a 
whole 
- 
do not suggest that this country should fill the 
role of a peripatetic Don Quixote, and interfere wherever 
some trouble exists, or wherever we think it exists, in 
every part of the civilised world. There is, of course, 
a certain amount of truth in the right honourable Gentlemanes 
1 British Labour and British Foreign Policy, 1933-9, p. 8. 
2 
'The Present and I=ediate Future of the Labour Party', Political 
Quarterly 1938. 
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statement (Eden) that every nation will not fight for 
each nation. Each case has to be considered on its 
merits, and we have to know how far each country can take 
action, and what that action ought to be. " 
I 
In 1937 Morrison contributed an article to a book entitled 
The League and the Future of the Collective System. In this were 
clearly set out the lines on which he would build up the collective 
system, which he recognised as no longer existing, except on paper: 
"The Covenant was framed to meet the needs of a 
universal League of lightly armed democracies 
... 
Instead 
we have today a half League struggling along in the midst 
of a tremendous arms race and in more or less open conflict 
with heavily armed nationalist dictatorships 
... 
In 
such a world the existing Covenant is clearly inadequate 
and indeed partly inapplicable. " 
2 
To remedy this situation Morrison advocated a world conference 
in which security, disarmament, economic and colonial issues would 
be included on the agenda. This was, of course, long established 
Labour policy, but Morrison differed from the party in his view 
of what should be done once the conference was in session. He was 
of the opinion that an all-European treaty should be proposed$ in 
which the contracting parties would record their interpretation of 
their collective system obligations as regards non-aggression, 
arbitration, and mutual assistance against aggression. Those states 
House of Commons Debates, 27 July, 1936, Col-1161. It is necessary 
to add that for the League stalwarts, such as Noel-Baker, anything 
that smacked of regional pacts marked a return to the old alliance 
systems. 
The League and the Future of the Collective System$ p. 16. 
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signing the treaty "should renounce war completely as between 
themselves and give effect to that offer by instructions to their 
Naval, Air, and War Ministries to scrap all plans providing for 
the contingency of defence against each other and to concert plans 
for joint defence against attack from outside and joint upholding 
of the provisions of the Covenant and the All-European Treaty in 
so far as their collective geographical situation and military 
strength allowed". 
1 Such a group would rapidly regain the 
initiative in international affairs which has been "captured by the 
nationalist dictatorships". 
Clearly Morrison did not expect Germany and Italy to co-operate. 
While on the one hand the 'peace-and-pooled-defence-group of States' 
was in the process of formation, the nationalist dictatorships, on 
the other hand, would be pressed to accept the obligations of the 
collective system and reduce and limit their armaments, in exchange 
for economic advantages and complete security. If they refused the 
peace offensive would be continued until war was made too dangerous 
for any would-be aggressor. 
Morrison's scheme is important in that it goes some way towards 
I dispelling the myth that Labour's League wing was completely out of 
touch with reality. It is true that the plan had serious weaknesses. 
Morrison had given no real thought to the difficulties involved in 
securing the co-operation of 'peaceful' nations, however much they 
had in common. Neither was any attention paid to rearmamentl the 
word not figuring at all in the article. Morrison had simply 
reckoned up the forces of good and evil and decided that those of 
1 The League and the Future of the Collective System, p. 22. 
302- 
the former were sufficiently superior. Yet faults included the 
scheme was "based on the principles of the collective system and 
not on the absence of principles, of international anarchy and 
power politics". 
1 
There were a handful of Labourites, however, who adopted an 
even more questioning attitude to the League's future. The most 
important of these, Dalton, had supported the League of Nations 
approach as a practical means of maintaining peace, but he never 
became a blind adherent of the League theme. Having swung, his 
weight in favour of the League at Brighton and watched it in action 
he believed that whatever the reason or blame, collective security 
had ceased to be practical in the form advocated by the Labour Party. 
One of the leading League enthusiasts, however, has described 
Dalton and others sharing his views as "self-styled realists who 
were prepared to rat on the League over Abyssinia and who wanted 
rearmament before the hope of defeating Mussolini and securing 
disarmament was dead. These were a small minority. The most 
important was Dalton. 
---. 
under the pressure of public opinion, 
(he) spoke in favour of the League and against Mussolini, but he 
was never really sound on the League". 
2 It must be admitted that 
Dalton was never enthusiastic about the possibilities of League 
action; nations, he felt, would not run the risk of war unless their 
own vital interests were clearly involved. Convinced that this was 
borne out by the Abyssinian episode, Dalton began exploring ways of 
linking together those European countries whose interests coincided 
1 The League and the Future of the Collective System, p. 26. 
2 Private information. 
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in a practical, strictly limited form of collective security. 
In effect he came to believe, now that general agreement on 
defence against aggression was increasingly remote, that the only 
alternative was for Labour to support the Government in a measure of 
rearmament, which in association with countries like Russia and 
France, was capable of deterring aggression. Although Dalton was 
recommending little more than an armed alliance for collective 
security purposes, like Churchill he was careful 
- 
indeed he had to 
be, considering the current climate of opinion within the party 
- 
to couch his appeal in terms of revitalising the League "by inviting 
a sufficient number of States, possessing a sufficient preponderance 
of collective force over any possible peace breaker within a 
&ropean pact of mutual assistance". 
1 Increasingly, other membeisof 
the parliamentary party came to share his approach to collective 
security. Retrospectively the Labour Member for Llanelly, James 
Griffiths, paid tribute to their realism: 
"Even at the eleventh hour, like most of my colleagues, 
I clung to the hope that the League of Nations, fully supported 
by the democracies, could save the peace. There were othersq 
notably Hugh Dalton, who believed it was too late to rely 
on the League, and that we should concentrate our energies 
on rearming and building up an alliance with France and the 
Soviet Union. " 2 
During the course of 1937-38 this view became increasingly 
dominant as successive crises threatened the peace of Europe. Fellow 
1 From an article written by Dalton for the Daily Herald, 13 July, 1936. 
2 Pages From Memory, p. 66. 
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MPs came to accept that the only possibility of preventing war and 
establishing a secure peace depended on Britain, in association with 
France and Russia and any other country ready to share in their 
aspirations and dangers, forming themselves into some sort of 
combination and organising for the mutual defence against aggression. 
This then, in a nutshell, despite frequent protestations that this 
was in essence a League or collective security policy and was 
therefore consistent with past policy, was to be the basis Of 
Labour's stance in the two years prior to the outbreak of war. 
Growing alarm at developments in Germany 
With Hitler's conquest of power in Germany at the beginning 
of 1933, the threat which ever more insistently haunted Labour was 
the threat of Nazism. The rise of Hitler, which was accompanied 
by the destruction of the German trade union movement and of the 
most powerful Social Democratic and Communist Parties in Western 
Europe, jolted the Labour world. In Great Britain it was the trade 
unionists who were in the vanguard of the response to the Nazi danger. 
At the request of the General Council of the Trades Union Congress, 
Sir Walter Citrine, who on repeated visits to Berlin on matters 
connected with the International Federation of Trade Unions, had 
watched the Nazis rise, prepared a reports Dictatorship and the 
Trade Union Movement. It dealt with the suppression of the German 
Socialists and the trade unions, the confiscation of their property, 
the arrest of their leaders, and the abolition of collective bargaining 
and the right to strike. 
1 Similarly Joseph Compton, of the Vehicle 
Builders and Chairman of the Labour Executive, in a pamphlet issued 
1 Trades Union Congress Report, 1933, pp. 425-35- 
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in May, 19339 outlined fascist repression of public opinion, education, 
trade unionism and socialism. 
1 
By contrast, the political wing of the movement, represented 
by the parliamentary party did not move with the certainty of the 
trade union leaders. In part this stemmed from the fact that the 
politicians were not so personally allied to the German Social 
Democratic leaders as were the industrial leaders to their German 
counterparts. Also important 
- 
as was noted earlier 
- 
was the poor 
quality of the parliamentary opposition: only 46 official Labour 
Party candidates were returned at the election of 1931 and half of 
that number were miners' representatives; of former cabinet ministers 
only Lansbury held his seat. Consequently the party in the Parliament 
of 1931-35 was ill-equipped and inexperienced to deal with the foreign 
situation. 
2 
Yet most important of all in hampering an unequivocal response 
was Labour's difficulty in reconciling opposition to Nazi Germany 
with its traditional policy of redress of German grievances. Revision 
of the Versailles treaty had become a prime element in party policyg 
clearly set out by Labour leaders at the time of peacemaking. Arthur 
Henderson, in a speech at Blackpool in 1919, declared that the "Peace 
Treaty is not our treaty and we shall never accept it,,. 
3 The first 
business of a Labour Government, he argued, would be to scrap the 
settlement and attempt to meet the substantial German grievances. 
Joseph Compton, Down With Fascism, in the National Joint Council's 
Hitlerism, pp. 10-11. In 1935 Compton was elected Member for Gorton. 
2 Of the 21 noted in the 1935 Parliament for a close interest in the 
foreign situation onlY 7 (Attlee, Cocks, Cripp8, Greenwood, Grenfell, 
Lan8bury, Wedgwood) were present in the previous House. 
21 June, 1919. Quoted in 0 
. 
Hogg, The Left Were Not Right, P-31- 
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Both Labour Governments, however modestly, had acted on these 
convictions. 
Although the conduct of the Nazis was to convert the party from 
the chief advocates of reconciliation with Germany to its firmest 
opponents, for the majority of Labour Members it was to be a gradual 
process, not a sudden conversion. Convictions held firmly for so 
long could not suddenly be rooted out in January 1933. lAbour 
continued to be bedevilled by a strong sense of guilt about the 
Versailles Settlement and German grievances, and was naturally 
reluctant to play down the basic tenets of its international policy. 
This is probably what Thompson had in mind when he remarked that 
the "Opposition stood closer to the Administration's position than 
its apologists cared to admit later". 
1 To support his claim he 
quoted from a speech of Arthur Henderson, made in 1938, when he told 
the House: 
"There is no honourable Member on this side of the 
House who has any objection to the policy of general 
appeasement to which the Prime Minister referred. The 
sooner the nations of the world can come together in an 
attempt to deal with the political and economic problems 
which confront civilisation today the more likely we 
shall be to avoid the conflagration which appears to 
many people to be inevitable. " 
2 
Unfortunately Thompson has taken Henderson out of contextj for the 
son of IAbour's former Foreign Secretary, while acknowledging the 
desirability of general appeasement, fundamentally disagreed with 
1 The Anti-Appeasers, p. 40. 
2 House of Commons Debatesq 21 Februaryl 1938, col. 86. 
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the way the Government was endeavouring to practice that policy. 
Thus he condemned the Prime Minister for being "hesitating and 
weak", allowing himself to be dictated tog and going "unconditionally 
into negotiations with Italy". Clearly here was no bipartisanship 
over foreign policy for IAbour's appeasement was, using Henderson's 
words, "conditional" and in no sense "giving way to demands". 
Yet while the party continued 
- 
with increasingly less 
emphasis 
- 
to recognise the need for appeasement in Germanyts 
interest, it never pretended to be anything other than hostile to 
Nazism, and its hostility grew as evidence accumulated of what was 
taking place in Germany. Pethick-Lawrence's experience epitomises 
that of Parliamentary IAbour in the years following 1933: 
ttI was profoundly moved at the stories which reached 
me of what was taking place 
... 
I was at first inclined 
to discredit the reports from Germany- But as case after 
case became authenticated, a blaýk shadow began to creep 
across my consciousness which has never been lifted to the 
present day 
... 
I now learnt with horror that one of the 
great countries of Europe was going back century by century 
in civilisation, and that atrocities were being committed 
in cold blood on defenceless men and womenj which had had 
their counterpart only in the darkest days of human history. " 
It seemed just possible to Pethick-IAwrence that carefully 
worded protests in Britain, signed by persons of eminencel might 
have some influence on Hitler's actions in Germany. He accordingly 
gathered round him a number of distinguished men and women, drawn 
1 Pethick-Lawrence, Fate Has Been Kind, 'P*179- 
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from all parties, including Labourites Jagger, Lawsons Noel-Baker, 
Walkden and Wedgwood, the Conservative Adamas Liberal National 
Leckie, and Independents Harvey and Salter, in what was called the 
Dimitroff Committee. They took up individual cases in letters to 
the Press, and occasionally addressed polite remonstrances to Hitler 
himself, or to one of his principal subordinates. According to 
Pethick-Lawrence they did not achieve very much; but one or two of 
Hitler's victims were released after they had exposed the hollowness 
of the charges against them. In particular Dimitroff, the Bulgarian 
Communist, after his acquittal in the Reichstag fire trial, was 
allowed to leave the country. The Committee was later reconstituted 
so as to cover help of various kinds for the prisoners who were 
the victims of persecution in Germany and Austria, but once it became 
apparent that Hitler would go his own way without regard to what 
people thought in other lands it was wound up. 
1 
The memoirs of other Iabour Members reveal how deeply concerned 
they were at the turn of events in Germany, which carried with it a 
new menace to neighbouring countries. This is strongly borne out by 
the writings of David Quibell and Tom Johnston. 
2 The formerg together 
with Rhys Davies and Bea Riley, travelled to Budapest in the autumn 
of 1938. They went via Germany, and Quibell was so impressed by what 
he saw that he noted in his diary: 
It 
... 
alongside our train was the longest troop train 
I have ever seen. Men, horses, guns, motor equipment and 
almost every kind of armament one could think of, all of 
Fate Has Been Kind, p. 180. 
Quibell, born 1879; builder; MP Brigg, Lincolnshire, 1929-31 and 
1935-45- 
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which took our minds and memories back to the days of 
the 1914-18 war. " 
Johnston, in the autumn of 1936, journeyed with Major James Milner, 
the Member for South East Leeds, to the threatened city of Danzig 
in the Polish Corridor. There Johnston recalled buying a copy of 
De Sturmer, the Nazi propaganda paper, and being horrified by its 
anti-Jewish nature: 
"The line taken 
... 
was that at their ritual feasts 
the Jews suck the blood of Christian children, and Herr 
Streicher, one of Hitler's right-hand men, who edited the 
rag, declared the Jewish butchers made their sausages from 
rats. The anti-Semitic cartoons in the copy I got were 
savagely conceived and forcefully drawn. '# 
In the streets they noticed much "marching and counter marching and 
heil Hitlering, and there was a general apprehensive of a pogrom of 
some kind in the near future". 
2 
Surprisingly the threat of danger ahead and the horror and 
shock at Nazi methods did not reconcile the divergent elements within 
the Labour movement. On the contrary, it accentuated and deepened 
the existing divisions. Differences emerged over the supposed 
nature of Nazism, or more generally fascism, and why it had triumphed 
in Germany and Italy. The Right of the parliamentary party tended 
to treat fascism as a middle-class revolution which came to power 
under conditions of acute political and economic crisis, and partly 
in response to the threat of Left revolution. This last point was 
E Dodd, David Quibell, p. 105. 
Johnston, Memories, P-127- 
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underlined at the 1933 Conference by Morrisont speaking on behalf 
of the Executive: "The real point about the Manifesto" (Democracy 
and Dictatorship) t1is that we condemn dictatorship as sucht whether 
the dictatorship is a dictatorship of the Left or of the Right 
,. 
. 
we cannot hunt with the hounds and run with the hare 
.0. If we 
ourselves flirt with a dictatorship of the Left or with a dictatorship 
of our own, and if some of our people use the word 'dictatorship' in 
a sense that they ought not to 
--. 
we are preparing a political 
psychology which, if we justify one form of dictatorship, gives an 
equally moral justification for a dictatorship of the other side. "' 
Meanwhile the Left proposed an atternate interpretation of the 
phenomenon of fascism. Where the Right had viewed fascism in the 
larger context of the struggle between democracy and dictatorship, 
the Left, grounded to the concept of the class struggle, associated 
fascism with capitalism, its rise appearing as a staggeringly accurate 
fulfilment of Marxist prophecy. Indeed Marx had warned of the ruthless 
way the ruling class would rally to the defence of its privilegeal 
sweeping away in the process all liberal trappings in the hour of 
need. 
Furthermore, Marxist analysis, in that it treated fascism as 
the final throw of capitalism in decline, made it difficult for the 
Left to rise above domestic terms. The question which was uppermost 
in the minds of Left-oriented members was not how Germany could be 
thwarted but rather how soon the German pattern would be applied in 
Britain, and how it could best be resisted. Regarding the Government 
as the chief fascist danger the Left required the Labour movement to 
devote its whole strength to the defeat of its class enemies masquerading 
1 Labour Party Conference Report, 1933, p. 63- 
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under the title of "National GovernmentIt. Thus a resolution adopted 
by the Socialist League Conference in June# 1936, ran: 
"Some say: 'Sanctions against Hitler if he walks into 
Austria'; some say: 'War with Hitler if he attacks the 
Soviet Union', but all of them are agreed that fascist 
Germany is the most important enemy to peace and of the 
working class and must be checked at all costs, even at 
the cost of collaboration by the workers with the war 
machine of the National Government. Such collaboration 
would be a betrayal of the interests of the workers since 
the National Government is capitalist and, at root, fascist 
in tendency and action. " 
1 
It was only very gradually, and then largely through the impact the 
Spanish imbroglio, that the Left began to shift from its preoccupation 
with the domestic Itenemy" to the international. 
Reactions to the Rhineland Coup 
The restoration by the German Government of its full and 
unrestricted sovereignty in the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland 
was to be part and parcel of IAbour's growing uneasiness about the 
Nazis' intentions. This, however, was not apparent in March, 1936, 
following Hitler's pledge to "work now more than ever to further 
the cause of mutual understanding between the nations of Dirope". 
2 
His appeal was very nicely judged. Most members of the British public 
saw very little harm in his action, for it appeared he was merely 
1 The Socialist, July-August, 1936. 
2 
Bullock, A Study of Tyranny,, P-345. 
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taking full possession of a territory which was Germany's by right. 
The Labour Party shared this reaction and was caught as unprepared 
by the violation as were the French and British Governments. There 
was no response comparable to the anger aroused by Mussolini's 
attack on Abyssinia. Any coercive action against Germany, Dalton 
informed the Commons, was quite out of the question: 
"It is only right to say bluntly and frankly that 
public opinion in this country would not support, and 
certainly the Labour Party would not supportq the taking 
of military sanctions or even economic sanctions against 
Germany at this time, in order to put German troops out 
of the German Rhinelande" 
The Member for Bishop Auckland went on to draw a clear distinction 
between the attitude of Mussolini in resorting to aggressive war, 
and waging it beyond his frontiers, and the actions of Hitler 
which had taken place within the frontiers of the German Reich. 
Hitler's peace proposals were eagerly taken up. From all 
wings of the party came the call to negotiate on the basis of the 
Chancellor's address to the Reichstag on 7 March. Cripps, speaking 
at Bristol the same day, announced that "there is no reason why our 
own Government and the Government of France should not test the 
11 2 worth of the offer he is making 0 Lan8bury, in an open letter to 
the Mayor of Poplar, declared that "those who desire peace should 
urge the Government to take Herr Hitler at his word 
.-* 
Our Government 
should accept the challenge Hitler makes for agreement and support 
1 House of Commons Debates, 26 Yarch, 1936, Col. 1458. 
2 Daily Herald, 9 March, 1935. 
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the demand for a new peace conference". 
1 Greenwood was equally 
emphatic: "This opportunity clearly ought to be seized without a 
day's delay for a free and full discussion 
... 
with all the 
nations of the world, of the outstanding problems that have helped 
to create this tension, unrest and war 
... 
If this chance is lost 
it will be a fatal and disastrous thing for the human race"* 
2 
The latter, in fact, was to visit Germany two months later. 
Together with Johnston and Kennedy, Smith, one. of the whips, and four 
other Labour MPs he was shown the German compulsory Labour Corps 
and otherwise given what one observer has termed the"full treatment". 
3 
He did not see Hitler. A subsequent report from the German embassy 
in London purported to observe that Greenwood has ceased publicly to 
attack Germany since his visit. 
4 
Even if we accept this view as 
valid, Greenwood was to make up for this "aberration" in 1938, when 
he became one of the most outspoken critics of Hitler in the party. 
5 
The remarks of Cripps, Lansbury and Greenwood above show clearly 
that lAbour viewed Hitler's offer to negotiate as a chance to bring 
up to the surface the inequalities and grievancesq under which 
Germany, it seemed, still laboured. Reginald Fletcher's intervention 
in the Rhineland debate summed up this feeling: 
"If our object is to get Germany to enter into 
negotiations, I suggest that the first thing to do is to 
endeavour to remove all obstacles to negotiations. In 
making proposals$ do not use injudicious language* 
1 Daily Herald, 9 March, 1935- 
2 
House of Commons Debates, 10 March, 1936, Col. 1982. 
3DC Watt, Personalities and Policies, p. 130. 
4 
German Embassy Report, 12 September, 1936s quoted in Watt. 
5 See his attack on Hitler in the Daily Herald, 23 Man 1938. 
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Endeavour to set in motion machinery for revision of 
just grievances from which we know Germany is suffering 
.. 
aim at cutting away all the tangle of the old 
treaties in which those grievances are rooted 
... 
(make) 
new treaties and new agreements which would be entirely 
divorced and separate from the old treaties and the 
grievances implicit in them. " 
1 
Three years after Hitler's coming to power IAbour was still 
bedevilled by a strong sense of guilt concerning the Treaty of 
Versailles. In effect the party's belief that the international 
order could only be sound when it was based on justice had become a 
weakness. Too long Labourites listened to Germany's case for 
revision even after it became Hitler's excuse for destroying international 
law. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that the 
parliamentary party was completely taken in by Hitler. Though his 
proposals were welcomed they were received with an air of scepticism. 
The paradoxical situation in which IAbour found itself is well 
illustrated by a speech made by Attlee, in Dumbartonshire, exactly 
a week after the Rhineland coup: 
"No sympathy for the injustices inflicted on the 
German people by the Versailles Treaty should blind us to 
the true nature of the act of the German Government. It 
has shattered all confidence in the words of Fascist rulers 
*&- Are they (pacts) to be repudiated whenever it suits 
the convenience of the German GovernmentVI 
2 
However the effect of the above was somewhat tempered by his 
declaration that a "new effort should be made to rebuild the fabric 
1 House of Commons Debates, 26 March, 1936, Col. 1520. 
2 Daily Herald, 16 March, 1936. 
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of peace and international security", which necessitated trust in 
Germany's word. 
Perhaps the best explanation of Tabour's attitude is found in 
Fletcher's comments to the Commons: 
"I think it is because of this feeling that Germany 
has certain grievances of substance that our action is not 
very clear-cut in this crisis, because we have not got 
entirely clear-cut convictions. " 
Labour Members acutely conscious of the German threat 
A recent writer on the Labour Party has observed that during the 
crisis the "Labour leadership denounced Hitler's move and understood 
its significance". 
2 In fact the most that can be said of Attlee and 
much of the leadership is that they were sceptical, increasingly so 
after the Rhineland episode, as to German intentions. There were, 
however, a handful of Labour Members, as there were in the Conservative 
and Liberal Parties, who went further than this and who shared an 
outright disbelief in the protestations of wounded innocence that 
Germany's ruler offered the world. For these either the year 1933 
marked a watershed in their attitude to Germany, or the activities 
of the Nazis since that date had convinced them that no confidence 
could be placed in their word. Such members had reached alarming 
conclusions as to the intentions of the Hitler regime and of the 
necessity of fortifying peace against it. 
Dalton, whose realisation of the German danger was unequalled 
in the party leadership, was the foremost of this group. As front- 
bench spokesman on foreign affairs he aired his fears that Hitler 
1 House of Commons Debates, 26 March, Cola-1515-16. 
2CF Brand, The British Labour Party, P-197- 
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had been "playing during these past weeks" for a free hand in 
Eastern and Central Europe. It was important therefore that Britain 
should make it clear that so"far as we are concerned he has no 
free hand to attack either Poland, Czechoslovakiaq Austria or Soviet 
Russia through any convenient door which may be opened to him". 
1 
Behind the scenes Dalton had urged his colleagues on the Executive 
to take a dim view of Hitler's move. "Don't condone Hitler* It 
is a very serious shock to confidence". What with the end of 
reparationsq disarmament, and the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, 
talk of German grievances now had a hollow ring. "Meanwhile no 
military and probably economic sanctions can be justified or would 
be supported by public opinion or by Labour Party opinion in 
particular against Germany unless she has actually attacked anyone. 
We should, however, in view of the danger of the situation press 
for an All-European Pact of mutual assistance against aggression. " 
2 
Dalton, within a month of Hitler coming to power, had had first 
hand experience of nazism. A short while before he had accepted an 
invitation to give a series of lectures in the principal German 
cities$ speaking on international relationss the League of Nations 
and disarmament. "But in March, when Hitler came to full powers I 
called this off 
... 
I did not wish to claim privileges of free 
speech now denied to Germans". 
3 Nevertheless, Dalton did visit 
Germany for four daysl albeit reluctantly, and his impressions were 
most sinister. Private executions, he learned were still going on, 
and the wiping out of old grudges. In the concentration camps, just 
1 House of Co=ons Debates, 26 March, 1936, Cols. 1461-62. 
2 Dalton Papers, Diary, 12 March, 1936. 
3 The Fateful Years, PP-37,39-40. 
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opened, things were pretty bad. From another source he heard that 
people were kept awake all night by the screams of the Nazis' victims 
in their barracks. The victims were buried at night and the undertakers 
dared not mention names. When he left, Dalton wrote in his diary, 
"I woke in Holland with a sense of freedom. Germany is horrible. 
A European war must be counted now among the probabilities of the 
next ten years". 
1 
An insight into Dalton's early realisation of the potential 
danger from Nazi Germany has been given by two of his colleagues in 
the parliamentary party. "Dalton", one of them wrote, "was a German 
hater so his views must be taken with some reserve". The other, an 
even closer colleague and friendl one of the few people referred to 
by Christian name in Dalton's private papersl concurred with this 
judgement: "Dalton was a German-hater 
... 
He embraced the doctrines 
of Vansittartism before and during the war; he was sent by Vansittart 
to see Mussolini and he came back saying what a great man the duce 
was. 112 
There is some truth in the latter remark. Dalton did visit Italy, 
interviewing Mussolini in the Palazzo Venezia, when he had praised 
Itthe elan and energy" which he had found in the country. "I spoke, 
in particular, of the Public Works, the affore8tation, the draining 
of the Pontine Marshes, which I had just seen, and the building of 
new villages there". 
3 Such policies were absent in Britain, bewailed 
Dalton, not because traditions and political institutions were so 
1 The Fateful Years, p. 41. 
2 Private information. The Vansittart referred to was Sir Robert 
Vansittart, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 
193o-38, and Chief Diplomatic Adviser to the Foreign Secretary, 
1938-41. 
3 Dalton, The Fateful Yearsq P-34. 
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different, but "because we have too many old men in high places". 
Contrary to what his colleagues thought, 'Dalton's admiration for the 
Italian "spirit of adventure" an inconsistency paralleled by that 
of the Conservative dissidents did not blind him to the ýarker side 
of fascism. Yet Italian fascism, just because it was Italian "was 
much less intenseq more casual, and therefore less evil, than German 
Nazism. Nor could Italy, standing alone, ever be the grim threat 
that Germany soon would bell. 
1 
As to Dalton's alleged natural dislike of Germans there is 
evidence that gives slight credence to such a view. Vansittart, 
very much the "professional" anti-German, who on one occasion noted 
that he did not "hate all Germans, only the bloody-minded bulk", 
spoke highly of Dalton: 
"Hugh (Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, 1929-31) 
redeemed his little habit of breathing down our necks by 
an intuition of the German danger unusual in 1930.,, 
2 
Whereas AL Rowse recalled him as describing the Germans as a "race 
of carnivorous sheep", Dalton himself registered the opinion that it 
was the German way "to bully the weak and cringe to the strong", and 
that "many Germans, but very few Italians, were really mad. The 
Germans never knew when to stop,,. 
3 
Moreover, like Austen Chamberlain, at no time did Dalton view 
Nazism as a new phenomenon. The brutality and provocation which 
characterised the Hitler regimel the conscription, the massive 
rearmament, and the carefully nurtured war spiritj were to him but 
1 Dalton, The Fateful Years, p. 41. 
2 
Vansittart, The Mist Procession, p. 46. 
3 All Souls and Appeasement, P-52; The Fateful Years, p. 41. 
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a modern variation of Germany's past history replete with the same 
methods and the same goal of universal domination. This being so, 
Dalton argued, in 1940, the need for the moral re-education of 
Germans. ' Whereas Britain and France, both aggressors in their 
time, had outgrown the bad habit of aggression, the theory of the 
'master race', destined to dominate other slave races, was still being 
widely disseminated in Germany. "Some time would be needed". he 
wrote, "a testing period, to determine whether, after the moral 
darkness of the Nazi years, Germans, and especially young Germans, 
could regain their sight. " 
2 
Whatever the truth of the matter the fact remains that Dalton 
was acutely conscious of the threat emanating from Nazi Germany, and 
his view was held by others within the parliamentary party. They 
included Wedgwood, Hicks, Compton, Lathan and Price. Others sharing 
their apprehensions but not always so outspoken, or in some cases as 
clear-cut in conviction, were Clynes, Cocks, Fletcher, Haden-Guest, 
3 
Arthur Henderson, Joseph Henderson, Jagger, Lawson, Noel-Baker, 
Pethick-Lawrence, Walkden and Wilmot. 
4 
The latter group were 
distinguished by their belonging to the Dimitroff Committee, membership 
of Focus and support of the movement Arms and the Covenant. 
According to a colleague quoted above, Dalton's anti-German bias 
was to lead to unfortunate results in the British radio propaganda 
during the war. He "succeeded in keeping away from the microphone 
German Socialists and Trade Unionists who might have done an 
immensely effective job. Dalton also used to say that the 
socialist exiles in Britain would have no influence in their 
country after the war. In fact these exiles dominated the German 
Social Democratic Party for many years. " 
2 Dalton, Hitler's War 
- 
Before and Afterý pp. 144-47, 
3 Doctor who served in the Boer War and both World Wars; travelled 
extensively, 1919-37; MP Southwark North, 1923-27; Islington North, 
1937-50; Member of the Parliamentary Committee on Evacuation of 
the Civil Population. 
4 
MP9 East Fulham, 1933-35; Kennington, 1939-45, 
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It is interesting to note that several of the above members, 
including Clynes, Cocks, Compton, Dalton, Fletcher, Joseph Henderson, 
Lathan, Lawson, Price and Wedgwood, were influential in the party 
rearmament lobby, which had accomplished the policy switch in the 
summer of 1937. There is an obvious connection between those aware 
of the German threat and the armaments issue. It was in the very 
circles that favoured rearmament that there existed the greater 
appreciation of Nazism and its intentions. Once the German danger 
was recognised it became obvious that Britain required a more 
effective arms establishment, not only to protect herself, but to 
play an effective part in any scheme of collective defence. 
Wedgwoodl in his autobiography, noted that "there was no firmer 
friend of the German Republic in the House of Commons than the writer 
of these Memoirs". 
1 1933 was the turning-point. Already he saw 
clearly that there was no friendship to be had with the German dictator 
at any price. Within a short time he had established himself as the 
most frequent and outspoken critic of Hitler in the House, a 
distinction which had a "depressing effect on the sale of Wedgwood 
china in Germany". 
2 
Thenceforward he never lost an opportunity to 
point out in debate that the Middle Ages had returned to the Twentieth 
Century, and that while he did not wish to destroy Germany, it was, 
he felt the duty of all those who loved civilisation to put an end 
to the sort of spirit ruling in that country. He noted that great 
as the danger was in 1914, he believed it to be infinitely greater 
now, for while it would undoubtedly have been unpleasant to be under 
the Kaiser's heel, to be under "this awful Frankenstein in Germany", 
1 Wedgwoodt Memoirs of a Fighting Life, p. 224. 
2CV 
Wedgwood, The Last of the Radicals, p. 212. 
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he maintained, would be more terrible. "There you have the complete 
negation of justice, the dark ages 
... 
it 1 
In 1937 the BBC invited him to take part in a debate on pacifism. 
Wedgwood spoke so strongly that the broadcast was cancelled. Undaunted 
he printed his comments in full: 
"What Hitler wants is Austria, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, 
some of Poland and the Ukraine and I hope some of the Southern 
Tyrol 
- 
not to mention Switzerland, Alsace-Lorraine, Schleswig- 
Holstein and Malmedy. ,2 
The only chance of preventing these things happening was to take a 
firm line and never give way to weakness. "If you do that, you 
encourage force 
... 
Do not let us rewrite the history of the 
end of the Roman Empire, continually buying off hordes by concessions 
to people whose appetite you merely whet by conciliation 
... 
We 
must stand together and not have divided opinions on when to put 
our foot down, but realise before the demands are made that they will 
be made, and that either we have to fight Germany now or allow 
Germany to fight us later on.,, 
3 
Compton, the lAbour Member for Gorton, was the Assistant General 
Secretary of the National Union of Vehicle Builders. 
4 
He served on 
House of Commons Debates, 13 November, 19331 Cols. 649-55- 
Wedgwood's horror at what was taking place in Germany was based 
on the evidence sent to him, in his capacity as Chairman of the 
German Refugee Hospitality Committee, by German Socialists and 
Jews. 
2 IAst of the Radicals, p. 230. 
3 House of Commons Debates, 26 may, 1933, Col-1504- It is interesting 
to note that Wedgwood considered that "till the invasion of Abyssinia I was quite alone in the House in holding such views. I 
would have struck 
... 
when Hitler seized power in 1933"- Memoirs 
of a Fighting Life, p. 230- 
4 
Compton: MP Gorton, 1923-31,1935-37; Chairman of the party, 1933- 
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the National Executive Committee of the Party from 1925 and represented 
British Labour on the Labour and Socialist International until his 
untimely death in 1937- In the latter capacity he came into contact 
with many foreign socialists including representatives of the German 
Social Democratic Party, soon to be destroyed by Hitler. 
1 His 
concern with the danger of Nazism is evident in the pamphlet, 
Hitlerism, issued in May, 1933s Here Compton strove to circulate 
the bitter truths about Nazi Germany, outlining the repression of 
socialism, trade unionism and public opinion that had taken place* 
George Lathan, MP for Park, Sheffield, was also a leading trade 
unionist sitting on Labour's National Executive. Prominent in the 
councils of the Railway Clerks' Association he had also been a 
member of the Advisory Committee to the International Labour Office, 
1923-37. At this time he was Chairman of the World Anti-Nazi Council, 
which, as has been noted elsewhere, aimed at awakening the public 
to a realisation of the German menace and to persuade them to 
boycott German goods. 
The Member for Gloucester, Price, drew upon a wealth of travel 
I 
and experience in assessing the Nazi regime. Probably the most 
important influence in the formation of his views was that of 
Russia where, following two visits before 1914, he was appointed by 
CP Scott to be the Manchester Guardian's correspondent, a post he 
held for the duration of the war. Price quickly became critical 
of the Tsarist regime, and was a natural supporter of the revolution 
when it came. Where he was unusual was in the speed and wholeheartedness 
with which he espoused the Bolshevik cause, sending back reports 
suggesting that they were the only Russians worth taking seriously 
In May, 1932, together with Attleet he attended a conference at Zuricht the last occasion the German Socialists were to be seen in full strength. Attlee, As It Happened, p. 79. 
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from a political point of view. "I had been all through the October 
Revolution there and had given considerable moral support to the 
Bolsheviks who, I thought, were the only people in Russia who could 
create order out of chaos, even if they had to use ruthless methods. 
I did not become a Communist, but by the time I got to Germany, I 
was certainly what one would call today a "fellow-traveller". 
Consequently when I came to Germany after the Armistice I soon saw 
that the so-called revolution in Germany was no revolution at all 
and that the old regime would, as it did, use all methods to get 
back to power, only dropping the Kaiser and the trappings of 
monarchy in order not to antagonise the Western Powers too much. 
Hence I at once disagreed with the sentimentalists and pacifists 
inside the Labour Party who argued that the Versailles Treaty was 
the cause of all the troubles in Germany. " 
1 
During the latter part of his time in Germany, when he was the 
Daily Herald correspondent in Berlin from 1919-23, Price became aware 
of the Nazis and similar organisations in Bavaria and wrote about 
them in his newspapers despatches, mentioning Hitler by name on 
several occasions, long before he was important. During the same 
period he married Elisa Balster, who for a short while had been one 
of Rosa Luxemborg's secretaries, and thus acquired close links with 
the German Left. Such knowledge derived from his time in Germany, 
and the contacts he maintainedt stood him in good stead when he 
entered Parliament in 1935- Unlike many of his colleagues he had 
clear ideas and genuinely saw the Nazi danger. 
Following the Rhineland crisis Price was to intervene in the 
House with a speech notable for its prophetic qualities. The 
1 Price, Letter to the author, 14 February, 1969. 
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remilitarisation of the Rhineland he argued, was "part and parcel 
of the whole Nazi policy and theory that they must keep power in 
their country by foreign diversions". It was his considered opinion 
that Austria was one of the places in Europe on which the Berlin 
leaders had their eyes: 
It 
... 
it is the place where the next move may take 
place. It will be even more serious if the move that takes 
place is against the one democratic republic which remains 
in the sea of Fascist dictatorshipsg the Republic of 
Czechoslovakia. There we have a German minority which 
might easily become the object of attention of the 
Gentlemen in Berlin"*' 
Faced with either of these I'diversionsIt, he warned, Britain could 
not retire into isolation otherwise "it will be our turn next some 
day". 
In The Gathering Storm Churchill pointed out that when Hitler 
came to power there was no one book which deserved more careful study 
than Mein Kampf, for here was the complete programme of the German 
resurrection, the concept of the Nazi state, the aims of National 
Socialism and the techniques and methods which were to be employed 
in carrying them out. Few Englishmen were familiar with the contents 
of this volume during the early years of Hitler's regime. The 
edition which was published in translated form at the end of 1933 
was brief and expurgated. Not until 1939 was the complete work made 
available to the British public. The language barrier, the difficulty 
in acquiring a copy of the book from Germany, the restrictions on 
its publication outside of the Reich that were later imposed by the 
1 House of Commons Debates, 26 March, 1936, Col. 1510. 
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Nazis, all undoubtedly were the cause of its not being known to any 
great extent in England. 
One of the small number of people that attempted to rectify this 
situation was George Hicks, Labour MP for Woolwich East and General 
Secretary of the Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers. 
1 Hicks 
was familiar with Mein Kampf and was convinced that the future policy 
of Nazi Germany could be traced within its pagese In an attempt to 
educate public opinion to the nature and intentions of the regime 
he published a booklet, entitled Hitler Means War, which showed by 
quotations from Mein Kampf that Hitler's main objective was expansion. 
His "plant', as Hicks termed it, was to expand the Reich, in the 
first place, in Eastern and South Eastern Europe and subsequentlys 
when strong enough, also in Western Europe, at the expense of France 
and Belgium. To accomplish this Germany's ruler was leaving nothing 
to chance and was occupying strategic positions, which would enable 
him to settle the various European countries one by one. In order 
to prevent the Nazification of Europe a practical system of collective 
security was necessary: 
"While endeavouring to transform the League into a 
more swiftly working instrumentl the first stop should be 
a firm non-aggression and mutual assistance pact betweoa 
Britain, France and the USSR, as the three countries whichq 
at the present time, stand for peace. 
"Other countries would9 of coursel be invited to join 
these pacts. Who can doubt that such a step would rally 
He too rubbed shoulders with foreign socialista in his capacity 
as delegate to the General Council of the International Federation 
of Trade Unions* Hicks was a Marxist and was pro-Russian without being a Communist. "He has always been", Dalton noted, "Ostentatiously 
pro-Soviet, is Chairman of the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, 
and spoke recently at the IFTU in favour of affiliating the 
Russian trade unions. " Diaries, 22 September, 1939- 
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the smaller countries of Europe? 
-.. 
If the rest of the 
world combined to outlaw war, in fact, and not merely 
in words, the two danger centres could be isolated, encircled, 
and perhaps ultimately even rendered innocuous. " 
1 
In calling attention to the brutalities of the Nazi regime, and 
in particular warning public opinion of the external threat posed to 
Britain by Germany, this handful of Members served their party 
- 
and their country - well. Although only a small minority in the 
counsels of the lAbour Party their opinions were to become increasingly 
dominant as successive crises indicated that the Hitler regime was 
a perpetual danger to world peace. Parliamentary colleagues, who 
had not moved with such certainty, came to accept the view that 
against Germany's aggressive militarism there was only one shield - 
collective security of a limited and practical nature. 
Liberal Part 
Abyssinia and the League of Nations 
During the autumn of 1935 it became clear that a crisis was 
at hand, not only for the League but for Liberal foreign policy, 
which was based on it. With the invasion of Abyssinia the party 
imýediately pressed for the application of sanctions in the hope that 
they would bring the aggressor to heel. During the election campaign 
that followed the Liberals maintained their commitment to the League. 
Richard Acland, Liberal candidate for Barnstaples told his future 
constituents "we must go the whole lengths of the Covenant to 
frustrate Mussolini's aggression", but added the proviso "if all 
other nations shirk their duties we cannot go on alone, and the 
1 Issued by the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, price ld. 
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whole situation must be considered". 
1 Other Liberal candidates, 
while firmly supporting the League, threw doubts on the sincerity of 
the Government's conversion to collective security. It seemed too 
recent to be genuine. 
One week after the new Parliament met, Liberal suspicions were 
confirmed when news of the Hoare-Laval Pact broke. 7he parliamentary 
party were aghast at the proposals and a resolution was tabled in 
the names of Sinclair, Francis and Richard Acland, Mander, Megan Lloyd 
George, 2 White, Griffith, Harris, Foot, 3 Rathbone and Wedgwood 
condemning "any settlement of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute which 
violates the territorial integrity or the political and economic 
independence of Abyssinia in favour of a declared aggressor and 
would regard any settlement on these lines as a betrayal of the 
League of Nations and as an act of national dishonour". 
Labour also submitted a vote of censure on the Government for 
its share in the Hoare-Laval episode and their move was supported 
by Liberal MPs. Sinclair took the opportunity to intervene, placing 
the blame squarely on the shoulders of the Prime Minister: 
Election Manifesto. Acland: MP Barnstaple, 1935-42 (Liberal), 
1942-45 (Common lth). This new party was founded in 1942 by 
Acland during the war-time electoral truce, and its aim was to 
contest seats where a "reactionary" candidate was in the field, 
not opposed by a "progressive" one. This should be seen as a 
continuation of his popular front activities. Acland, now Sir 
Richard, joined Labour once the 1945 results were known, 
becoming MP for Gravesend, Kent, 1947-55l and in the latter year, 
in his characteristic way, lost his seat in a famous by-election. 
Harris wrote of his membership of the Liberal Party (words 
equally applicable to his time in Labour) "I was never quite 
certain what he would say or do, and it was agreed that his 
attitude was hardly consonant to an official of the party (assistant whip), and he resigned. After the outbreak of war 
his speeches became more extreme in form and matter. I was 
pressed from outside to turn him out of the party, but this I 
refused to do. " Forty Years in and out of Parliament, p. 142. 
2 MP, Anglesey, 1929-51. 
MP, Dundee, 1931-45. 
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"here is an issue which involves the honour of 
the country, the authority of the League, and the peace 
of the world. The man who bears the supreme responsibility 
for an issue of that kind is the Prime Minister, and he 
cannot divest himself of it at this stage by sacrificing 
a colleague. "' 
Sinclair went on to pinpoint Abyssinia as "the great test andl if the 
League does not survive the test, it may never be reconstructed in 
our lifetime". What was needed to give a lead and to make a success 
of the League of Nations was for the Government to show confidence 
and faith in it. "The League', ' he said, "can be made to succeed, but 
it needs faith, which is moral energy and firmness of purpose in 
asserting the authority of the League on the part of Britain and 
British statesmen above all. " 
2 
When the issue was put to the vote 18 Liberals combined with 
the Official Oppositiong but 29 RH Bernays and JP Maclay, voted 
with the Government. 
3 Thus not all Liberal Members of Parliament 
were united behind the party's avowed foreign policy. Within a 
year one of the dissentieats, Bernays, the Member for Bristol North, 
wrote to Sir John Simon asking that the Liberal National Whip be sent 
to him when Parliament reassembled. 
4 
The Liberal Magazine noted 
that "for many months he has been in agreement with the Government 
1 House of Commons Debates, 19 Decemberl 1935, Col. 2040. 
2 Ibid, Col. 2o45. 
David Lloyd George was not present in the House when the vote was taken but was absent paired. Manchester Guardian, 20 December, 1935, 
4 
Bernays: News Chronicle correspondent in Indiag 1930-31; Germany, 1933; MP 1931-45; Parliamentary Secretary for Health, 1937-399 
Tran3port, 1939-40. 
329s 
on all the main issues of policy. What particularly influenced 
him was the course of events abroad". 
1 Bernays, in fact, had for 
some time past experienced difficulties within his constituency 
party. In a letter to Samuel, written in November 1933, Bernays 
explained his problems, which accounted for his later defection 
from the Independent Liberals. He seems to have been willing, 
against his own judgement, to follow Samuel but had trouble with 
his local Liberal Association, who "do not mind how much I criticise 
and vote against the Government - but ... contend that except on 
some great issue I ought to do so from the Government side of the House". 
2 
The fact that in the General Election of 1935 he was only opposed 
by a Labourite, relying on Conservative support to be re-elected, must 
also have weighed heavily upon him and his local organisation. 
The other dissident on this occasion, Maclay, a frequent rebel 
on major issues, was in a similar situation, only scraping home by 
389 votes in a two-cornered fight with Labour. And, of those voting 
for Labour's motion of censure, Herbert Holdswortht the Member for 
Bradford Southq later crossed the floor to join the Liberal Nationalst 
and he too had fought a direct contest with a labouritet defeating 
him in the absence of a Conservative candidate. 
3 
1 Liberal Magazine, September, 1936. 
2 Bernays to Samuel, Samuel Papers 19 Novemberv 1933- He was soon 
appointed to a junior ministerial post and was to follow the 
Government faithfullyq through thick and thin, against his 
inclinations. Nicolsoal his closest friend in the Housel recorded 
his true feelings. Over Eden's resignation he was "unhappy" and 
felt he "ought to have taken a line against the Prime Minister" 
(Diaries and Letters P-325). During the Czech crisis he confessed 
that he had "lost all confidence in this Government and that nothing 
will restore it", but eventually decided it was "far easier to 
resign than not to resign". (PP- 371-75)- 
'Five Liberal Members in all fought the General Election againat 
Labour, Conservative candidates not standing: the above three plus 
Ernest Evans and Sir Percy Harris. The latter two, however, 
represented seats which had remained Liberal in 19299 although 
contested by all 3 parties, while the other 3 had gone Labour. 
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When in May, 1936, Abyssinia fell to the Italianal the 
executive of the National Liberal Federation, in almost its last 
act, gave expression to the shame and horror with which it regarded 
the fate that had befallen Abyssinial a primitive country which 
trusted to the honour of the civilised countries. 
' 
"By their 
pitiful weakness in resisting this defiance of the League system, 
the Governments of the Powers, including Britain, have jeopardised 
the League of Nations, have terribly increased the menace of war, 
and have ensured that, if it comess this war will be so ruthless 
that it will probably bring down our civilisation in ruins. " 
2 
Meanwhile the parliamentary party anticipated moves within the 
Government to end sanctions. On 11 Hay Sinclair, Mander, Footq 
Owen Evans, White and Richard Acland tabled the following resolution: 
"That this House, believing that any settlement of 
the Italo 
-Abyssinian dispute which confirmed and accepted the 
triumph of the aggressor would be fatal to the collective 
peace system and would encourage acts of unprovoked aggression 
throughout the worldq urges His Majesty's Government to 
take the lead at Geneva in advocating the maintenance and 
intensification of sanctions until-a settlement is reached 
in accord with the principles of the Covenant., 13 
Within a month their fears were confirmed when the Foreign 
Secretary announced the Government's intention to drop all sanctions 
against Italy. Immediately the Liberal Conventionmeating in London 
The National Liberal Federation was wound up in Junet 1936t and 
merged into the new Liberal Party Organisation. 
2 Liberal Magazine, Junet 1936. 
3 Notices of Motionst Mayt 1936. 
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to discuss the new constitution of the party, passed a motion which 
voiced the indignation which Liberals felt. It spoke of the deep 
sense of humiliation with which Liberals had learnd of the 
Government's decision to "surrender" to the aggressors, to "betray" 
the League of Nations, and to "disregard the pledges" which it had 
given at the General Election. The Convention went on to reaffirm 
its unfaltering loyalty to the Covenant of the Leaguel which it 
declared would not have failed if courageously applied. 
1 
Attempting to do everything in its power to arouse the conscience 
of the nation to the issues at stake the party organised a series of 
rallies and meetings. As part of the agitation the parliamentary 
party tabled a condemnatory resolution dissenting "from the decision 
of His Majesty's Government to abandon the policy of steady and 
collective resistance to unprovoked aggression to which they are 
pledged by their declarations at the General Electiong and regrets 
the giving up of sanctions by which alone the rule of law can be 
asserted against arbitrary power, and the Italian Government be 
compelled to agree to a settlement of the Abyssinian question in 
conformity with the Covenant of the League". In the debate that 
followed David Lloyd George took the opportunity to make a brilliant 
and devastating speech, contrasting Eden with Hoare, the previous 
Foreign Secretary. Witheringly he commented that he had been in the 
House very nearly fifty years and "have never heard a British 
Minister, one holding the most important position in the Government 
to the Prime Minister at the present momentt come down to the House 
of Commons and say that Britain was beaten, Britain and her Empire 
beaten, and that we must abandon an enterprise we had taken in hand", 
1 Manchester Guardian, 19 June, 1936. 
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At least Eden's predecessor, "when his policy had been thrown over", 
had had "the decency to resign". Turning to the Prime Ministers he 
referred to a recently published book containing the speeches of 
Baldwin: "In one he is talking about the difficulties of Abyssinia, 
and he says it is essential 'that the country stand like a rock in 
the wavesq however rough they may be'. The rock has turned out to 
be mere driftwood. He goes on to say 
... 
in a great message to 
the Peace Society, talking about this dispute: 'Let your aim be 
resolute and your footsteps firm and certain'. Here is the resolute 
aim, here is the certain footstep - running away. " 
1 
Frances Stevenson noted in her diary that I'D. had a smashing 
success in the House on Thursday, a real resurrection of his old 
fighting days. The House almost hysterical and so was I* The 
Front Bench literally cowed before his onslaught, and Baldwin's 
reply was pitiable. There was consternation on the faces of young 
Tory backbenchers. After the speech a young Tory went up to Winston 
and said he had never heard anything like it in the House. 'Young 
man', replied Winston, 'you have been listening to one of the 
greatest Parliamentary performances of all time'-" 
2 If, as Macmillan 
concurredq it "had a demoralising effect on the Treasury bench", it 
did not affect the formal vote of censure. 
3 
Like Labour, the Liberal Party clung to the League after the 
Abyssinian debacle, sharply criticising any talk of weakening it 
still further. "Ministers say that the League should be reformed", 
1 House of commons Debates, 18 June, 1936, Cols*1225,1231-2. 
2 Lloyd George, A Diary by Frances Stevenson$ P-324. 
3 Winds of Changes P-457- 
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said Sinclair, "in my opinion there its something much more urgent 
and practical to be done, and that is to reform the Government. It 
was not for want of material force that the League has so far failed 
- 
its material force is overwhelming in its struggle with Italy. It 
is moral force which has been lacking. It is not the machinery of 
the League, but the faith, the name, and the will of the Government 
which has failed. " 
1 
In consequence of their refusal to abandon faith in the League, 
Liberal Members called upon the Government to take a courageous and 
definite lead in the organisation of peace, with the object of 
restoring confidence in the League as an instrument of collective 
security and a medium for the redress of grievances. 
2 As the League 
system was the basis of the policy that Liberals had advocated 
since the Peace Settlement it could not be dropped lightly, unlike 
the National Government whose adherence to the League was much more 
short-lived. In fact, of the three established parties it might be 
argued that the Liberals were the most heavily committed to the 
League of Nations. Certainly this was true of its House of Commons 
personnel: five of the parliamentary party had served on the Executive 
of the League of Nations Union, including Harris, Megan Lloyd George, 
Mander, Roberts and Sinclair. Seven 
- 
Bernayst Owen Evans, Ernest Evans, 
Griffith, White, Megan Lloyd George and Mander 
- 
belonged to the 
New Commonwealth Society, the pro-League organisation which advocated 
the creation of an international police force. A further seven 
members had also been involved in the Movement for the Defence of 
Freedom and Peace: Richard Acland, de Rothschild, Seely, Bernays, 
1 Speech to the Liberal Convention, 18 June, 1936. 
2 The Times,, 3 December, 1936, Statement entitledPeace or wa?. 
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Griffiths, Harris and Sinclair. In all 13, or 61.9% of Liberal 
members were involved in pro-League organisations. 
Germany and the Rhineland 
March, 1936, brought a further jolt to the parliamentary party, 
when German troops violated the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland. 
The party leader, however, drew a distinction between Mussolini's 
action and that of Hitler, which did not necessitate punitive 
measures or sanctions: 
"Nor, while we must condemn any violation of treaties, 
can we regard the occupation of German territories by 
German troops as so clearly indefensible as an aggression 
against the territory of a member of the League. " 
1 
Sinclair's view waz reinforced by that of the deputy leader, Sir Francis 
Acland who argued "that the action of the French and British 
Governments has been correct under the Treaty (Locarno), and that 
no more violent action could have been justified. 112 
Germany, Liberals admitted, had by unilateral action torn up 
a treaty to which she had fixed her signature, but if this breach was 
all that had happened the outlook would have been bleak indeed. 
Instead Hitler had accompanied his defiance with a remarkable offer 
of conciliation "which transformsEurope's crisis into Europe's 
opportunity". 
3 Therefore the parliamentary party felt that the 
Government ought not to let slip the opportunity for finding a basis 
for the rule of lawt to which Germany, with every other nation in 
1 House of Co=ons Debates, 9 Marchl 1936, Col. 1867- 
Letter to The Times, 18 March, 1936. 
News Chroniclel, 9 Marcht 1936. 
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Europe, would freely consent. 
As in the case of JAbour, sympathy for the underdog, Germany, 
and her cry for equality of treatment came to the surface. Equality 
did not exist as long as she, alone of all the Powers, was denied 
the right to maintain troops in an integral part of her territory. 
The News Chronicle, summarising the views of Liberal Members, 
announced that it was "high time to make it clear that the country 
cannot forever continue to underwrite a dictated peace and be the 
defender of an international system founded on inequality and the 
desire to keep the vanquished down". 
1 
One of the News Chronicle's headlines for 9 March had been 
"Lloyd George's faith in German Peace Offert'. By the mid-twenties 
David Lloyd George had revived much of his earlier admiration for 
Germany and he continually urged that her claims for equality of 
status and fairer treatment were well founded. Now that Germany 
had occupied the Rhineland and backed it up with an offer of a 
twentyfive years peace pact, Lloyd George thought the offer should 
be taken seriously. Three weeks after the Rhineland move he outlined 
his plan for a "policy of appeasement in the world" in a letter to 
Kingsley Martin, the editor of the New Statesman and Nation. His 
plan envisaged the rectification of German frontiers, "where 
boundaries were not quite justly drawn't, the reallocation of 
colonial mandates, and "the enforcement of provisions as to the 
rights of (German) minorities". 2 
Lloyd George had regarded the Russo-French Pact as provocation 
for, if not justification of, Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland. 
News Chronicle, 9 I-larch, 1936. 
Uoyd George Papers, Letter dated 28 March, 1936. 
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He told the Co=ons: 
"The moment the Russo-French Pact was signed, no, one 
responsible for the security of Germany could leave its 
most important industrial province without defence of any 
sort or kind when 
- 
and here is a thing which is never 
dwelt upon 
- 
France has built up the most gigantic fortifi- 
cations ever seen in any land 
... 
Yet the Germans are 
supposed to remain without even a garrison, without a 
trench. I am going to say here that if Herr Hitler had not 
taken some action with regard to that 
... 
he would have 
been a traitor to the Fatherland. " 
1 
Small wonder that Lloyd George's views were noted with interest, 
if not approval, within ruling circles in Berlin. Subsequently 
Ribbentrop, the German Ambassador in London, formally invited him 
to visit Germany. The notorious trip took place in September 1936 
when, accompanied with his children, Megan and Gwilym, both Liberal 
Members of Parliament, Lloyd George visited Germany on the pretext 
of seeing what Hitler had accomplished in conquering unemployment. 
2 
He met Hitler twice. By all accounts Lloyd George was favourably 
impressed, and convinced that the Chancellor was a man of peace, a 
genius bent on social reform, with no desire whatsoever to plunge 
Europe into war. Yet of the leading figures in the regime Lloyd George 
admired only Hitler, for he refused to see Goering or Goebbels, 
apparently flouting their invitations. 3 Whatever his reasoning it 
1 House of Commons Debates, 27 JulY, 1936, Col. 1209. 
2 See Tom Jones, A Diary With Letters pp. 239-65 for an eyewitness 
account of the trip. The full transcript of Lloyd George's talk 
with Hitler can be found in Martin Gilbert's Roots of Appeasement, 
Appendix II. 
3 
Lloyd George, Twelve Essays. 'Lloyd George and Compromise Peac6'9 
Paul Addison, P-365- 
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appears strange that Lloyd George could so easily divorce Hitler 
from his associates and the system that he had established. 
On his return, Lloyd George wrote an article for the Daily 
Express, which attracted much attention and no doubt sent a shudder 
through his parliamentary colleagues. It was a wildly extravagant 
tribute to Hitler: 
"One man has accomplished this miracle. He is a 
born leader of men. A magnetic, dynamic personality with 
a single-minded purpose, a resolute will and a dauntless 
heart 
-.. 
The old trust him; the young idolise him. It 
is the worship of a national hero who has saved his country 
from utter despondency and degradation ... not a word 
of criticism or disapproval have I heard of Hitler. He 
is the George Washington of Germany. " 
1 
For two years Lloyd George remained full of admiration for 
Hitler and convinced that Germany's leader was not temperamentally 
an aggressor. In December 1937, while writing to a friend, he 
recalled the trip, and yet again lauded Hitler: 
"I had the privilege of meeting the great leader of 
a great people. I have never doubted the fundamental 
greatness of Herr Hitler as a man even in moments of 
profound disagreement with his policy. ... I only wish 
we had a man of his supreme quality at the head of affairs 
in our country today, " 
and bewailed the fact that Britain had not composed her differences 
with Germany before the Spanish crisis ever arose. Even then Lloyd 
George somehow convinced himself that it was "not Hitler's fault 
Quoted in D McCormick's The Mask of Merlin, p. 277- 
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that a friendly arrangement was not reached 
... 
The present 
muddle is entirely due to the hesitancy and the nervelessness of 
the Baldwin Administration. They never saw an opportunity until 
it was too late to act upon it. " 
1 
It is interesting to note that while admiring Hitler, Lloyd 
George reserved a strong contempt for Mussolini. "It looks'V he 
wrote, "as if the Fuhrer has committed himself to Mussolini 
- 
that 
adds enormously to the obstacles in the path of friendly accommodation 
of the troubles of Europe. Mussolini is temperamentally an 
aggressor. I have never thought Herr Hitler was and I do not believe 
it now. " This he wrote at the height of the Spanish Civil War, 
although it is fair to say that Spain was far more an Italian than 
a German operation, and Lloyd George was strongly for the Republic, 
as he had been for Abyssinia. 
Nevertheless, less than a year later and largely under the impact 
of the Spanish conflict, Lloyd George moved away from a position 
favouring revision of the Versailles Treaty. During 1938 he became 
one of the most outspoken and articulate critics of Chamberlain's 
foreign policy and a leading member of that group urging some form 
of Anglo-French-Soviet collaboration as an alternative to appease- 
ment. But on Czechoslovakia his line was not all that it seemed. 
He called for an arrangement with Russia to stop Hitlerl and 
condemned the Munich Agreement as a surrender. Yet it was clear that 
Lloyd George was also inclined to be anti-Czech, and his attack on 
Munich was far more anti-Chamberlain than anti-Hitler. 
Excluding Lloyd George, Richard Acland could still describe the 
attitude of Liberal Members to Hitler's remilitarisation of the 
Letter to Professor Conwell-Evans, 17 December, 19379 Lloyd George 
Papers. He was not wholly blind, however, to the dar aspects of 
Nazism, making clear his dislike for anti-Semitism. AJ Sylvesters 
Life With Lloyd George, P-154. 
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Rhineland as "woefully blind". Nevertheless, there were within the 
Liberal position nagging doubts. 
1 Negotiations with Hitler on the 
basis of his offer would not by itself remove suspicions of German 
motives for, by the brusque and defiant manner the Rhineland had been 
occupied, confidence in Germany's good faith had been shaken. As 
Sinclair told the House: 
Not for the first time he tears up by unilateral I" 
action a treaty to which German signatures have been appended. 
It is, however, for the first time he tears up a treaty 
which he himself has undertaken to respect. tt 
In consequence it was necessary for the Chancellor to dissipate the 
suspicion that he was attempting to free Germany from shackles that 
prohibited his freedom of action. 
For the Liberal Party, as with Labour, the value of the Rhineland 
coup lay in its educative effect. "It will be said", commented the 
News Chronicle, "it has been said a dozen times already 
- 
that we 
cannot trust Germany's word. Even if that is true, the negotiation 
of a new Locarno would not place Europe in any graver crisis than she 
is in today. At the very worst, the world would discover Hitler 
for a villain, and at the least we should know where we were and what 
to do.,, 3 The sequel was indeed to show that Germany's apparent 
unwillingness to come to terms with the Locarno Powers did not go 
unnoticed on the Liberal benches. A growing awareness of the Nazi 
threat became evident. 
1 Acland, Why So Angry, P-30- 
2 House of Commons Debates, 9 March, 1936, Col. 1867- 
News Chronicle, 9 march, 1936. 
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Of Liberal Members Geoffrey Mander was almost unrivalled in his 
understanding of the German situation. In April, 1936, he asked the 
Foreign Secretary whether the Foreign Office would enquire of the 
German Government if Mein Kampf remained a reliable expression of 
German foreign policy. Not to be fobbed off by Viscount Cranborne's 
reply that "no useful purpose would be served", Mander wondered: 
"In view of the fact that this book contains some very 
aggressive proposals and is regarded as the Bible of the 
German people, would it not be desirable to include such 
matters as this in the forthcoming questionnaire to Germany? " 
1 
Three months later, when he again addressed the House, he announced 
that the views expressed by Churchill on the danger of the menace 
were not the least bit exaggerated. "I believe that the whole world 
is faced with a danger of the gravest kind, threatening us at the 
present moment and with a growing certainty as the months go by. 
The German Government are treating our Government with the utmost 
contempt. They do not even trouble to reply to diplomatic documents 
or questions which we submit to them". 
2 
Other Liberal Members sharing Geoffrey Mander's apprehensions 
concerning Germany's future policy included Sinclair and de Rothschild 
- 
two close associates of Churchill 
- 
Richard Aclandq Foot, Griffith and 
Harris. As private members they were distinguished by their 
participation in Focus and the Movement Defence of Freedom and Peace. 
House of Commons Debates, 28 April, 1936, Col-735- Eden had 
considered it worthwhile to get some idea of German intentions 
and drew up a questionnaire, which was put to Hitler. Vo reply 
was ever received. Facing the Dictatorst P-372- 
2 House of Commons Debates, 20 Julyq 1936, Col. 139. It is interesting 
to note that Manaer argued the case for rearmament by reference to Germany: ftIn a world", he wroteo "that is rapidly rearming and which possesses an almost self-designated aggressor in the person of Germany, rearming more vigorously than all, it is necessary for the country not to be left behind in so deplorable a race"s Contemporary Review, May, 1936. 
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Foreign Affairs Debates 
As with the Tabour PartY, Liberal contributions to foreign affairs 
debates for the period November, 1935 to September, 1939, have been 
recorded. The following were found to be the most active members: 
Member Number of Speeches 
Acland, F 2 
Acland, R 7 
Lloyd George, D 18 
Griffith, K 5 
Harris, P 2 
Mander, G 20 
Roberts, W 10 
Sinclairt A 421 
White, H 2 
Bernays, R2 3 
The results indicate that half of the party took part in debatess 
although clearly Sinclair, Mander, David Lloyd Georgeq Robertst 
Richard Acland and Griffith were the most active leaders on foreign 
affairs before the war. 
An analysis of the seven members taking part in debates with 
any consistency revealed no marked differences from their fellow 
Liberal Members. Nevertheless, background information on the seven 
supports the contention that those Members of Parliament who take 
an interest in foreign affairs are almost always found to have 
lived abroad, to have travelledl or in some way to have been placed 
in close contact with particular foreign interests. Bernays, in his 
capacity of special correspondent for the News Chronicle, had travelled 
extensively, residing abroad on more than one occasion. He had, 
The figure of 42 interventions may appear high but as chairman of 
the Parliamentary Party he assumed the leadership in debates of 
importance. 
2 
While a member of the Independent Liberals, 1935-6. 
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in fact, reported for the paper from Germany in the year that Hitler 
came to power. Mander, too, had travelled widely in Europe, as 
when he visited the Baltic States in 1935, discussing the international 
situation with statesmen there. 
1 Roberts and Acland, whose interest 
in foreign affairs dates largely from the Spanish conflict, were known 
to have visited Spain, studying týe situation and obtaining first- 
hand knowledge of what was happening there. Lloyd Georges of course, 
was not only a hardened traveller but as Prime Minister from 1916-22 
had been ultimately responsible for the formation of Britain's 
foreign policy, and had himself presided over a number of important 
international conferences. 
1 Mander, We Were Not All Wrongg p. 61. 
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CHAPTERIV 
THE INTER-PARTY MOVEMENTS AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 
The Inter-Party Movements 
Within three months of the General Election Mander, in surveying 
what little scope there was for a Liberal advance, co=ended the 
"possibility of the development of a moderate centre government 
commanding the support of the Left". 
1 He saw two organisations; 
around which such a gathering of forces could take place: the Next 
Five Years Group and the Council of Action for Peace and Reconstruction. 
Similarly Ramsay Muir, ex-chairman of the Liberal Partyq in a letter 
to Samuel on the disastrous election results, felt: 
"We may perhaps hope for some good results from the 
inter-party discussions of the Council of Action, which 
might conceivably lead to the formation of a middle party, 
eventually liberal in character. But I doubt if it will 
come to much. It is too Noncomformist, and too narrow in 
its range. " 
2 
The Council of Action for Peace and Reconstruction had been 
formed in the summer of 1935- Its formation had been foreshadowed 
in a manifesto, issued by David Lloyd George and 34 Free Church 
leaders, entitled Peace and Reconstruction: A Call to Action. 
The appeal to the electorate was made under two heads: 
1 The Contemporary Review, January, 1936. 
2 Samuel Papersq letter dated 17 November, 1935. Stephen Koss has 
described the Council of Action as the last and most spectacular 
of the attempts to reactivate Nonconformity as "a political vehicle 
and to bring its waning influence to bear in domestic and 
international affairs". However, the campaign revealed beyond 
all doubt that Radical Nonconformity was "not dormant but dead". 
Nonconformity in British Politicst p-11. 
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"l. PEACE. We call upon all lovers of peace to give 
their support at the next General Election only to those 
candidates who pledge themselves to exact from whatever 
Government takes power after the Election, the positive 
and courageous use of British initiatives towards redressing 
injustices, economic and territorial, which breed the 
spirit of war, and who pledge themselves to support 
energetically practical measures of disarmament, and 
the maintenance of peace through conciliation, arbitration 
and collective action within the League of Nations. 
2. UNEMPLOYMENT. We invite men and women irrespective of 
party attachments, to pledge themselves to secure at 
the next General Election the return of a parliament 
whose members are committed to insist on measures that 
will apply to the problem of unemployment remedies 
commensurate with the magnitude of its dangers to the 
moral and physical well-being of the community. " 
1 
The following month a convention was held at Central Hall, 
Westminster to consider the manifesto. It was attended by 82 MPs. 
Two resolutions were passed. The first expressed approval of the 
manifesto and the second, moved by Lloyd George, constituted as a 
Council of Action such of the signatories to the manifesto as were 
prepared to act, and pledged the delegates to set up constituency 
Measures in mind were: a national Development Council, with 
representatives of industry, commerce, financet the workers and 
economic thinkers, with independent power to plan bold schemes; 
a small cabinet of only five, largely non-departmental ministers, 
on the lines of his own war cabinet; action on housing, roads, 
land, and the reconstruction of depressed industries. 
2 Among those attending were Lansbury, then Labour's leader, Samuel, 
Liberal leader, Lord Cecil of Chelwood, and Harold Macmillan. 
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councils to secure the return to the next Parliament of members 
prepared to seek appropriate action on the peace and reconstruction 
issue. It was stressed that the purpose of the Council of Action 
was not to form a new political party. Rather the local councils 
would interrogate all candidates to secure pledges of support for 
the peace and reconstruction policies. Only those giving the required 
undertaking would be supported by the councils. Where all candidates 
were found to be unsatisfactory it was left to the local councils to 
decide whether new candidates should be promotede 
1 
The Council's foundation was denounced by some as an attempt 
on the part of Lloyd George to undermine the Government and get his 
hands on the levers of power again. However much this was denied 
at the time, retrospectively it appears to be so. Lloyd George's 
secretary, Frances Stevenson, revealed that he was thinking in terms 
of t1wrecking" the power of the National Government, in the event of 
an election, by securing a Liberal-Labour coalition including, if 
possible, Left-wing Tories, under his leadership, or at any rate 
under his inspiration. 
2 
"He calculates", she wrote, "that Labour 
may win 27.5 seats, on the analogy of the 1929 election. If then 
the Liberals have only 20, that would give the Government a majority 
of only 25 to carry on with, which would make things impossible for 
them after a very short time. If on the other hand Labour win 290, 
and we win 4o, then the Government would be defeated. But in that 
case, even by combining forces with Labour, we should not have a 
sufficient majority to carry on a vigorous policy. 'Under those 
1 The Times, 2 July, 1935- 
Lloyd George, A Diary by Frances Stevenson, p. 296- Apparently 
Lloyd George, when informed by Tom Jones that Baldwin was t1angry, 
thinking D. is out to wreck", replied "That is precisely what I 
am out for. " Ibid, P-313- See also AJ Sylvester, Life With 
Lloyd Georgel p. 124. 
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circumstances', said D., 'I would form a Government with lansbury 
as nominal Prime Minister but retaining the active leadership for 
myself. I would then proceed to formulate a devastating progressive 
programme and go to the country again immediately upon it with a 
terrific campaign, and return with a majority of 150'-" 1 
Lloyd George's only hope of attaining this was to secure, in the 
new Parliament, as many members as possible pledged to vote for the 
Council's policy, whatever party was in power. In the event, the 
Council never really got a sufficient hold on the country to fire 
the electorate in time for November's election. "A general election 
now almost certain to take place next month. D. dispirited and 
discouraged. It has come far too early for him 
... 
He is out of 
heart at the Government election changes and realises the Government 
have torpedoed his plans, probably deliberately. " 
2 In effects exactly 
as Baldwin intended, the Council of Action 
- 
like the Labour and 
Liberal Opposition 
- 
was caught off-guard. 
Out of the 615 members returned only 67 supported the new deal 
policy. It was clear that the Council could neither "smash the power 
of the National Government" nor exert anything but little influence 
in the face of the solid Tory majority. 3 Undeterred, Lloyd George 
called a meeting of the 67 to discuss how the questions of peace 
and reconstruction could be kept before the new Parliament. Less than 
half the group attended the meeting on 29 November, when Lloyd George 
1 Lloyd George, A Diary by Frances Stevenson, P-312. 
Ibid, pp-318-9. 
Frances Lloyd Georgeq The Years That Are Past, P-233- Broken down, 
the 67 supporters consisted of 11 National Mem era, 21 Liberals, 
34 Labourites and 1 Independent. 
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was appointed sessional chairman and it was reaffirmed that there 
was no intention of forming a separate party in the Commons. At a 
further meeting an executive was elected consisting of 10 members: 
Liberals 
- 
Richard Acland, Gwilym Lloyd George, Mander and White; 
Labourites 
- 
Alexander, Ammon, Hopkin, Jenkins, Milner and Young. 
The Conservatives were conspicuous by their absence. 
With Lloyd George to finance it the Council was kept going. 
Established in a suite of offices in Central London it maintained a 
steady stream of propaganda on behalf of the policy of peace and 
reconstruction. A weekly News Bulletin of political information was 
issued as were speakers' notes and other literature. The Council 
intervened strongly at by-elections, laying its programme before 
the candidates and working for those that agreed to support it if 
returned. "There can be no doubt", wrote Malcolm Thomson, "that in 
a number of by-elections which took place in the four years between 
1935-39, the Council's activities turned the scales in favour of its 
protege. "' 
The Council took a stand on the foreign policy issues of these 
years. It opposed the Hoare-Laval proposals and co-operated in the 
campaign of protest which led to Hoare's resignation. Refusing to 
recognise the annexation of Abyssinia, the Council, in May 1936, 
called for the application of oil sanctions on Italy and the 
closing of the Suez Canal. Although favouring the non-intervention 
policy on the outbreak of war in Spain the Council, as early. as 
October 1936, set aside non-intervention which it considered "One- 
sided in its effects", and urged the Government "to restore the right 
Thomson, David Lloyd George, p. 420. It is likely that the victory 
of Noel-Baker at Derby, in 19369 and those of Stokes and Summerskill 
at Ipswich and West Fulham, in 1938, were in part attributable to 
the Council's efforts. See AJ Sylvesterg Life With Lloyd George, 
pp. 143,195. 
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of the constitutionally elected Spanish Government to buy arms in 
this country 
-a right to which she is entitled under international 
law. " 1 Supporting Eden at the time of his resignation, it organised 
test ballots in four Government held constituencies in order to get 
a rapid test of public opinion "on the Eden crisis". 
2 A reply-paid 
ballot card wag sent to every elector with the following leading 
question: 
"Do you approve of Mr Eden's stand for good faith in 
international affairs, and will you support his demand for 
the re-establishment of peace and security through the 
League of Nations?,, 3 
The replies clearly indicated that there was widespread support for 
the stand taken by Eden. 
4 
Actively opposed to the Government's 
course throughout the Czech crisis, it subsequently launched a 
Czechoslovakian Thanksgiving Fund in gratitude for the sacrifices 
the Czechs had submitted to in order to preserve peace. 
The hopes held by Lloyd George that the Council of Action might 
become a focal point for a united resistance to the National Government's 
policies, contributing to its eventual overthrow and replacement by an 
inter-party administration, never came to fruition. Neither can it 
be. said that, in the period from the election to the outbreak of war, 
the Council succeeded in influencing the Government nor in impressing 
its views upon the nation. In fact it only subsisted to the outbreak 
of war by paring its platform to certain limited objectives on 
1 The Times, 21 October, 1936. 
2 The Times, 5 March, 1938. 
Ibid. 
According to Harveyq the Whips asked Eden "if he will publicly disown the Council of Action's Referendum on his resignation. He 
has refused to do so-" Diary entry for 6 Marcht 1938. 
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which action and agreement amongst members could be obtained. Even 
on this narrow ground the movement experienced dissension$ particularly 
from the few Left-Wing Tories associated with it. The continual 
criticism levelled at the Government's handling of affairs both home 
and abroad placed the Tories pledged to the Council's policy in such 
an awkward position that they soon found it necessary to repudiate 
the organisation and its activities. 
1 
"It has been made clear beyond 
all doubt", complained five Conservative members, "that the Council 
is in reality nothing more or less than an appendage of that section 
of the Liberal Party which opposes the Government 
... 
becoming a 
platform organisation for the propaganda of one distinguished 
statesman". 
2 Similarly, a year later, Anthony Crossley severed all 
connection with the Council on the grounds that it was a "body under 
the influence, inspiration or domination of Lloyd George. 
Supposedly non-party it nevertheless lent its support to almost any 
opposition candidate in every by-election". 
3 
The other movement around which a possible alternative Government 
might have formed was the Next Five Years Group. This, like the 
Council of Action, originated in the summer of 1935, when a number 
of people of all parties and of none, inspired by Lord Allen of 
Hurtwood, came together to urge a 'new deal' for Britain. 
4 
They 
The Conservatives associated with the Council were equally attracted 
by its progressive policies and its declared freedom from party 
bias, however little this meant to Lloyd George. Yet anti-Government 
tendencies could be distinguished from the first, tendencies which 
had led such interested Conservatives as Adams, Crossleyl Marsden, 
McCorquodale, Molson and Watt to protest at the movement's 
partisanship. The Times, 29 July, 193.5. 
2 The Times,, I June, 1937- The five, all of whom had signed the 
pledge were: Gratton-Doyle, Denville, Craven-Ellis, Dudley Joel 
and Shepperson. 
3 The Times, 5 March, 1938. 
4 
Lord Allen: an important, but secondary, figure in the Labour 
movement; supported MacDonald in 1931 and was made a peer in 1932. 
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planned a book to put forward their policy. This, published in July, 
was entitled The Next Five Years, ando naturally enough, propounded 
a political programme for five years. The book, divided into two 
sections, outlined radical proposals for economic reconstruction and 
social justice as well as a plea for the sincere support of collective 
security through the League of Nations. 
1 The greater part of the 
signatories to the book were not politicians as such, although there 
were 17 MPs mostly supporting the Government. 2 These included some 
that were later distinguished by their opposition to the Government's 
foreign policy, including Hills, Macmillan and Molson. 
3 Prom the 
signatories an executive committee was formed, which included Allen 
as Chairman, Macmillan as joint treasurer, and Molson, Mander, 
King-Hall, White and Salter as members. 
Its detailed plans included a government planning committee of 
cabinet ministers, an economic general staff, public control of 
utilities and a nationalized Bank of England. It advocated 
reducing hours of work, abolishing the means testt raising the 
school-leaving age, and increasing death duties. 
2 Conservatives: T Cazalet, G Ellis, CF Entwistle, FM Graves, 
JW Hills, NK Lindsay, Macmillan, TB Martin, Molson, TJ O'Connor. 
National Labour: RD Denman. Liberals: Acland, Bernays, I Foot, 
Mander, White. Independent: Rathbone. Another four signatories 
were to become MPs: Bartlett, TE Harvey, King-Hall, Salter. 
3 Molson: MP Doncaster, 1931-35; High Peakq Derbyshire, 1939-61. 
Although defeated at the General Election, he aided with the Tory 
dissidents and when re-elected to the House he voted against Chamberlain, 
in May, 1940. He spent much of his time out of Parliament travelling 
in Europe and was well-equipped to warn that National Socialism 
"teaches that force is the source of Right" and that Germany is 
"physically the strongest nation in Europ e and certainly her Government 
and probably her people are imbued with a desire to assert themselves 
aggressively in foreign affairs". The peace-loving countries, he 
urged, "must stand by the League and each other'19 becoming a "Grand Alliance of defence", organising a "co-ordinated rearmament of its 
members to ensure its superiority over the anti-League Power8l's 
Germany, Japan and Italy. New Outlook, August, 1936. 
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As the programme of the Next Five Years Group was similar to 
that of the Council of Action it was natural that there should be 
talk of co-operation between the two. That August representatives 
of the Next Five Years, including Macmillan, had a much publicized 
meeting with Lloyd George, which gave rise to a crop of rumours that 
some kind of new coalition was in process of formation for the next 
election. 
1 In fact there was no foundation for the speculation as 
the meeting was confined purely to the "possibility of getting a joint 
policy out of the two documents Five Years and Organising Prosperity". 
Apparently Lloyd George favoured such a move but the Next Five Years 
representatives were very 'sticky', so much so that he lost his temper 
and taunted them with being cowards. "When one of them tentatively 
suggested that what they were afraid of was that the movement would 
become a Lloyd George one, he suggested that there was an easy way 
out of the difficulty. 
21 
will withdraw altogether from it, and you 
can run the thing yourselves. I ask for nothing better. I will 
have nothing to do with the campaign, and will retire to my 
3 
constituency and occupy myself with that". This, however, did not 
satisfy the Next Five Years representatives and the two bodies 
4 (from previous page) 
Salter: Directorg Fconomic and Finance Section, League of Nations 
Union, 1919-20, and 1922-31; Gladstone Professor of Political Theory 
and Institutional Oxford University, 1934-44; Independent MP Oxford 
University, 1937-50 
- 
his election to the House was to be the only 
striking public success attained by the Next Five Years Group. 
Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Shippingg 1939-41. 
1 The Times, August, 1935. This was exactly what Lloyd George wanted 
and he was hoping to detach Macmillan and other Left Wing Conservatives 
from the Government forces. 
2 Certain of the Next Five Years Group viewed Lloyd George's Council 
of Action and his so-called New Deal with apprehension: "We do not 
want", Lord Allen remarked, "the New Deal to turn out a 'New Game,. " 
Macmillan, Winds of Change, P-377- 
3 Lloyd George, A Diary by Frances Stevensont P-314. 
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remained separate in form and purpose: the Council a definite 
political movement; Next Five Years existing for research and the 
propagation of ideas. 
After the General Election there was much discussion about the 
future. At length, in February, 1936, the Next Five Years was 
reformed as a definite organisation, not as a party but as a 
pressure group. Its purpose now was to mobilize public opinion in 
support of the principles outlined in the book. This would be done 
by the publication of further literature, holding meetings and 
lectures, conducting correspondence in the press, and arranging 
deputations and employing other means of bringing influence to bear 
upon ministers, local authorities, political partiesq and other 
organisations. 
1 The Group also agreed on the launching of a monthly 
journal entitled The New Outlook, first issued in June, 1936, with 
Macmillan virtually in control of its publication. 
As 1936 progressed differences began to emerge as to the function 
of the group. Some members wanted to keep the group as it was, a 
constructive academic pressure group whose foremost concern was to 
secure the adoption of their programme and to this end be free to 
permeate all parties. By contrast a section led by Macmillan, acutely 
aware of the need for immediate action in regard to home and foreign 
affairs, wished to "bring together the progressive elements in the 
political life of Britain in a common movement for the achievement 
1 The Times, 18 February, 1936. 
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of a programme of immediate demands". 
1 In effect what was proposed 
was an English version of the French Popular Front, the success of 
which had not gone unnoticed in Britain. "Should we not launch", 
asked Macmillang "some kind of popular front wide enough to embrace 
Progressive Conservatives, Radicals, Liberals, and those members of 
the Socialist Party who were prepared to work for a limited objective? " 2 
A start could be made by linking the Next Five Years Group, the 
Council of Action, and other similar bodies. t'It is obvious that 
the official Party leaders cannot take action on these lines. If 
it is true, however, that the mass of people in Britain desired such 
a movement then the Party machines might be expected to move into line 
3 
at a later stage, in response to rank and file pressure". 
Letter from Macmillan to Lloyd George, 12 August, 19369 Lloyd George 
Papers. In an interview in The Start who were running a series 
about the possibility of a Popular Front, Macmillan said on 
25 June, 1936, that he thought the Conservative Party had become 
dominated by money and the City. "A party dominated by second- 
class brewers and company promoters 
-a Casino capitalism - is 
not likely to represent anybody but itself". But there was not 
much confidence to be placed in the Left either: "after ten years 
of no imagination, no drive, all we are left with is men like 
Attlee and Lansbury who are quite incompetent to govern an Empire". 
Macmillan felt that progress could be made in creating a popular 
front but it would have to be done slowly. What was needed was 
the formation of a great popular political party 
- 
he suggested 
Morrison as leader 
-! which would be Labour stripped of its 
extremes, "but he would have to achieve a fusion of all that 
is best in the Left and the Right and it would have to be a 
Left Centre rather than a Right Centre". 
Winds of Change, p. 487- 
Letter, Macmillan to Lloyd George, 12 August, 1936. 
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As the Next Five Years remained divided over the popular front 
proposals it was agreed that the Group be officially separated from 
The New Outlook, the official journal. The former concentrated on 
the academic and educative side while the latter entered the field 
of current politics, becoming involved in electoral activities. 
The Next Five Years continued its useful propaganda until it became 
clear it could not do much more along old lines, and was thus wound 
up in November, 1937. At the same time The New Outlook, with its 
board of directors, began exploring the possibilities of a popular 
front movement, based on a five-point programme of collective security, 
abolition of the means te8tq steps to help distressed areas, willing- 
neS8 to reduce tariffs and extension of public control over industry. 
In August 1936 Macmillan sent out a letter to interested parties: 
"As Chairman of the Board of Directors of the 
The New Outlook Ltd I am asked to communicate with you 
to find out whether you would be prepared to attend a 
meeting to be arranged for the early part of September to 
discuss the possibilities of launching such a movement. "' 
Lloyd George, at any rates replied to the effect that he was "in 
entire sympathy" with the exploratory movement. 
2 However, with 
Parliament in recess and so many people on holiday at that time of 
year, the meeting was postponed until a more favourable date could 
be arrived at. 
Meanwhile the journal% New Outlook, commenced its discussion and 
comment on the practicability of co-ordinating organisations and 
persons into a popular movement. A number of eminent people from 
1 Letterl Macmillan to Lloyd George, 12 August, 1936. 
2 Lloyd George Papers, Letter to Macmillang 18 August, 1936. 
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different walks of life made contributions, including such Members 
of Parliament as Morrison, John Parker, Foot, Mander and Roberts, 
although these were not all favourable to a front. From the articles 
published it is clear that the international situation influenced 
many in favour of a combination of progressive forces: questions of 
home policy were treated as secondary in urgency to foreign affairs. 
1 
In January, 1937, the meeting to discuss the possibility of 
launching a Popular Front at last took place. It was attended by 
representatives of the Next Five Years, the Council of Action, the 
Labour and Liberal Parties, the People's Front Propaganda Committee 
together with churchmen and people of no definite political attach- 
ments. Macmillan, in a letter to Lloyd Georgeq set out the basis for 
discussion and the programme of action which he hoped they would 
eventually adopt. "We have been discussing", he wrotel "the possibilities 
of an alliance of Progressives for the advocacy of an agreed short 
term programme 
... 
The first step is to achieve the partial unity 
we suggest (co-ordination of the Next Five Years, Council of Action, 
People's Front Propaganda Committee etc). Next is to obtain a 
following in the country. And the following would persuade or compel 
the Party leaders to take the action desired. " 
Nothing, in fact, came of the attempt as the various individuals 
3 
and groups "broke into fragments" 
. 
Undeterred, Macmillan continued 
to agitate for combined political action until it became clear, with 
the New Outlook ceasing publication, the Next Five Years Group being 
1 See New Outlook, July, 1936. 
2 Lloyd George Papers, Letter dated 16 January, 1937- 
Ibid, Council of Action Memorandum on the Left Book Club, 
12 February, 1937. 
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wound up, and the Council of Action beginning to "fade out as 
Lloyd George realised that it could not succeed in overthrowing 
the Government or even in influencing it, 
... 
that by the end of 
1937 these various movements, whether academic or political in a 
narrower senseq were nearing their end". 
1 
Failure, in part 
attributable to the organisations available not being strong enough 
and agreement not broad enough to carry into fuition any effective 
plan, can also be put down to their inability to overcome the rigid 
party alignments in British politics. The Labour Party rejected 
any association with other political bodies not sharing its "determina- 
tion to achieve our democratic socialist objectives", while the 
Liberal Party could not allow itself to be "identified with a policy 
of complete state socialism to which the Labour Party is committed". 
2 
Although New Outlook might declare that "the rival principles and 
catch words which marked the lines of political cleavage in the 
past, are to a large extent irrelevant to the real issues now", the 
cleavage nevertheless existed 
.3 "Obsolete" and "irrelevant" party 
structures may have been but the fact remained that they were an 
effective. obstacle in the way of the new developments. 
4 
It was an 
obstacle on which all the united or popular fronts were to founder. 
Macmillan had realized that "if the Popular Front proves impossible 
if the various progressive groups will not come together 
- 
then the 
only thing for people like myself is to revert back to the old policy 
of trying to influence the present Government". 
5 Though described 
1 Winds of Change,, p. 489. 
2 Liberal and Labour Party statements quoted by JV Delahaye in 
"Party Manifestoes", New Outlook, February, 1937. 
3 New Outlook, January, 1936; article entitled "Old Divisions Now 
Irrelevant". 
4 
Macmillang New Outlook, Mayg 1937. 
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by national newspaper as a "rebel at heart" Macmillan turned back 
to his party, working with the dissident Conservatives to strengthen 
its policies, but never quite relinquished his hope of a "a 1931 in 
reverse". 
1 
Spain and the later fronts 
The Right 
In the summer of 1936 a new question came to divide British 
public opinion. This was the Spanish Civil War. Neither the 
aggressions of Hitler's Germany and its anti-Jewish atrocities nor 
Italian barbarities in Abyssinia aroused such political passions as 
did that event. Nothing since the French Revolution, KW Watkins 
concluded from his study of British opinion towards the war, had so 
tragically divided the British public as the conflict in Spain 
- 
and 
that at a moment when unity was more necessary than at any time in 
British history. 2 In so doing, public attention was distracted 
from the graver problems raised by the revival of German power. 
The bitter and passionate differences between the Right and the 
Left, which existed at this time, have somewhat obscured differences 
within the Right. Three trends can be discerned among the National 
Government supporters over Spain. Nicolson recorded in his diary, 
in July, 1937: 
"The Foreign Affairs Committee discuss Spain. The 
enormous majority are passionately anti-Government and 
pro-Franco.,, 
3 
(from previous page) 
Letter to Lloyd George, 16 January, 1937, Lloyd George Papers. 
The Sunday Times, 8 February, 1937l quoted in Sampson's 
Macmillan 
-A Study inAmbiguity, p. 44. 
Britain Divided: the effects of the Spanish Civil War on British 
Public Opinionl, p. VII. 
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This large, ardent pro-Franco section was well-satisfied with a 
situation in which the policy of non-intervention was operating to 
the advantage of the Nationalists. Another trend was that of the true 
neutrals, who were indifferent to the issues being fought out in 
Spain and were therefore anxious to operate non-intervention in the 
cause of peace and to discourage any violation of that policy by 
Germany, Italy and Russia. The last, somewhat minimal, sympathised 
with the elected Republican Government. 
Where did those Government supporters considered so farl and 
others soon to oppose appeasement, stand over the Spanish issue? 
The dissidents in fact reflected the divisions of the Government 
supporters at large, and saw little connection between a Nazi Germany 
and a Franco Spain. Although the friends of Hitler were to a great 
extent those of Franco, Franco also had other supporters who were 
by no means so well-disposed to Hitler. There were a number of 
Conservatives who supported Franco, but who believed that the policy 
of strengthening Hitler by making concessions was fraught with danger. 
For Amery ideology and class sympathies were paramount in any 
analysis of the civil war. To him a Left Wing combination, dependent 
on the Communists and other extremist elements, had "created a state 
of anarchy and terror which by July led to a ferocious and implacable 
civil war. " 
1 Amery's sympathies went to those attempting to "reatore 
order",. the Nationalists, just as he had sympathised with Mussolini: 
"It was in this atmosphere of violence and frustration 
that Mussolini 
... 
rallied round him his little bands of 
3 (from previous page) 
Nicolson, entry for 15 July, Diaries and Letters, P-307- 
The Unforgiving Years, p. 193. 
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men determined to restore some sort of social and industrial 
order and, above all, as he told me at the timeg to see 
to it that no man's honourable wounds should be insulted 
with impunity. " 
1 
Was not Franco attempting to do the same thing in Spain? Amery, 
however, perhaps regarding Spain as a mare's nest, tended to be 
silent on the issuel as his colleague Austen Chamberlain was. The 
latter favoured Franco, although inclined to view Spain as an 
embarrassment, presumably a distraction from the main German 
challenge, as he indicated in a, letter to his sister, Ida: 
"I wish that Franco would make a quick end of it 
for the longer the civil war lasts the greater the inter- 
national complications and danger. " 
2 
Other Conservative dissidents who, from the beginning of the 
civil war, had openly supported Franco were Crossley, Page Crofts 
Cazalet, Wolmer, Keyes and Bower. Crossley visited Spain during the 
Christmas recess 1936-37 and met Franco, to whom he made a promise 
Itto tell the truth about what I had seen and what I had heard in the 
part of the country which he ruled". 
3 Crossley told the Commons 
that everywhere the Red Forces had retreatedq images had been rooted 
out of the churches, altars hacked down and some buildings had been 
razed to the ground. "In one church I saw tombs that had been 
desecrated 
... 
then there are the massacred priests. Out of the 
136 priests in Toledo, six are now alive. 114 Crossley frankly admitted 
1 ýV Political Life, P-380. 
2 Austen Chamberlain Papers, 28 November, 1936. 
3 House of Commons Debates, 19 January, 1937, Col. 124. 
4 Ibid, Col. 126. 
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sympathising with the Nationalists who, he claimed, not only carried 
on behind the lines in a perfectly normal and civil way but stood 
up for the rights of religion. The Member for Stretford was himself 
a Roman Catholic and as such sided with the majority of Spanish 
Catholics in seeing the Republican forces as fundamentally anti-God. 
Page Croft, perhaps the most voluble exponent of the Nationalist 
cause, belonged to the Friends of National Spain, the important pro- 
Franco propaganda organisation. In his memoirs Croft explained the 
reasons for involving himself in the conflict: 
"the case of Nationalist Spain was never presented, murder 
and outrage never exposed and the Reds had it all their 
own way 
... 
under these circumstances I, with some friends, 
decided to inform the country-" 
1 
Croft published a pamphlet describing "the welter of cruelty on the 
part of the Red Government", organised meetings and spoke on many 
occasions, either inside or outside the House, in support of the 
Nationalists. 
2 One such meeting was at Queens Hall on 23 March, 1938 
when Croft declared: "I recognise General Franco to be a gallant 
Christian gentleman, and I believe his word.,, 
3 Like Crossleyq 
Sir Henry was motivated by his religious feelings, but there was 
also his firm belief in law and order: 
"I desire to see Franco win because*I feel there 
is a danger of Christianity being completely wiped out 
in Spain. When before the revolution, I saw the wholesale 
1 My Life of strife, Croft, p. 266. 
2 lbid, p. 270. " 
3 Report of a Meeting Published by the Friends of National Spain, 
March, 19.38. 
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destruction of churches, and when I saw 
... 
that the 
law no longer ran and the liberty of the people no longer 
existed, I feel convinced that we must hope that the 
forces of law and order will win in Spain 
... 
Franco 
will win. 11 
1 
Captain Victor Cazalet belonged to the Friends of National Spain. 
In March 1938 he shared the Queens Hall platform with Croft, and 
described Franco as "the leader of our cause today". 
2 Wolmer was a 
member of a further pro-Franco organ18ation of some importance, the 
United Christian Front, which sought to show that Franco was fighting 
the cause of Christianity against the anti-Christ. Another Conservative 
dissident that openly supported the Nationalists was the Catholic 
Robert Bower, who was subsequently involved in a physical clash over 
Spain. In April 1938 when Emmanuel Shinwell was questioning the 
privileges accorded by the Government to Franco's agent in London, 
Bower interjected "Go back to Poland". 3 Shinwell rose from the 
Front Opposition Benchl crossed the floor of the House and struck 
Bower a resounding blow on the cheek with the open palm of his 
right hand. The Member for Seaham continued to stand over Bower, 
challenging him to remove his jacket and together leave the Chamber. 
Bower, although an experienced boxer, refused to leave his seat. 
Such was the passion aroused by Spain. 
4 
So much for the overt sympathisers of Franco within the group 
of Government supporters studied here. By contrast a number were by 
House of Commons Debates, 14 March, 1938, Cols-74-75- 
Daily Herald, 24 March, 1938. 
3A 
reference to Shinwell's Polish ancestry. 
4 
The Times, 5 APril, 1938. 
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and large, genuinely neutral throughout the Spanish melee. Macmillan 
recorded how, over the Spanish issue, not only was public opinion both 
in France and in Britain deeply divided, but the attention of 
Governments, of Parliaments, Press and the public was distracted 
from the real dangers immediately ahead. He went on: 
"I remember Churchill talking to me with great 
fervour on this aspect of the Spanish question. He decided 
to declare himself neutral, for his eyes were on the real 
enemy* In my small way, I took the same course. "' 
Consequently Macmillan agreed with the Government 
- 
whose policy, 
contrary to what members of the Left envisagedt seems on the whole 
to have been governed by a lack of sympathy for either side 
- 
that 
the chief danger lay in the possibility that the war in Spain would 
spread and escalate into a general European conflict. 
2 Open 
intervention rather than non-intervention would increase the chances 
of such a conflagration, and no issue to his mind could have been a 
worse one than the Spanish on which to challenge the dictators. Both 
French and British opinion was divided in sympathy and in any case 
both countries were, he felt, largely unarmed. 
Other Conservatives who, in Boothbyls'words found it "difficult 
on many occasions to support whole-heartedlyq in every one of its 
aspects, the policy of His Majesty's Government", but on the issue 
of Spain "wholeheartedly" supported this Itside of their policy", 
thinking it "admirable" and feeling that "the country thinks so too", 
included Horne, Spears, Sandys and Kerr. 3 It is apparent from such 
Winds of Change, p. 475. 
Hoare, for example, is supposed to have remarked in the summer of 
1936 that he hoped for a war in which Fascists and Bolsheviks would 
kill each other off. 
3 House of Commons Debates, 30 JulYi 19379 Col-3357. 
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sentiments that although Spain may have divided the British political 
community as a whole, it did much to unite the supporters of the 
National Government and smooth over many of their former disagreements 
over foreign policy. 
"For my part", declared Horne, "simply facing the real practical 
issue, I am prepared, even though non-intervention proves more 
ineffective than it is today, to support that policy in order to 
prevent the spread of a conflict which would be disastrous to the 
1 
civilisation of Europe. " Spears was another not wanting to become 
embroiled in the conflict. Great Britain was "dealing with an 
extremely dangerous civil war which, if we are not careful may 
involve Europe in war". He was against taking sides for the reason 
that "what is happening in Spain is that you have two extremist forces 
fighting it out, and the people as a whole clearly only want to be 
left in peace". 
2 Using a similar argument Sandys announced: 
"We on this side do not view with equanimity the 
establishment in Spain of either a Communist or a Fascist 
Government, but we are not'so ready as Members opposite 
to make a choice between those two evils.,, 
3 
The Member for Oldham, Hamilton Kerr, shared these sentiments 
and was persuaded that "a policy of neutrality will serve not only 
our interests but the cause of European peace". He admitted that 
Germany and Italy hoped they could establish a Fascist Government 
in Spain, subservient to their interests, but this he felt did not 
1 House of Commons Debates, 29 Octoberl 1936, Cols. 72-3. 
2 Ibid, 1 December, 1936, Col-1093o 
Ibid, Col. 1123. 
364. 
take into account the Spanish temperament and character which 
resented outsiders interferring in the nation's affairs. Like 
many other Conservatives he rested on Wellington's experience during 
the Peninsula War, hoping that the Spanish national character 
would, after the conflict, prevent any permanent control or occupation 
of Spanish territory by foreign powers. 
1 
A slight difference of approach among the non-interventionists 
can be detected in the case of John Macnamara. Having visited 
Republican Spain and showed great understanding of the situation 
there, he pressed the Government to do all in its power to make 
non-intervention effective. Fearful lest the Government - so 
soon after Abyssinia - again showed to considerable disadvantage, 
he called upon his fellow members to face the facts and not delude 
themselves that non-intervention was working: 
"Our prestige is at stake in the whole world, and there 
is an attitude of mind in many countries that we are 
running away from Italy and Germany. We have to regain 
our prestige and make non-intervention effective, because 
if we do not, we shall only store up much more trouble 
for ourselves in the future. tl 
2 
If non-intervention were made effective, he added, then either the 
Spaniards would fight it out in their own way, or else would listen 
to efforts of mediation. 
Churchill claimed that he too was neutral in the Spanish quarrel. 
The dominant factor in deciding his thinking was the critical 
House of Commons Debates, 18 December, 1936, Col. 2855- "There ia 
no country in Europe", the Duke had declared, "in the affairs of 
which foreigners can interfere with so little advantage as Spain. " 
Kerr: MP Oldham, 1931-45; Parliamentary Private Secretary to 
Duff Cooper, 1933-38. 
2 House of Commons Debates, 16 July, 1937, Col*2847- 
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importance of concentrating attention upon the German threat and not 
on a subsidiary issue. He might declare: 
"This Spanish welter is not the business of either 
France or Britain. Neither of these Spanish factions 
expresses our conception of civilisation 
... 
Let us 
stand aloof in redoubled vigilance and ever-increasing 
defences. " 19 
but it is apparent from his writings that he regarded the Nationalists 
as the lessor of two evils. 
Newspaper article after article gave indications of his bias. 
On 21 August he wrote that the majority of the nation supported 
Franco, and referred to the Republicans as "the Communist, Anarchist 
and Syndicalist forces which are now openly warring for absolute 
dominance in Spain". It is clear that Churchill was seriously alarmed 
by the revolutionary character of the Republic and felt it was only 
a matter of time before the 'democratic' force would be dispersed 
with, and the direct rule of Communists and Anarchists openly 
established: 
"Since the early part of this year, we have 
witnessed in Spain, an almost perfect reproduction, 
2 
mutatis mutandis, of the Kerensky period in Russia. " 
Although he expressed distaste at the atrocities committed by 
both sides, it was unfortunate that Churchill always managed to 
differentiate between them. Thus, although it seems to be the practice 
of the Nationalist forces to shoot a proportion of prisoners taken 
1 Step By Step, 10 August, 1936, P-53- 
2 Ibid. 
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in arms, they cannot be accused of having fallen to the level of 
committing the atrocities which are the daily handiwork of the 
Communists, Anarchists and the POUM, as the new and most extreme 
Trotskyist organisation is called. It would be a mistake alike 
in truth and wisdom for British public opinion to rate both sides 
at the same level. " 
1 That same month Churchill made his attitude 
very clear to Azcaratej the Republican Ambassador in London. On 
being presented to the Ambassador, Churchill turned red with anger, 
muttered "Blood, blood, blood", and refused the Spaniard's Outstretched 
hand. 
2 
Churchill's ambivalent attitude did not go unnoticed. Perhaps 
the most outspoken attack on his stance was made by Alan Sainsbury 
in the magazine New Outlook: 
"Unable to stage his comeback on India, he is now trying 
another game and angling for the support of the progressives, 
by posing as a strong believer in the League of Nations. He 
appears as star turn (really rather a ham actor) at a 
demonstration for "Peacet Freedom and Democracy" at the 
Albert Hall. With his incomparable demagogic oratory he 
praises the virtues of peace, democracy and better armaments. 
But make Spain the test caset and read his recent newspaper 
articles on this subject and you see the real Churchill. 
Is he for democracy in Spain? N011,3 
It may be said that Churchill was obsessed with the German menace and 
deplored any diversion from what he regarded as the real enemy, but 
1 Step By Step, 2 October, 1936, P. 67- 
2 Quoted in Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 220. 
3 New Outlook, February, 1937, Article entitled "Liberals and Spain". 
3679 
the fact remains he was inconsistent over Spain. Much of his recent 
activity had been devoted to espousing the League and defending 
democracy against dictatorship, and yet here we have him overlooking 
the position of the League and all but sympathising with a would-be 
dictator, backed by Germany and Italy. 
His attitude lends weight to the view that he saw the League 
simply in terms of the containment of Germany. Throughout the 
conflict he did not protest at the League being completely ignored 
and he even applauded the Non-Intervention Committee, which only 
succeeded in further reducing all international agreements into 
contempt. On 14 April, 1937, after reiterating his Olympian detach- 
ment, he told the Commons: 
"I expect the Non-Intervention Committee is full of 
swindles and cheats; anyhow it falls far short of strict 
interpretation and good faith, but it is a precious thing 
in these times that five great nations should be slanging 
each other round a table instead of blasting and bombing 
each other in horrible war. " 
Churchillis stance was open to question for not only did it wholly 
ignore the position and authority of the League, but also the 
attitude of "progressives" in Parliament, and Hitler's use of the 
Spanish issue. 
1938, however, witnessed a change in Churchill's attitude 
towards the Republic. He wrote in December that "The British 
Empire would run far less risk from the victory of the Spanish 
Government than from that of General Franco"* 
1 Ignoring his own 
1 Step By Step, 20 Decemberg 1938, P-313- 
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previous record of implicit support of the Nationalists, he described 
the possible triumph of the Republicans as a "strategic security for 
British Imperial communications through the Mediterranean"s 
Hugh Thomas puts Churchill's conversion down to "the work of 
his son-in-law, Sandys, who visited Barcelona in the Spring of 1938". 
2 
There is, however% no evidence to support such a contentions Sandys 
did indeed visit Republican Barcelonag but this was in his official 
capacity as Secretary of the Conservative Air Raid Precautions Committee. 
The Committee, which had a membership of over 100 MPs, was formed in 
1937 to press the Government for more action in the field of precautions. 
It had six sub-Committees dealing with gas, high explosivest fire, 
evacuationt public servicest and finance and insurance, and its work 
included research into precautions taken in other countries. 
3 In 
March, 1938 the Chairman, Oliver Simmonds, and Sandys, visited Spain 
for the express purpose of viewing the havoc wrought by bombing from 
the air and the precautions that were being taken by the authorities. 
On his return, Sandys reported to the Committee the results of the 
trip, and outlined what Britain's towns could expect in the event of 
bombing and what precautions could be taken before the event. 
4 
Despite this visit to Barcelona, at no time did Sandys display any 
sympathy to the Republict neither did he attempt to influence his 
father-in-law's views. 
5 
1 Step By Stepq 20 December, 1938, P-313- 
2 The Spanish Civil Warl P-531- So doeis RR Jamest Churchill: A 
Study in Failure, t P-321- 
3 Members of the committee visited Berlin on 20 February, 1938. The 
German Air Ministry arranged a three day programme of tours of Berlin's air raid shelters and, c, entres. The Times, 9 February, 1938. 
The Times, 8 Aprill 1938. 
5 Private information. 
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Thomas further contends that the English Conservative opponents 
of Chamberlain, headed by Churchillq came during the summer of 1938, 
to be Republican sympathisers. 
1 Again there is little evidence to 
support such a statement. It has been possible to ascertain that 
of the opponents of Chamberlain only Boothby, Nicolson, Hills, Adams 
and Atholl were sympathetic to the Republican cause. 
2 Nicolson 
recorded how he and Boothby felt over Spain in contrast to Churchill: 
"Winston doesn't fully agree with us about Spain, but 
mainly because of his friendship with Spanish grandees.,, 
3 
At the outbreak of the war Nicolson, like Boothby, had been a 
genuine neutral, since the brutality and political aims of each side 
were equally obnoxious to him. A year of intervention had followed 
and Nicolson had become partisan: 
"I know that in the Spanish situation I desire the 
Spanish Government to win. If I were to say in the House 
what I think about Franco I should use the most turbulent 
language. 114 
Adams, too, had been neutral on the outbreak of war in Spain. 
Within a few monthsq however, despite his continued support for 
non-intervention, he could tell the House that in one respect 
Gallacher the Communist MP and himself agreed: 
that is in an ardent desire that General Franco 
shall not win. I am not sure why the honourable Member 
wants him to lose. I dot because among other reasons, 
cannot conceive anything more damaging to the security 
1 The S nish Civil War, P-531- 
There is a possibility that Macnamara became sympathetic to the 
Republic. Late in the war he was secretary to one of the main 
Spanish relief organisations, the National Joint Committee for 
Spanish Relief. 
3 Diary entry, 16 march, 19389 Diaries and Letters, P-332. 
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and interests of the British Empire than a victory for 
General Franco. " 1 
During the course of the following year, when non-intervention 
visibly collapsed$ Adams felt on two grounds 
- 
"the ground of 
justice and the ground of British self-interest 
- 
the Spanish 
Republican Government should have had restored to it the power to 
defend itself1t. 2 
But the most famous of Britain's Republican sympathisers was the 
Duchess of Atholl, who was to ruin herself politically by her 
championing of the Republic. In fact Gallacher was to write that 
"Republican Spain never had a more loyal, earnest and energetic 
supporter". 
3 
In her autobiography Atholl confessed to "knowing nothing about 
Spain". It was the news that Germany and Italy were aiding the 
Nationalists that opened her eyes as to what was at stake there: 
"It seemed clear to me that if Hitler as well as 
Mussolini was helping Franco, his victory would be 
dangerous to us. tl 
4 
What is surprising is that the Duchess wasalmost alone in the recogni- 
tion of danger to Britain. She did, however, pay tribute to Major Jack 
Hillsq who she wrote was "the only Conservative MP who saw Spanish 
4 (from previous page) 
House of Commons Debates', 19 July, 1937, Col. 894. 
1 House of Commons Debates, 21 October, 1937, Col-150- 
2 Ibid, 28 February, 1939, Cols. 1158-59. 
3 The Chosen Few, p. 49. 
4A 
Working Partnership, p. 208. 
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affairs as I did". 
1 The latter, on the occasion of Eden's resignation, 
explained his standpoint over Spain: "I want the Government in Spain 
to win. I should regard a victory for Franco as a national disaster". 
1 
The Duchess was instrumental in setting up an All-Party Committee 
for Spanish Relief, which attempted to evacuate children from bombed 
areas during the early months of the war. Her interest in Spain was 
to deepen so that in April, 1937, accompanied by Eleanor Rathbone and 
Ellen Wilkinson, she paid a short visit to Spain to get first-hand 
knowledge of the situation there. 
2 Atholl was impressed with the way 
the Republican authorities were handling the emergency and was eager 
to publicize this on her return to England. Reactions to her visit 
reveal the extent to which the Right was committed to Franco. A 
National Citizens' Union, which she had joined because it had opposed 
the India Bill, "summoned" her to appear before its Committee to 
explain the reasons for her visit to the Republic. When the annual 
meeting of the union took place some weeks later, she was not 
surprised to find that she was no longer Vice-President. 
1 House of Commons Debate8,, 21 February, 1938, Col. 115. 
2 Rathbone: Independent MP Combined Universities, 1929-46. Through- 
out the 1930s she was a member of the executive of the League of 
Nations Union, and she favoured "the emergency of the League as 
an effective instrument for imposing a rule of law upon an anarchic 
international situation". Earlier than many of her contempories 
she realized that as a "last resort the League must be prepared to 
use force". M Stocks, Eleanor Rathbone, p. 228. With the emergence 
of Hitler, Rathbone believed that a new menace confronted the 
civilized world. t1A spirit has come over Germany", she said, "One 
speaker called it a new spirit, but I would rather call it a 
re-emergenge of an evil spirit which bodes very ill for the peace 
and freedom of the world". House of Commons Debates, 13 April, 1933, 
Col. 1034. Her concern for the victims of Nail excesses led to her 
involvement, as vice-chairman, of the National Committee for the 
Rescue from Nazi Terror. She also refused to visit Germany and was 
in favour of an economic boycott of German goods. With the outbreak 
of war in Spain, Rathbone chaired a Commission of Inquiry into Alleged 
Breaches of the Non-Intervention Agreement and further involved 
herself in the conflict by heading a National Joint Committee for 
Spanish Relief. I 
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In the Commons Atholl made known her views. One such occasion 
was the December, 1936 debate over the Carriage of Munitions to Spain 
Shipping Bill. If the Spanish Government won, she said, the dangers 
that would involve Britain were much less than those which might be 
faced if the insurgents were victorious, "Obviously, they have had 
valuable assistance from Fascist Powers which could not well be 
repaid in money, and would therefore have to be repaid by some 
transfer of territory, or the use of ports, air bases and so on. 1t 
Unfortunately for her standing in the Tory party, Stafford Cripps, 
who followed her, "humbly and respectfully" congratulated her on 
the speech. 
1 
To counter the general ignorance about the origin and history 
of the Spanish war, Atholl set about writing a book. She called it 
Searchlight on Spain, which kept her busy until June 1938, when it 
was published by Penguin. She started with the background of 
agrarian poverty that had provoked the fall of the monarchy, the 
peasants living on an average of is 6d a day, with no unemployment 
insurance or old age pensions to fall back on. She showed how from 
the very first the Right had never accepted the Republics and cited 
testimony to show that as early as 1934 Mussolini had been promising 
armed aid for the restoration of the monarchy. This was the preface 
to the story of the war itself, which occupied the remaining four- 
fifths of the book, and which examined and described the various 
insurgent propaganda myths, beginning with the legend that Franco 
had forestalled a Communist rising by striking when he did. At the 
end of her book she included a chapter entitled "What it means to us" 
in which she considered the war in relation to the vital interests of 
1 House of Commons Debatest 1 December, 1936, Col. 1140. 
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Britain: 
"the importance to U8 of Spain not falling into h08tilO 
hands cannot be exaggerated. A friendly Spain is very 
desirable, a Spain which is at least neutral is 
essential. " 
1 
Searchlight on Spain was among the most successful of all the 
books on the Spanish war. It sold 100,000 copies in a week and ran 
into a third edition. Atholl received an amazing amount of publicity 
and "from a local and insular figure she suddenly became almost a 
world figure". 
2 Inevitably it provoked an answer from the Right by 
Professor Charles Saroleal entitled Daylight on Spain, which summed 
up the feelings of the Tory Party towards the Duchess: 
"The Duchess of Atholl, merely by flying the Conservative 
flag is attempting to foist a pro-Bolshevik policy upon 
the Unionist Government and may succeed at least in dividing 
a party in which, until recently, she was a shining light and 
of which she nominally remains a member. 
0 
Meanwhile her views on Spain did not go unnoticed in her own 
constituency. A Catholic member of the Executive of the West 
Perthshire Unionist Association published and circulated a pamphlet 
attacking her support of the Republicans. Naturally, the Duchess 
replied to this, and her reply was circulated in the constituency. 
Soon afterl the Annual General Meeting of her Association took 
place, and as the author of the pamphlet was present, there was a 
1 Searchlight on Spain, p. 18. 
2C Saroleaq Daylight on Spaing P-15- 
3 Ibidl p. 15. 
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somewhat heated discussion. It ended when the Chairman reminded the 
meeting that his predecessor in the chair had made a bargain with 
Atholl that she was to have liberty to differ from the party line 
if she so desired. A resolution was then agreed toreaffirming the 
meeting's strong support of the Government's policy of non-intervention 
in Spain but recognising that the arrangement made with her at the 
last General Election gave her liberty to express her own personal 
views. In reply the Duchess made it plain she had never advocated 
intervention in Spain but only the restoration of the Republicans' 
right to buy arms. 
With this in mind she wrotel on 25 April, 1938, to the Prime 
Minister and told him she believed the scales were being weighted 
against the Spanish Government. In it she detailed a series of 
points in which she felt the position of the Republican Government 
had been seriously weakened by the so-called non-intervention policy. 
"Chamberlain", she wrotet "gave what seemed up to a degree to be 
reassuring replies"t but ended his letter by saying that he assumed 
this would not satisfy her. Therefore he had sent word to David 
Margesson to deprive her of the party whip. ' 
only a month later came a further meeting of the executive of 
the Unionist Association of her constituency party. This was to 
consider a charge against Atholl that at a recent Glasgow meeting in 
aid of Spanish relief she had joined in singing "the Red Flag". Unable 
to attend, she sent a complete rebuttal, which the majority of those 
present did not accept. Without consulting her they decided to look 
for another candidate. "I felt so confident that time would make 
1A Working Partnership, p. 219. 
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clearer the dangers of Europe, that I was not unduly depressed by 
the Committeds decision. " 
She was to be involved in a further incident of note. With 
Eleanor Rathbone and Ellen Wilkinson, the Duchess had given her 
name as patroness to a fund raised for an International Brigade 
Dependents' Committee to help men who had been disabled while 
fighting in Spain. On 27 July, 1938 a Captain Heilgers, Conservative 
Member for Bury St Edmandsl rose in the House and alleged that the 
Committee was recruiting young men for the Brigade. Heilgers 
implied that Atholl was involved. Two days later Atholl made a 
personal statementq replying fully to the charges. However, "my 
accuser was unrepentant, and on my going to him to assure him of 
my innocencet I found he would not listen. I actually heard him 
and the member next to him referring to me as a Communist. " 
When all is said and done it seems hardly credible that the 
Government and its supporters ignored strategic factors of paramount 
importance and pursued a policy divorced from Britain's national 
interests. Ideologically blinkered, the National Members overlooked 
their cherished Empire and paid no heed to warnings that: 
"from a strategical point of view, the political outcome 
of the present struggle is not, and cannot be a matter 
of indifference to us. A friendly Spain is desirable, 
a neutral Spain is vital-" 
1 
It is true that the hope, shared by so many Government backbench 
supporters of non-intervention, that Spanish national character 
would prevent any permanent control or occupation of territory by 
1 The Defence of Britain, B Liddell Hartq p. 66. 
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foreign powers was realised. Nevertheless Franco's Spain subsequently 
made available to Germany and Italy naval and air bases, in'formation 
on Allied movements, strategic war materials and Ivolunteeralt both 
soldiers and workers. Although Spain did not openly come into the 
war on the side of the Axis Powers therefore, as many on the Left 
feared and prophesied, it is evident that it came as near to doing 
so as its internal position would allow. 
Particularly blind were the majority of those Members who could 
be termed opponents of Chamberlain. Although support for appeasement, 
to a great extent, went hand in hand with sympathy for Franco, there 
were a number of Conservatives who supported Franco, or consented 
to an ineffective non-intervention policy, and yet who believed 
that the policy of strengthening Hitler by making continual 
concessions was dangerous. Macmillan might claim that Churchill's 
eyes were on the "real enemy", but this entirely ignores the manner 
in which Hitler utilized to his own future advantage 
- 
as seen 
above 
- 
the war in Spain. Furthermore, France was increasingly 
isolated since she had an unfriendly neighbour to the south-west 
in the event of war, while at the same time the international 
co-operation that many of the dissidents hoped for was brought into 
further disrepute. These were the fruits of the war for Germany 
and for the most part they ascaped the gaze of those whot more than 
any other group in their partyl should have noted the way Hitler 
lost no opportunity in gleaning every possible advantage from the 
conflict. 
The Left 
Just as there was much sympathy for Franco on the Right, there 
was passionate sympathy throughout the Labour movement, as indeed far 
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outside it, for the Republican cause. Excluded were the pacifists, 
to whom violence, even in the noblest cause, was abhorrent, and a 
number of Catholics for whom the official voice of the Church was 
just as compelling as any political factor, David Logan, the 
Catholic Member for the Scotland division of Liverpool, described 
the dilemma that Spain had placed him in: 
have been in a difficulty in regard to Spain during 
the last two years, having many friends on both sides, and 
being asked by both parties to visit Spain and express my 
opinion. I have always refused to do so for the simple 
reason that I should be considered a partisan. " 
1 
These apart, the overwhelming majority of the British Left professed 
complete support for the Spanish Republic. 
Nevertheless, in practice, the Right of Labour 
- 
with some 
exceptions 
- 
did not approach the Left and certain League enthusiasts 
in the ardour of their support for the Republicans. The Right, and 
those associated with it on this issue, was influenced by several 
factors: the strong pacifism in France; the hope that if Europe could 
be prevented from lining up in warring camps over the Spanish issueý 
a friendly settlement might be effected; above all, the conviction 
that the Spanish situation was fraught with danger of a general war, 
for which Britain was ill-prepared in armed might and allies, and 
which her public would not sanction, divided as it was. In addition, 
Labourites of the Right had little enthusiasm for the Spanish 
Popular Front Government. "I was not an admirer", wrote Dalton, "of 
the Spanish approximation to democracy. When the Spanish Left lost 
the elections in 1934, they started an armed revolt to reverse the 
House of Commons Debates, 24 April, 1940, Col-326. Other Catholics 
on the Labour benches were JJ Jonest WT Kelly, WA Robinson, 
JJ Tinker and RR Stokes- 
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result of the voting. This was very inefficient and soon fizzled 
out. Now that the Spanish Right had lost in 1936, they too had 
started an armed revolt, which looked more serious. I did not 
think well of this political method e.. I was, therefore, a 
good deal less enthusiastic than many of my political friends on 
behalf of the Spanish Republican Government. I was also far from 
enthusiastic for the slogan "Arms for Spain", if this meant, as 
some of my friends eagerly thought it did, that we were to supply 
arms which otherwise we should keep for ourselves. For I was much 
more keenly conscious that most of my friends of the terrible 
insufficiency of British armaments against the German danger. " 
None the less, since Germany and Italy were now Britain's potential 
enemies in Europe, and since Franco was their ally, Dalton held that 
it was "a British interest that Franco should not win this civil war". 
It was on this propositiong rather than on any extravagant eulogy of 
the Republic that he based most of his public references to the 
struggle. owing to this difference of approach, Dalton, although 
front bench spokesman of foreign affairs, did not speak in any of 
the numerous Parliamentary debates on this subject demanded by his 
colleagues. 
1 
Dalton's cautious approach characterised the reaction of those 
responsible for shaping Labour's attitude to the outbreak of war 
in Spain. With Labour's leaders out of the country during the summer 
recess, it fell to Greenwood, Bevin, Citrine and party officials to 
deal with Blum's proposals for non-intervention. Following extensive 
consultation with the Foreign Secretary they felt that they could not 
take lightly the risk of general war in Spain and therefore recommended, 
1 The Fateful Yearaq pp. 96-7- 
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at a hastily convened meeting of the remnants of the Parliamantary 
Labour Party, the Trades Union Congress General Council and the 
General Executive Committee, that Labour support non-intervention. 
In a statement issued on 28 August, the day of the meetingg the 
right of the Spanish Government to obtain arms was stressed as 
against the illegal supply of arms to the rebels. Grudgingly, 
however, the statement went on to commit Labour to non-interventioný 
expressing regret "that it should have been thought expedient, on 
the ground of the dangers of war inherent in this situations to 
conclude agreements among the European Powers laying an embargo upon 
the supply of arms and munitions of war to Spain, by which the rebel 
forces and the democratically elected and recognised Government of 
Spain are placed on the same footingt'. 
1 
Labour, then, together with the Government and the Liberal Party 
agreed that the correct policy was one of strict non-intervention in 
conjunction with France. The Spanish borders would be sealed and 
the Spaniards left to fight out their differences among themselves. 
That policy was perfectly to the Labour Party's liking so long as 
it was effective and the agreements "loyally observed by all parties, 
and their execution effectively co-ordinated and supervised1t. 
2 
It is easy in retrospect, to regard the policy of non-intervention, 
as Labour's Left did, as a gross betrayal by the Labour leadership of 
the Republican Government. Yet this misses the force of the argument 
for effective non-intervention in August and September, 1936. Had 
the policy been strictly observed and enforced, it could well have 
1 Labour Party Conference Report, 1936, p. 29. 
2 Rom the statement made on August 28. 
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proved in the general interests of Europe and the particular interests 
of the Spanish Government, since the rebels would have been more 
damaged by the cessation of aid from Hitler and Mussolini than the 
Republic hurt by the proscription of aid from France and Russia. It 
was not therefore the policy which was at fault but the way in which 
it was implemented, whereby intervention was permitted under the 
guise of non-intervention. Only when it became clear that the policy 
was working against the Republicans was it necessary to oppose non- 
intervention and advocate instead the sale of arms to Spain, in 
the same manner as they would be supplied to any other legitimate 
Government facing an insurrection. 
By the time the IAbour Party Conference assembled in Edinburgh 
on 5 October rumours were already circulating of the one-sided 
operation of non-intervention, and already there was a great upsurge 
of sentiment running contrary to the views of the Labour leadership. 
Greenwood was given the task of moving the resolution in support of 
the policy of the National Council of Labourt but was very uncomfortable 
with his brief, and was not very effective. Dalton summarised his 
speech: 
I 
"The alternative to non-intervention, he said, was 
'free trade' in arms, and then the rebels would get fifty 
guns from Germany and Italy, for every one which the 
Republicans would get from other countries. This was 
received with anger and jeers from the delegates. Nor 
did they respond much better to his well meant reference 
to Blum's difficultiest nor to his warning that 'free trade' 
in armsj with the incidents which it was likely to cause, 
would much increase the risk of general war. " 
1 
1 The Fateful Years', p. 98-9. 
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When Greenwood eat down no one rose from the floor to second the 
motion. The embarrassment was only broken when Grenfell eventually 
stepped into the breach, but even he, within a few months and 
following a visit to Spain, was to openly advocate the repudiation 
of non-intervention. 
Vigorous opposition to the non-intervention policy came from 
the floorl including speeches by Noel-Baker, Bevan and Dobbie. 
Noel-Baker, no Leftist, termed the rebels a "handful of adventurers" 
who were defeating a government backed by the vast majority of people. 
They were only able to do this because non-intervention was being 
violated, and consequently he wanted Labour to press the Government 
to announce that it would suspend the arms embargo. Unlike other 
speakers in the debate, William Dobbie had recently visited Spain, 
where a militiaman had told him: 'With us it is victory or death. 
Take the message to your people, and ask them to give us, not helpq 
but the opportunity to buy the things necessary for us in the defence 
of democracy, not only of ourselvesl but of the free peoples of the 
world'. 
1A dreadful picture, said Aneurin Bevan, had been painted 
of what would be the consequences if free trade in arms took place. 
But, he asked, "is it not obvious to everyone that if the arms 
continue to pour into the rebels in Spain, our Spanish comrades will 
be slaughtered by hundreds of thousands? Has Mr Bevin and the 
National Council considered the fate of the Mum Government if a 
Fascist Government is established in Spain? How long will French 
democracy stand against Fascism in Germany, Fascism in Italy, Fascism 
in Spain, and Fascism in Portugal? *.. Democracy in Europe will 
soon be in ruins. This is the consequence of this policy. 112 
Iabour Party Conference Report, 1936, p. 142. Dobbie was President 
of the National Union of Railwaymen, 1925-28 and 1930-33; MP9 
Rotherham, 1933-50- 
2 Iabour Party Conference Report, 1936, p. 145. 
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The comments of Bevan, Dobbie and others at the Conference make 
nonsense of Neville Thompson's view that while the Opposition became 
engrossed in the long drawn out Spanish conflict "their attention 
was diverted from events in the rest of Europe. To ignore the 
invasion of the Rhineland while preoccupied with sanctions was 
serious enough; but during the three years that attention was fixed 
on Spain it was hard to see clearly the significance of the Anschluss, 
the absorption of half of Czechoslovakia in two stages, and the 
Italian seizure of Albania. While the dictators were making these 
gains the British Government received no strong pressure from the 
Labour and Liberal Parties to pursue a different course". 
1 Rather 
the reverse was true. Spain for many in the Opposition Parties 
was the key to an understanding of what was at stake in Europe 
generally. Far from diverting attention from events in the rest of 
Europe, the civil war made them aware of German and Italian expansion, 
so that they were able to keep their eyes firmly fixed on the 
dictators' actions and to press the Government to see that the 
danger to European peace came not from Spain but from Germany and 
Italy. 
The Edinburgh debate continued heated to the end, when Greenwood's 
resolution was approved. However, the size and composition of the 
minority indicated the displeasure with a course that followed too 
closely that of the Government. The Manchester Guardian characterised 
the feeling of the delegates as Judases and went on: "If decisions 
were counted by heartsv not hands, today saw the heavy defeat of the 
official policy of non-intervention in Spain, " 
2 
Thompson, The Anti-Appeasers, p. 116. 
6 October, 1936. 
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The Conference was not finished with Spaing howeverg because two 
Spanish fraternal delegates spoke the following day* One of them, 
Isabel de Palencia$ known as La Passionaria, electrified the delegates 
with a passionate speech that brought them to their feet spontaneously 
singing the "Red Flag". Whereupon the wisdom of non-intervention was 
further questioned and accordingly Attlee and Greenwood proceeded to 
London to discuss Spain with Chamberlain, the acting Prime Minister. 
As a result Attlee, on the last day of the Conference, moved a resolu- 
tion stating that if there proved to be deliberate violations of 
the agreementg the British and French governments should at once 
restore to the Spanish Government the right to purchase arms. Attlee 
cautioned that abandonment of non-intervention involved the risk of 
war but nevertheless9 the Conference unanimously accepted the 
resolution. Presumably the fear that a bold British stand on Spain 
would be courting war, one of the major themes in Greenwood's 
argument, must have now given way to a hope that such was not the 
caise. 
This decision is a classic illustration of the contradiction with- 
in the existing policies of Labour. Whilst calling for an increasingly 
militant anti-Fascist policyl the party was still opposing the 
development of the very forces and materials, which, in the last resort, 
would have been essential to sustain it. Small wonder Dalton described 
the delegates, after the decision, as "wallowing in sheer emotion, 
in vicarious valour. They had no clue in their minds to the risks, 
and the realities, for Britain of a general war". 
2 
Although 
Apparently delegates circulated a petition among themselves which 
demanded that the Spanish question again be brought before the 
Conference. 200 signatures were obtained including those of 40 MPs. 
2 The Fateful Years, p*100- 
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KW Watkins takes Dalton to task for what he terms this "inherently 
contemptuous attitude to the democratically elected representatives 
of the rank and file of his own movement", the Labour Leader's 
comments appear justified, particularly in the light of the Hasting's 
Conference of 1933, when the rank and file voted both to oppose 
war by any means at their disposal while enthusiastically supporting 
a collective security approach, 
In all the Conference "was a most unhappy experience" with no- 
one, Left or Right, pleased with the results. To outsiders the 
proceedings over Spain gave an impression 
- 
not a mistaken one 
- 
of a leadership which was following from behind rather than one 
which was urging its supporters forward. Consequently The Times was 
not far wrong when it concluded that Labour was a party "adrift in 
a stormy world, with a committee of divided leaders uncertain how 
or where to steer'le 
2 
Any shred of confidence in non-intervention disappeared within 
a month after the Edinburgh conference. Hitler and Mussolini made 
a farce of it with a steady flow of aid to Franco that sooner or 
later was certain to strangle the Republic. Thus on 28 October, in 
accord with the Conference resolution, JAbour now demanded "that the 
right of the constitutionally elected Government of Spain to secure, 
in accordance with the practice of international law, the means 
necessary to uphold its authority and to enforce law and order in 
Spanish territoryq must be re-established". 
3 From then onwards Dalton 
1 Britain Divided, p. 166. 
12 October, 1936. 
Labour Party Conference Report, P-7- 
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noted "we stood on the simple slogan, 'Arms for Spain"'. 
' 
Yet was this opposition to non-intervention? Watkins has argued 
that the "demand that the Republican Government should be permitted 
*. 
to purchase arms abroad was not opposition to non-intervention. 
For the next nine months the official policy of the Labour Movement 
was one of pressing the National Government both to support the 
implementation of this demand and to take measures to make the 
Non-Intervention Agreement work". And again he has written that 
not until 27 July, 1937 did "the British Labour Movement officially 
adopt a policy of opposition to non-intervention". 
2 
In fact this is 
incorrect for opposition dates from Octoberq 1936, as Sir Charles 
Trevelyan indicated in a speech, on 7 October, at the 1937 Party 
Conference. While proposing that the National Executive launched 
forthwith a nation-wide campaign to "compel the Government to: 
1. Abandon the so-called Non-Intervention Agreement 
which allows the Fascist rebels to receive help while imposing 
sanctions on the Spanish Government. 
2. Restore to the democratically elected and Constitutional 
Spanish Government its rights under International Law to 
purchase arms and maintain its authority and establish order 
in its own territory'll 
Trevelyan remarked that "for the beat part of a year the repeatedly 
declared policy of the Party has been to demand the cessation of 
non-intervention and the restoration to the Spanish Government of 
3 its rights to purchase arms". 
1 The Fateful Years, p. 105. 
2 Britain Divided, pp. 167 and 181. 
3 Labour Party Conference Report$ p. 212. 
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If then Labour opposed non-intervention as from October% 1936, 
what is the significance, if any, of events in July, 1937, to which 
Watkins referred? Interestingly enough the statement of the 
National Council of Labour, issued on 27 July, is important, not as 
regards non-intervention, but precisely what Labour meant by 
"intervention". The meeting of the National Council followed an 
earlier one in Paris, of the Labour and Socialist International and 
the International Federation of Trade Unions, at which member groups 
were required "to bring pressure to bear by all possible means and 
without delay upon the Governments, members of the League of 
Nations, in order that in accordance with the Covenant, they assist 
the Spanish Government to recover its political and territorial 
independence", and ensure that it "may acquire the arms necessary 
for the defence of its territory and its rights". 1 The fact that 
the sale of arms is argued separately from the reference to assisting 
the Spanish Government to recover its independence is clearly 
ominous. The two Internationals were implying not simply the sale 
of arms but direct military assistance by the League Powers to 
redress the balance in the Republic's favour. Labour's National 
Council met on 27 July to consider the import of the above require- 
ment, and significantly played down the involvement implication for 
Britain. The "political and territorial integrity of Spain", the 
manifesto stated, "is not the exclusive interest of France and Great 
Britain. It is a matter of concern to all memberscf the League of 
Nations. It is the duty of the League to assist the Spanish people 
to recover their independence 
... 
Britain should use its power 
and influence as a member of the League to ensure the immediate 
1 labour Party Conference Report, p. 12* 
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withdrawal of foreign troops from the soil of Spain", 
1 These 
were guarded words, carefully framed to avoid committing Labour to 
the alternative of military assistance; what was really desired, as 
the manifesto elsewhere made clear, was the restoration to Madrid 
of a government's normal rights. 
With the decision to stand on the legal right of the Republican 
Government to buy arms the parliamentary lines were drawn which 
were to persist for the duration of the Spanish Civil War. The 
party thereafter remained critical of the British Government's 
policy whenever foreign affairs were debated but its opposition, 
though persistent, was fruitless and altered the government's 
course not a whit. The party protested in scores of questions, and 
with motions of censuref and consistently opposed legislation which 
was judged to damage the cause of the Spanish Government. One such 
instance was the party's resistance to a "Carriage of Munitions to 
Spain" Bill which prohibited British ships from carrying munitions 
to Spain. Labour's objection was that Britain surrendered her 
bargaining power in taking such action before the Fascist Powers 
similarly committed themselves. At the same time the Government 
banned the recruitment or volunteering of British citizens for the 
conflict, which IAbour condemned as a further one-sided sop to the 
dictators. 
The party also objected to a Merchant Shipping Bill, introduced 
in March, 1937 to tighten the controls preventing the passage of 
supplies to both sides. 
2 At first the executive suggested that the 
Bill should be allowed to go through unopposed with Tabour merely 
Labour Party Conference Report, P-13-; 
Merchant Shipping (Spanishý Frontiers Observation) Bill. 
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pointing out the Bill's shortcomings. Backbench discontentt howevert 
defeated this line at the party meeting, and the Bill was opposed 
both on first and second readings. The Labour front bench would then 
have been content to let the measure go through without further 
opposition but some Labourites were prepared to challenge each 
clause as it came up for discussion. 
After Noel-Baker, for the executive, had announced that "having 
made our protestt we mean, if the Third Reading is challenged to 
abstain from voting", Seymour Cocks confessed that he took "a much 
stronger line of antagonism to the Bill". 
1 The strength of feeling 
that motivated him can be seen from his speech: 
"I do regard this measure 
... 
as one of the most 
*. 
despicable 
... 
pieces of legislation that'has ever 
been brought before this House. It seems to me to be 
part of a general scheme that has been going on in the 
last few months to destroy the Spanish Government, and 
over the bodies of the Spanish peoples to erect a Fascist 
State in Spain. 
.. - 
If there is anybody in the House 
who has a sense of chivalry or a 
ieeling 
of fair play, 
who loves liberty and cherishes democracy, I ask him 
to vote against the Bill on the Third Reading. The 
Spanish people are fighting for liberty and freedom 
... 
If anybody will help me, I will divide the House. t' 
2 
Sixteen responded to his appeal and defied the Whips, though 
three were non-Labourites: Gallacher the Communist, Campbell-Stephen 
and Buchanan of the Independent IAbour Party. The other thirteen were: 
1 Hansard, 18 March, 1937, Col. 2458. 
2 Ibid, Cols. 2458-60. Cocks had vi; ited Spain during the summer recess 
of 1936, and, like William Dobbie, returned saying non-intervention 
was a farce. Bevan and Davidson are also known to have gone to Spain. 
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Bevan, Cripps, JJ Davidson, S0 Davies, Dobbie, T Henderson, 
AC Jones, WT Kelly, E Smith, WJ Stewart, J Westwood, EJ Williams 
and W Windsor. An analysis of the fourteen (including Cocks) 
revealed little except that the majority were manual workers with 
little formal education, who had worked their way into Parliament via 
the trade unions. 
1 The only exceptions to this were Cripps and 
Cocks, from comfortable homes, possessing a good education, holding 
jobs untypical of the party, respectively a lawyer and journalist. 
What is surprising in view of the fact that foreign affairs was 
a minority interest, the preserve of the middle class MPs, is that 
such average members should concern themselves with events abroad. 
Hansard, in fact, reveals that 10 of the 14 never intervened in a 
foreign affairs debate in the 193.5-39 period, suggesting no pre- 
occupation with external matters. Of the 5 that contributed, Bevan, 
Cocks, Cripps, Davidson and Dobbie, the majority of their speeches 
were concerned with Spain. It seems true to say therefore that the 
Spanish struggle widened the horizons of many 'domestic' Labour 
Members and brought home to them the connection between events abroad 
and the security of Britain. 
This was especially true of Left-wing Labour MPs who were well- 
represented in the fourteen: Cripps and Bevan, two of the most 
prominent Left-wingers in the party; Davidson, 
2 Davies, 3 Stewart, 
4 
1 Five, in fact, were miners. 
2 MPq Maryhill, 1935-45. 
3 MP, Merthyr Tydfil, 1934-72. 
4 
MP, Houghton-le-Spring, 1935-45; an unemployed miner at the 1935 
General Election. 
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Williams' and Windsor. 
2 The Civil war seems to have stirred the 
emotions of such Left-Wing MPs in the same way as Abyssinia had 
aroused the League devotees. In fact the crusading zeal with 
which they and other like-minded Labourites approached the issue 
was to induce severe strains within the parliamentary party. in 
their enthusiasm to preserve the Republic, the Left turned against 
the party leadership no less than the British Government$ regarding 
their leaders as being too accommodating and cautious for the 
vigorous opposition warranted by the situation. 
KW Watkins has argued that the upsurge of sentiment as a 
result of the war produced a situation in which two alternatives 
confronted the leadership of the Labour Party. "The first was to 
pursue a more militantly anti-Fascist policy, especially over Spain, 
which would have strengthened their leadership, and at the same time 
would have cut the ground from under the feet of the Communists. 
The second was to try and hold back the tide, using the weapons of 
discipline and expulsion against their dissident members, and by so 
doing to drive many into alliance with, or membership of, the 
Communist Party". In his view the leadership "chose the second path", 
their policy to a considerable extent "determined by their anti- 
Communism. In practice, this led to a position in which the 
Communists were enabled to appear as the true anti-Fuscists and the 
defenders of democracy. They reaped a harvest in membership and 
3 influence which would otherwise have been unthinkable"* 
MP, Ogmore, 1931-46; Secretary to the No Conscription Fellowship 
and the Hands Off Russia Council. 
2 MP, North East Bethnal Greent 1923-29; Kingston-upon-Hull, 1933-45. 
Britain Divided, pp. 181-82. 
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On several counts this will simply not do. At no time does 
Watkins spell out what he means by a "more militantly anti-Fascist 
policy over Spain". Presumably he has in mind a great agitation in 
the country to force the Government to give back to the Spaniards 
their international right to be armed, but precisely how this was 
to be done he does not make clear. A 'Spain Campaign Committee' was 
in fact appointed by the Executive after the 1937 Conferencel and 
it did organise meetings, demonstrations and collections of relief 
funds, culminating in a great demonstration at the Albert Hall in 
December 1937. After that, it must be admitted, the initiative 
waned, as it was mainly left to local parties and organisations, 
but it nevertheless remains true that the Labour Party was more 
active on Spain than an any other issue in this period. Perhaps 
Watkins goes further and is of the opinion, along with some members 
of the Left, whom he quotes, that greater pressure should have been 
applied by general protest strikes and non-co-operatioa in rearmament 
schemes, which might have forced the Government to reverse its 
position over Spain. This c. ertainly would have been a more 'militant' 
policy but it ignores the fact that the failure of 1926 was 
uncomfortably close, that strikes "designed or calculated to coerce 
the government" were thereafter illegal, and that such a course would 
have created bitter divisions both within the Labour movement and in 
the nation at large. As to halting rearmament, Labour would have 
laid itself more open to the charge 
- 
already made 
- 
of making Britain 
defenceless while willing to run the risk of war to arm a foreign 
government. 
Why, then, did the leadership act as it did? Those who "grasped 
the levers of power", as Watkins unkindly put it, were forced by 
virtue of their position, to take into account the realities of the 
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general situation, not solely events in Spain. There were those in 
the leadership, it is true, who had their doubts about the character 
of the Republican regime, but there were graver considerations, 
graver than anti-Communism, influencing the leaders as a whole. There 
was the yawning chasm in French political life to be taken into 
account, the widespread pacifism amidst Popular Front supporters, and 
the non-intervention initiative urged by Blum on his British 
colleagues. Then there was the conviction that the Axis could 
supply arms far in excess of what the Democracies could provide, 
a telling argument for the effective non-intervention that the 
leadership initially wanted. Above all was the conviction that the 
Spanish situation was fraught with danger of a general war, for which 
Britain was ill-prepared 
- 
and certainly would have been if the Left 
had had their way 
- 
in armed might, and which her public, divided as 
it was, would not have sanctioned. 
The latter point raises the familiar question in Labour politics 
whether the party was to act the part of a movement looking to power 
or to play the role of a party of protest. Although the majority of 
the public was broadly sympathetic to the Republican cause, Labour's 
leadership was acutely aware of the need to tread warily lest it go 
to lengths which the publicq to whom there were more things under 
the sun than Spain, would be unprepared to brook. With the ultimate 
aim of attaining power, the leadership regarded it as essential to 
maintain contact with public opinion and practical considerations, 
not leaving both behind, as did many of the Left to whom "little 
else mattered" save Spain. 
1 Given all these factors it is under- 
standable why leaders were reluctant to be too militant, and unfair 
1 Foot, Aneurin Bevan, p. 226. 
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to dismiss them as Ithaving abrogated political wisdom to themselves", 
and "reached a position in which the ends justified the means", 
"prepared to use all available weapons to obtain support for non- 
intervention, even if this meant that support for the Republicans 
could only be verbal". 
1 
FVrthermore it is not correct to argue that the leadership used 
the weapons of discipline and expulsion to hold back the tide of 
sentiment over Spain. Discipline and expulsions were used, not to 
hold back the "Spanish tide", but to prevent co-operation with the 
Communist Party, the ideology of which, like fascism, was anathema 
to Labour orthodoxy. Herbert Morrison, of all people, who had 
expounded Labour's thinking on this score at the Hastings Conference, 
was himself a dissident over Spain, having opposed non-intervention 
from the beginning, and there was no question of expelling him or any 
of likemind over this issue. Seen in this light, it was not points 
of view that were at stake but associations, and any schoolmasterly 
behaviour displayed by the leadership at this time must be directly 
related to the approach of members of the Left to the Communist 
Party, an organisation which was pulling in a similar direction in 
the tide of sentiment over Spain. 
One further point remains. Were 'many# driven into alliance 
with, or membership of, the Communist Party, which thereby "reaped 
a harvest of membership and influencett? Watkins quotes Burgess and 
McLean and other intellectuals as examples, but just how representative 
were they? Henry Pelling's figures for Communist Party membership 
are revealing 
- 
implying, in the view of this writerl how much out 
on a limb the Left were over Spain 
- 
for although they show a rapid 
1 Britain Divided, p. 166. 
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expansion in membership the party was still comparatively tiny. From 
a total of about 7,500 early in 1936, the figures rose rapidly to 
lls500 in November. Thereafter, however, in spite of most favourable 
conditions for recruitment, the expansion slowed down; it was 129250 
in May, 1937, and 15,570 in September. In the first eight months of 
1939 the party remained fairly constant in size at about 18,000, 
dropping to 10,000 in 1940. it was therefore not without reason that 
Manuilsky complained in March, 1939, that the British party was 
"one of the most backward sections of the Comintern. It has not 
succeeded in breaking through to the main sections of the British 
working class". 
1 Having questioned the many, it remains to say 
that if the Communists did appear the "true anti-Fascists and 
defenders of democracy's this could only have been to a few thousand 
people, predominantly drawn from Left-wing circles. 
The United Front with the Communists 
The depth of the commitment to the Republic felt on the Left can 
be gauged not only by the breaking of ranks over the Merchant Shipping 
Bill, and the bitter intra-party clashes at the Party Conferencesl 
but 
- 
as has been hinted at above 
- 
by the attempt to establish a 
united front in Britain. As the agitation over Spain had appeared 
to indicate that it was the Communists who were the busiest, organising, 
demonstrating, protesting and also fighting in Spain, it seemed to 
some Left-wing members of the Labour Party less and less defensible 
to treat them as pariahs. Rather, the situation required an 
association between the Labour and Communist Parties as well as the 
Independent Labour Party. 
1 The British Communist Parq, p. 104. 
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The Labour leaders, for their part, were firmly opposed to the 
formation of a "united front" with the Communists, or for that 
matter of a popular front, including anyone opposed to the GovernmentIs 
policies, which was also then being considered. At the 1936 
Conference, their attitude had been overwhelmingly endorsed: a 
united front resolution was defeated by 1,805,000 votes to 435,000. 
An amendment to the resolution suggesting that the National Executive 
should "take all practicable steps to mobilize the support of all 
peace-loving and democratic citizens in the struggle for peace and 
fight against Fascism" was turned down by an even larger majority. 1 
The delegates then unanimously agreed to a resolution which declared 
that they were irrevocably opposed to any attempt to water down Labour 
policy in order to increase membership. 
Despite the fact that the Conference had given massive endorse- 
ment to the Executive's opposition to the united front, the Socialist 
League, under the guidance of Crippsj pressed more vigorously than 
ever for its creation. 
2 On the 16-17 of January a special delegate 
Conference of the League approved, by 56 votes to 38, with 23 
abstentions, the launching of a Unity Campaign with the Independent 
Labour and Communist Parties. The three organisations agreed to 
cease attacking each other and sought to make an alliance with the 
Labour Party in order to effect the unity of the three parties at the 
next election. 
1 labour Party Conference Report, 1936, p. 257- 
2 Cripps, according to Fenner Brockway, the moving spirit behind the 
campaign, was "convinced that the official leadership of the Labour 
Party had not the inspiration or the policy to lead the workers to 
socialism", and hoped that a combination of the Communist Party, 
Independent Labour Party and Socialist League would "resurrect" the 
Labour Party, making it more "socialistic" and "dynamic". Inside 
the Left, p. 264. 
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A Unity Manifesto, jointly signed, was issued calling for 
"Unity in the struggle against Fascism, Reaction and War, and 
against the National Government", and advocated "the return of a 
Labour Government as the next stage in the advance to working-class 
power". It repudiated "class-collaboration", denounced the Government 
as "the agent of British Capitalism and Imperialism" and recorded its 
"implacable opposition to the rearmament and recruiting programme 
of the National Government", which it accused of using armaments "only 
in support of Fascism, of Imperialist War, of Reaction, and of 
Colonial Suppression". The workers were summoned to I'mobilise for 
the maintenance of peaceq for the defence of the Soviet Union and 
its fight for peace, and for a pact between Great Britain, the 
Soviet Union, France, and all other states in which the working class 
have political freedom". 
The Unity Campaign was officially launched at a meeting in the 
Free Trade Hall, Manchester on 24 January, 1937. Remarkable meetings, 
almost revivalist in nature, were held in Cardiff, Swansea, 
Birmingham, Plymouthq Bristol, Leeds, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Dundee. 
Members of Parliament taking part in the campaign included Cripps, 
Strauss, Pritt, Bevan, Gallacher, and the four Independent Labour Party 
Members: Buchanan, Maxton, McGovern and Stephen. The appearance of 
members of the different groupings on the same platform, however, gave 
the united front an air of unity which did not exist. Negotiations 
for the campaign had nearly broken down several times, and even when 
launched there were serious differences, as testified to by Gallacher: 
"It was a tough proposition from the start 
... 
We 
were presumably campaigning for unity of the Labour movement 
which meant winning over the Labour Party. The Independent 
397- 
Labour Party representatives took an ultra-Left attitude 
on all questions, always putting forward the most extreme 
proposals, proposals that would have made any approach to 
the Labour Party impossible. Harry (Politt) would reason 
with them 
... 
while the Socialist Leaguers, in a sort 
of political daze, would gaze from one side to the other 
with little or no appreciation of what was going on. We 
never really got down to a common basis of understandingl 
nor was there that measure of confidence essential for 
the success of a joint campaign. Cripps, Brockway and I 
were billed one Sunday for meetings in Eastleigh and 
Southampton. We travelled from Waterloo in the same traing 
but in different carriages. What an exhibition of unity&" 
The Labour Party Executive reacted at once with a circular 
headed Party Loyalty, which damned such collaboration with the 
Communists. Dalton privately recorded his annoyance at this "piece 
of clotted nonsenself, which was "a most exasperating diversion of 
the Party's mind and energies". 
2 As Executive pressure on the 
League failed to bring it to heelt on January 27,1937, the 
organisation was expelled from the Party and a further circular 
issued. This chronicled the errors of the Socialist League and 
declared membership of it inconsistent with membership of the 
Labour Party. The Socialist League countered by dissolving itself 
in March, leaving members of the Labour Party free to support 
the unity campaign as individuals. The executive replied by 
threatening to expel members who did so, but at this point the 
1 Gallacher, The Rolling of the Thunder, p. 147- 
2 The Fateful Years, p. 12-9. 
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Independent Labour and Communist Parties decided to withdraw, and the 
campaign collapsed. Cripps resurrected the united front iasue at the 
party's annual conference at Bournemouth in October, 1937; but the 
executive, defended by Clynes and Morrisont were supported by an 
overwhelming vote. 
Yet as long as the international situation moved from crisis to 
crisis, neither conference vote nor executive decision could end the 
agitation for an anti-fascist front. 
1 When it re-emerged, however, 
the demand took a different form. Whereas the proposed united front 
had been mainly a demand for joint action between the IAbour Party 
and the Communists to meet the dangers of fascism both abroad and 
at home, that of the later months of 1937 rested on a basis broader 
than that of the working class. There began to appear a growing 
demand for the widest possible coalition of anti-Government, anti- 
fascist forces, with the object of evicting Chamberlain from office 
and installing by pressure of public opinion a government that would 
stand up to the aggressor nations. 
The importance of events in Spain, not only on the various united 
front and popular front movements of these yearal but on the Labour 
Party cannot be overstressed. 
2 The conflict induced severe strains 
within the Labour Party; it exacerbated the divisions to such an 
extent that the Edinburgh Conference and its sequel marked the nadir 
of party unity in the 1930s. Nevertheless, the Nationalist revolt 
According to GDH Colet the situation in Spain 
- 
whereby the 
Italians and Germans poured military help more and more openly, 
while nothing was done to aid the Republicaa cause 
- 
called very 
strong feelings into play among the Left, becoming the "main 
driving force behind the various United Front and Popular Front 
movements of the years 1937-39". History of the LabourParty, P-329, 
2 Undoubtedly Spain intensified the movement's growing interest in 
foreign affairs. It has been possible to trace over 20 Labour 
Members of Parliament who visited Spaing several of whom had 
previously paid little attention to events beyond Britain's borders. 
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and the aid Franco received from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy 
strengthened the convictiong which originated in Mussolini's 
attack on Abyssinia, that there were issues in the international 
scene which justified a resort to arms. The Left 1 and other 
domestic orientated Labour Members came to recognise the threat 
of fascism from without, and in so doing, as CL Mowat has writteng 
"It led to a changing of sides over peace and war. The Left became 
war-minded: the Spanish Civil War mobilised the non-trade-union 
sections of the Labour movement as Hitler's brutalities had already 
begun to mobilise the trade unions. The more this happened, the 
more the Government moved away from war; peace with the dictators, 
at almost any price, seemed to be its policy. " 
2 
Since the Tory Party, including most of those aware of the Nazi 
threat, was strangely silent about British interests in the conflict, 
Labour, and in particular its Left, became acquainted with a new 
vocabulary, one which spoke of vital communications and interestse 
It remained for Bevan to warn that "should Spain become Fascist, 
as assuredly it will if the rebels succeed 
... 
then Britain's 
undisputed power in the Mediterranean is gone". 
3 Small wonder 
Bernays commented: 
"There is a new tone about their speeches nowadays. 
They talk about the prestige of the Navy and the might and 
power of the British Empire. Phrases have been used by 
the Opposition in these Debates that might have come 
One symptom of the change was the Left's new found enthusiasm 
for the League, which was now no longer an international burglars' 
union, but the means through which the apread of fascism could be 
challenged. 
Britain between the Wars, PP-577-8. 
Foot, Aneurin Bevan, p. 219. 
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straight from a Palmerstonian Parliament. We have heard 
about Drakds drum and the Nelson touch and about how 
Britannia rules the waves, and one almost expected some 
honourable Member to rise on the Labour benches and say: 
'We don't want to fight, but by jingo if we do 
We've got the ships, we've got the men and we've 
got the money too. "' 
1 
But the fact that domestic oriented MPs, particularly the Left, 
became 'war-minded' does not warrant Watkins description of the 
Left of the Labour Movement as being one of the "two sections of 
British political life which most clearly foresaw the Nazi menace to 
Britain". 2 That description, 'if it must be applied, belongs elsewhere, 
to the Daltons, Bevins and Citrines, men disparaged by Watkins. It 
was this section, unlike the Left, which supported rearmament, and 
were willing to pursue a militant foreign policy, given the right 
conditions, which they felt did not exist over Spain. Nevertheless, 
Labourites, drawn asunder by Spain, were to be united by the Czechoslovak 
crisis, when the party as a whole pursued a militant foreign policy, 
with opposition to rearmament having withered away. 
3 
Like Tabour, the Liberal Party's initial reaction, on the outbreak 
of strife in Spain, was to prevent the flames of war spreading into 
Europe. Consequently the party applauded the French proposals 
concerning the non-intervention agreement which, it was felt, if 
properly implemented, would effectively isolate the conflict* Once 
1 House of Commons Debates, 20 April, 1937, Col. 1698. 
2 Britain Divided, p. 186; the other being the Churchillian Tories. 
With the exception of the damaging Petition Campaign of Crippa. 
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the danger of an European conflagration had been overcome, the 
British Government should endeavour to mediate with a view to an 
armistice and an ultimate settlement. This is not to say that the 
Liberal Party was neutral in sympathy for, as a draft resolution, 
passed by the Liberal Council, read "The Spanish rebels are striving 
to overthrow the constitutionally elected Government of Spain. They 
are being backed by powerful elements in the British Press and the 
Conservative Party. If this revolt succeeds dictatorship will have 
become the predominant form of government in Europe, and will 
confront France on three fronts. " 
1 
Why then did the Liberal Party reject the policy that the Labour 
Party adopted in October, 1936, that owing to violations of the non- 
intervention agreement, the Spanish Government should be enabled to 
buy arms? Sinclair explained the reasons for the Liberal standpoint, 
during the first real debate on the Spanish imbroglio: 
"I often hear it said by those who are in favour of 
abandoning the policy of non-intervention, that the agreement 
has been broken by the Fascist Powers and that we have the 
right to claim to be able to supply the Spanish Government. 
Of course we have. But what is lawful is not always expedientt 
and it is the expediency of abandoning the policy of non- 
intervention that I doubt 
... 
if we support the constitutional 
Government, and the other Powers are going to give fifty times 
the support to the rebels, and we shall then be in a 
general European conflict, the two sides of which will be 
evenly matched. tt 
2 
The Times, 16 September, 1936. 
Hansard, 29 October, 1936, cols. 66-68. 
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What the majority of Liberal Members wanted was not the sale of 
arms to the Republicans, but the effective application of the policy 
of non-intervention so that arms would no longer be sent to the rebel 
forces. Sinclair repeatedly voiced this in the House: 
"Let the Government patch up this Non-Intervention 
Agreement if they can 
... 
but to put all the patches on 
the holes through which the constitutionally elected government 
of Spain is getting supplies, and to leave open all the 
holes through which the rebels are drawing suppliesq would 
ensure the defeat of the Spanish Government 
... 
I 
believe the defeat of the Spanish Government would be a 
disaster to the peace of the world and a serious threat 
to the interests of this country and of the Bspire, " 
1 
Some Liberal MPs came to view the Spanish conflict as a great 
opportunity to resurrect the authority of the League of Nations* 
on several occasions during the war they advocated the reference of 
the whole of the Spanish problem to the League. During a debate 
in June, 1937, the leader of the party suggested that the League 
should send an impartial commission to ascertain the facts, "to 
find out whether this really was a civil war between two fairly evenly 
matched parties in Spain with some foreign support to each, and, if 
so, let that Commission see if mediation was possible between the 
two sides so as to bring this horrible tragedy to an endl and 
re-establish peace; or whether intervention on such a scale and so 
one-sided as to amount to a deliberate attempt by certain foreign 
powers, with some Spanish military support, to conquer the Spanish 
1 Hansard, 1 December, 1936, Cols. 1087-88. 
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people, to acquire Spanish mineral and other resources, and to occupy 
in Spain strategic positions". 
' Wilf Roberts too, supporting his 
leader, called for the League to send a commission to Spain, but 
added that "if either party in the Spanish conflict refuses to 
accept that condition of investigation, if either party refuses to 
agree to the withdrawal of foreign volunteers, if either party refuses 
to submit to that investigation as to the extent of foreign interven- 
tion, then it be treated as an aggressor in the war and that the 
League procedure be applied to that party as an aggressor". 
2 However 
well-intentioned the proposal, its over-optimism was obvious, although 
Liberals were not alone in putting forward such a policy. 3 By 1937 
the League's authority was almost non-existent, and in any case 
the League Powers were as badly divided over Spain as British 
public opinion. 
After months of intervention, some of it blatant, the Liberal 
Party Assembly at Buxtont in May 1937, still passed a resolution 
calling on the Government to exert pressure to make non-intervention 
a reality, "to procure the cessation of aerial bombing in Spain 
and to secure the withdrawal of foreign nationals from the armed 
forces on both sides; and further, the Assembly urges His Majesty's 
Government to use their influence to bring about an armistice and, 
1 House of Commons Debates, 
. 
25 June, 1937, Cola-1543-44. 
2 Ibid, Col-1564. 
3 Noel-Baker is recorded as having "transferred all his eager 
enthusiasm and credulous optimism from Geneva to the Spanish front"s 
Dalton, Diaries, 12 April, 1938. He, too, pressed for the Spanish 
question to be referred to the League, in the hope that the rule 
of law might thereby be preserved and the League's pre-eminence 
restored. See his intervention, House of Commons Debates,, 26 October, 
1937, Cols. 284-5. 
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if so desired by the Spanish people, to assist in the establishment 
of permanent peace". 
1 The Liberalst therefore, were far more cautious 
than Labour in their approach to the Spanish problem. 
Yet within the parliamentary party voices were raised questioning 
the wisdom of continued support of non-intervention. David Lloyd 
George, for one, queried the system whereby the machinery of war 
was sent by foreigners in the proportion of eight to one to one side. 
"You are not stopping equipment, you are not stopping bloodshed. 
All you are doing is giving an overwhelming advantage to one side. " 
2 
Other members acutely stirred over the Spanish issue, and who tended 
to be drawn from the Left of the party, were Robertst Richard Acland, 
Megan Lloyd George and Mander. When the Civil War started they had 
no doubt that the correct course would be to supply arms to the 
constitutionally elected government and to deny arms to the rebels. 
At no time did they favour denying the legal right of the Republican 
Government to buy arms, for as Acland put it: 
"Once the Non-Intervention Treaty became a fait accompli 
our concern was two fold: first to call attention to the 
flagrant way in which Germany and Italy were defying the 
Treaty in the interests of Franco; and then to say because 
they are breaking the Treaty on their side, we ought to 
abrogate the Treaty and sell arms to the Republicans. 113 
All four MPs belonged to a Parliamentary Committee on Spain, aa 
did Atholl and several Labour MPs. 
4 
The Committee was anxious to 
1 Liberal Magazine, Junel 1937- 
2 House of Commons Debates, 25 June, 19379 Col. 1598. 
3 Letter to the author, 22 March, 1971- 
4 
The Labour Members were Bevan, Grenfell, Jagger, Noel-Bakerw Pritt, 
Silverman, Strauss, Summerskill, Wedgwood and Wilkinson. 
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publicise the breaches of the non-intervention treaty and to press 
for the restoration of the Republic's right to buy arms. To this 
end Committee members were active in promoting Parliamentary questions, 
and in collecting and circulating material to be used in foreign 
policy debates. The Committee also supplied information on the 
voting and speaking records of the pro-Franco MPs to the various 
opposition parties in their constituencies; the reason being that 
these members could be attacked locally for supporting Franco, in 
the hope that this would help to unseat them at the forthcoming 
general election. 
1 
Perhaps the most active of Liberal MPs as regards Spain was 
Roberts, the Member for Cumberland North. Roberts helped set up 
the Parliamentary Committee on Spain, and, with the co-operation of 
fellow MPs like Rathbone and Atholl, was instrumental in establishing 
an All-Party Committee for Spanish Relief. The Committee's form of 
help was to send motor lorries to bring children from bombed areas, 
particularly from Madrid which by the autumn of 1936 was being bombed 
by the Nationalists, to safer districts. Roberts became the Relief 
Committee's energetic young secretary and, in that capacityq had 
first hand experience of Madrid, when he Visited Spain in November, 
1936.2 
In Parliament Roberts regularly intervened in debates, often 
bitterly attacking the Conservative Party for its policy towards 
Spain: 
Rathbone Papers, in which there are personal files on the speeches 
and activities of such pro-Franco Mps as Crossleyl Croft and 
Keyes. 
2 Report on the Visit by an All Party Group of Mps to Spain,, 
November, 1936-. 
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III cannot understand why the constitutional party 
which sits oppositel on every occasion on which democracy 
is threatened, support the dictators, and I sometimes 
fear if in England democracy should decide on a Left- 
wing government, what, in those circumstances, would be 
the method of some honourable Members who sit opposite? " 
1 
Roberts went on to argue that British interests were essentially bound 
up with the victory of the Spanish Government under its Liberal 
and Republican leadership. 
By May, 1938, opinion in the party, stirred up by the events 
abroad, particularly the continuing breaches of the non-intervention 
agreement, swung completely against existing Liberal policy. A 
resolution, therefore, was passed at the Bath Assembly that the 
t1failure of the Non-Intervention agreements should be frankly 
recognised; that the Non-Intervention Committee be dissolved; and 
that, while any direct intervention by the British Government in 
Spain should be confined to the relief of the sufferings of the 
Spanish people and the promotion of peace, it should no longer 
prevent the constitutional government of Spain from purchasing the 
supplies which it needs to defend itself from rebellion at home and 
invasion from abroad". Thenceforward the Liberal and Labour Parties 
stood firm on the policy that the Non-Intervention Agreements be 
ended, and that the Spanish Government should be entitled to buy 
arms. Neither favoured the alternative of intervention save as, 
in the words of the resolutiont to relieve the sufferings of the 
people and promote peace. 
The Bath Assembly also witnessed the party's official advocacy 
of the popular front. Although the parliamentary party had been 
1 House of Commons Debates, 31 JulY, 1936, Col. 1920. 
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intent on "building up a non-Socialist alternative to the present 
Government", by sheer lack of numbers it could on the short-term 
be nothing but a second and weaker opposition, unable to exercise 
any important influence on public policy. 
1 In such circumstances 
a handful of Liberal Members, drawn from the radical wing of the 
party,. came round to the idea of building a popular front against 
the Government. Pressure of events abroad, in particular the out- 
break of war in Spain, brought this change from the independent 
stance affirmed after the General Election. 
2 Liberal enthusiasts 
reasoned that any moderate government of the Left, although this 
would involve the temporary abandonment of ideological differences, 
was preferable to the continuance of the disastrous National 
administration. 
In August, 1936, Mander wrote a letter to the magazine New 
Outlook arguing that "an association of Left parties is manifestly 
desirable". He went on to claim that the whole future of the 
world, for generations to come, hung in the balance, and depended 
upon courageous British leadership in the field of foreign affairs. 
This would not be given by Baldwin's Government* "Party considera- 
tions are of minor importance compared with the vital necessity of 
securing a Government which will give this leadership". 
3 Mander's 
1 Sinclair, 
-speech recorded in the Liberal Magazine, January 1937- 
2 By contrast the course of events abroad, notably in Spain, influenced 
Bernays to apply for the Liberal National Whip. In Spain, the 
Member for Bristol North arguedq "were manifested in a lamentable 
form the results of the weak Popular Front Government now being 
strongly advocated in this country as the only alternative to the 
National Government". He had been increasingly convinced that in 
the"interest of efficient Government, and indeed of democracy 
itself, it behoved every Liberal to play his part in helping to 
maintain the existing National Front in these dark and difficult 
days". Liberal Magazine, Octobert 1936. 
3 New Outlook, August, 1936. 
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call was taken up by Richard Acland. In December he addressed a 
meeting in the Friends' House, and spoke of the need for a short- 
term programme of co-operation between Left inclined groups and 
individuals in order to overthrow the Government. 
1 
An article written by Wilfrid Roberts showed clearly that the 
impetus for a broad-based grouping came from overseas: 
11 
... 
some of us regard home policy, important 
as it is, as only secondary in urgency to foreign affairs. 
If we really believe what we have been saying about the 
danger of war, how can we avoid the irresistable conclusion 
that the National Government must be replaced at the next 
general election by those who are determined to avert the 
next war by collective action 
... 
Communists, Conservatives, 
Liberals, Labourites 
-I would accept the help of any or 
of all. It 
2 
In the autumn of 1936 a statement entitled the Liberal Party 
and a Popular Front was submitted to the Party Executive. This met 
to consider the proposals and rejected them out of hand. A manifesto 
was issued indicating that a popular front involved an agreement 
between the progressive parties on a programmeq domestic as well as 
international, and an electoral bargain whereby they undertake to get 
out of each other's way in the constituencies. As Labour was not 
willing to suspend its efforts to realise its socialist aims for the 
time being, and concentrate on an agreed programme of practical reform, 
any basis of agreement was gone. Furthermoret any electoral bargain 
1 Liberal Magazine, January, 1937- 
2 New Outlook, April, 1937- 
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between the party headquarters whereby rival candidates undertook 
to get out of each other's way would break down in the constituencies. 
"Liberals", the statement announced, "are not prepared to accept 
dictation and in most of the constituencies where they have a 
candidate they would insist on fighting, knowing that withdrawal 
would mean the destruction of their organisatioa. ft While admitting 
the danger of war, the solution$ the Executive felt, was a "new 
Liberal Party, attracting to its banner the millions who seek 
peace and progress 
... 
the typically British means of averting 
the dangers of war". 
1 
Not to be fobbed off by the Executive the popular front 
enthusiasts took their case to the party conference. The 1937 
Assembly, which was the first general meeting of the party under 
the new constitution, met at Buxton at the end of May. A resolution, 
in effect welcoming the popular front% survived the chairman's axe 
at a time when only 200 delegates were left in the hall. It was 
eventually thrown out but the majority was surprisingly narrow, 2 
Within a year with the international situation going from bad to 
worse$ Richard Acland, overriding the objection of the Party leaders, 
managed to persuade the rank and file at the Assembly to reverse 
the Buxton decision. 
The demand for the widest possible coalition of anti-fascist, 
anti-Government forces, with the object of evicting Chamberlain from 
office and installing a Government that would stand up to the 
aggressor nations, gathered support during the winter of 1937-8- 
Eden's resignation in February, 1938, followed by the annexation 
of Austria, and the force of events in Spain strengthened this 
Liberal Magazine, February, 1937. 
The Times, 31 may, 1937- 
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movement. It was, however, an agitation without a definite Organising 
centre, unlike the united front movement of the previous year. 
Reynolds News, the paper of the Co-operative Movement, took up the 
appeal, advocating a "United Peace Alliance" based on the Labour 
and Co-operative movements but including those Liberals and even 
those Tories who were critical of Chamberlain and accepted the need 
for collective security. The Liberal newspapers, the News Chronicle 
and the Manchester Guardian, disregarding the outlook of the Liberal 
machine, also took up the demand on much the same basis. Meanwhile, 
a number of local popular fronts made their appearance, composed 
mainly of the more radical Liberals, independent-minded Labourites, 
supporters of the League of Nations Union, and other non-party bodies. 
At the Easter Conference of the Co-operative Party a resolution 
in favour of a peace alliance was carried, although by a narrow 
majority. Two Labour and Co-operative MPs had been prominent in the 
carrying of the resolution: AJ Barnes, the Chairman of the Co-operative 
Party, and the Reverend GS Woods. Due to the Closeness of the vote 
the National Committee of the Co-operative Party delayed approaching 
the Labour Party with the embarrassing preposition with which it had 
been landed, and referred the matter to the Co-operative Congress, 
meeting at Whitsun. In fact the Labour Executive had already issued 
a manifesto against the peace alliance, which it regarded as tending 
to the "weakening of Party policy to accommodate other political 
demands". As this did not deter the growth of popular front 
sentiment within the party, the Executive issued another manifesto, 
The Labour Party and the Popular Front. The basic theme was that 
this new combination would be weaker electorally than the Labour 
Party fighting alone. Nevertheless the Executive did not offer 
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absolutely unqualified hostility to the popular front movement under 
all possible circumstances-' It argued that the case might be altered 
were there any evidence of an internal crisis in the Conservative 
Party. t1A new situation might arise, of course, if any considerable 
number of MPs now supporting the Government were to rebel against 
the Prime Minister's authorityN As to other suggested participants 
in such a combination, the Communists would be an "electoral 
liability rather than an asset, by driving millions into Mr Chamberlain's 
camp", while there was no direct evidence that the Liberals would 
"Join the proposed combination as a body; and there is some evidence 
to the contrary". In any caseq the manifesto argued, there was no 
certainty that the Liberal electorate would follow the advice of the 
Liberal leaders, should they decide in favour of the fronto 
The Liberal Assembly at Both, in May, went some way towards 
undermining the case set out in Labour Party and the Popular Fronto 
Acland moved a resolution which read: 
"That, whil8t scrupulously safeguarding the independence 
of our party position, this Assembly is prepared to give 
assistance to and receive assistance from any individuals 
any group, or any organisation which is prepared to receive 
assistance from, and give assistance to the Liberal Party 
Several members of the Executive Committeet including Crippat Pritts 
Wilkinson, and Laskit were known to favour the alliancet and Cripps, 
in the summer of 1938, had submitted a popular front proposal to 
the National Executive Committee but only received the support of 
the aforementioned members, Since the time when Cripps had helped 
launch the Socialist League, on all international questions he had 
taken his stand on the need for fiChting the class enemy in one's 
own countryt refusing all associations with Liberals and Tories. 
Now that the policies of Chamberlain had helped to create so 
ominous a situation he was convinced that all opposition elements 
must combine to force the Government's resignation and replace 
it with a popular front government. 
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in order to put into operation the Foreign Policy adopted 
by this Assembly, and in order to achieve in the immediate 
future, a programme of domestic reform which is not 
inconsistent with the policy of the Liberal Party. " 
Acland freely admitted that the resolution marked a change in out- 
look from the General Election, when the party had determined against 
political flirtation of any kind. Yet the needs of the international 
situation required that the Liberal Party, while preserving its 
essential independenceg should make itself a rallying point for 
a popular front movement. 
He went on to frankly state that as yet there was no certainty 
that any substantial number of Conservatives would break away from 
the present Government. Neither was there any indication that the 
Labour Party machine had ceased hunting around for signs of the 
possibility of a purely party victory. Neverthelessl Acland 
envisaged, in the immediate future, all people who believed in 
collective security, from the extreme Left to the Churchillian 
realists in the Conservative Party, and even a few I'Simonites 
if they knew it was going to win'll joining a mighty army that 
would sweep Chamberlain into oblivion. 
Acland's speech revealed that the advocates of the popular 
front did not envisage the problem merely in electoral terms. 
Even before the Government saw fit to dissolve Parliament, it was 
hoped that pressure in the Houseq leading to defections from the 
Government ranks, combined with a ferment of opinion in the country 
would divert British policy from its dangerous course and at beat 
topple the Chamberlain administration. The front, then was designed 
1 Liberal Magazines June, 1938. 
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to stop the Chamberlain Government's course, if possible, before an 
election, but should that fail it would reap its rewards, once the 
Prime Minister went to the country, by mobilising the electors against 
fascism and the policy of appeasement. 
Behind the scenes the Liberal leader, Sinclair, expressed his 
misgivings over the policy change. In an interview with Lord Cecil 
he explained that the Liberal Party aimed at being a National Party 
and that, therefore, it had a large number of candidates all over the 
country, and it would be a blow to these if all but 40 or 50 of 
them were withdrawn. Moreover, those on the Right-wing of the 
Liberal Party would resent very bitterly any agreement with the 
Socialists and it would probably mean considerable aeceasions before 
any agreement was reached. Putting the Liberal interest to one side 
0 
he expressed doubt whether lAbour would consent to any arrangement, 
"since it would hamper them in their attitude towards the Communistalle 
Furthermore, there was the "supreme difficulty" that there was no 
outstanding personality to be a leader of such a combination. The 
IAbour Party had no magnetic leader, nor was there anyone anywhere 
else in the Liberal or lAbour ranks". The situation, Sinclair 
concluded, might be different "if Eden came out" and lead a popular 
movement against the Government's foreign policyl it being "relatively 
easy to make a combination of all the parties under himN 
2 
The popular front movements having received considerable 
impetus from the passing of Aciand's resolution, suffered a serious 
blow within a month of the Bath Assembly* A resolution in favour of 
the United Peace Alliance, though sponsored by the Co-operative 
Undoubtedly a factor in Labour's opposition to a popular front, 
Bitter internal dissension was inevitable if the leadership 
advocated an alliance with the Liberals etc having persistently 
refused co-operation with the Communists. 
2 
Note of an interview with Sinclair, 28 July, 19389 Cecil Papers, 5180. 
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Party, was defeated by over 2 million votes at the Annual Co-operative 
Congress. This did not end the movement; but it was reduced to a 
series of local actions, including the famous Oxford and Bridgwater 
by-elections. The following year, howeverg saw a revival of the 
popular front agitation in a new formq this time under the leader- 
ship of Cripps. 
What must be kept in mind if the motives of those who backed the 
popular front activities are to be understood is the overwhelming 
concern with events abroad, in particular Spain. The necessities of 
the international situation required the immediate subordination 
of differences in ideology and policy. "We do not know", said 
Acland at the Bath Assembly, "whether we will not be dead in war 
before the date of our next meeting. This fact reduces tb relative 
unimportance many things which, if it were not true, would be of 
the highest possible importance. " 
1 Similarly, Bevan underlined the 
urgency for the front: 
I'If the Government remains in office another two or 
three years we shall rue in blood and tears that we did not 
take action earlier. The country is faced with two 
alternatives 
- 
the establishment of the Popular Front in 
this country, under the leadership of the IAbour Party or 
drift to disaster under the National Government. " 
2 
112» 
Z 
1 Liberal Magazine, June, 1938. 
2 From a speech to a May Day demonstration at Pontypooll in 1938. 
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